RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3074-24
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
A.T.1,
Respondent-Appellant. ____________________________
Argued May 18, 2026 – Decided June 1, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Children and Families, Division of Child Protection and Permanency, Case ID No. 24-0020.
Eric R. Foley argued the cause for appellant (Guzzo Law Firm, attorneys; Eric R. Foley, on the brief).
1 We use initials to identify the parties and certain witnesses in order to preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). Alicia Y. Bergman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alicia Y. Bergman, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A.T. appeals from a May 22, 2025 final agency decision of the Assistant
Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF), Division of
Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) adopting an Administrative Law
Judge's (ALJ) initial decision that affirmed the DCF's substantiated findings
based on A.T.'s action that neglected R.C., who was under his supervision as an
Assistant Family Service Worker (AFSW), when he left R.C. on the side of the
road during a transport to a supervised visit with R.C.'s family and accordingly
placed A.T. on the Child Abuse Record Information (CARI) registry. Because
we derive nothing arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable concerning the
Department's determination as it is supported by substantial credible evidence,
and comports with the applicable law, we affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from the record of the hearing before the
ALJ. On August 28, 2023, the date of the incident, A.T. had been an ASFW for
twenty-two years. A.T. testified he transported R.C. to visits with his mother,
A-3074-24 2 sibling, doctor appointments, and psychological appointments for
approximately two months.
R.B., R.C.'s resource parent, testified that on the day of the incident, A.T.
arrived at his home to transport R.C. to a supervised visit with his mother. R.B.
stated that A.T. returned back to his home approximately ten minutes later and
complained about R.C.'s behavior for roughly the first five minutes that
followed. R.B. also testified his other son, M.B., informed him that R.C. was
not home.
R.B. then asked A.T. where R.C. was, and A.T. told him that R.C. had
"jumped out of the car." After R.B. learned the location of where A.T. left R.C.,
R.B. stated he immediately grabbed his keys and went to locate R.C. because
the road where R.C. was left had no residential areas, houses, or sidewalks, and
he was worried about R.C.'s safety.
R.B. located R.C. two miles from his home. R.B. stated R.C. told him he
was simply tapping on the side of the car, before A.T. suddenly stopped the car,
hit the back of his seat to get his attention, pulled over, and told R.C. to get out
and drove off. R.B. testified he then drove R.C. to his scheduled supervised
visit and drove him back to his house after it was concluded.
A-3074-24 3 Investigation Report
Roughly two weeks after the incident an intake worker investigating
R.C.'s mother for an unrelated issue spoke with R.C. During her conversation
R.C. disclosed that A.T. left him alone in a remote area. The intake worker
called the child abuse hotline and described R.C.'s allegations. Pursuant to th e
referral, DCF's Office of the Conflict Investigation Unit assigned Kelly
Williams to investigate the matter. In December 2022, pursuant to Williams'
investigation, A.T. was substantiated for neglect based on his conduct during
the incident.
In substantiating A.T. for neglect, Williams found that four aggravating
factors under N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5(a) applied. First, she concluded, the "child's
safety require[d] separation of the child from the perpetrator," N.J.A.C. 3A:10-
7.5(a)(7), based on R.C.'s statement to his therapist he was worried about his
safety and feared he would be abandoned again. Second she determined a
finding of "[i]nstitutional neglect," N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5(a)(1), was warranted as
R.C. was a ward of the State, and was placed at risk of harm by A.T., who
although was assigned to ensure his safety, left him alone in an unfamiliar
remote area intentionally. Third, Williams concluded the "tender age, delayed
developmental status, or other vulnerability of the child," factor enumerated in
A-3074-24 4 N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5(a)(3), applied because R.C. was intentionally left in a
remote area from the resource home, had no viable way to call for assistance,
has not lived in the United States for a majority of his life, was unfamiliar with
the area where he was abandoned, and his most recent location was his third
foster home placement which he had been at for only a single month. The final
aggravating factor she found applicable was N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5(a)(4), based on
the "significant or lasting psychological or emotional impact" on R.C. Williams
premised this finding on statements made by R.C.'s therapist which confirmed
he was traumatized as he continued to discuss the incident months later and his
expression of fear that he would be abandoned again. The fact that A.T.'s
conduct was an isolated incident was deemed a mitigating factor under N.J.A.C.
3A:10-7.5(b)(3). On balance, Williams determined the aggravating factors
outweighed the lone mitigating factor.
