Dermody v. Sticco

465 A.2d 948, 191 N.J. Super. 192
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedMay 5, 1983
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 465 A.2d 948 (Dermody v. Sticco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dermody v. Sticco, 465 A.2d 948, 191 N.J. Super. 192 (N.J. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

191 N.J. Super. 192 (1983)
465 A.2d 948

WILLIAM DERMODY, PLAINTIFF,
v.
ELMER A. STICCO, MICHAEL R. ROSSI, JR., GEORGE L. HERBERT, DATRON SYSTEMS, INC., AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS CORP., DEFENDANTS.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division Hudson County.

Decided May 5, 1983.

*193 Rabin & Silverman for plaintiff (by I. Stephen Rabin).

Kasen and Kraemer for defendants (by Waldron Kraemer).

*194 CASTANO, J.S.C.

This class action, tried without a jury, arises out of a short form corporate merger in which a defendant corporation, owner of 90% of the stock of a subsidiary, acquired all of the remaining shares of the subsidiary and merged it with another wholly owned subsidiary pursuant to N.J.S.A. 14A:10-5 and N.J.S.A. 14A:10-7(4).

The issue before me is whether the minority shareholders of the subsidiary, whose approval of the merger was not required by the statute, were paid "fair value" for their interest. I find that they were.

At common law the consent of all stockholders was required to carry out corporate mergers and a minority of the shareholders could always block a merger if it was not to their liking or for no reason at all. To protect majorities from arbitrary minorities all states have enacted statutes under which a merger may be ratified by less than a unanimous vote. See Note, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1453 (1966).

In New Jersey today, mergers proposed by the directors need be approved by only a majority or two-thirds of the shareholders, depending on when the corporation was organized. N.J.S.A. 14A:10-3.

In addition, New Jersey has adopted a short form merger statute, derived from the Delaware Corporation Act. N.J.S.A. 14A:10-5. It provides that a corporation owning at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class and series of another corporation's stock may merge such other corporation into itself without any shareholder approval at all.

In effect, the parent corporation is authorized to buy out the minority shareholders of the corporation to be merged by converting their shares into cash whether they want to sell or not. N.J.S.A. 14A:10-2(2)(b) and (c). The only limitation is that they must be paid "fair value" for their shares. The statute has never been construed in a reported opinion in this State.

*195 The essential facts in this case were stipulated.

In December of 1979, defendant International Controls Corp. (ICC), a Florida corporation was the owner of more than 90 percent of the outstanding shares of common stock of defendant Datron Systems, Inc. (Datron), a New Jersey corporation, and was the owner of all of its outstanding preferred stock. Datron was a manufacturer and distributor of electro-mechanical and microwave transmission components, electronic relays, power conversion products and steam traps used mainly by the refining industry.

The issued stock of Datron at the time consisted of 5,336,904 shares of common stock, 100,000 cumulative preferred shares and 26,000 cumulative convertible serial preferred shares. On the financial side, Datron was in arrears on its preferred stock dividends in the amount of $9,747,000 and was faced with the obligation of commencing sinking fund payments to redeem the convertible shares within 15 months thereafter.

On December 4, 1979, ICC announced a short form "triangular" merger plan in which it proposed to merge Datron with Nortand Systems, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICC. Datron was to be the surviving corporation as a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICC. The merger was effected as proposed on December 24, 1979.

The plan provided that the Datron common stockholders would be paid $1.25 per share. The figure had been determined by a major investment banking firm retained by ICC to provide an independent appraisal. A member of that firm who was defendants' expert at the trial testified that his firm's assignment was to deliver its opinion as to a fair price rather than to marshal evidence in support of any prior valuation made by defendants.

Plaintiff, who owned 1,000 shares of Datron's common stock, was the only one of 470 minority holders — other than those not contacted because of a change of address — who did not tender his shares and accept the payment offered. He was of the *196 opinion that $1.25 a share was not "fair value" and instituted this suit to recover the difference between the offer and what he deemed to be the fair value of the stock.

Originally, his complaint charged Datron, ICC and several individual defendants with self-dealing and with a violation of their fiduciary duties. Those allegations were abandoned prior to the pretrial conference, however, and the sole issue litigated was whether the shareholders as a class had received "fair value," the action having been certified as a class action on behalf of all of the minority shareholders. Defendants acknowledged that they — not the plaintiffs — had the burden of proof on that issue.

The "burden of establishing the fairness of the transaction" in merger litigation is always "on those seeking to uphold the merger," Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 477 (1967), because those

... who control the affairs and conduct of a corporation, whether public or private, have a fiduciary duty to all the stockholders and the powers they have by virtue of their majority status are powers held by them in trust. [citation omitted] They cannot use their powers for their own personal advantage and to the detriment of minority stockholders. Berkowitz v. Power Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 45 (Ch.Div. 1975).

A fairness controversy, in effect, tests whether that fiduciary duty has been breached and it is only logical that the burden should be on the fiduciaries to justify that they have not violated their trust.

While there is "no inflexible test as to what fairness is * * *," Brundage v. The New Jersey Zinc Co., supra, 48 N.J. at 482, an assessment of fair value requires consideration of "proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissable in court." Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), rev'g, 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981).

To adjudicate fairness, therefore, a court must first consider separately the alternate methods of valuation proposed and then assign to each the evidentiary weight it deserves in the *197 context in which it is being offered. See Annotation, Valuation of stock of dissenting stockholders in case of consolidation or merger of corporation, sale of its assets, or the like, 48 A.L.R.3d 430 (1973).

As was pointed out in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952):

* * * all relevant value factors must be considered in arriving at a fair value * * * But the requirement that consideration be given to all relevant factors entering into the determination of value does not mean that any one factor is in every case important or that it must be given a definite weight in evaluation * * the relative importance of several tests of value depends on the circumstances.

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Bluebook (online)
465 A.2d 948, 191 N.J. Super. 192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dermody-v-sticco-njsuperctappdiv-1983.