[221]*221RAKER, Judge.
In this case, we must decide whether home detention1 qualifies as “confinement in a correctional institution” under Maryland’s enhanced penalty statute directed at habitual criminal drug offenders. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Article 27, § 286(d)2 of the Controlled Dangerous Substances law, provides that a defendant who “has been convicted twice” of similar offenses under § 286(b)(1) or (b)(2) and has served a “term of confinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institution” is subject to a prison term of no less than twenty five years. We shall hold that a period of home detention does not meet the statutory requirement of confinement in a correctional institution and therefore, the sentence prescribed by § 286(d) may not be imposed where the requisite term of confinement was spent in home detention.
I.
On January 22, 2002, Prince George’s County police executed search and seizure warrants on the vehicle of Oscar Louis Deville and Apartment 303 at 6449 Hilmar Drive, in Forest-ville, Deville’s purported residence. In his bedroom, police found crack cocaine and related drug paraphernalia. Deville was subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine with [222]*222intent to distribute. The State sought application of the mandatory sentencing provisions of Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 286(d).3
Two prior convictions served as the State’s basis for seeking enhanced sentencing. The first occurred in 1990, when Deville pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. For this offense he was sentenced to incarceration for five years, all of which was suspended in favor of a thirty-six-month term of supervised probation. The second conviction occurred on February 18, 1999, when Deville was sentenced for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He was sentenced to ten years incarceration, all suspended except for eighteen months “house arrest thru AADC [Anne Arundel Detention Center] to begin on 2/22/1999,” with five years probation. Deville served his sentence under the County house arrest program, where he received day-for-day credit; he fully served nine months of this sentence in home detention and was subsequently released.
The State contended that house arrest or home detention was equivalent under the statute to time served in a correctional institution, and that Deville had therefore satisfied the required 180 days confinement under § 286(d). The trial judge agreed and sentenced Deville to imprisonment for 25 years without the possibility of parole. Deville noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and that Court affirmed, based largely on this Court’s holding in Dedo v. State, 343 Md. 2, 680 A.2d 464 (1996).
We granted Deville’s petition for writ of certiorari to consider whether time spent in home detention can fulfill the 180 days confinement in a correctional institution as required under § 286(d). We must determine whether home detention is the equivalent of confinement in a correctional facility under Maryland’s enhanced penalty statute for recidivist drug offenders. '
[223]*223II.
As we have so often stated, the chief objective of statutory construction is to discover and effectuate the actual intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. See Price v. State, 878 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). We begin with the plain language of the statute, and where the language of the statute is ambiguous, our task is to resolve that ambiguity, in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. See id. Ordinary and popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of terminology within legislation. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994).
Where the language of a statute is ambiguous or unclear, we examine legislative history, prior case law, and statutory purpose. See Melgar v. State, 355 Md. 339, 347, 734 A.2d 712, 716 (1999). A statute is ambiguous when there are two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. See Price, 378 Md. at 387, 835 A.2d at 1226. Ambiguous or equivocal statutory language requires us to consider not only the ordinary meaning of words, but also to interpret how that language relates to the overall meaning, setting, and purpose of an act. See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 436, 639 A.2d at 678. Therefore, when interpreting unclear language within a statute, we consider both the particular and broad objectives of the legislation, in addition to the overall purpose of the statutory scheme. See id. at 436, 639 A.2d at 678-79. In other words, we do not view the plain language in isolation, but analyze the entire statutory scheme as a whole. See Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 41, 641 A.2d 870, 880-81 (1994).
