Devin Forrest, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MAV KG, LLC, a limited liability company, and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: September 29, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00257
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEVIN FORREST, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 12 No. 2:25-cv-00257-TLN-JDP Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 ORDER MAV KG, LLC, a limited liability 15 company, and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendant MAV KG, LLC’s (“Defendant”) Motion to 19 Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 5) and Motion to Amend (ECF No. 19). Also before the Court is 20 Plaintiff Devin Forrest’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 8.) All motions are fully 21 briefed. (ECF Nos. 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES 22 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8), DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 23 19) as moot, and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 5). 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed this putative wage and hour class action against 3 Defendant — his former employer — in Placer County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1-4 at 5–29.) 4 Defendant removed the action to this Court on January 21, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) On February 18, 5 2025, Defendant moved to compel Plaintiff’s claims to arbitration. (ECF No. 5.) On February 6 29, 2025, Plaintiff moved to remand the action to Placer County Superior Court. (ECF No. 8.) 7 On March 31, 2025, Defendant moved to amend its Notice of Removal. (ECF No. 19.) 8 II. MOTION TO REMAND 9 A. Standard of Law 10 A civil action brought in state court, over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 11 may be removed by the defendant to federal court in the judicial district and division in which the 12 state court action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The district court has original jurisdiction 13 over civil actions between citizens of different states in which the alleged damages exceed 14 $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 15 proving diversity. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Resnik v. La Paz Guest 16 Ranch, 289 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1961)). Removal statutes are to be strictly construed against 17 removal. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds in 18 Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87–89 (2014). 19 The amount in controversy is determined by reference to the complaint itself and includes 20 the amount of damages in dispute, as well as attorney’s fees, if authorized by statute or contract. 21 Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005). Where the complaint does not 22 pray for damages in a specific amount, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the 23 evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 24 Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 25 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996)). If the amount is not facially apparent from the complaint, the Court 26 may “require parties to submit summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in 27 controversy at the time of removal.” Id. (citing Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 28 1335–36 (5th Cir. 1995). 1 B. Analysis 2 Plaintiff argues this action should be remanded because: (1) Defendant has failed to 3 establish the amount in controversy in this action exceeds $75,000,1 and (2) Defendant 4 improperly reserved its right to remove the action based on the Class Action Fairness Act 5 (“CAFA”). (ECF No. 8-1.) Plaintiff also argues attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded 6 based on Defendant’s “objectively unreasonable removal.” (Id. at 13.) The Court addresses the 7 arguments in turn. 8 i. Amount in Controversy 9 Plaintiff contends Defendant relies on speculative and unsupported assumptions regarding 10 attorneys’ fees to fabricate an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2.) 11 Specifically, Plaintiff argues Defendant assumes, without evidence, attorneys’ fees will be 12 $150,000. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff contends Defendant’s estimate as to the amount of hours it will 13 take to litigate Plaintiff’s claim is conclusory and unsupported by an explanation or evidence. (Id. 14 at 8.) Further, Plaintiff contends Defendant’s estimate as to the amount of hours it will take to 15 litigate Plaintiff’s claim includes work that would be conducted on behalf of the putative class. 16 (Id. at 9.) Finally, Plaintiff argues Defendant’s estimate of attorneys’ fees attributable to 17 Plaintiff’s claims is incorrect because the estimated attorneys’ fees must be distributed on a pro 18 rata basis amongst the named plaintiff and all putative class members.2 (Id. (citing Magee v. 19 Iconix Waterworks (US) Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00840-KJM-DB, 2020 WL 4188607, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 20 1 The Court notes the parties do not dispute that diversity of citizenship exists. (See 21 generally ECF Nos. 8-1, 13, 17.)

