Dept. of Human Services v. D. M. B.

Opinion

718 September 2, 2026 No. 848

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of L. C. M. B., a Child.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent,

v. D. M. B., Appellant.

Lane County Circuit Court 24JU03635; A189896 (Control)

In the Matter of H. D. L. B., a Child.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent,

v. D. M. B., Appellant.

Lane County Circuit Court 24JU03637; A189897

Stephen W. Morgan, Judge. Argued and submitted July 22, 2026. Holly Telerant, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission.

Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 718 (2026) 719

Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed.

______________

* Lagesen, Chief Judge, vice Pagán, Judge.

720 Dept. of Human Services v. D. M. B.

AOYAGI, P. J. Father appeals judgments terminating his parental rights to his children, L and H, who were eight and seven years old, respectively, at the time of the termination trial. Father raises 28 assignments of error, in which he challenges each of the unfitness bases as to each child, the bestinterests findings, and the ultimate decision to terminate his rights. “We review the record in proceedings for termination of parental rights de novo, ORS 19.415(3)(a), and determine anew whether to terminate parental rights.” Dept. of Human Services v. J. M.-A., 333 Or App 334, 336, 554 P3d 263 (2024). In this case, having carefully considered the evidence and found the facts anew, we ultimately agree with the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) that termination is warranted and in the children’s best interests , notwithstanding the substantial progress made by father since the children’s plans were changed to adoption. Accordingly, we affirm.

Legal standard. A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights based on unfitness, ORS 419B.504, if it determines “by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child or ward and [that] integration of the child or ward into the home of the parent or parents is improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.” Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. K., 270 Or App 1, 16, 346 P3d 1254, rev den, 357 Or 324, cert den, 577 US 944 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ORS 419B.521(1) (“The facts on the basis of which the rights of the parents are terminated, unless admitted, must be established by clear and convincing evidence * * *.”).

Courts engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether a parent is unfit. First, the court must determine whether “the parent has engaged in some conduct or is characterized by some condition” that “is ‘seriously detrimental’ to the child.” State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 145, 36 P3d 490 (2001) (quoting ORS 419B.504). If so, second, the court must determine whether “ ‘integration of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable within

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 718 (2026) 721

a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.’ ” Id. (quoting ORS 419B.504). Both the “serious detriment ” and “reasonable time” inquiries are “child-specific” and require evidence regarding the particular child’s needs “in psychological and developmental terms.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. M. M., 248 Or App 352, 367, 368, 273 P3d 322, rev den, 352 Or 170 (2012). In this context, “ ‘[r]easonable time’ means a period of time that is reasonable given a child or ward’s emotional and developmental needs and ability to form and maintain lasting attachments.” ORS 419A.004(27). Importantly, “a parent’s fitness must be measured at the time of the parental rights termination trial.” State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Simmons, 342 Or 76, 96, 149 P3d 1124 (2006) (emphasis in original).

If a parent is deemed unfit under ORS 419B.504, the court must next consider the child’s best interests. The court may terminate the parent’s parental rights only if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that doing so is in the child’s best interests. ORS 419B.500; Dept. of Human Services v. D. E. P., 315 Or App 566, 570, 502 P3d 764 (2012). Relevant considerations include “(1) the strength of the bond between the parent and child; (2) whether severing that bond will help or harm the child; (3) the benefits to the child of terminating parental rights; and (4) the risk of harm to the child posed by termination.” Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. B., 321 Or App 50, 53, 515 P3d 927 (2022).

Analysis. In this case, ODHS alleged, and the juvenile court found, that father is unfit in 11 different ways. Two of those ways parallel dependency jurisdictional bases— unfitness based on father’s “[a]ddictive or habitual use of intoxicating liquors, cannabis, or controlled substances” and unfitness based on “[e]xposure of the children to domestic violence.” The parties disagree as to how related the other nine are. Father contends that it was error for the juvenile court to rely on unfitness bases different from the dependency jurisdictional bases and that, in any event, ODHS did not prove current unfitness. ODHS responds that the statutes do not limit unfitness determinations to the dependency jurisdictional bases, that that issue is unpreserved for appeal, and that any error is certainly not plain. ODHS 722 Dept. of Human Services v. D. M. B.

further argues that it has proven each of the unfitness bases and that any one basis is enough to terminate.

We begin with whether father was unfit at the time of the termination trial based on his “[a]ddictive or habitual use of intoxicating liquors, cannabis, or controlled substances .” Father started using methamphetamine as a teenager and used it for nearly all his adult life. In the 15 months before the termination trial, however, he had stopped using. That is the longest that father had ever gone without using methamphetamine. At the time of trial, he was living in a clean and supportive environment at an Oxford House, working nights, and meaningfully engaged in therapy.