Enhanced penalty statutes are highly penal statutes and must be construed strictly in order to prevent punishment not contemplated by the Legislature. See Melgar, 355 Md. at 347-48, 734 A.2d at 716-17; Gargliano, 334 Md. at 437, 639 A.2d at 679; Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 172, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991); Jones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 38, [224]*224595 A.2d 463, 466 (1991). When there is doubt as to the Legislature’s intent regarding the application of an enhanced penalty, the rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity within criminal statutes be interpreted in favor of the defendant. See Melgar, 355 Md. at 347, 734 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted). See also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493, 497 (1971). We reiterated the rule in Melgar as follows:
“[A]n enhanced penalty statute, is highly penal and must be strictly construed so that the defendant is only subject to punishment contemplated by the statute. When doubt exists regarding the punishment imposed by a statute, the rule of lenity instructs that a court ‘not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’ ”
355 Md. at 347, 734 A.2d at 716-17 (citations omitted).
Applying these principles, we conclude that home detention cannot satisfy the predicate 180-day term of confinement in a correctional institution required by § 286(d). Rather, we hold that this requisite period of incarceration must be spent within a penal institution such as a jail, detention center or prison.4
III.
Section 286, the statute here at issue, provides in relevant part:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[221]*221RAKER, Judge.
In this case, we must decide whether home detention1 qualifies as “confinement in a correctional institution” under Maryland’s enhanced penalty statute directed at habitual criminal drug offenders. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Article 27, § 286(d)2 of the Controlled Dangerous Substances law, provides that a defendant who “has been convicted twice” of similar offenses under § 286(b)(1) or (b)(2) and has served a “term of confinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institution” is subject to a prison term of no less than twenty five years. We shall hold that a period of home detention does not meet the statutory requirement of confinement in a correctional institution and therefore, the sentence prescribed by § 286(d) may not be imposed where the requisite term of confinement was spent in home detention.
I.
On January 22, 2002, Prince George’s County police executed search and seizure warrants on the vehicle of Oscar Louis Deville and Apartment 303 at 6449 Hilmar Drive, in Forest-ville, Deville’s purported residence. In his bedroom, police found crack cocaine and related drug paraphernalia. Deville was subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine with [222]*222intent to distribute. The State sought application of the mandatory sentencing provisions of Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 286(d).3
Two prior convictions served as the State’s basis for seeking enhanced sentencing. The first occurred in 1990, when Deville pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. For this offense he was sentenced to incarceration for five years, all of which was suspended in favor of a thirty-six-month term of supervised probation. The second conviction occurred on February 18, 1999, when Deville was sentenced for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He was sentenced to ten years incarceration, all suspended except for eighteen months “house arrest thru AADC [Anne Arundel Detention Center] to begin on 2/22/1999,” with five years probation. Deville served his sentence under the County house arrest program, where he received day-for-day credit; he fully served nine months of this sentence in home detention and was subsequently released.
The State contended that house arrest or home detention was equivalent under the statute to time served in a correctional institution, and that Deville had therefore satisfied the required 180 days confinement under § 286(d). The trial judge agreed and sentenced Deville to imprisonment for 25 years without the possibility of parole. Deville noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and that Court affirmed, based largely on this Court’s holding in Dedo v. State, 343 Md. 2, 680 A.2d 464 (1996).
We granted Deville’s petition for writ of certiorari to consider whether time spent in home detention can fulfill the 180 days confinement in a correctional institution as required under § 286(d). We must determine whether home detention is the equivalent of confinement in a correctional facility under Maryland’s enhanced penalty statute for recidivist drug offenders. '
[223]*223II.
As we have so often stated, the chief objective of statutory construction is to discover and effectuate the actual intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. See Price v. State, 878 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). We begin with the plain language of the statute, and where the language of the statute is ambiguous, our task is to resolve that ambiguity, in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. See id. Ordinary and popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of terminology within legislation. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994).
Where the language of a statute is ambiguous or unclear, we examine legislative history, prior case law, and statutory purpose. See Melgar v. State, 355 Md. 339, 347, 734 A.2d 712, 716 (1999). A statute is ambiguous when there are two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. See Price, 378 Md. at 387, 835 A.2d at 1226. Ambiguous or equivocal statutory language requires us to consider not only the ordinary meaning of words, but also to interpret how that language relates to the overall meaning, setting, and purpose of an act. See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 436, 639 A.2d at 678. Therefore, when interpreting unclear language within a statute, we consider both the particular and broad objectives of the legislation, in addition to the overall purpose of the statutory scheme. See id. at 436, 639 A.2d at 678-79. In other words, we do not view the plain language in isolation, but analyze the entire statutory scheme as a whole. See Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 41, 641 A.2d 870, 880-81 (1994).
