Destiny Corbin, V Life Care Centers Of America, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 13, 2026
• Docket: 88134-5
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DESTINY CORBIN, an individual, and MELANIE ANDREWS, an individual, No. 88134-5-I on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, DIVISION ONE

Appellant, PUBLISHED OPINION

v.

LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., a Tennessee corporation,

Respondent.

BIRK, J. — Destiny Corbin and Melanie Andrews (collectively Corbin) were

absent class members in a class action brought by Lamont Atkinson against Life

Care Centers of America Inc. (Atkinson action).1 The Atkinson parties entered into

a court approved class action settlement agreement resolving claims for unpaid

COVID-19 testing and screening time under the Washington Minimum Wage Act

(MWA), chapter 49.46 RCW. Five days after final approval, Corbin, on behalf of

putative class members who were also absent class members in the Atkinson

action, brought claims against Life Care for unpaid meal break violations under the

MWA. The superior court dismissed Corbin’s complaint, concluding that claim

preclusion2 barred Corbin’s claims because Corbin did not assert them in the

1 King County Superior Court cause no. 22-2-00662-5 SEA. 2 The parties refer to “claim preclusion” as “res judicata.” As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion” “have replaced a more confusing lexicon. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 n.5, 128 No. 88134-5-I/2

Atkinson action. Because the settling parties’ intent controls the preclusive effect

of a class action settlement agreement, and the parties here intended to release

only claims due to unpaid COVID-19 testing and screening, we reverse and

remand.

I

A

On January 12, 2022, Lamont Atkinson brought putative class action claims

against Life Care for its alleged failure to pay regular and overtime hours to its

employees for testing and screening for COVID-19. Atkinson worked at Life Care

as a certified nursing assistant and alleged he was required to undergo COVID-19

testing and screening without pay. Life Care operates facilities in Washington

where it provides nursing and rehabilitation services.

The Atkinson complaint proposed class certification for two classes: a

screening class, and a testing class. Before the court ruled on the parties’ motions

for and against class certification, Atkinson and Life Care reached a proposed

class settlement. In both the unopposed motions for preliminary and final approval

of class action settlement, the proposed class included “[a]ll Washington State

employees of Defendant who worked for Defendant in the position of non-exempt

hourly worker and who worked at least one shift between February 1, 2020, and

the date of preliminary settlement approval.” The unopposed motion for

S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). Claim preclusion describes the rules formerly known as ‘merger’ and ‘bar,’ while issue preclusion encompasses the doctrines once known as ‘collateral estoppel’ and ‘direct estoppel.’ ” Id. (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 77, n.1, 104 S. Ct. 892, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984)). For clarity and consistency, we use claim preclusion.

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preliminary approval and the proposed class settlement agreement contained the

same release language for settlement class members. In the class settlement

agreement, the settlement class members released Life Care from

any and all claims that were or could have been asserted in this lawsuit for unpaid wages due to allegedly unpaid [COVID-19] testing and screening relating to the Participating Class Member's employment with Defendant during the Class Period, including any and all associated liquidated damages, penalties, attorneys’ fees, costs, interest, and/or any related sums relating to or arising from those claims, whether founded on state, federal or local law.

In contrast, the named plaintiff class representatives in Atkinson, Atkinson

and another class representative, agreed to a broader release for their personal

claims. They released Life Care from

all known and unknown claims, promises, causes of action, that they presently may have relating to disputes of any nature arising out of their employment with Defendant (including but not limited to those pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act [of 1938, 29 U.S.C., §§ 201- 219 (FLSA)], Washington Minimum Wage Act, [ch. 49.46 RCW,] Washington Wage Rebate Act, [RCW 49.52.050,] and any other federal, state, or local law related to wages, meal periods, or rest periods), including any related penalties, liquidated damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and/or costs to any of the Released Parties through the date of preliminary approval by the Court.

On December 6, 2024, the superior court granted Atkinson’s unopposed

motion for final approval and certified the settlement class as proposed. The court

concluded that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. The settlement

agreement distributed the settlement amount based upon how many minutes class

members were off the clock when testing and screening. The court ordered that

“all members of the Class: (1) are bound by this Final Judgment; and (2) are forever

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barred from instituting, maintaining, or prosecuting any claim released by the

Settlement Agreement.”