22 2 Plaintiff also argues the attorney’s hourly rate used to calculate the amount in controversy 23 should not apply because: (1) the attorney whose hourly rate was used, Justin Marquez (“Marquez”), is no longer with the firm and (2) the rate applied to a complex class action. (ECF 24 No. 8-1 at 8.) The Court finds both that these arguments are unpersuasive and they do not warrant lengthy discussion. First, at the time of removal, Marquez was counsel of record and 25 signed Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF No. 1-4 at 61.) Thus, Defendant appropriately used his hourly rate to calculate the amount in controversy. As to Plaintiff’s second argument, Plaintiff 26 provides no evidence that Marquez would have used a different, lower hourly rate to litigate 27 Plaintiff’s individual wage and hour claim. Accordingly, the Court declines to further consider Plaintiff’s underdeveloped argument. 28 1 2020)).) 2 In opposition, Defendant maintains it properly calculated Plaintiff’s individual share of 3 attorneys’ fees for the amount in controversy.3 (ECF No. 13 at 8.) Specifically, Defendant 4 argues: Plaintiff filed an individual case; it provided evidence in support of its calculation of 5 attorneys’ fees in the form of a declaration under oath and Plaintiff has failed to submit any 6 evidence in support of its contention that a different amount of attorneys’ fees is reasonable; and 7 disaggregation of the estimated attorneys’ fees is inapplicable because Defendant’s removal is 8 based on Plaintiff’s likely damages in his individual wage and hour claims. (Id. at 11–24.) 9 Upon review of Defendant’s Notice of Removal and the evidence submitted in support of 10 its opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, the Court finds Defendant has sufficiently 11 established the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Evidence establishing the amount is 12 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the 13 defendant’s allegations in its notice of removal. See Owens, 574 U.S. at 89. Here, Defendant 14 cites to wage and hour cases asserting individual claims in which courts have recognized an 15 attorney typically spends far more than 100 hours on such cases and others in which courts 16 awarded attorneys’ fees exceeding $100,000. (ECF No. 1 at 20.) Furthermore, Defendant 17 18 3 Defendant also contends Plaintiff violated the Court’s Civil Standing Order by filing his Motion to Remand without raising either of his arguments during the meet and confer process. 19 (ECF No. 13 at 10.) In response, Plaintiff does not directly contradict Defendant’s argument and instead argues he sufficiently attempted to meet and confer. (ECF No. 17 at 2–3.) The Court 20 finds Plaintiff did not meaningfully meet and confer prior to filing his motion, which indeed violates the Court’s Civil Standing Order. While troubled by Plaintiff’s lack of transparency, the 21 Court exercises its discretion to proceed and address Plaintiff’s motion on the merits. The parties are warned that any future failure to meet and confer could lead to the Court striking the motion 22 in its entirety. 23 Defendant further argues Plaintiff agreed to binding arbitration of any disputes arising out 24 of Plaintiff’s employment on an individual basis. (ECF No. 13 at 12.) The Court addresses this argument below when discussing Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. 25

The Court also notes both parties violated the Court’s Civil Standing Order by failing to 26 adhere to the page limits set by the Court. While the Court reaches the merits of the parties’ 27 motions in its discretion and for judicial efficiency, the parties are warned any future violations could lead to the Court striking the motions entirely. 28 1 provides an estimate of time it would take for the various tasks necessary for Plaintiff to prepare 2 for and litigate his case on an individual basis and projects the amount of attorneys’ fees for such 3 tasks to amount to over $190,000. (ECF No. 13 at 17.) The various tasks include: fact 4 investigation and drafting the complaint; drafting a remand motion and reply thereto; drafting an 5 opposition to a motion to compel arbitration; conducting written discovery and document review 6 for Plaintiff’s individual claims; preparing Plaintiff for and defending his deposition; preparing 7 for and taking the deposition of Defendant’s person most knowledgeable as to Plaintiff’s 8 individual claims; preparing for and taking the deposition of Plaintiff’s supervisor; opposing 9 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and preparing for and appearing at the trial for 10 Plaintiff’s individual claims. (Id. at 17–18.) Plaintiff does not argue, and the Court does not find, 11 Defendant’s estimates are unreasonable. 12 Further, the Court finds Plaintiff’s reliance on Magee misplaced. In Magee, the court 13 found the defendant’s attribution of half of the total estimate of class-wide attorneys’ fees to 14 plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees was improper. 2020 WL 4188607, at *2. Here, in calculating its 15 amount in controversy, Defendant has not allocated any of the attorneys’ fees to litigating the 16 entire putative class action. Instead, Defendant’s removal is based on Plaintiff’s likely damages 17 on his individual wage and hour claims and his likely attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating those 18 claims. (ECF No. 13 at 17–18.) In that way, Magee is distinguishable. 