Dexter v. Phillips

121 Mass. 178, 1876 Mass. LEXIS 325
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedOctober 19, 1876
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 121 Mass. 178 (Dexter v. Phillips) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dexter v. Phillips, 121 Mass. 178, 1876 Mass. LEXIS 325 (Mass. 1876).

Opinion

Gray, C. J.

It is a general rule of the common law, followed in chancery, that sums of money, payable periodically at fixed times, are not apportionable during the intervening periods.

It is accordingly well settled, both at law and in equity, except when otherwise provided by statute, that a contract for the payment of rent at the end of each quarter or month is not apportionable in respect of time. Sohier v. Eldredge, 103 Mass. 345. Clun's case, 10 Rep. 127 a, 128 a. Jenner v. Morgan, 1 P. Wms. 392. In re Markby, 4 Myl. & Cr. 484. Browne v. Amyot, 3 Hare, 173. Beer v. Beer, 12 C. B. 60. In re Clulow, 3 Kay & Johns. 689. The opposing decision on this point in Foote, appellant, 22 Pick. 299, appears to have been made without much consideration or reference to authorities, and is in effect overruled by Sohier v. Eldredge, ubi supra.

So dividends on shares in corporations or joint stock companies are not apportionable, unless expressly so directed by statute, or by the instrument under which the question arises. Foote, appellant, 22 Pick. 299. Granger v. Bassett, 98 Mass. 462. Clive v. Clive, Kay, 600. In re Maxwell's trusts, 1 Hem. & Mil. 610. Although the uncertainty whether the dividend will be declared on a particular day, and the impracticability of ascertaining how much of it has been earned at any earlier time, have been mentioned in some of the cases as reasons for this conclusion, they are not the principal grounds on which it rests; for the rule has been held equally applicable to cases where there was no such contingency.

Thus annuities, except where clearly intended for the daily support of the beneficiary, as in the case of a child or of the separate maintenance of a wife, are within the rule. Wiggin v. Swett, 6 Met. 194. Hay v. Palmer, 2 P. Wms. 501. Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atk. 330, 336. Howell v. Hanforth, 2 W. Bl. 1016. Anderson v. Dwyer, 1 Sch. & Lef. 301. Franks v. Noble, 12 Ves. 484. The Queen v. Treasury Commissioners, 16 Q. B. 357. Leathley v. Trench, 8 Irish Ch. 401.

The rule has always been held in England to apply to is vestments in the public funds. It was applied by Lord Haidwicke to the South Sea Annuities, even where the debt, by the terms of the settlement, had originally been secured upon a mortgage, the interest upon which would have been apportionable, and had [181]*181been transferred to government securities by order of the court; or where the money was directed to be laid out in land, and in the mean time to be invested in government securities, the interest and dividends to go in the same way that the rents and profits would, and the rents, if it had been actually invested in land, would have been apportionable under St. 11 Geo. II. c. 19, § 15. Pearly v. Smith, 3 Atk. 260. Sherrard v. Sherrard, 3 Atk. 502. Wilson v. Harman, 2 Ves. Sen. 672; S. C. Ambl. 279. And it has been uniformly applied to the three per cent, bank annuities or consols. Rashleigh v. Master, 3 Bro. Ch. 99. Mich-ell v. Michell, 4 Beav. 549. Campbell v. Campbell, 7 Beav. 482. In re Longworth's estate, 1 Kay & Johns. 1. O'Brien v. Fitzgerald, 1 Irish Ch. 290. In each of those cases, the interest of the holder was a perpetual annuity, at a fixed rate of interest, subject to redemption by the government by payment of the principal sum upon which the interest was computed. St. 6 Geo. II. c. 28. Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 440, 444. Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 748, 751. Wildman v. Wildman, 9 Ves. 174, 177.

So the half-yearly interest on a share in a loan of the East India Company, redeemable after a certain period at the option of the company, but of which the holder could not demand payment, was held by Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce not to be apportionable between tenant for life and remainderman; although it had been taken as a substitute for a debt of the company, secured by its promissory note bearing .interest; and although the stock certificate described the new loan as a debt, and, under the condition for redemption, the last payment might have to be for an apportioned part of the half-yearly interest. Warden v. Ashburner, 2 De G. & Sm. 366.

The same rule was applied by this court in Sargent v. Sargent, 103 Mass. 297, to coupons for interest on bonds of the United States; and upon reconsideration of the question, with the aid of the able argument for the remaindermen in the present case, we see no reason to doubt the correctness of that decision.

It is contended by the learned counsel that the interest on such bonds falls within the rule that interest on money is apportionable, though payable half-yearly or at other stated times.

That is doubtless the rule with regard to interest upon a debt, the principal of which is already due and payable, and in an ac[182]*182tian upon which the creditor might recover interest for the detention of his money if no days of payment of interest had been fixed; and even if the debt is secured by bond or mortgage. Foote, appellant, 22 Pick. 299. Edwards v. Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 171, 176 S. C.1 Bro. P. C. (2d ed.) 207. Banner v. Lowe, 13 Ves. 135. The reason for this was stated by Lord Hardwicke, in the cases already cited, to be “ because there interest accrues every day for forbearance of the principal,” and the “ mortgagee may call in his money when he will.” 3 Atk. 261. 2 Ves. Sen. 673.

The reason assigned in Foote, appellant, 22 Pick. 299, 305, that “ the acquisition is uniform and certain, and capable of an exact apportionment for any definite periods of time, whether great or small,” cannot be relied on; for the same reason would be equally applicable, and, as we have seen, was in that case erroneously applied to rents.

The cases, cited for the remaindermen, of Johnston v. Moore, 27 L. J. Ch. 453, and Ibbotson v. Elam, L. R. 1 Eq. 188, depended upon the terms of partnership agreements to pay interest upon the amount of capital contributed by each partner.

Only two other cases have been cited, in which the interest was apportioned, when the principal debt was not already due and payable.

The one is Sweigart v. Frey, 8 S. & R. 299, in which land, devised to a widow for life, with directions to executors to sell it at her death and divide the proceeds of sale equally among the testator’s children, was sold by agreement of all parties in her lifetime, and the purchaser expressly agreed to pay the purchase money to the heirs at her death and to pay interest thereon annually to her during her life. The decision, in favor of the apportionment of the interest during the year in which she died, rests either on the express agreement of the parties, or on a somewhat doubtful analogy to the cases, already mentioned, of provisions for the support of children or for the separate maintenance of a wife. See Wiggin v. Swett, 6 Met. 194, and other cases above cited; Gheen v. Osborn, 17 S. & R. 171; Tracy v. Strong, 2 Conn. 659 ; Manning v. Randolph, 1 Southard, 144.

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