A.T. appealed the DCF's findings and the matter was transferred to the
Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case. The ALJ heard
testimony over the course of two non-consecutive days from R.C.'s therapist,
Cindy Scott, L.S.W., Williams, R.C., and R.B. A.T. also testified. Additionally,
DCF presented documentary evidence at the hearing, including an investigation
summary of the August 28 incident.
A-3074-24 5 OAL Hearing
Williams testified that she worked in the Conflict Unit, which investigates
allegations involving DCF employees. Williams explained that A.T. was an
AFSW worker assigned to transport R.C. to and from visits. She described R.C.
as a sixteen-year-old who had immigrated to America from Brazil, had
experienced trauma with his birth family, has been through multiple placements,
and was unfamiliar with the area where he was living at the time of the incident.
Williams stated that the referral alleged A.T. left R.C. on the side of a
remote road after an argument between them during transport. Williams
testified that R.C. reported being picked up alone by A.T. for a visit, during
which he listened to music and had his head down while sitting in the passenger
side rear seat of the vehicle. After an argument, R.C. stated A.T. accused R.C.
of banging on the car, pulled over, and told R.C. to get out of the vehicle.
Williams also stated that during the interview, R.C. reported feeling scared and
concerned as he was unfamiliar with the area and stated that he had no reliable
means of contacting anyone for help as the rural area had spotty cellular service.
Williams also provided that during the interview, R.C. said he no longer felt
comfortable being transported by A.T. after the incident.
A-3074-24 6 Williams also interviewed R.B., who stated that A.T. returned to the
resource home without R.C., and only after being prompted did he reveal R.C.
had been left on the side of the road. R.B. stated as soon as he learned what
A.T. had done, he immediately went to locate R.C. as he did not think it was
appropriate for him to be left on the side of the road in an area to which he was
unfamiliar.
Williams testified that A.T. admitted to leaving R.C. but did not express
remorse, stating he did not see a concern because R.C. "thinks he’s grown."
Williams concluded that A.T.'s actions constituted neglect, citing the child's
vulnerability, the remote location, and the lasting psychological impact.
Scott testified that she had been providing intensive in-home therapy to
R.C. since March 2023. Scott described R.C. as quiet and polite, but identified
he had abandonment issues, distrust of adults, and emotional regulation issues.
She explained that after the incident, R.C. experienced a setback in therapy, as
it exacerbated his fear of abandonment, created feelings of self-blame, and an
increased distrust of adults. Scott stated that R.C. continued to bring up the
incident from time to time during their clinical sessions. Scott testified she
believed the emotional impact was significant given the duration of time from
when the incident happened to what was then current as R.C. continued to raise
A-3074-24 7 the issue during their sessions. Scott also stated she believed R.C. still required
intensive therapeutic intervention.
R.C. testified that on the day of the incident, A.T. picked him up in the
afternoon to transport him to a family visit. R.C. stated he was listening to
music, tapping on the side of the car, and then A.T. stopped the car and banged
on the back seat. R.C. testified that after an expletive-laden exchange, A.T.
exited the car, opened the passenger door, told R.C. to get out of the car, and
left him on the side of the road. R.C. also stated there were no houses,
residences, businesses, sidewalks, road shoulders, or people around and only
saw trees nearby.
R.C. described the incident as something that still scared him and he
regularly speaks to his therapist about it. He testified that eventually R.B. found
him and drove him to his visit. R.C. stated that he apologized to A.T., but A.T.
ignored him. R.C. also stated that the incident made him feel unsafe and
distrustful of all people, and he did not want A.T. to transport him again.
R.B. stated that he had been caring for R.C. for over a year and described
him as hardworking and a positive presence in the home. R.B. recounted that
after A.T. left with R.C., A.T. returned alone and only after inquiring with
respect to R.C.'s whereabouts, did A.T. reveal R.C. "jumped out of the car."
A-3074-24 8 R.B. also stated that at no point upon his return to the resource house did
A.T. ask for help, merely commenting upon R.C.'s actions as "[d]isruptive."
R.B. testified he was concerned for R.C.'s safety, describing the area as remote
and unsafe, and stated that R.C. was in shock when found. R.B. also testified
that the incident compounded upon R.C.'s distrust of the DCF. R.B. also stated
that he and R.C. continued to discuss the incident for as long as five months
after and that R.C. struggled with the emotional aftermath, feeling anger and
distrust toward the agency.