Enhanced penalty statutes are highly penal statutes and must be construed strictly in order to prevent punishment not contemplated by the Legislature. See Melgar, 355 Md. at 347-48, 734 A.2d at 716-17; Gargliano, 334 Md. at 437, 639 A.2d at 679; Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 172, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991); Jones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 38, [224]*224595 A.2d 463, 466 (1991). When there is doubt as to the Legislature’s intent regarding the application of an enhanced penalty, the rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity within criminal statutes be interpreted in favor of the defendant. See Melgar, 355 Md. at 347, 734 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted). See also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493, 497 (1971). We reiterated the rule in Melgar as follows:
“[A]n enhanced penalty statute, is highly penal and must be strictly construed so that the defendant is only subject to punishment contemplated by the statute. When doubt exists regarding the punishment imposed by a statute, the rule of lenity instructs that a court ‘not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.’ ”
355 Md. at 347, 734 A.2d at 716-17 (citations omitted).
Applying these principles, we conclude that home detention cannot satisfy the predicate 180-day term of confinement in a correctional institution required by § 286(d). Rather, we hold that this requisite period of incarceration must be spent within a penal institution such as a jail, detention center or prison.4
III.
Section 286, the statute here at issue, provides in relevant part:
“(d)(1) A person who is convicted under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section or of conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less than 25 years and subject to a fine not exceeding $100,000 if the person previously:
[225]*225(i) Has served at least 1 term of confinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a previous violation of this section or § 286A of this article; and
(ii) Has been convicted twice, where the convictions do not arise from a single incident:
1. Under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section;
2. Of conspiracy to violate subsection (b)(l) or subsection (b)(2) of this section;
3. Of an offense under the laws of another state, the District of Columbia, or the United States that would be a violation of subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section if committed in this State; or
4. Of any combination of these offenses.”
As we explained in Melgar, this mandatory penalty can be broken into three primary factors. First, the defendant must be convicted of either violating or conspiring to violate § 286(b)(1) or (b)(2). See Melgar, 355 Md. at 344, 734 A.2d at 714-15. Second, the defendant must have two prior § 286(b)(1) or (b)(2) convictions arising from separate incidents. See id. at 344, 734 A.2d at 715. Third, the defendant must have served a term of confinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institute as a result of a previous § 286 or § 286A conviction. See id. Petitioner challenges neither the first nor the second prong of this test; therefore we concern ourselves only with the examination of the third factor.
Commonly known as “Three Strikes” laws, statutes that mandate enhanced penalties for certain repeat criminal offenders exist in different forms in every state and in the federal government. See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 434, 639 A.2d at 677. Such statutes have a long history in the United States,5 but it [226]*226was during the 1990s that they became particularly popular throughout the country. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes:, Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 395, 400 (1997). Three strikes laws differ in a number of significant ways including, but not limited to, the number of requisite prior felonies, the nature of predicate prior and current offenses, the age of the past offense, and the length of the term of the prior sentence. Id. at 400-01, 639 A.2d 675. These requirements both limit and broaden the extent of recidivist mandatory sentencing.
