Destromp v. Music

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 8, 2024
Docket8:24-cv-01148
StatusUnknown

This text of Destromp v. Music (Destromp v. Music) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Destromp v. Music, (M.D. Fla. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

DIANA LYNN DESTROMP and CONNER WYATT PELTIER,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-01148-TPB-AEP

SONY MUSIC, SAM HUNT, HANNAH FOWLER, BRAD BELANGER, and ROBERT LAWSON,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s renewed Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5). Previously, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) and moved to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). Upon review, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 3), finding that her Complaint failed to set forth a viable claim, and provided Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that set forth a factual basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s claims, and the relief requested. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 4) and renewed her Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5). However, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint suffers the same deficiencies as her original Complaint. Thus, for the reasons detailed below, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s renewed Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 5) be denied and Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 4) be dismissed. I. Legal Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914, the clerk of each district court shall require the parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in such court to pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, however, a court may, upon a finding of indigency, authorize the commencement of an action without requiring

the prepayment of fees or security therefor. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). When an application to proceed in forma pauperis is filed, the court must review the case and dismiss it sua sponte if the court determines the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

District courts maintain broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). An action is frivolous where the allegations lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations

omitted). Accordingly, where the court determines from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are without merit, the court may conclude a case has little or no chance of success and dismiss the complaint before service of process. Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citations omitted). In reviewing a complaint, courts hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard and therefore construe the complaint more liberally.1 Tannenbaum v. U.S., 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”). Further, to state a claim, a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). Relatedly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 mandates

that the complaint “state its claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” and that “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . be stated in a separate count.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Taken in combination, Rules 8 and 10 “work together to require the

pleader to present his claims discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, [and so that] the court can determine which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted.” Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079,

1 Although courts afford liberal construction to pro se litigants’ pleadings, litigants appearing pro se in this District must adhere to the procedural requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the Local Rules for the Middle District of Florida. McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (“And although we are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, we nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[O]nce a pro se IFP litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including 1082 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Dismissal for failure to state a claim in this context is governed by the same standard as dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Leonard v. F.B.I., 405 F. App’x 386, 387 (11th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam)2 (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)); Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Namely, dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the facts, as pleaded, fail to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citation omitted). Moreover, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, thus, have an obligation to inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking. Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2001); See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.

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Related

Fikes v. City of Daphne
79 F.3d 1079 (Eleventh Circuit, 1996)
Mitchell v. Farcass
112 F.3d 1483 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
Arrington v. Cobb County
139 F.3d 865 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co.
168 F.3d 405 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Adem A. Albra v. Advan, Inc.
490 F.3d 826 (Eleventh Circuit, 2007)
Alba v. Montford
517 F.3d 1249 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
Miller v. Donald
541 F.3d 1091 (Eleventh Circuit, 2008)
McNeil v. United States
508 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Charles Edward Pace v. David Evans
709 F.2d 1428 (Eleventh Circuit, 1983)
David Richard Moon v. Lanson Newsome, Warden
863 F.2d 835 (Eleventh Circuit, 1989)
Leonard v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
405 F. App'x 386 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)

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