Detroit United Railway v. City of Detroit

248 U.S. 429, 39 S. Ct. 151, 63 L. Ed. 341, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2288
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 13, 1919
Docket666
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 248 U.S. 429 (Detroit United Railway v. City of Detroit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Detroit United Railway v. City of Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 39 S. Ct. 151, 63 L. Ed. 341, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2288 (1919).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Day

delivered the opinion of the court.

The Detroit United Railway Company brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to enjoin the City of Detroit from enforcing the provisions of an ordinance regulating street railway fares in that city. The ordinance was passed August 9, 1918. It is printed in the margin.1

[431]*431The bill attacks the ordinance upon two constitutional grounds: 1st, That it impairs the obligation of the company’s existing contracts; 2nd, That it is confiscatory and hence deprives the company of its property without due process of law. The suit came on for hearing before the district judge upon an application for a temporary injunction, the judge denied the application and upon his own motion dismissed the bill.

The question upon this appeal is: Did the bill, taking its allegations to be true, state grounds for relief to which the company was entitled upon the facts set forth? The action of the District Court was equivalent to sustaining a demurrer to the bill.

[432]*432The bill alleges that the complainant company is the owner of all the street railways in the City of Detroit, constituting a system of tracks of upwards of. two hundred and seventy miles. The sources of title of the company are set forth in the bill, and shown by many exhibits. It is sufficient for the present purpose to say that the system consists of a considerable mileage of tracks upon which the franchises have expired; upon other portions of the system there are unéxpired franchises, some of them de-. rived from villages in which the roads were constructed, which villages were subsequently incorporated into the city. : That from December 1, 1917, its system was operated, except the so-called 3-cent lines, upon terms as followfe: 5-cent cash fares for each passenger carried on or over its,.lines, including so-called universal transfers, with Vorkingmen’s. tickets, 8 for 25 cents, between certain hours, and bn the so-called 3-cent lines a cash fare of 5 cents, with 8 tickets for 25 cents between certain hours; good only on such 3-cent lines with the privilege of a transfer on payment of a 5-cent cash fare, and also with the privilege of purchase of 6 tickets for 25 cents, also good between certain hours.. It is averred that afterwards it became necessary to increase rates of fare. The bill recites the demand of the employees of the company for increased'wages, which was refused; that a submission of the controversy was made to the War Labor Board; that the Board after a hearing awarded a substantial increase of wages, and recommended an increase in passenger fares to enable the company to -meet this cost. The bill alleges that the increase made by the War Labor Board amounted to about $2,000,000 per annum. The company petitioned the city for an increase of rates of fare, and this petition was denied.

On August 7,1918, the company put in force a schedule of its own, making single fares 6 cents, with' 10 tickets for 5,5 cents, cash fare or tickets good on connecting or inter[433]*433secting lines within the city. It is contended that this action of the company was without legal authority. Whether this was authorized or not, is not an issue involved in this case, and we express no opinion concerning it. The matters involved in this bill concern the validity of the ordinance passed August 9,1918.

It is further alleged that Detroit is a city of a population exceeding 750,000; that it is an industrial city with much the larger part of its male population employed in industrial plants within and adjacent to the city; that the operation of the company’s railway system was the only means of transportation of such employees from their homes to their places of employment, and that the interruption of the operation of the company’s system, or the separation in operation of the franchise from the non-franchise lines, would paralyze the industrial and business life of the city, throw thousands of its residents out of employment, and result in shutting down its industrial plants and factories. Allegations follow setting forth' the value of the company’s property, and stating that the effect of the ordinance, if enforced, will be to require the operation of the company’s system at a deficit, and, consequently, with no return on the investment.

The learned district judge answered the contention of the company by holding, in substance, that as to the non-franchise lines the remedy of the company was to abandon the service and take its property from the city streets, and that as to the franchise lines the exception of, the fifth section of the ordinance saved the company’s contract rights from impairment. There can be no question that it was within the city’s power to compel the company as to its non-franchise lines to remove its tracks from the streets of the city. This was settled in Detroit United Railway v. Detroit, 229 U. S. 39. The city did not do so. Instead of taking such action it passed the ordinance in controversy, providing for the continued operation of [434]*434the company’s system. This ordinance has application to the entire street railway system. In section one it provides that no more than 5 cents shall be charged for a single ride, or 6 tickets for 25 cents, for one continuous trip through the city over any line operated without a franchise. Section two purports to preserve the right to charge franchise rates when fixed by contract. Section three provides for fares, 8 tickets for 25 cents, except when such fares are contrary to contract rights. Section four provides that where a trip is over two or more lines, whether franchise or not, the maximum fare shall be 5 cents, or 6 tickets for 25 cents, and no transfers shall be exacted which raise these rates of fare. Section five defines a continuous trip to mean a journey from one point in the city to. another, whether on one car line or by means of transfers, and the company is required to furnish transfers to carry the provisions of the ordinance into effect. It is further provided that the ordinance is not to be construed as an attempt to impair the obligation of any valid contract, but shall apply to all street railway passenger traffic in the city except when the same is governed by the provisions of a contract. Section six provides for fines or imprisonment for violations of the provisions of the ordinance. Section seven provides that the ordinance shall be in effect for the term of one year from August 9, 1918, unless sooner amended or. repealed.

The allegations of the bill, which for the present purposes must be taken as true, are ample to the effect that the enforcement of this ordinance will result in a deficit to the company. We cannot construe the exception of section five, having reference to existing franchise contracts, in. such way as to modify the requirements of section four which in explicit terms fixes the fares for trips over two or more lines whether franchise lines or not, and limits the maximum fare without charge for transfers. This must be read .in view of the definition of a continuous [435]*435trip in section five, as meaning a journey from one point to another point in the city whether the same is made on one car line ór by means of transfers from car to car or from line to line.

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Bluebook (online)
248 U.S. 429, 39 S. Ct. 151, 63 L. Ed. 341, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2288, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/detroit-united-railway-v-city-of-detroit-scotus-1919.