Dept. of Human Services v. J. S. F.

347 Or. App. 517

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: A187149
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

No. 165 February 25, 2026 517

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of R. F., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. S. F., Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 24JU00148; Petition Number 114967; A187149 (Control) In the Matter of S. F., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. S. F., Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 24JU00149; Petition Number 114967; A187150

Francis G. Troy II, Judge Submitted November 20, 2025. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. 518 Dept. of Human Services v. J. S. F.

Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 517 (2026) 519

AOYAGI, P. J. Father appeals juvenile court judgments asserting dependency jurisdiction over his son R, born in 2020, and his daughter S, born in 2022. Mother is not a party to this appeal, so we limit our discussion to the jurisdictional bases pertaining to father. After a contested hearing, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over the children on the bases that father (1) failed to maintain a safe environment for R and S because he allowed them to live in an unsafe home, placing them at risk of harm, and (2) sexually abused another child—P, born in 2018, who is R’s and S’s half-sister— placing S at risk of harm if in his care. Father raises two assignments of error on appeal, one for each child. As to each child, he argues that the evidence was legally insuffi- cient to support the assertion of dependency jurisdiction. He alternatively requests de novo review of the finding that he sexually abused P. As explained below, we affirm. The juvenile court is authorized to assert depen- dency jurisdiction over a child whose condition and cir- cumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious loss or injury that is likely to be realized unless the court asserts dependency jurisdiction. ORS 419B.100(1)(c); Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391, 397-98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). The petitioner, usually and in this case the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS), bears the burden of proof. Id. That burden includes demonstrat- ing a nexus between the allegedly risk-causing conditions and circumstances and a threat of harm to the child of the type, degree, and duration necessary to justify juvenile court intervention into the constitutionally protected family sphere. Dept. of Human Services v. S. D. I., 259 Or App 116, 121, 312 P3d 608 (2013). Sexual abuse of another child. We begin with the juvenile court’s finding that father sexually abused P, as relevant to the assertion of dependency jurisdiction over S. Father does not contest that, if he sexually abused P, there would be a current, nonspeculative risk of harm to S. See State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. T. S., 214 Or App 184, 195, 164 P3d 308, rev den, 343 Or 363 (2007) (as a general princi- ple, “it is easy to infer the likelihood of harm to a child 520 Dept. of Human Services v. J. S. F.

by past physical or sexual abuse of other children in the home”). Father argues that the evidence was “insufficient” to make that finding, however, because “[P]’s accusations against father were uncorroborated, lacked detail, and were likely untrue given the circumstances of her disclosures.” Alternately, he requests de novo review of that finding. On non-de novo review, we “view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the [juvenile] court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit that outcome.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. P., 257 Or App 633, 639, 307 P3d 444 (2013). Here, having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to allow a finding that father sexually abused P. P reported sexual abuse by father in two separate forensic interviews and, notwithstanding some variations in her accounts, consistently reported that father touched her genital area with his fingers. Father alternatively asks us to find on de novo review that he did not sexually abuse P. De novo review is discretionary in juvenile dependency matters other than termination of parental rights, ORS 19.415(3)(b) and, as a general matter, is limited to “exceptional cases,” ORAP 5.40 (8)(c). We are unpersuaded to conduct de novo review in this case. The juvenile court made an express finding on a disputed factual issue that it recognized was very important to the disposition. See ORAP 5.40(8)(d) (identifying the exis- tence of express findings as one factor that may be relevant in deciding whether to conduct de novo review). Because “we are in no better position than the juvenile court to dis- cern the objective ‘truth’ of what actually occurred,” we are “unlikely to substitute our judgment for the juvenile court’s in such a case, even though we could, because, at least absent unusual circumstances, we would simply be reweigh- ing conflicting evidence regarding a disputed issue.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. H., 313 Or App 560, 563, 496 P3d 704, rev den, 368 Or 637 (2021) (footnote omitted). There is noth- ing about the evidentiary record in this case or the juvenile court’s reasoning in this case that makes it an outlier or Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 517 (2026) 521

otherwise causes us the type of concern that might war- rant de novo review. Also, as in T. H., which involved sim- ilar circumstances, “this is not a case where the evidence so strongly favors a different outcome that we are willing to substitute our judgment for that of the lower court by conducting de novo review.” Id. at 562. We therefore decline de novo review, and we affirm the juvenile court’s finding regarding P. It follows that we affirm the assertion of depen- dency jurisdiction over S. Unsafe home. Father next argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to assert dependency jurisdiction over R and S based on father failing to maintain a safe envi- ronment for them by allowing them to live in an unsafe home. Father argues that the “home was clean and habitable at the time of the hearing.” The difficulty with that argument is that, although ODHS included unsanitary conditions in the pleaded allegation, the juvenile court did not take jurisdic- tion on that basis. The court explained that it was not per- suaded on that issue, given the evidence, and therefore was “striking the word ‘unsanitary’ from that allegation.” As we understand it, at least as to father, the found jurisdictional basis regarding an unsafe home pertains only to an unse- cured firearm to which the children had access. Father has not challenged that finding or jurisdictional basis, which applied to both R and S. Dept. of Human Services v. E. M. S. M., 339 Or App 620, 625, 568 P3d 1004 (2025) (explaining that we will not address jurisdictional bases as to which the appellant has provided no argument). We therefore affirm the taking of dependency jurisdiction over both children. Affirmed.