19 Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant has sufficiently established the amount in 20 controversy exceeds $75,000. 21 ii. CAFA 22 Plaintiff contends Defendant’s attempt to “reserve” the right to invoke jurisdiction under 23 CAFA is procedurally improper and legally insufficient. (ECF No. 17 at 7–9.) In opposition, 24 Defendant argues this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA and provides facts to support 25 removal under such. (Id. at 24.) Defendant also filed a motion for leave to file an amended 26 notice of removal to cure the jurisdictional allegations that Plaintiff contends are defective. (ECF 27 No. 19-1.) 28 Because the Court concludes Defendant has sufficiently established the amount in 1 controversy exceeds $75,000 — and therefore, has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 — 2 the Court does not address whether Defendant improperly reserved its right to remove the action 3 based on CAFA. 4 In sum, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and Plaintiff’s request for 5 attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No. 8.) Because the Court need not reach Defendant’s Motion to 6 Amend (ECF No. 19), the Court DENIES said motion as moot. 7 III. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 8 A. Standard of Law 9 “[T]he federal law of arbitrability under the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) governs the 10 allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators.” Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 11 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008). There is an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute 12 resolution.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985). As 13 such, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 14 arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an 15 allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone 16 Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)). 17 Generally, in deciding whether a dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement, the Court 18 must determine: “(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the 19 agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 20 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court’s role “is limited to determining arbitrability and 21 enforcing agreements to arbitrate, leaving the merits of the claim and any defenses to the 22 arbitrator.” Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 478 (9th Cir. 1991). 23 “In determining the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the district court looks to 24 ‘general state-law principles of contract interpretation, while giving due regard to the federal 25 policy in favor of arbitration.’” Botorff v. Amerco, No. 2:12-cv-01286-MCE-EFB, 2012 WL 26 6628952, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012) (quoting Wagner v. Stratton, 83 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th 27 Cir. 1996)). An arbitration agreement may only “be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract 28 defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to 1 arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” 2 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339(2011) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. v. 3 Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). Therefore, courts may not apply traditional contractual 4 defenses, such as unconscionability and duress, in a broader or more stringent manner to 5 invalidate arbitration agreements and thereby undermine FAA’s “principal purpose” to “ensure 6 that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” Id. at 1748 (quoting 7 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 8 B. Analysis 9 Defendant argues Plaintiff is contractually bound by an arbitration agreement containing a 10 class action waiver and requiring final and binding arbitration of any claims related to Plaintiff’s 11 employment on an individual basis (“the Agreement”). (ECF No. 5-1.) 12 In opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant is not a named party or signatory to the 13 Agreement and thus, cannot enforce it.4 (ECF No. 12 at 4–5.) Plaintiff further contends 14 Defendant is not a third-party beneficiary to the Agreement either. (Id. at 5.) Specifically, 15 Plaintiff argues: (1) the Agreement explicitly defines who it is intended to benefit and apply to 16 and does not include Defendant in any way; (2) Defendant cannot show that a “motivating 17 purpose” of the Agreement was to provide a benefit to it; and (3) allowing Defendant to enforce 18 the Agreement would contradict the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.5 (Id. at 5– 19 8.) 20 In reply, Defendant contends as of January 1, 2024 — the effective date of the 21 Management Services Agreement — all employees of Maverick, Inc. became employees of 22 4 Plaintiff also argues Defendant has not adequately shown Plaintiff signed the Agreement. 23 (ECF No. 12 at 8–11.) Because the Court concludes Defendant is not a named party or signatory to the Agreement and thus cannot enforce the Agreement, the Court does not address this 24 argument.