ODHS argues that, “although father had abstained from methamphetamine for approximately 15 months [at the time of trial], his circumstances indicated that he was at a high risk of relapse.” We are unpersuaded that father’s circumstances at the time of trial put him “at a high risk of relapse” and decline to assume a future relapse. The record suggests that father is committed to recovery. The longstanding and severe nature of his addiction is a fact that he must deal with, and certainly there are more things that he could do to support his recovery, such as attending support meetings, finding a mentor, and ending his relationship with mother, who continues to regularly use methamphetamine. But we are mindful that the focus here is on father’s fitness at the time of the termination trial, Simmons, 342 Or at 96, and we are unpersuaded that father is at such a high risk of relapse as to be currently unfit based on that risk itself.

There is no question, however, that father’s longstanding addiction and habitual use of methamphetamine has been seriously detrimental to L and H, and, in our view, it has led to a situation in which integration of L and H into his home is improbable within a reasonable time, notwithstanding father’s substantial recent progress. In short, at the time of trial, father’s longstanding addiction continued to impair his fitness to parent in that his own current needs—which must be met for him to maintain his hardwon sobriety—are incompatible with parenting these particular children.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 718 (2026) 723

Both L and H have suffered serious harm over a long period of time as a result of their parents’ substance abuse and domestic violence. L and H have been wards of the court on and off for most of their lives, and both children have heightened needs. Over the life of three dependency cases, the first of which began in 2017 when L was a baby, L has been removed from parents’ care four times and H three times. H suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), has nightmares, and is uncomfortable around men. L suffers from “other trauma and stressor-related disorder” (which is less severe than PTSD). As a result of past events and their ongoing effects, both children need a securely attached caregiver and stable permanent home immediately . The children are bonded to mother and father, but that attachment is insecure. Both children experience anxiety and distress related to their relationships with mother and father.

At trial, father testified that he was ready for the children to immediately transition into his care. He proposed that they could live with him at the Oxford House, where he resides in a single bedroom and shares common spaces with eight other men in recovery. Father works nights and acknowledged that he would need to get a different job to be able to care for the children. He expressed his intention to promote a continuing relationship between the children and his half-sister, their current resource parent with whom they have lived for two years and to whom they are securely attached, and stated a preference that the children gradually transition from her care to his care.

Although we do not doubt father’s sincerity, we are persuaded on this record, by clear and convincing evidence, that father is presently unfit to parent L and H. These particular children have heightened needs as a result of past trauma, including the need for private spaces to calm down when they are upset. The children’s behavior caused difficulties for group living when they previously lived with mother in a different Oxford House, and, as previously mentioned, H is uncomfortable around men. Father’s living situation— which is entirely appropriate for him and indeed necessary for his long-term recovery—is therefore incompatible with 724 Dept. of Human Services v. D. M. B.

his parenting these children. Father’s work schedule is also incompatible, and he would need to change jobs to care for the children, as he acknowledges. We also find that, despite his good intentions, father is currently unlikely to promote a healthy relationship between the children and his half- sister, the one person to whom they are securely attached, given that father himself presently does not have a relationship with her and has conflicted feelings about his family and how they have dealt with his drug addiction and its impact on his children.

To be clear, our disposition does not turn on any discrediting of the evidence regarding father’s recovery. We are persuaded on this record that father had not used for 15 months at the time of the termination trial, that he is actively in recovery from drug addiction, and that he is committed to that recovery. His current lifestyle is part and parcel of that recovery, which he must necessarily prioritize above all else at this point. The problem is that father’s longstanding methamphetamine addiction has been seriously detrimental to L and H, and, although his current circumstances relating to addiction make him unfit in a different way from his past circumstances, they are nonetheless incompatible with parenting these children now or anytime soon. And, given their specific histories and specific emotional and developmental needs, these children must have permanency now. We therefore find father unfit to parent L and H based on current conditions arising from his historical use of methamphetamine and ongoing addiction for which he is currently in active recovery.

We also find father unfit based on his inability to protect the children from mother’s substance use and resulting abusive or neglectful behavior. Father contends that it was improper for the juvenile court to consider unfitness allegations not directly aligned with dependency jurisdictional bases, but he did not raise that legal issue below, so it is unpreserved, and we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (“Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.”). Mother and father have a difficult and codependent relationship. Father remains

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 718 (2026) 725

invested in that relationship, despite mother’s ongoing methamphetamine use and the risk that it poses to his own recovery and to L and H if exposed to her. Father has made significant progress in domestic violence treatment, which has certainly improved the situation, but his relationship with mother remains fraught and challenging. Moreover, between mother and father, the children have primarily been parented by mother in the past, and father has difficulty making independent decisions for and regarding the children. On this record, we are convinced that father would be unwilling or unable to parent L and H independently of mother (whose rights have been terminated), that his ongoing inability to protect them from her substance abuse is seriously detrimental to them, and that their immediate integration into father’s home is not possible for that reason as well.

Having concluded that father is unfit to parent L and H for at least two reasons, ORS 419B.504, we decline to consider the other unfitness allegations. As for the children’s best interests, that determination is not nearly as close as the unfitness determination. At this point in their lives, termination of father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments terminating father’s parental rights as to H and L.

Affirmed.