Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 1, 2023
• Docket: 20-36024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 1 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE No. 20-36024 LIMITED, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01360-TSZ Petitioner-Appellee,

CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LIMITED; MEMORANDUM* DEVAS MULTIMEDIA AMERICA, INC.; DEVAS EMPLOYEES MAURITIUS PRIVATE LIMITED; TELCOM DEVAS MAURITIUS LIMITED,

Appellees-Intervenors,

v.

ANTRIX CORP. LTD.,

Respondent-Appellant,

DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LTD., No. 22-35085

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01360-TSZ

CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD; TELCOM DEVAS MAURITIUS LIMITED; DEVAS MULTIMEDIA AMERICA, INC.; DEVAS EMPLOYEES MAURITIUS PRIVATE

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. LIMITED,

Intervenor-Plaintiffs- Appellees,

Respondent.

DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE No. 22-35103 LIMITED, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01360-TSZ Petitioner,

and

CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LIMITED; DEVAS MULTIMEDIA AMERICA, INC.; DEVAS EMPLOYEES MAURITIUS PRIVATE LIMITED; TELCOM DEVAS MAURITIUS LIMITED,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 7, 2023

2 San Francisco, California

Before: MILLER and KOH, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,** District Judge.

These three companion appeals concern an agreement between two Indian

corporations: Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. (“Devas”) and Antrix Corp. Ltd.

(“Antrix”). In the Confirmation Appeal (20-36024), Antrix challenges the district

court’s orders denying its motion to dismiss and confirming an International

Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration award in favor of Devas. In the

Registration Appeals (22-35085 and 22-35103), Antrix and Devas challenge the

district court’s order granting the motion of CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Telcom

Devas Mauritius Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Ltd., and Devas

Multimedia America, Inc. (collectively “Intervenors”) to register the judgment in

the Eastern District of Virginia. We hold that the district court erred in exercising

personal jurisdiction over Antrix, and we reverse.

1. The district court erroneously concluded that a minimum contacts

analysis was unnecessary to exercise personal jurisdiction over Antrix. Personal

jurisdiction over a foreign state in a civil action is governed by the long-arm

provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). See Broidy Cap.

Mgmt., LLC v. State of Qatar, 982 F.3d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the FSIA,

** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

3 a foreign state “shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United

States” unless an enumerated exception applies. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. The FSIA also

provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every

claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)

where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1330(b). The parties agree that for purposes of the FSIA, Antrix is a “foreign

state,” service has been made, and an enumerated exception applies.

In Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional De Produccion De Costa

Rica (“Gonzalez”), we rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the FSIA’s long-arm

provision changed the minimum contacts analysis for foreign states. 614 F.2d

1247 (9th Cir. 1980). We held that “[t]he legislative history of the Act confirms

that the reach of [§] 1330(b) does not extend beyond the limits set by the

International Shoe line of cases. Personal jurisdiction under the [FSIA] requires

satisfaction of the traditional minimum contacts standard.” Id. at 1255 (footnote

omitted). Since Gonzalez, we have continued to apply the rule that personal

jurisdiction under the FSIA requires a traditional minimum contacts analysis. See,

e.g., Theo. H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of Marshall Islands, 174 F.3d 969, 974

(9th Cir. 1998) (“[The FSIA’s] long-arm statute, however, is constrained by the

minimum contacts required by International Shoe . . . and its progeny.” (citation

omitted)); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f

4 defendants are not entitled to immunity under the FSIA, a court must consider

whether the constitutional constraints of the Due Process clause preclude the

assertion of personal jurisdiction over them.” (emphasis omitted)); Richmark Corp.

v. Timber Falling Consultants, Inc., 937 F.2d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991)

(“Personal jurisdiction under the FSIA is determined by resorting to the traditional

minimum contacts tests.”).

Devas and Intervenors argue that these precedents have been called into

question by the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,

Inc., in which the Court stated, “Assuming, without deciding, that a foreign state is

a ‘person’ for purposes of the Due Process Clause, . . . we find that Argentina

possessed ‘minimum contacts’ that would satisfy the constitutional test.” 504 U.S.