B

Five days after the court granted final approval to the Atkinson settlement,

on December 11, 2024, Corbin filed a putative class action complaint against Life

Care for its alleged willful failure to provide compensation to class members for

missed meal periods. Corbin proposed a class including “[a]ll hourly, non-exempt

Life Care employees who missed a meal period and were not paid compensation

in addition to the pay for the hours they worked during the meal period at any time

from December 11, 2021 to the date of certification of the class.” Corbin alleged

Life Care failed to ensure class members followed policy and, by understaffing its

locations, prevented staff from taking meal breaks. The same attorneys who

negotiated the Atkinson settlement represent Corbin. Corbin was a member of the

Atkinson settlement class.

Life Care moved to dismiss Corbin’s complaint, arguing it is barred by claim

preclusion. The superior court dismissed Corbin’s complaint. Corbin

unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration and appeals both the orders granting

dismissal and denying reconsideration.3

II

We review rulings on CR 12(b)(6) motions de novo. Tavaglione v.

Dehkhoda & Qadri, PC, 34 Wn. App. 2d 515, 519, 568 P.3d 1158 (2025). The

3 Because we conclude it was error to grant Life Care’s CR 12(b)(6) motion,

we do not separately consider the order denying reconsideration.

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purpose of a CR 12(b)(6) motion is to “determine if a plaintiff can prove any set of

facts that would justify relief.” P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPI Corp., 176 Wn.2d 198, 203,

289 P.3d 638 (2012). “Under CR 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate only when it

appears beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts, consistent with

the complaint, which would justify recovery.” San Juan County v. No New Gas

Tax, 160 Wn.2d 141, 164, 157 P.3d 831 (2007). “The complaint’s legal

conclusions are not required to be accepted on appeal.” Jackson v. Quality Loan

Serv. Corp., 186 Wn. App 838, 843, 347 P.3d 487 (2015). We review application

of claim preclusion de novo. Carter v. MultiCare Health Sys., 31 Wn. App. 2d 755,

773, 553 P.3d 98 (2024).

We first conclude that the settling parties’ intent determines the preclusive

effect of a class action settlement agreement.

This court addressed a similar scenario in Knuth v. Beneficial Washington,

Inc., 107 Wn. App. 727, 31 P.3d 694 (2001). There, the initial action began when

a plaintiff brought putative class claims against a loan servicer, alleging the

servicer improperly charged borrowers demand and reconveyance fees when

borrowers paid off their loans. Id. at 729. Shortly after class certification, the

parties settled, with class members releasing all claims that were or could have

been asserted against the servicer in that action. Id. at 730. Then, a former absent

class member brought putative class claims against the same servicer, alleging

the servicer improperly charged a forwarding fee when borrowers paid off their

loans. Id. In analyzing claim preclusion, this court looked to the settlement release

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language, to the order certifying the class for the previous action, and to whether

the settlement disposed of the proposed class claims. Id. at 731-33. We said that

the second action impaired rights established in the settlement agreement

because the settlement agreement specifically released the defendant from any

claims that could have been brought by the class at the time. Id. at 732.

In cases not involving class action settlement agreements, Washington

decisions have focused on the intent of the parties when determining the

preclusive effect of a settlement agreement. See Pederson v. Potter, 103 Wn.

App. 62, 73, 11 P.3d 833 (2000) (“If the Pedersons are permitted to pursue their

complaint, they will in effect argue they were not obligated to pay the Potters under

the terms of the sale because of the breach. Yet the settlement and confession of

judgment already established the rights and liabilities of the parties.”); Hadley v.

Cowan, 60 Wn. App. 433, 444-45, 804 P.2d 1271 (1991) (barring subsequent

claims for tortious interference with parent/child relationship where parties had

included the phrase “loving relationship that exists” in a settlement agreement).

The Ninth Circuit identified the rationale undergirding Washington law

limiting the preclusive effect of a class action settlement to the settling parties’

intent in Wojciechowski v. Kohlberg Ventures, LLC, 923 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2019).