Provisions requiring prior incarceration, as opposed to the predicate felony-conviction requirements, serve to limit the breadth of qualifiers under recidivist statutes. We have found a limited number of state habitual offender laws with this requirement; but where such limitations exist, they restrict the number of people that satisfy the definition of a recidivist offender. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 25 (2002); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2221(1) (1995). Several states, including California, specifically require no prior incarceration for a felony conviction to count as a strike. See Cal.Penal Code § 667(a)(2) (West 2004) (providing that “[tjhere is no requirement of prior incarceration or commitment for this subdivision to apply”). See also Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2) (2003 Supp.) (providing that “[i]t is immaterial that sentence was stayed, withheld or suspended, or that the actor was pardoned, unless such pardon was granted on the ground of innocence”). California’s Three Strikes law is considered by many as the most draconian of all habitual offender statutes, and it is clear that its legislation was meant to be as rigid and broad-sweeping as possible. See Vitiello, supra, at 396-97. By excluding requisite prior incarceration explicitly, the California legislature in effect emphasized the limiting consequence such a provision has on habitual offender statutes.
Maryland first codified and required enhanced penalties for repeat criminal drug offenders in 1982, with the enactment of § 286(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Although this legislation was limited to two-time offenders, it was the General Assembly’s initial attempt to respond to a disproportionately small num[227]*227ber of offenders who committed a great number of Maryland’s drug-related crimes. See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 439, 639 A.2d at 680. In 1988, § 286 was amended to provide greater penalties for an individual’s third and fourth criminal drug convictions. With the addition of § 286(d) and (e), and the recodification of § 286(b)(1) and (b)(2) as § 286(c), this legislation created a graduated mandatory penal system for repeat offenders. See id. at 440, 639 A.2d at 680. Subsection (d) specifically provided mandatory penalties for three-time offenders, and within this provision, § 286 required prior “confinement ... in a correctional institution” for the first time.
The State bases its argument on three main points. First, the State maintains that the ordinary and popular understanding of “confinement ... in a correctional institution” must include home detention. Second, the State contends that while the legislative history of § 286(d) fails to explain the meaning of “confinement ... in a correctional institution,” the Legislature’s intent to construe drug laws liberally,6 combined with the general goal of criminal drug laws to “turn the screw of the criminal machinery ... tighter and tighter,” Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 189, 567 A.2d 126, 129 (1989) (citations omitted), are together sufficient to prove that home detention was meant to be included within the phrase. Third, the State relies on our opinion in Dedo to determine that house arrest and home detention qualify as “confinement ... in a correctional institution,” for the purposes of § 286(d).
Petitioner relies largely on the same points of contention as the State, however, he uniformly comes to different conclusions. First, petitioner claims that “confinement ... in a correctional institution” cannot include home detention based on the ordinary and popular understanding of the phrase. [228]*228Second, he argues that despite scarce legislative history regarding § 286(d), the history of similar legislation, in addition to the need for strict construction of highly penal statutes, dictates that home detention cannot be included within the term “confinement ... in a correctional institution.” Third, petitioner states that Dedo’s interpretation of home detention cannot apply to § 286, because that case dealt with a different statute.
We begin with the plain language of § 286(d). The phrase “confinement ... in a correctional institution” has not been defined by the General Assembly. The State contends that home detention qualifies as “confinement ... in a correctional institution” under § 286(d) because “confinement” means the inability to leave a place, and while under house arrest a party is clearly confined. Petitioner argues that a house cannot be a “correctional institution,” and therefore home detention cannot qualify as “confinement ... in a correctional institution” under § 286(d).
Although there is some merit in both arguments, neither resolve the issue. While a person confined under home detention, or placed under house arrest, clearly is “confined,” the level of confinement is not equal to that of a person incarcerated within a prison, jail, detention center, or the like. Additionally, although a home is not a correctional institution in a traditional sense, it does serve to detain a party under house arrest. Therefore, because a reading of the statutory language does not answer the question before us, we move beyond the plain language of § 286(d) to interpret the meaning of “confinement ... in a correctional institution.”