607, 619 (1992) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24

(1966)). However, our prior precedents are binding unless “the relevant court of

last resort [has] undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit

precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Our prior precedents are

not “clearly irreconcilable” with Weltover for two reasons. First, Weltover left

open the question of whether foreign states are persons—and thus entitled to a

minimum contacts analysis under the Due Process Clause—and only suggested

how the Supreme Court might rule on the issue. Second, the application of the

5 minimum contacts analysis to actions under the FSIA in Gonzalez is statutory

rather than constitutional. Rather than relying on a foreign state’s personhood,

Gonzalez relies on a reading of the FSIA’s legislative history to conclude that the

FSIA was intended to be consistent with the minimum contacts analysis. 614 F.2d

at 1255 n.5. It follows that if a foreign state is not a person and thus not entitled to

a minimum contacts analysis through the Constitution, it is still entitled to a

minimum contacts analysis through our reading of the FSIA.

Thus, the district court erred in ignoring our precedents requiring it to

conduct a minimum contacts analysis.

2. The district court also erred in concluding that Antrix has the requisite

minimum contacts with the United States. A defendant is subject to specific

personal jurisdiction if “(1) the defendant performed an act or consummated a

transaction by which it purposely directed its activity toward the forum state;

(2) the claims arose out of defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise

of personal jurisdiction is reasonable.” San Diego Cnty. Credit Union v. Citizens

Equity First Credit Union, 65 F.4th 1012, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2023). “The plaintiff

has the burden of proving the first two prongs. If he does so, the burden shifts to

the defendant to set forth a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would

not be reasonable.” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2015)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). “Where service is made under FSIA

6 section 1608, the relevant area in delineating contacts is the entire United States,

not merely the forum state.” Richmark, 937 F.2d at 1447 (cleaned up) (quoting

Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Devas has failed to meet its burden under the first prong to show that Antrix

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the United

States. Devas primarily relies on the Antrix and Indian Space Research

Organization (“ISRO”) Chairman’s 2003 visit to Washington D.C. to meet with

Forge Advisors and a series of 2009 meetings between ISRO officials and the

Devas team. Assuming that ISRO’s contacts with the United States may be

attributed to Antrix, these meetings are still insufficient because they are not

purposeful, but rather “random, isolated, or fortuitous.” LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont’l

Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.

Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021)). Indeed, ISRO officials came

to the United States in 2009 for “unrelated meetings.” The Agreement between

Antrix and Devas was negotiated outside of the United States, executed in India in

2005, and did not require Antrix to conduct any activities or create ongoing

obligations in the United States. See, e.g., Picot, 780 F.3d at 1213 (finding

insufficient contacts with California because, although the defendant physically

entered California, the trips held “no special place in his performance under the

agreement as a whole,” especially where the agreement was executed in Michigan

7 and contemplated obligations largely in Michigan); Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d

1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a contract for sale negotiated in California

did not establish minimum contacts in the state because it did not create ongoing

obligations in the state); Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d

450, 462 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no minimum contacts when a foreign company

made a presentation on a cruise ship in Miami, Florida). Moreover, to the extent

that the district court relied on Devas’s connections to the United States to justify

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Antrix, this reliance is erroneous because

it is the defendant’s conduct that must drive the personal jurisdiction analysis, not

the plaintiff’s. See Picot, 780 F.3d at 1212–13 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.

277, 289 (2014)).

Thus, the district court erred in holding that Antrix had the requisite

minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction.

* * *

Because we hold that the district court erred in exercising personal

jurisdiction over Antrix, its judgment is reversed, and we need not address any of

the other issues raised in the Confirmation Appeal. Because there is no judgment

to register, the district court’s order permitting Intervenors to register the judgment

in the Eastern District of Virginia is also reversed, and we need not address any of

the issues raised by the Registration Appeals.

8 REVERSED.1

1 Antrix’s motion for a limited remand, 20-36024 Dkt. 72, is DENIED. CCDM Holdings, LLC; Telcom Devas, LLC; and Devas Employees Fund US, LLC’s motions to intervene, 20-36024 Dkt. 94, 22-35085 Dkt. 44, 22-35103 Dkt. 48, are DENIED.