There, the court analyzed the settlement release language and concluded the prior

class action settlement agreement did not release claims against a defendant that

was not a party to the prior class action. Wojciechowski, 923 F.3d at 690. The

claim preclusion inquiry is modified when the earlier action was dismissed based

on a settlement agreement. Id. at 689. When a court dismisses an action because

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of a settlement agreement, the settlement is “ ‘stamped with the imprimatur of [a]

court with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the lawsuit.’ ” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553,

1557 (3rd Cir. 1994)). Applying a preclusive effect greater than the parties’

intentions at settlement would undermine the contractual nature of court approved

settlement agreements. Id. at 691. Wojciechowski described this as a general

principle of preclusion law. Id. As described in Knuth, Washington law is in accord.

Thus, “[w]e look to the intent of the settling parties to determine the preclusive

effect of a dismissal with prejudice entered in accordance with a settlement

agreement, rather than to general principles of claim preclusion.” Wojciechowski,

923 F.3d at 689-90.

This is especially appropriate for class action settlements binding absent

class members. A class settlement agreement may preclude a party from bringing

a related claim in the future “ ‘even though the claim was not presented and might

not have been presentable in the class action,’ ” but only where the released claim

is “ ‘based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the

settled class action.’ ” Summers v. Sea Mar Cmty. Health Ctrs., 29 Wn. App. 2d

476, 504-05, 541 P.3d 381 (quoting Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th

Cir. 2010)), review denied sub nom. Barnes v. Sea Mar Cmty. Health Ctr’s, 3

Wn.3d 1002, 549 P.3d 112 (2024). In class action cases, the courts have an

independent obligation to protect the interests of the class. Deien v. Seattle City

Light, 26 Wn. App. 2d 57, 65, 527 P.3d 102 (2023). As a court has said in the

analogous setting of the FLSA, “[t]he parties have every right to enter into a

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settlement that waives claims relating to the existing suit in exchange for a

settlement payment. But the Court will not countenance employers using FLSA

settlements to erase all liability whatsoever in exchange for partial payment of

wages allegedly required by statute.” Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, 96 F. Supp.

3d 170, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting settlement of FLSA collective action among

other reasons because release language was “too sweeping to be ‘fair and

reasonable.’ ”). Courts look to the operative pleadings, class notice, and the

settlement approval process to determine the appropriate scope of a class

settlement.4

We interpret settlement agreements as contracts. Condon v. Condon, 177

Wn.2d 150, 162, 298 P.3d 86 (2013). Washington adheres to the objective

manifestation theory of contracts. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co.,

154 Wn.2d 493, 503, 115 P.3d 262 (2005). “[W]e attempt to determine the parties’

intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than on

4 See McAdams v. Robinson, 26 F.4th 149, 158 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure] 23(e) requires notice that describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.”); In re TikTok, Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig., 713 F. Supp. 3d 470, 487-88 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (“The language of the Settlement Agreement, the consolidated complaint, and representations made during the approval process are all important indica of both the Original Parties’ intent as to the release and the court’s understanding of that intent at the time of entry of the final approval order.”); Nunez v. BAE Sys. San Diego Ship Repair, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1047 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (finding the exact factual predicate met where the class notice of released claims stated “ ‘will be releasing the claims and causes of action asserted in the operative Complaint on file in the Class Action between May 27, 2012 and October 13, 2016, or which could have been alleged based on the facts set forth in the operative Complaint’ ”).

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the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties.” Id. “We impute an intention

corresponding to the reasonable meaning of the words used.” Id. “We generally

give words in a contract their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning unless the

entirety of the agreement clearly demonstrates a contrary intent.” Id. at 504. We

may interpret particular language of a contract in the context of other contract

provisions. C.A. Carey Corp. v. City of Snoqualmie, 29 Wn. App. 2d 890, 907, 547

P.3d 247, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1012, 554 P.3d 1219 (2024). Washington courts

also consider the “context surrounding an instrument’s execution.” Hearst

Commc’ns, 154 Wn.2d at 502. If relevant for determining mutual intent, including

the meaning of specific words and terms used, extrinsic evidence may include (1)

the subject matter and objective of the contract, (2) all the circumstances

surrounding the making of the contract, (3) the subsequent acts and conduct of the

parties, and (4) the reasonableness of respective interpretations urged by the

parties. Id. at 502-03.