In his defense, A.T. testified that despite working as a transportation aide,
he had not received formal training on handling behavioral issues or provided
with supervision protocols. He stated that on the day of the incident, R.C. was
banging on the car, switching between hitting the glass and the side panel of the
car. A.T. testified that while he was driving, he waved his hand in front of R.C.'s
face because he was afraid R.C. would damage the vehicle. He stated that R.C.
acknowledged his attempts but continued to bang on the car, and he then pulled
the car over and put it in park.
A.T. testified that R.C. then said, "what the F [are] you doing," to which
A.T. told R.C. "that I've been trying to get [your] attention to stop the noise
[because] it's deafening and it's dangerous" and A.T. was "afraid he's going to
A-3074-24 9 break the vehicle['s] . . . window." A.T. testified that R.C. was very aggressive
and agitated and R.C. had stated "it's not your f***ing car, what are you going
to f***ing do." A.T. claimed he did not tell R.C. to get out of the vehicle but
rather he stated they would not be continuing to the visit and offered to return
R.C. to the resource home if he stopped banging on the car. A.T. alleged that at
that point, R.C. started to exit the vehicle.
A.T. testified that as R.C. exited the vehicle he asked him where he was
going and R.C. then violently slammed the door shut, shaking the car. A.T.
stated he attempted to reach the assigned case worker, but his phone call wasn't
going through, and decided the best course of action would be to drive back to
the resource home to get assistance from R.B. A.T. alleged that upon arrival at
the resource home his conversation with R.B. was short, and he drove R.B. to
the location where he left R.C. After R.C. got in R.B.'s vehicle, R.B. told him
he would drive R.C. to the visit and that when they arrived at the visit he
accepted R.C.'s apology.
A.T. testified that he acknowledged in hindsight he should not have
allowed R.C. to get out of his car but maintained that he did not believe R.C.
was at risk because he was in a "safe environment and [his] intention was to get
help immediately." A.T. stated he was not aware of R.C. having expressed
A-3074-24 10 concerns about the incident until hearing the testimony during the OAL
proceedings.
DCF's Initial and Final Decisions
The ALJ issued a detailed written decision, denying A.T.'s appeal and
sustaining the DCF's substantiated finding of neglect. The ALJ carefully
weighed the testimony and documentary evidence, ultimately crediting the
testimony provided by Williams, R.B., and R.C.'s therapist. The ALJ found that
on August 28, 2023, A.T., a transportation aide with over twenty years of
experience, was responsible for transporting R.C., a seventeen-year-old child in
DCF custody, to a supervised family visit. The ALJ noted that A.T. had
transported R.C. on prior occasions and was familiar with his duties as a
transportation aide, which primarily involved ensuring the safe transportation of
children in DCF's care.
The ALJ first recounted the conflicting testimony regarding the incident.
According to R.C., he was listening to music and tapping on the car window
when A.T. pulled the vehicle over, yelled, exchanged expletives, ordered him
out of the car, and drove off. Conversely, A.T. claimed that R.C. exited the
vehicle voluntarily and that he attempted to get help by returning to the resource
home.
A-3074-24 11 After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ found that A.T. knowingly and
intentionally left R.C. on the roadside for an estimated period of ten to fifteen
minutes. The ALJ explained that the location where R.C. was left 2 was "remote,
[] heavily wooded, . . . [lacked] visible homes, businesses, or buildings that R.C.
could go to for assistance . . . had poor cell-phone reception and was unfamiliar
to R.C." The ALJ further credited R.B.'s testimony, who described A.T. as
spending several minutes complaining about R.C.'s behavior before disclosing
that R.C. had been left on the side of the road. The ALJ recounted Scott's
statements to Williams that the incident traumatized R.C. The ALJ also
recounted her clinical summary which stated that she found the incident had
been a significant therapeutic setback even more than a year later and that R.C.
fostered significant distrust towards the DCPP.
In recounting Williams' findings, the ALJ noted that in A.T.'s interview
with Williams he showed little remorse and was unconcerned for R.C.'s safety.
The ALJ determined that A.T. failed to exercise the minimum degree of care
required of a DCF employee supervising a child. The ALJ concluded that the
facts before him provided that A.T. made no effort to remain close by, call for
2 We have viewed the photo exhibits of the area in the appendices. A-3074-24 12 help, or deescalate the situation once R.C. exited the vehicle, and thus his actions
constituted a clear failure to provide proper supervision.