9 FILED AUG 1 2023 Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Nos. 20-36024+ MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS MILLER, Circuit Judge, with whom KOH, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring:

I join the court’s disposition because it correctly applies our precedent that

“[p]ersonal jurisdiction under the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] requires

satisfaction of the traditional minimum contacts standard.” Thomas P. Gonzalez

Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th

Cir. 1980). I write separately to make two observations about the origins of the

minimum-contacts requirement and the ways in which it can be satisfied.

First, although our cases have clearly recognized a minimum-contacts

requirement for subjecting foreign states to personal jurisdiction, they have been

less clear about the source of that requirement. Some of our cases have suggested

that the Due Process Clause requires a minimum-contacts analysis. See, e.g.,

Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989). I agree with the

District of Columbia Circuit, however, that “[n]either the text of the Constitution,

Supreme Court decisions construing the Due Process Clause, nor long standing

tradition provide a basis for extending the reach of this constitutional provision for

the benefit of foreign states.” Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

294 F.3d 82, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692

F.3d 661, 694 (7th Cir. 2012); Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of

Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009). “The word ‘person’ in the

1 context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any

reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the

Union.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). It would be even

less reasonable to interpret “person” to encompass foreign states. Whereas the 50

States are part of the constitutional compact—they “derive important benefits and

must abide by significant limitations as a consequence of their participation”—

foreign states are “entirely alien to our constitutional system.” Price, 294 F.3d at

96. Principles of comity, diplomacy, and international law, including “a panoply of

mechanisms in the international arena,” protect the interests that foreign states

have in resisting the jurisdiction of United States courts. Id. at 97–98. The Due

Process Clause does not.

As the court explains today, the better reading of our cases is that “the

application of the minimum contacts analysis to actions under the FSIA . . . is

statutory rather than constitutional.” But the statutory theory of a minimum-

contacts requirement is little better than the constitutional one. Nothing in the text

of the FSIA’s long-arm provision describes a minimum-contacts requirement. 28

U.S.C. § 1330(b). To the contrary, that provision says categorically that

“[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief

over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service

has been made under section 1608 of this title.” Id. In so doing, it “clearly

2 expresses the decision of the Congress to confer upon the federal courts personal

jurisdiction over a properly served foreign state—and hence its agent—coextensive

with the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity in the FSIA,” and it imposes no

additional limitations. TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d

296, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

In sum, our precedent applying the minimum-contacts test to the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over foreign states has no foundation in the Constitution or

the FSIA, and it is contrary to the views of other courts of appeals. In an

appropriate case, we should reconsider it en banc.

Second, in most cases involving the enforcement of an arbitral award under

the New York Convention, the minimum-contacts requirement will have little

practical significance because it can easily be satisfied by the presence of assets in

the forum. In Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., we

held that, “in suits to confirm a foreign arbitral award under the [New York]

Convention,” a court may exercise “jurisdiction over the defendant against whom

enforcement is sought or his property.” 284 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002)

(emphasis added); see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rels. L. § 487 cmt. c. (Am.

L. Inst. 1987) (“[A]n action to enforce a foreign arbitral award requires jurisdiction

over the award debtor or his property.”). We explained that “[c]onsiderable

authority” supports the exercise of jurisdiction to enforce an arbitral award against

3 a respondent’s forum property “even if that property has no relationship to the

underlying controversy between the parties.” Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1127.

And in most cases in which a party is seeking to enforce an arbitral award against a

foreign state in the United States, that state will have assets here. (Why else would

anyone seek to enforce an award here?)

In response to questioning at oral argument, Intervenors sought to invoke

that basis for personal jurisdiction, arguing that Antrix had assets in the United

States against which Devas sought to enforce its award. But it is the plaintiff’s

burden to establish personal jurisdiction, FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828

F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1987), and no party raised this theory in the district court

or in the briefing on appeal. Indeed, it appears that Devas did not identify any

assets that Antrix had in the United States until after the confirmation of the award.

See Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1128. Because the argument has been forfeited,

the court appropriately declines to consider it today. See Ellis v. Salt River Project

Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 24 F.4th 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2022). And I

agree with the court that Devas’s other efforts to establish minimum contacts are

unsuccessful.