25 5 Although Defendant argues the Agreement has a delegation provision, “California case law is clear that ‘an arbitrator has no power to determine the rights and obligations of one who is 26 not a party to the arbitration agreement. The question of whether a nonsignatory is a party to an 27 arbitration agreement is one for the trial court in the first instance.’” Benaroya v. Willis, 23 Cal. App. 5th 462, 269 (2018). 28 1 Defendant. (ECF No. 15 at 7.) Defendant further contends, because Plaintiff enjoyed the benefits 2 of being employed with Defendant, he cannot now evade his contractual obligations to arbitrate 3 his claims against his employer under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (Id. at 8.) Finally, 4 Defendant argues it can enforce the Agreement as a third-party beneficiary because Defendant’s 5 relationship with Maverick, Inc. includes being an affiliate, a successor, an assignee, and an 6 agent.6 (Id. at 9.) 7 “A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as 8 it existed at the time of contracting[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 1636. The mutual intention of the 9 parties is determined “‘from the written terms [of the contract] alone,’ so long as the ‘contract 10 language is clear and explicit and does not lead to absurd results.’” Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC, 11 977 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kashmiri v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 156 Cal. App. 12 4th 809 (2007)); Cal. Civ. Code § 1638 (“The language of a contract is to govern its 13 interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.”), 1639 14 (“When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the 15 writing alone, if possible[.]”). 16 Here, the Agreement is between Plaintiff and Maverick, Inc.— not Defendant. (ECF No. 17 5-3 at 14–18.) Thus, the Agreement binds Plaintiff only to disputes with Maverick, Inc. See 18 Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v. Beta Healthcare Grp., 197 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1153 19 (2011) (“As a general rule, only a party to an arbitration agreement may enforce it.”) The Court 20 is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument, which is unsupported by any authority, that Plaintiff is 21 obligated to arbitrate his claims against Defendant — despite not being named in the Agreement 22 — solely because Defendant is Plaintiff’s employer. 23 However, the Ninth Circuit has indicated there are a variety of ways that a non-signatory 24 may be bound by an arbitration agreement. Specifically, “non-signatories of arbitration

25 6 Defendant also argues it can enforce the Agreement because it is a joint employer of Plaintiff. However, the Agreement explicitly states “[n]othing herein shall be interpreted to (a) 26 suggest any particular entity or person is or will be [Plaintiff’s] employer or joint employer[.]” 27 (ECF No. 5-3 at 17.) Based on that language, the Court is not persuaded that, at the time of contracting, the mutual intention of the parties was to bind Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against 28 Defendant, even if Defendant is a joint employer. 1 agreements may be bound by the agreement under ordinary contract and agency principles.” 2 Comer v. Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Letizia v. Prudential Bache 3 Securities, Inc., 802 F.2d 1185, 1187–89 (9th Cir. 1986)). Among these principles are the 4 following: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veil piercing/alter ego; 5 and (5) estoppel. Id. Regarding estoppel, the Ninth Circuit has expressed that it “precludes a 6 party from claiming the benefits of a contract while simultaneously attempting to avoid the 7 burdens that contract imposes.” Id. 8 Defendant argues Plaintiff should be precluded from avoiding the burdens that the 9 Agreement imposes — arbitration of his claims — because Plaintiff enjoyed the benefits of being 10 employed by Defendant. (ECF No. 15 at 8.) However, Defendant has not put forward any 11 evidence to support its contention that the benefit of being employed with Defendant is a benefit 12 that derived from the instant Agreement. Rather, the Court discerns no benefit that Plaintiff is 13 attempting to claim from the Agreement. Thus, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does require 14 Plaintiff’s claims to be compelled to arbitration. 15 Finally, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument that it can enforce the Agreement 16 as a third-party beneficiary because Defendant’s relationship with Maverick, Inc. includes being 17 an affiliate, a successor, an assignee, and an agent. Defendant’s evidence purporting to 18 demonstrate its relationship with Maverick, Inc. falls short. Even if the Management Services 19 Agreement in fact transferred all employees from Maverick, Inc. to Defendant, Defendant offers 20 no authority to support its contention that the alleged transition conferred a right to enforce 21 Maverick Inc.’s Agreement. The Court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s point that if “Defendant truly 22 became the employer of Maverick, Inc.’s former employees, it would have ensured that its 23 employment agreements — including arbitration agreements — accurately reflected that change.” 24 (ECF No. 12 at 7.) Instead, the Management Services Agreement appears to be an agreement 25 whereby Defendant merely provides management services to Maverick, Inc. Thus, the 26 Management Services Agreement is insufficient for the Court to determine, at this juncture, that 27 Defendant is an affiliate, a successor, an assignee, or an agent of Maverick, Inc. Based on the 28 evidence before it, the Court finds Defendant is not a third-party beneficiary to the Agreement. 1 In sum, the Court finds Defendant was not a party or third-party beneficiary to the 2 Agreement and thus, cannot enforce it. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration 3 is DENIED. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8) is DENIED, 6 Defendant’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 19) is DENIED as moot, and Defendant’s Motion to 7 Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 5) is DENIED. 8 Date: September 26, 2025 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28