Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Kingman Holdings, LLC

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided October 5, 2015·No. 05-14-00855-CV·Published

Opinion

Reverse and Remand; Opinion Filed October 5, 2015.

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-14-00855-CV

DEUTSCHE BANK, NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE, IN TRUST FOR THE REGISTERED HOLDERS OF MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I INC. TRUST 2006-NC5, MORTGAGE PASS-THOUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006 NC5,1 Appellant V. KINGMAN HOLDINGS, LLC, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE MAHOGANY 1857 LAND TRUST, Appellee

On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 429-04363-2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Fillmore, Stoddart, and Richter2 Opinion by Justice Stoddart In this restricted appeal, appellant seeks to overturn a no-answer default judgment.

Appellant contends there is error apparent on the face of the record because, among other

reasons, appellee failed to strictly comply with the requirements for valid and effective service of

citation. Because the face of the record shows appellee failed to strictly comply with the

requirements of valid and effective service of citation, we reverse the trial court’s default

judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. 1 In its notice of restricted appeal, appellant stated: “Plaintiff wrongly identifies Defendant in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as ‘Deutsche Bank, National Trust Company, as Trustee Morgan Stanley ABS Capital 1 Inc., Trust 2006-NC5 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2006-NC5.” We do not need to resolve appellant’s proper name. 2 The Hon. Martin Richter, Justice, Assigned A restricted appeal is a direct attack on the trial court’s judgment. See, e.g., Rone Eng’g

Serv., Ltd. v. Culberson, 317 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (citing Gen.

Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apts., J.V., 811 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex. 1991)). To sustain a proper

restricted appeal, the appellant must prove: (1) it filed notice of the restricted appeal within six

months after the judgment was signed; (2) it was a party to the underlying lawsuit; (3) it did not

participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and did not timely file any

post-judgment motions or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is

apparent on the face of the record. Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c), 30. The face of the

record in a restricted appeal consists of the papers on file with the trial court when it rendered

judgment. See Lytle v. Cunningham, 261 S.W.3d 837, 839 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).

The contested issue in this appeal is whether error is apparent on the face of the record.

In its first issue, appellant asserts the face of the record shows appellee did not strictly

comply with the requirements for valid and effective service of citation. Appellant’s brief states

the return of service shows that service was on appellant “as Trustee Company” without stating

the name of the trust on whose behalf appellant was operating.

Appellee filed its first amended petition to quiet title, naming “DEUTSCHE BANK

NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, herein sued in its capacity as the Trustee for the Morgan

Stanley ABS Capital 1 Inc., Trust 2006-NC5, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-

NC5,” as the defendant. Alleging the defendant was a foreign corporation that does not maintain

a registered agent for service of process in Texas, the amended petition instructed that service

should be upon the Texas Secretary of State and that the Secretary of State should then transmit

the citation and petition to an address for the defendant’s home office in California.

The civil citation issued by the District Clerk of Collin County identifies the defendant in

the caption as “Deutsch Bank, National Trust Company, as Trustee Morgan Stanley ABS Capital

–2– 1 Inc. Trust 2006-NC5 Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2006-NC5,” but states that the

citation is addressed to “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee Company.” The

return of citation identifies the defendant as “Deutsche Bank, National Trust Company, as

Trustee Morgan Stanley ABC Capital 1 INC, Trust 2006-NC5 Mortgage Pass Through

Certificates Series 2006-NC5.” However, the affidavit of service reflects the process server

delivered Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition to Quiet Title to “Deutsch Bank National

Trust Company as Trustee Company” by serving the Texas Secretary of State. The Secretary of

State certified it forwarded a copy of the citation and First Amended Petition to “Deutsch Bank

National Trust Company as Trustee Company” to the address in California the plaintiff had

identified as the defendant’s home office.

For a default judgment to withstand direct attack, strict compliance with the rules

governing service of process must affirmatively appear on the face of the record. Rone Eng’g

Serv., Ltd., 317 S.W.3d at 508 (citing Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex.

1994); Lytle, 261 S.W.3d at 839–40). If the record fails to show strict compliance with the rules

of civil procedure governing issuance, service, and return of citation, then the attempted service

of process is invalid and of no effect. Id. In contrast to the usual rule that all presumptions will

be made in support of a judgment, there are no presumptions of valid issuance, service, and

return of citation when examining a default judgment. Dole v. LSREF2 APEX 2, LLC, 425

S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.).

A citation must show the names of the parties and be directed to the defendant. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 99(b). Rule 107 provides that the officer or authorized person executing the citation

must complete a return of service. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(a). The return of service, together

with any document to which it is attached, must include, among other information, “the person or

entity served.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(b)(5). A judgment cannot be rendered against a defendant

–3– unless the defendant has been properly served, accepted or waived service of process, or made an

appearance. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 124.

Here the citation is addressed to “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee

Company,” which is not the defendant named in the first amended petition, and the affidavit of

service shows the citation was sent to the same party for service via the Secretary of State.

The Waco court of appeals concluded “there are a number of cases in which a minute

discrepancy between the named defendant on the citation and the person or entity listed on the

return to whom the citation had been delivered required a reversal.” Midstate Envtl. Servs., LP v.

Peterson, 435 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, no pet.) (citing Uvalde Country Club v.

Martin Linen Supply Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (petition identified

the registered agent for service as “Henry Bunting, Jr.” but the citation and return of service

reflected delivery to “Henry Bunting”); Hendon v. Pugh, 46 Tex. 211, 212 (1876) (petition

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Related

Lytle v. Cunningham
261 S.W.3d 837 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2008)
General Electric Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint Venture
811 S.W.2d 942 (Texas Supreme Court, 1991)
Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co.
690 S.W.2d 884 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)
RONE ENGINEERING SERVICE, LTD. v. Culberson
317 S.W.3d 506 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2010)
Primate Construction, Inc. v. Silver
884 S.W.2d 151 (Texas Supreme Court, 1994)
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425 S.W.3d 617 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2014)
Hendon v. Pugh
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Midstate Environmental Services, LP v. Peterson
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