Our review of the legislative history of § 286 is not much help. The legislative history contains no discussion regarding the reason for, or definition of, the term “confinement ... in a correctional institution.” What is clear is that this language was an amendment to the original version of the bill, and that the legislation passed only subsequent to its inclusion. See 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 439 at 3230, Amendments to House Bill No. 606, 3/17/88.7 Additionally, we know that the general [229]*229purpose of § 286 is to provide more stringent penalties to offenders that persist repeatedly in certain criminal drug activities. See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 442, 639 A.2d at 681. We cannot, however, determine whether the Legislature intended this Act to reach all individuals who commit multiple offenses or whether its purpose was to limit the statutory penalty to a narrower class of individuals who have not responded to prior punishment. See id. Regardless, it is clear that the legislative history of § 286 does not provide a satisfactory interpretation of “confinement ... in a correctional institution.”
Although the legislative history of § 286 fails to provide an actual definition of “confinement ... in a correctional institution,” the time period in which legislation passed offers assistance in this determination. As we have previously discussed, § 286 was not amended to include this language until 1988. The Legislature, however, did not enact home detention legislation until 1990.8 In the absence of any statutorily recognized home detention program, it is unlikely that the Legislature contemplated home detention when it focused on place of confinement in the statute. As such, we find it an unreasonable construction of the statute that “confinement ... in a correctional institution” includes home detention.
[230]*230Section 643B,9 the statute regarding mandatory imprisonment for habitual violent offenders, also offers some guidance in interpreting “confinement ... in a correctional institution,” as seen in § 286(d). Similar to legislation regarding habitual drug offenders, § 643B(c) requires a term of confinement in a correctional institution prior to qualification as a third-time violent offender. While the 180-day minimum term of imprisonment found within § 286(d) is absent in § 643B(c), the language of the two statutes is similar. Section 643B(a), however, prior to recodification,10 defined “correctional institution” as a facility including “Patuxent Institution and a local or regional jail or detention center.” It did not include “home detention,” and under the statutory rule of construction, ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, this definition limits the places that qualify as confinement in a correctional institution. We do not think it could include home detention. Section 643B was amended to include confinement in a correctional institution six years prior to the first structured home detention program in the United States,11 and thirteen years before the first [231]*231legislation explicitly authorizing home detention in Maryland. The similarity of the language in § 286(d) and § 643B(c) is persuasive evidence that the General Assembly had the same purpose when it mandated a period of confinement in a correctional institution under both statutes.
The State relies heavily on our opinion in Dedo to support its contention that the petitioner’s home detention qualifies as “confinement ... in a correctional institution.” This interpretation is misguided. Dedo was based on the construction of different words of a different statute, having a different purpose. The relevant legislation in Dedo, § 638C,12 provided an individual with credit for time spent in custody prior to conviction. We have explained that this statute is distinguishable from § 286 because § 638C was meant to provide credit, whereas § 286 is meant to enhance punishment. See Melgar, 355 Md. at 349, 734 A.2d at 717-18. This difference in diction indicates a distinct legislative intent. Therefore, our decision in Dedo, to qualify home detention as incarceration in an institution, cannot be analogized to petitioner’s case.
Section 286 is a highly penal statute that must be interpreted in light of the rule of lenity. See Melgar, 355 Md. at 347-48, 734 A.2d at 716-17; Gargliano, 334 Md. at 437, 639 A.2d at 679. The rule of lenity requires us to limit the breadth of § 286 in this instance. Where the Legislature has not specifically instructed the courts of Maryland to expand the scope of a penal statute, the rule of lenity dictates that we limit such laws to that which can be construed clearly from the statute. As a result, we cannot read § 286(d) to include home [232]*232detention within the definition of “confinement ... in a correctional institution.”
Finally, where the General Assembly allows enhanced punishment for multiple offenders, as seen in § 286, the State bears the burden of proving all statutory conditions necessary for application of such laws. See Jones, 324 Md. at 37, 595 A.2d at 465 (and cases cited therein). State-produced evidence must not only be competent, but must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each statutorily imposed prerequisite is satisfied. See id. In this particular instance, the State has failed to .meet its burden. We hold that the Legislature did not intend home detention to be the equivalent of “confinement ... in a correctional institution.”
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMING SENTENCE REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR RE-SENTENCING CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY.
BATTAGLIA, J., dissents.