Derrick Jackson v. Patwin Horn, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided January 22, 2026·No. 1:25-cv-01426·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DERRICK JACKSON, No. 1:25-cv-01426-SAB (PC) 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE 13 v. TO THIS ACTION 14 PATWIN HORN, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING ACTION BE DISMISSED 15 Defendants. FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF 16 (ECF No. 13) 17

18 19 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 20 U.S.C. § 1983. 21 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed December 29, 22 2025. 23 I. 24 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 25 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 26 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 27 Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 28 1 “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 2 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 3 see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 4 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 5 is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 6 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 7 do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 8 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 9 participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 10 2002). 11 Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 12 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 13 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 14 facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that 15 each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 16 Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 17 unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” 18 falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 19 II. 20 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 21 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the 22 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The alleged incident at issue in this action took 23 place at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP). 24 On December 29, 2024, Plaintiff slipped and fell in a puddle of water caused by a leaking 25 pipe in front of his cell. Plaintiff injured his head, neck, and back. Plaintiff was taken to the 26 Correctional Treatment Center where he received a neck brace before being transported to 27 Adventist Health in Delano. 28 /// 1 After returning from the hospital to KVSP, Plaintiff noticed a “Caution” sign put up in the 2 location where the fall occurred that was not there at the time of the incident or the weeks 3 preceding thereto. 4 Footage from video cameras in the dayroom would have shown the condition leading to 5 the slip and fall, as well as subsequent actions of Defendants who should have preserved the 6 video footage. 7 Prior to the incident, Plaintiff had notified Defendants to put in work orders for 8 maintenance to fix the problem multiple times which they continued to neglect. The leakage 9 occurred for the entire months of September through December. 10 Work order are now placed via computer, rather than in writing, and it is believed 11 computer records would show none were for the leakage causing puddles resulting in Plaintiff’s 12 injuries. 13 Compared to other prisons, KVSP has an extensive history of incidents of slip and falls, 14 negligence in maintenance of the plumbing problems, and aging/leaking pipes since the prison 15 opened in 2005. It takes months for repairs after work orders are placed, and there is a policy of 16 “temporary fixes” with non-stop leakage problems known to the Warden, Chief Plans Operator, 17 and plumbers. 18 Plaintiff alleges that plant operations claims to not have received a work order in this 19 instance. Supervisor did not conduct routine safety checks on piping conditions or visual 20 inspections of conditions of the facility, despite a duty to maintain the facilities. 21 An audit by the Office of the Inspector General would likely show a custom or practice of 22 negligently responding to pipe leaks (since a 2006 aging pipes report was release), shower 23 flooding, and other leakage complaints at KVSP. Over thirty civil rights actions have been filed 24 against officers and supervisors at KVSP between 2008 and 2024. 25 Despite numerous complaints, no protocol was established for video evidence 26 preservation when responding to slip and fall incidents, where several of the lawsuits claimed the 27 injuries were the result of supervisory implemented policies. 28 /// 1 III. 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. Conditions of Confinement/Slippery Floors 4 The “ ‘treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is 5 confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.’ ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 6 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “ensure that inmates receive 7 adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” and to “ ‘take reasonable measures to 8 guarantee the safety of the inmates.’ ” Id. 9 To establish an Eighth Amendment claim on a condition of confinement, such as an 10 excessive risk to health or safety, a prisoner-plaintiff must show: (1) an objectively, sufficiently 11 serious, deprivation, and (2) that the official was, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the 12 inmate's health or safety. Id. at 834. The objective prong may be satisfied by the existence of a 13 serious medical need if the failure to address that need “could result in further significant injury 14 or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 15 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant is deliberately indifferent if he knows that 16 an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 17 reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The defendant must not only “be aware of 18 facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 19 he “must also draw the inference.” Id. There must be “harm caused by the indifference,” although 20 the harm does not need to be substantial.

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