The ALJ found that after Williams weighed the aggravating and mitigating
factors, she concluded the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating
circumstances. Specifically, the ALJ recounted the four aggravating factors
Williams found applicable: (1) R.C.'s safety required separation from A.T.; (2)
R.C.'s vulnerability due to unfamiliarity with the area and recent immigration;
(3) R.C.'s significant and lasting psychological and emotional impact as reported
by his therapist; and (4) the institutional nature of the neglect because of A.T.'s
role as a DCF employee. The ALJ also explained Williams' finding that the sole
mitigating factor was the isolated nature of the incident and affirmed her
conclusion this was insufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors.
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that a preponderance of the evidence
showed that A.T. failed to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing
proper supervision to R.C., and that his conduct of leaving "R.C. on the side of
the road, plac[ed] his physical, mental, and emotional condition in danger of
being impaired." The ALJ held that A.T.'s actions constituted inadequate
supervision and neglect pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b), and affirmed the
substantiated finding of neglect.
A-3074-24 13 On May 22, 2025, the Assistant Commissioner issued a final decision and
found A.T.'s "exceptions . . . without merit" and that the ALJ "provided a well-
reasoned and thorough [i]nitial [d]ecision supporting his findings and credibility
determinations." The Assistant Commissioner adopted the ALJ's initial decision
and concluded A.T. neglected R.C. pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), affirmed
the substantiated finding of neglect, and ordered A.T. to be placed on the CARI
registry.
On appeal, A.T. urges us to reverse the final agency decision contending
his actions were at no time willful or reckless to support the determination that
he neglected A.T. because "his actions were objectively reasonable under the
circumstances he face[d]." A.T. maintains that his actions did not "even rise to
the level of mere negligence" and argues the "substantiated" finding should be
reversed and changed to either "not established" or "unfounded." A.T. also
contends that the court's alleged failure to resolve material disputes of fact, make
specific credibility findings, and resolve the conflicting testimony, specifically
R.C.'s, requires a reversal of the "substantiated" finding and remand the matter.
A.T. further contends that the judge failed to make independent findings as to
the aggravating and mitigating factors and the lack of an independent analysis
A-3074-24 14 mandates the matter be reversed and remanded for further consideration of the
governing factors. We reject all of A.T.'s arguments.
II.
Our scope of review of a final agency decision is circumscribed. Russo
v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). When
reviewing an agency decision, we examine (1) whether the agency action
violated "express or implied legislative policies," (2) whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the agency's decision, and (3) whe ther in
applying the law to the facts, the agency reached a conclusion "that could not
reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors." Allstars Auto
Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018). Where an
agency's decision satisfies these criteria, we accord substantial deference to its
fact-finding and legal conclusions, recognizing "the agency's 'expertise and
superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing
Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting Greenwood v. State
Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). We do not "substitute [our]
own judgment for the agency's." Ibid. (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483
(2007)). The party challenging the final administrative action has the burden to
A-3074-24 15 demonstrate grounds for reversal. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171
(2014) (citing In re J.S., 431 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div. 2013)).
Further, it is well settled that "'[a]n administrative agency's interpretation
of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility
is ordinarily entitled to our deference.'" Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles,
337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001) (citations omitted). Moreover,
"[a]ppellate courts owe deference to [an administrative] court's credibility
determination . . . because it has 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in
evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021)
(quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)). The deferential standard is
applied "because an appellate court's review of a cold record is no substitute for
the trial court's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the
stand." Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020). "Although we recognize
that deference is generally given to an administrative agency charged with
interpretation of the law, we are not bound by the agency's legal
opinions." Levine v. State, Dep't of Transp., 338 N.J. Super. 28, 32 (App. Div.
2001) (citations omitted).
An "abused or neglected child" is defined under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) in
pertinent part as a child under age eighteen:
A-3074-24 16 whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as the result of the failure of [the child's] parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, . . . or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court[.]
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).]
"Parent or guardian" as defined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(a) includes "a teacher,
employee, or volunteer . . . of an institution who is responsible for the child's
welfare and any other staff person of an institution regardless of whether or not
the person is responsible for the care or supervision of the child."