The Atkinson settlement manifests the parties’ intent to settle class claims

regarding Life Care’s COVID-19 testing and screening practices. For release of

claims, the parties agreed the named-party class representatives would release

any and all claims “that they presently may have” “related to wages, meal periods,

or rest periods” without mention of COVID-19 testing and screening. More

narrowly, the absent class members released “any and all claims that were or

could have been asserted in this lawsuit for unpaid wages due to allegedly unpaid

[COVID-19] testing and screening,” but gave no release referencing meal periods.

The settlement provides that the absent class members will be paid for “Minutes

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Off-the-Clock,” defined as “the sum of Screening Minutes and Testing Minutes for

each Settlement Class Member.” The settlement includes definitions for

“Screening Class Period,” “Testing Class Period,” “Screening Shift,” “Testing

Workweek,” “Screening Minutes,” and “Testing Minutes,” but it does not include

any definitions for meal breaks, meal periods, or other employment claims.

The amended complaint proposed two classes, a “Screening Class” and a

“Testing Class,” who were comprised of members “instructed not to clock into Life

Care’s electronic time keeping system prior to daily screening” and “who were

subject to Life Care’s mandatory [COVID-19] testing policy,” respectively. It

alleged the predominating questions of law and fact common to the proposed class

included, “[w]hether Life Care requires employees to undergo [COVID-19]

screening during their shift without compensation” and “whether Life Care requires

employees to undergo weekly [COVID-19] testing but does not compensate them

unless the testing occurs during the employee’s regularly scheduled shift.”

In the unopposed motion for preliminary approval of settlement, the parties

agreed that the settlement amount would be distributed to class members “based

proportionally on the number of allegedly unpaid minutes estimated to have been

spent testing and screening.” Then, the motion for final approval of the settlement

stated that class members will be paid for “Minutes Off-the-Clock,” which the

parties defined as “the sum of Screening Minutes and Testing Minutes for each

Settlement Class Member.” The motion further stated that if the parties did not

settle, the Atkinson plaintiffs would face increased uncertainty in summary

judgment motions practice surrounding the commonality of class members’

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experiences “due to differences in testing and screening practices.” The class

members’ release was specifically limited—in contrast to the named-plaintiff class

representatives release—to extend only to claims for COVID-19 testing and

screening, and these were the only claims described in the operative complaint,

class notice, and motions for preliminary or final approval.

The operative release language covered “claims that were or could have

been asserted in this lawsuit for unpaid wages due to allegedly unpaid [COVID-

19] testing and screening relating to the Participating Class Member's

employment.” Life Care argues that the phrase “for unpaid wages due to allegedly

unpaid [COVID-19] testing and screening relating to Participating Class members’

employment” modifies the term “lawsuit” and does not modify “claims.” From this

premise, Life Care reasons that the release extends to claims relating to the class

members’ employment that were or could have been brought in the lawsuit for

unpaid wages due to allegedly unpaid COVID-19 testing. Life Care’s interpretation

of the “for” phrase modifying lawsuit and not claims is grammatically possible—the

“for” phrase could be read in a limited way to modify exclusively “lawsuit.” But this

reading is not reasonable under the circumstances. Under Life Care’s reading, the

description of the released claims is no more specific than those that could have

been brought in the lawsuit and relate to the class members’ employment. In the

context of the settlement on behalf of absent class members, the “for” clause

describes which “claims” are released, in this case coinciding with the claims

asserted in the complaint, described in the class notice, subject to the array of

defined terms in the settlement, and analyzed in the motions for settlement

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approval. Those documents describe exclusively claims based on COVID-19

testing and screening. Moreover, this scope of release falls clearly within the

identical factual predicate supported by the operative pleadings, class notice, and

motions for settlement approval. Summers, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 504-05.

We conclude the parties intended that the absent class members release

only claims for unpaid COVID-19 testing and screening. As a result, the Atkinson

settlement does not have preclusive effect barring Corbin’s claims for allegedly

uncompensated missed meal periods.

Reversed and remanded.

WE CONCUR: