Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Moberly

52 S.W.2d 298, 1932 Tex. App. LEXIS 718
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 16, 1932
DocketNo. 2673.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 52 S.W.2d 298 (Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Moberly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Moberly, 52 S.W.2d 298, 1932 Tex. App. LEXIS 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1932).

Opinion

PELPHREY, C. J.

On the 27th day of December, 1928, a contract was entered into between the state of Texas, represented by the state highway engineer, and E. Eproson & Co., a firm composed of G. A. Eproson, Ernest Eproson, and R. B. Truett, for the improvement of road bridge No. 19, job No. 108-D., in Henderson county, Tex., according to plans, specifications, proposal, and notice to contractors.

The proposal of the contractors was to do the amount of work itemized in the proposal for $55,527.82, and the contractors executed a bond for that amount with appellant as surety, conditioned that the contractors “shall in all things well and truly perform all the terms and conditions of the foregoing contract, to be by them (him) performed, and within the time therein mentioned, and shall pay all lawful claims for labor performed and material furnished in and about the construction of said road bridge and shall have paid and discharged all liabilities for injuries which have been incurred in and about the said construction, under the operation of the statutes of the State, * * * ”

The work was abandoned by the contractors on or about October 22,1929, arid, on February 5, 1930, the state employed the firm of Brown & Abbott to complete the work.

On January 30, 1930, Mrs. E. L. Moberly, a feme sole, filed this suit against G. A. Epro-son, Ernest Eproson, and appellant; Truett, being deceased, and his estate insolvent, it was not made a party.

She sought to recover $240 for hire on some teams she had rented to Eproson & Go., and the further sum of $1,010.50 as damages arising from the death of certain mules and the loss of certain property rented to them, which she alleged was brought about by their lack of diligence in the preserving and care of her property. She prayed for attorney’s fees and for a lien upon any funds due or to become due to the contractors.

G. A. Eproson answered on behalf of himself, Ernest Eproson, and Eproson & Co., admitting the abandonment of the contract; the making of the bond with appellant as surety; the making of the contract with Mrs. Moberly, and the receipt thereunder of the mules and equipment; the death of the mules and loss of equipment by reason of their lack of care; and that they had not paid her for the hire of the teams and equipment.

Later a number of furnishers of labor and material intervened, each seeking recovery on account of that which he furnished. The state of Texas also intervened, seeking recovery of a loss alleged to have been caused by the default of the contractors and priority as to payment.

Appellant answered by general demurrer, exceptions, and by pleas, asserted that no cause of action was stated as against it because it was shown that, at the time plaintiff’s suit was filed, the contract had not been completely performed, and that final settlement on account thereof within contemplation of the statute authorizing suit on the bond had not been had; that it had been released by changes made in the contract, plans, and work without its consent; and that the state had not completed the work as cheaply as possible, but had arbitrarily spent more than the fair and reasonable cost of completing the work.

The cause was tried before the court, and a judgment was rendered against the principals and the surety on the bond; the state of Texas being given priority thereunder.

Mrs. Moberly and several of the interveners were denied recovery, either in whole or in part, as against the surety. Appellant duly perfected its appeal, and the Texas Sand & Gravel Company also excepted and gave no tice of appeal.

*300 Mrs. Moberly excepted to the judgment, but did not perfect ber appeal.

The questions presented for our determination are those presented by appellant and by the cross-assignments of the Texas Sand & Gravel Company.

Opinion.

The first proposition presented by appellant reads: “Because the statute authorizing furnishers to institute suit on a bond covering a contract for public work provides that ‘it shall not be commenced until after complete performance of said contract and final settlement thereof,’ and plaintiff declared on such bond, alleging that the contractors had abandoned the contract, but not alleging and proving that the contract had been performed and settled, no cause of action was stated against the surety and the court erred in holding to the contrary and in rendering judgment against it on account of the bond.”

The statute in question, being one creating a right and prescribing a time within which the right might be asserted, is one of limitation. Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Southern Surety Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 283 S.W. 624.

The objection urged here being that the cause of action on the bond had not arisen at the time the suit was commenced, not having been presented by plea in abatement in due order of pleading, was waived. Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Southern Surety Co., supra; Love v. Austin Bridge Company (Tex. Civ. App.) 5 S.W. (2d) 570; American Surety Company v. Alamo Iron Works (Tex. Civ. App.) 29 S.W. (2d) 493. Appellant’s assignments raising this question are accordingly overruled.

By its second and third propositions appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment here, asserting that the undispxited evidence, or at least the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence, shows that the state of Texas did not complete the contract as cheaply as possible, and that, in the exercise of due diligence, it should have completed it at a cost not exceeding the unpaid balance of the contract pidce.

Under these propositions appellant argues that ‘the work was abandoned October 22, 1929; that the original price was 855,527.82; that the quantities were increased to such an extent that the total cost was increased to $70,231.21; that, according to Mr. Hank, a witness for the state, the prices specified in the Eproson & Co. contract were adequate prices for the work covered by it; that, of the contract price, $28,054.02 whs paid to Eproson & Oo. on account of the work done by them before abandonment; that an additional $13,022.79 was retained by the state on account of the work done, making a total of $41,076.81, which represented the proportion of the work done before abandonment, based on contract prices; that this amount, deducted from $70,231.21, left remaining $29,154.40, representing the proportion of the work, based on contract prices, remaining to be done after abandonment; that for this amount of work the state paid $60,305.-25; that, if the work had been completed during October, November, and December, 1929, it would have cost appreciably less than it did when actually done; that Matt Larkin, a responsible contractor, on December 6, 1929, being prepared to give a bond to guarantee the performance of his contract, offered to complete the unfinished part of the work at cost plus 15 per cent, thereof, not to exceed the Eproson & Co.

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Bluebook (online)
52 S.W.2d 298, 1932 Tex. App. LEXIS 718, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/detroit-fidelity-surety-co-v-moberly-texapp-1932.