Only conduct that is "grossly or wantonly negligent" constitutes failure to
"exercise a minimum degree of care" under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). G.S. v.
Dep't of Hum. Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 178 (1999); L.A. v. N.J. Div. of Youth &
Fam. Servs., 217 N.J. 311, 332 (2014). The standard "implies that a person has
acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others." G.S., 157 N.J. at 179.
Whether a defendant's conduct is grossly negligent and, therefore, constitutes
abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b), is a question of law, which
we review de novo. See Dep't of Child. & Families v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 308
(2011).
A-3074-24 17 The Department "is charged with the responsibility to investigate all
allegations of child abuse or neglect." Id. at 211. Under regulations associated
with Title Nine, allegations that a child has been abused or neglected can either
be "substantiated," "established," "not established," or "unfounded." N.J.A.C.
3A:10-7.3(c); see also N.J. Dep't of Child. & Families v. R.R., 454 N.J. Super.
37, 40 (App. Div. 2018).
An allegation shall be "substantiated" if the preponderance of the evidence
indicates that a child is an "abused or neglected child" as defined in N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.21 and either the investigation indicates the existence of any of the
circumstances outlined under N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.4 or substantiation is warranted
based on consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed
in N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.5.3 Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(d) "[a] finding of
either established or substantiated shall constitute a determination by the
Department that a child is an abused or neglected child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21." Notably, only findings that are substantiated are to be disclosed by DCF
"for a Child Abuse Record Information (CARI) check." N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.7(a).
3 In S.C. v. N.J. Dep't of Child & Fams., our Supreme Court thoroughly charted the development of the four designations under N.J.A.C. 3A:10-7.3(c) and the DCF's evidentiary burden with respect to each category. 242 N.J. 201, 211, 225 (2020). A-3074-24 18 Against this background, and recognizing the ALJ had the benefit of
hearing directly from R.C., R.B., A.T., Williams, and other witnesses to assess
their credibility, and also had the advantage of reviewing the exhibits presented
in that context, we are satisfied there is ample credible evidence in the record to
support the finding that A.T.'s actions and inactions on August 28, 2023, support
a finding of substantiated neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). We affirm
substantially for the reasons set forth in the ALJ's initial decision adopted by the
Assistant Commissioner's final decision. We add the following comments.
Contrary to A.T.'s arguments, the ALJ's initial decision reflects that the
ALJ clearly engaged in credibility determinations and made sufficient findings
of fact. The ALJ acknowledged the conflicting testimony as to what prompted
R.C. to exit from the vehicle but ultimately found "R.C.'s statements were
corroborated by the credible testimony of [] Williams, [R.]B., and [] Scott ."
From that comment, we discern the court clearly considered and credited R.C.'s,
R.B.'s, Williams', and Scott's testimonies over A.T.'s testimony. Furthermore,
there is no dispute the ALJ concluded that R.C. was unjustifiably left on the side
of the road. As the ALJ had the opportunity to hear testimony, review exhibits,
and make credibility determinations, his determinations as to witness credibility
are entitled to our deference in light of his careful consideration of the facts and
A-3074-24 19 detailed, supported findings of fact. See M.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families,
479 N.J. Super. 471, 482 (App. Div. 2024).
Moreover, the record demonstrates that while the ALJ did not explicitly
identify in his initial decision the aggravating factors, his findings of facts and
conclusions of law clearly reflect his acknowledgment as to the presence of
several aggravating factors based on his crediting Williams' investigation
summary and testimony. Specifically, the ALJ, in deeming Williams' testimony
credible, clearly credited her findings as to the existing aggravating factors, and
further accepted her conclusion that "A.T.'s unblemished record [w]as a
mitigating factor, but it did not outweigh the aggravating factors." The presence
of these factors was supported by the credible record evidence and various
testimony that A.T. left R.C. on the side of a remote road which traumatized the
child. The Assistant Commissioner ultimately adopted these findings in his final
decision.
In sum, we are satisfied the DCF's substantiated finding is neither
arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable, nor is it contrary to law, and affirm its
determination substantially for the reasons outlined by the ALJ's initial decision
as it is supported by substantial credible evidence and as adopted by the
Assistant Commissioner in his May 22, 2025 final decision.
A-3074-24 20 To the extent we have not otherwise addressed the parties' arguments, it
is because we have considered them and concluded they are without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D)-(E).
Affirmed.
A-3074-24 21