Deveroux v. State

548 P.2d 1296, 1976 Alas. LEXIS 298
CourtAlaska Supreme Court
DecidedApril 26, 1976
DocketNo. 2636
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 548 P.2d 1296 (Deveroux v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alaska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deveroux v. State, 548 P.2d 1296, 1976 Alas. LEXIS 298 (Ala. 1976).

Opinions

OPINION

CONNOR, Justice.

This appeal questions the propriety of using certain information in the sentencing process, and involves the standards used therein.

Winslow Deveroux pleaded guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession of a prohibited weapon,1 and was sentenced to four years imprisonment. The maximum sentence for the crime is five years.2

The pre-sentence report revealed that Deveroux was frisked at a traffic stop while suspected of robbing the Hong Kong Restaurant in Anchorage, Alaska. Although the police were unable to establish any connection between Deveroux and the robbery, they did find a .25 caliber pistol and over $1,000 on his person. Possession of the pistol and the discovery of his prior conviction for burglary gave rise to the present charge. Besides his 1970 burglary conviction, Deveroux’s criminal record reveals 11 other convictions for offenses ranging from breach of the peace to petty larceny, 13 traffic offenses, and one entry of “Obtaining Money by False Pretense 2 Cts. & Assault & Battery” in 1973 for which no disposition is listed. The pre-sentence report also contains a note to the court:

“in addition to the indicated offenses, there are seven additional arrests for violation of the criminal statutes, varying from suspicion of theft to Frequenting a Gambling Establishment to Assault With a Dangerous Weapon.”

In addition to this, Deveroux’s plea bargain in the instant case entailed his admitting, for purposes of sentencing, a charge of larceny in a building although the charge itself was to be dropped later.3

Deveroux raises, directly or indirectly, several contentions as to why his sentence should be reconsidered. He first argues that the trial court failed to conform to proper standards in sentencing, and failed to articulate its reasons for'and the purpose to be served by the'1 sentence. We disagree.

In State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970), we said :

“Under Alaska’s Constitution, the principles of reformation and necessity of protecting the public constitute the touchstones of penal administration. Multiple goals are encompassed within these broad constitutional standards. Within the ambit of this constitutional phraseology are found the objectives of rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of society, isolation of the offender from society to prevent criminal conduct during the period of confinement,- deterrence of the offender himself after his release from confinement or other penological treatment, as well as deterrence of other members of the community who might possess tendencies toward criminal conduct similar to that of the offender, and community condemnation of the individual offender, or in other words, reaffirmation of societal norms for the purpose of maintaining respect for the norms themselves.” (Footnotes omitted)
[1298]*1298In the case at bar, the trial judge specifically stated:
“looking at the record, there’s no question in my mind that this person is a danger to society.”

This would seem to fall under the objective and purpose of isolating the offender from society, mentioned in Chaney. The court also indicated that it considered and rejected the possibility of rehabilitation, “at least . . . unless there’s a complete change of attitude by the defendant.”

The information in the report which was taken into account in reaching such a conclusion was also specified by the trial judge:

“As I say, I look at the person’s earning record, his contacts with the police, what his friends say about him, what his friends say against him. ... I look at his record.”

Traffic offenses, at least when there are'a great number of them, may be included in a pre-sentence report, as here, and considered as evidence of a defendant’s antisocial life style. See Peterson v. State, 487 P.2d 682, 683 (Alaska 1971).4 We have repeatedly cautioned that “police contacts” not leading to conviction should not be considered.5 In addition to the cases cited by appellant, we note that Alaska Criminal Rule 32(c)(2) has provided since 1973 that no record of arrest or other police contacts shall be included in a pre-sen-tence report.

But our reading of the record convinces us that unexplained police contacts were not a significant factor in the trial court’s decision to impose a four year sentence. Deveroux’s prior “police contacts” not leading to convictions were discussed in ascertaining how long he had served on a prior conviction, and other matters which are not direct bases for increasing his sentence.

Deveroux does have an extensive history of criminal and traffic convictions. Although some of these are petty in nature, their number warrants consideration. Furthermore, for purposes of sentencing there are two felonies to be considered: burglary and a recent larceny in a building.6 Although Deveroux’s list of convictions does not necessarily show a propensity for violence, his former probation officer’s letter to the court did. This officer also indicated that Deveroux had not benefited from his probation on the burglary charge, in the past.

We hold that the trial judge was not clearly mistaken in imposing sentence on Deveroux.

AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Sandvik v. State
564 P.2d 20 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
548 P.2d 1296, 1976 Alas. LEXIS 298, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deveroux-v-state-alaska-1976.