Dewese v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company

295 So. 2d 574
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 13, 1974
Docket4529
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 295 So. 2d 574 (Dewese v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dewese v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 295 So. 2d 574 (La. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

295 So.2d 574 (1974)

Jennifer Suzette DEWESE, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4529.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

May 24, 1974.
Rehearing Denied June 26, 1974.
Writ Refused September 13, 1974.

Welton P. Mouton, Jr., Lafayette, for defendant-appellant.

Domengeaux & Wright by Bob F. Wright, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before CULPEPPER, MILLER and WATSON, JJ.

*575 WATSON, Judge.

Plaintiff, Jennifer Suzette DeWese, was a guest passenger in a Chevrolet automobile driven by Donald J. Adair, and filed this suit to recover damages for injuries she received in an accident on June 25, 1970, when the automobile ran off the road. The trial court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, the liability insurer of the automobile, in the amount of $76,712.85.

The primary defense urged by defendant at the trial was that Miss DeWese was contributorily negligent and/or had assumed the risk of driving with Mr. Adair because of his intoxicated condition. The trial court found as a fact that Mr. Adair "... was not intoxicated to the point of not being able to drive a vehicle in a prudent manner." (TR. 177). Although Mr. Adair apparently fell asleep at the wheel of the automobile, this fact was attributed to lack of sleep during the preceding day rather than to drunkenness. Thus, the trial court found as a fact that Miss DeWese was not contributorily negligent and allowed her to recover.

The trial court found that plaintiff sustained "... a compression fracture of D-12 vertebrae as well as a resultant Schmorl's Node ..." (TR. 180) and awarded the sum of $35,000.00 for this injury. Dr. Marvin F. Miller, a psychiatrist, testified that plaintiff suffered a depressive reaction as a result of the accident which causes her to fear riding in automobiles and the court gave $2,500.00 for this condition. An award of $10,000.00 was made for plaintiff's pain and suffering. Plaintiff is a physical education teacher and was awarded $9,450.00 for loss of income. On the basis of testimony that plaintiff is now unable to pursue her profession as a physical education instructor, the court awarded plaintiff $17,400.00 for loss of future income. She was also awarded $450.00 for the psychiatric treatment needed for her depressive reaction, $1,359.94 for hospital bills, and $552.91 for other incidental expenses occasioned by the accident.

Defendant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, has appealed from the adverse judgment of the trial court. Defendant's counsel, in brief, has made two assignments of error on the part of the trial court as follows:

"1. The trial court committed manifest error in failing to take into consideration the obvious intoxication of the driver and the fact that the guest passenger knew or should have known of the driver's intoxication to an extent that she was guilty of independent negligence and assumed all of the risks involved.
"2. Alternatively, the award made by the trial court judge to plaintiff was manifestly erroneous and grossly in excess of previous awards for similar injuries."

Contributory negligence is, of course, an affirmative defense which must be proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Cavalier v. City of New Orleans, 273 So.2d 303 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1973); writ refused, La., 275 So.2d 781 (1973). The existence of contributory negligence is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Odom v. Hooper, La., 273 So.2d 510 (1973).

The doctrine of assumption of risk urged by defendant was defined by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971), as follows:

"Usually, the assumption of risk doctrine will apply where the nature of the relationship of the parties appears to exact consent from the one injured to be exposed to possible harm. In such situations the plaintiff understands the risk involved and accepts the risk as well as the inherent possibility of damage because of the risk. There is some authority for rejecting assumption of risk in *576 cases which do not involve negligence, but the majority view is that assumption of risk is a defense to strict liability. A plaintiff who with full knowledge and appreciation of the danger voluntarily exposes himself to the risks and embraces the danger cannot recover damages for injury which may occur." 249 So.2d 140

Assumption of risk is also an affirmative defense which must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, supra.

As to the second assignment of error there is no question as to the "much discretion" given the trier of fact in assessment of damages.

Our review of the evidence, as set forth hereinafter, shows no manifest error on the part of the trial court in deciding the factual questions presented and the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Sergeant Frank Guidry of the Louisiana State Police testified that he had been an employee of the State Police for 14 years and investigated the accident in question. He received notice of the accident at approximately 12:50 A.M. and proceeded to the scene which was near the Judice community in Lafayette Parish or about one and six-tenths of a mile from the intersection of Highways 724 and 342. When he arrived at the scene, he found that a 1970 Chevrolet had been traveling south on the blacktop road; had failed to negotiate a very sharp curve or turn; had struck an embankment on the south side of the blacktop and entered a pasture. The car was approximately 50 or 60 feet into the pasture and the occupants were in an ambulance leaving the scene. The car was completely demolished. Sergeant Guidry then proceeded to the hospital and arrived there approximately two hours after the accident. At the hospital he talked to Jennifer Suzette DeWese and the operator of the automobile, Donald J. Adair. Sergeant Guidry testified that Mr. Adair stated he was not familiar with the area and hadn't seen any sign of the curve. He smelled of intoxicants and said that he had had a couple of drinks but was very prompt in his answers to the questions and spoke clearly. His answers were coherent and his attitude was cooperative. His speech was good. No blood alcohol content test was administered. Sergeant Guidry testified that a glass he found in the car smelled of alcohol. He stated that Miss DeWese was vomiting and complaining of pain in her back when he saw her but seemed perfectly sober.

Donald J. Adair testified that he is now married to plaintiff, Suzette DeWese; that they were married August 21, 1971; that he is now 26 years of age; that he was driving the Chevrolet automobile on the night in question; that it was a company car leased by his employer, Darrel DeMoss Photographers, but that there were no restrictions on his use of the automobile. He stated that he had gotten up at 4:00 A.M. on the morning of the accident and arrived in Lafayette at approximately 3:30 P.M. He then got together with some friends, Barbie and Allen Neighbors, and went with them to the apartment of Don Hinners. They had a couple of beers and then went to a pizza and poorboy place on Pinhook Drive where they ate. Miss DeWese was called from the eating place by Mrs. Neighbors and then he talked to her. They picked her up at her home in the Neighbors' automobile between 9 and 9:30 P.M. After picking up Miss DeWese, Mr. and Mrs. Neighbors drove Mr. Adair and Miss DeWese back to the pizza place where they picked up Mr.

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