Despard v. Despard

44 S.E. 448, 53 W. Va. 443, 1903 W. Va. LEXIS 51
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedMay 2, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 44 S.E. 448 (Despard v. Despard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Despard v. Despard, 44 S.E. 448, 53 W. Va. 443, 1903 W. Va. LEXIS 51 (W. Va. 1903).

Opinion

MilleR, Judge:

We are met at the threshold by an objection to the hearing [444]*444or consideration by this Court of the appeal herein, because, as appellees allege, no appeal or supersedeas became effective within two years from the date of the diz^e appealed from. The said decree was made and entered by the circuit court of Harrison County, on'the 25th day of January, 1889. The appeal with supersedeas, was allowed On the 25th day of August, 1900. A bond in the penalty of five hundred dollars was required, which was given on the 3rd day of August, 1901. A copy thereof was received by the clerk of this Court on the 7th day of August, 1901. More than two years had elapsed from the date of said decree until said bond had been given as aforesaid. Ap-pellees contend that, because appellants did not give the required bond wthin two years from the date of the decree, the appeal did not take effect. They assert that the statutes in existence prior to the year 1899, when given the proper construction, made it necessary, in order to effectuate an appeal, that, not only the petition therefor should have been presented within two years •after the decree was rendered, hut also, that the bond should have been given within the same period.

Chapter 135 of the Code of 1868, made no limitation for the allowance of an appeal or writ of error. That was a matter of right, where the appeal or writ of error would lie, upon execution and delivery of the undertaking prescribed in section 2., The limit for giving and filing the undertaking was five years next after the date of the decree, judgment or order appealed from. Chapter 17 of Acts, 1872-73, was a new enactment, covering the whole subject of appeals, writs of eerror and sup&i'sedecbs. It provided for a petition, assigning errors, thus giving the power to the court to refuse the writ. It limited the presentation of the petition to five years, from the date of the decree or judgment. In order to have a limit on the time of giving the appeal bond, section 17 was enacted. If five years had elapsed from the date of the decree or judgment before the record had been delivered to the clerk of the appellate court, no process could be issued by him. Therefore, no bond could be given. Taking the sections together, they required the appeal to be perfected within five years from the. date of the decree. Said section 17 was re-enacted in the Act of 1882. Appellees contend that as the Act of 1882 covered the whole subject of appeals, writs of error and supersedeas, and repealed all acts and parts of acts with[445]*445in its purview, or inconsistent therewith, .it repealed section 17 of Acts, 1872-73. But it did not. omit section 17. It retained both sections 3 and 17, as found in chapter 17, Acts, 1872-73. It is strange that the legislature retained that section, and at the same time repealed it; that a later act repealed a section of a former act, yet the later act retains that .section; that when a former act contained two sections, which were literally re- ’ enacted by a later act — one section is repealed and not the other. It might be asked which section is so repealed. We must allow both of said sections to stand and give to each a meaning and effect if that can be done.

Section 3 of chapter 157, Acts 1882, provides that no petition shall be presented for an appeal from, or writ of error or supersedeas to, any judgment, decree or order, which had been rendered or made more than five years before such petition was presented, if the judgment, decree or order mentioned in the petition had been rendered or made before said chapter, as amended, took effect; but if such judgment, decree or order was rendered after said chapter took effect, such petition should not be presented after two years from the date of such judgment, decree or order. It may be, as contended, by appellees, that the legislature intended by the Act of 1882, to limit-an appeal, in any court, to two years from decrees and judgments rendered after that act took effect; and that by inadvertence section 17 was not repealed, while section 3 was amended by limiting the presentation'of the petition to two years.

Be this as it -may, as section 3 then stood, it limited the application for an appeal to two years; but section 17 gave five ■ years within which to perfect the appeal, by bond and delivery of the record to the clerk. If we were required.to find a reason for the difference in time allowed by sections 3 and 17, we would say that there should be some time given after the granting of the appeal, in which to execute and deliver the bond. The appeal may be allowed on the last day of the two years. The bond must be given before the clerk. of the- circuit court, wherein ' the decree was rendered. Without sufficient time to do this, the appeal would be uselss. The legislature may have given too much time; but it was so enacted. ’ ■

Section 3 of chapter 14, Acts of 1899, is now section 3 of chapter 135 of the Code. Although the legislature of 1899 saw [446]*446proper'to amend and re-enact certain sections of said chapter 135 of the Code, it left section 17 as it had theretofore-stood. Said chapter 14 was and is an act amending only sections 3, 18 and 19 of chapter 135 of the Code.

By chapter 78 of the Acts of 1901, said section 17 was amended and re-enacted, and changed the time for giving the bond and filing the record from five to two years. Said chapter 78 was passed February 22, 1901, and took effect ninety days thereafter. This chapter was the first express change made by the-legislature in said section 17. There is no repugnancy in the said sections 3 and 17, in all of the legislation referred to-. The two sections relate to two different matters — one limits the time for the application for the appeal — the other limits the time for the execution of the bond, and delivery of the record to the clerk. Both can stand, with distinct operation.

It is further contended that chapter 78, Acts 1901, amending section 17 of chapter 135 of the Code, by providing that the bond must be given, and the record delivered to the clerk within two years instead of five, retróacts and vitiates this appeal. This proposition is contrary to the rule that laws do not retroact from mere implication. Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524.

When the bond in question was given, said section 17 of chapter 135 of the Code had not been amended. Appellant, under it, had five years from the date of the decree within which to execute the appeal bond, and file the record of the cause with the clerk. Said section 17 was not repealed or amended by the legislature by implication. We see no reason for saying that chapter 78 of the Acts of 1901 is retroactive. We must therefore hold that appellants have, within the time allowed to them by law, properly perfected their appeal.

The said decree' appealed from was rendered in -the cause of Charles S. Despard- and others against Diana M. Despard, J. M. Bennett and others, and in the cause of J. M. Bennett against Allen Stalnaker and others, both commenced in the circuit court of Calhoun County but removed to the circuit court of Harrison County, and there consolidated and heard together.

The bill in said first mentioned cause was filed on the 22nd day of October, 1879, by Charles S. Despard, Burton M. Des-pard, Laura B. Goff and Nathan Goff, Jr., plaintiffs, against Diana M. Despard, Flora H. Despard and Duncan Lee Despard, [447]*447infánt children and heirs at law of Bnrton Despard, deceased, and Jonathan M.

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44 S.E. 448, 53 W. Va. 443, 1903 W. Va. LEXIS 51, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/despard-v-despard-wva-1903.