Detroit Ry. & Harbor Terminals v. Ferguson

41 F.2d 688, 6 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2881
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 12, 1930
DocketNo. 5330
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 41 F.2d 688 (Detroit Ry. & Harbor Terminals v. Ferguson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Detroit Ry. & Harbor Terminals v. Ferguson, 41 F.2d 688, 6 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2881 (6th Cir. 1930).

Opinion

HICKENLOOPER, Circuit Judge.

This is an action for infringement of patent No. 1,089,405, issued to W. S. Ferguson, March 10, 1914, for a reinforced concrete dock or pier. The District Court held claims 10,12, and 16 infringed. Defendants appeal.

The patent has been before this court on two other occasions, upon both of which its validity was recognized and decree of infringement sustained. Detroit Iron & Steel Co. v. Carey (C. C. A.) 236 F. 924; City of Detroit v. Kahn et al. (C. C. A.) 22 F.(2d) 613. The claims in suit are quoted in the margin of the report of the Carey Case, and need not here be repeated. The first question for determination is whether the prior art as shown by the present record differs so materially from the prior art as shown in the other two records as would have required a different conclusion in either, had it there been presented. Otherwise the court will adhere to its previous decisions upon principles of stare decisis. Payette Neckwear Co. v. Franc-Strohmenger & Cowan, Inc., 39 F.(2d) 899 (C. C. A. 6, April 21, 1930).

None of the hew evidence is urged upon us as showing anticipation, prior use, or publication of the complete combination covered by the claims. As was said of similar evidence in our former decisions, it is to be classified either as disclosing a design for retaining walls, not extending over the water nor presenting the problems of dock construction (examples being the Merwede Canal Wall and the Puget Sound quay wall, both built in 1904, and the Antwerp dock, subject to indefinite publication in February, 1906), or as structures of the mass concrete type, such as the dock at Wallabout Basin, the Champlain Canal approaches, and the Peavey dock at Duluth. Structures of both types [689]*689were considered by the court in our previous opinions, were there rejected as invalidating the patent, and it seems manifest that the very purpose and utility of the Ferguson patent was the avoidance of the-necessity of these massive structures, on the one hand, and the adaptation of the elements of the land structures to dock construction, on the other. We do not again inquire into the question whether it required more than a high degree of mechanical and engineering skill for Ferguson to design his dock, if he be assumed, as he must be, to have had knowledge of these prior art structures. On both previous occasions this court held that invention was disclosed by the combination of elements, all old in the art, for the purpose of the construction of a more efficient and useful dock. We accept this finding, conclude that a different decision would not have been required had the new evidence in this record been before tho court on the previous occasions, and turn to the question of infringement, which is the chief question here involved.

As we now read the specifications and claims, in view of the prior art, Ferguson made practical use of reinforcement of concrete to construct a lighter, stronger dock of the subfloor and platform type. On the out-, er side, running parallel with the shore linó, he designed a huge girder of reinforced concrete, the lower flange resting longitudinally upon a series o£ piles, the upper ends of which aro imbedded in the concrete. The preferred form also shows the use of reinforced concrete beams extending shoreward and longitudinally of the dock in the construction of tho sub-floor. The reinforcement of this beam construction of the subfloor is described in some of the claims as tension and shear members, and the entire structure is described in the specifications as comprising a system of reinforced beams or girders horizontally and vertically positioned, including a reinforced girder floor; but the patentee also says that "many of the members specifically mentioned in the reinforcing scheme described in connection with the dock invented by me, may be dispensed -with, or modified to meet varying conditions of service,” thus emphasizing the fact that sueh beam and girder construction is but the-preferred form.

• Concrete was known to offer high resistance to compression hut to have relatively low tensile strength. The reinforcement of the subfloor over the heads of the piles must be sufficient to resist the shear and tension strains produced by the load above. The earth fill above the subfloor, the pavement above that, and the weight of cargo and of unloading machinery, railway ears, etc., also tend to overturn the outside wall. The jar of landing vessels tends to force the wall inward. To counteract these forces and to distribute them over a large area,, and yet to avoid mass construction and produce a dock of maximum strength and durability, Ferguson utilized transverse bracing walls of concrete, resting upon the subfloor and offering resistance to the compression strains and jars from landing vessels, and reinforced from the subfloor to near the top of the outside girder to resist tho tension strain and hold the outer wall in place. In thus utilizing these known practices to avoid the necessity of mass construction in docks, and still produce a structure of great strength and durability, invention was held to lie.

In detail, tho defendant’s structure departs somewhat from the preferred form shown in the patent, and reverts toward greater mass construction. The supporting piles are not imbedded in the concrete of the subfloor nor the front wall; the reinforcement of the subfloor is of the mattress type, rather than in beam or girder form; the piles are closer together than is required by Ferguson’s preferred form, the reinforcement is less, and the concrete subfloor is of necessity thicker. Instead of transverse bracing walls placed at intervals, the front wall is thickened at its base, shoreward, and the diagonal reinforcement placed by Ferguson in these transverse walls and providing tensile strength to resist the pressure of earth fill and superimposed load is also used by the defendant, but it runs between a point slightly above the middle line of the front wall to the longitudinal reinforcement of the subfloor, instead of from very near the top of sueh wall to a point further shoreward; and, while Ferguson’s preferred form of shore anchorage consists of stay piles, or other solid anchorage erected on shore, and reinforcing means connecting the wall and sub-floor firmly with sueh anchorage, the defendant’s dock is anchored shoreward by batter-piles at intervals longitudinally, which piles are imbedded in the concrete of the sub-floor. These batter-piles are constructed toward the shoreward side, and effectively hold the structure from sliding into tho river. It is also-contended that defendant’s dock is not an integral monolithic whole, in that the concrete subfloor is separated from the piling by a two-inch wooden floor, and the subfloor of concrete was poured before the front wall, producing a theoretical line of separation. [690]*690These differences} it is alleged, avoid infringement.

We are not impressed with the contentions either that the defendant’s dock is an example of reversion to the mass construction of the prior art, or that the 'structural differences are so radical a departure from the patent as to avoid infringement. Practically and functionally the defendant’s dock is a monolithic whole. The vertical and diagonal reinforcement firmly unites the front wall and subfloor, and the weight of the whole structure, as well as the tie-rods driven into the piles and extending into the subfloor, as firmly holds such piles integral with the sub-floor as if they were imbedded in' it.

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Related

Carey v. Ford Motor Co.
115 F.2d 204 (Sixth Circuit, 1940)
Wabash Ry. Co. v. Dock & Terminal Engineering Co.
56 F.2d 574 (Sixth Circuit, 1932)
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Emery
42 F.2d 398 (Sixth Circuit, 1930)

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Bluebook (online)
41 F.2d 688, 6 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/detroit-ry-harbor-terminals-v-ferguson-ca6-1930.