1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DENYS SVENIN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01865-CAB-KSC
12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden of Imperial [Doc. No. 1] Regional Detention Facility, and U.S. 15 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 16 SECURITY, 17 Respondents. 18 19 On July 21, 2025, Petitioner Denys Svenin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 20 against Respondents Jeremy Casey, Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility 21 (“IRDF”), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). On July 25, 2025, the 22 Court ordered Respondents to file a response to Petitioner’s habeas petition, which they 23 did on July 30, 2025. [Doc. No. 5.] The Court finds this case suitable for determination 24 on the papers submitted and without oral argument in accordance with Civil Local Rule 25 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons below, the Court DENIES the petition. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, is a Ukrainian national that lawfully entered the United 28 States pursuant to humanitarian parole along with his wife and daughter on April 28, 2024. 1 [Doc. No. 1 at 1; Doc. No. 8 at 2.] He says that on January 30, 2025, due to a GPS mistake, 2 he accidentally drove across the U.S.-Mexico border in Calexico, California. [Doc. No. 1 3 at 1.] When he turned back and attempted to re-enter the United States, he was detained 4 by immigration officials at the border processing facility. [Id.] Respondents allege that 5 Petitioner’s parole status automatically terminated upon his departure from the United 6 States and that when he sought to re-enter, immigration officials determined he was 7 inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(i)(I) as an immigrant not in possession of a valid 8 entry document. [Doc. No. 8 at 2.] Subsequently, Petitioner was issued a “Notice and 9 Order of Expedited Removal under section 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality 10 Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).” [Id. at 2–3.] 11 On February 3, 2025, Petitioner was received into Immigration and Customs 12 Enforcement (“ICE”) custody at IRDF. [Doc. No. 8-1 at 2.] On February 10, 2025, ICE 13 considered paroling Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), which “provides 14 discretionary authority to parole for significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian 15 reasons[,]” but declined to do so. [Doc. No. 8 at 3.] On May 23, 2025, and July 2, 2025, 16 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services asylum 17 officer interviewed Petitioner “to determine whether he had a credible fear of persecution 18 [or] torture if removed to Ukraine.” [Id.; see also Doc. No. 1 at 1.] In both instances, the 19 officer rejected Petitioner’s asylum claim. [See Doc. No. 8 at 3; see also Doc. No. 1 at 1.] 20 On July 9, 2025, an immigration judge affirmed the asylum officer’s rejection and 21 “returned the matter to [DHS] for execution of the expedited order of removal to Ukraine.” 22 [Doc. No. 8 at 3.] 23 Petitioner seeks the following forms of relief from the Court: (1) restoring his 24 humanitarian parole, (2) granting him temporary protected status, (3) releasing him on 25 bond, (4) prohibiting his transfer to another place of detention, (5) confirming his right to 26 voluntarily depart to a third country, and (6) immediate release from custody. 27 28 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 28 U.S.C. § 2241 states that a federal district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 3 if the petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 4 United States[.]” Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating his detention is unlawful. 5 See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In . . . federal habeas 6 proceedings, it is the petitioner who bears the burden of proving his case.”); see also 7 Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the burden of proof under 8 § 2241 is on the petitioner). The petition “must . . . specify all the grounds for relief 9 available to the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting each ground.” Davydov v. Casey, 10 No. 25-CV-845-RSH-AHG, 2025 WL 2042355, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2025) (quoting 11 Rule 2(c) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts). 12 Petitioner asserts that his now-seven-month detention is unlawful because there is 13 no “realistic prospect of [his removal.]” [Doc. No. 1 at 2.] He also argues that as a civil 14 immigration detainee he is being held with criminals, which is purportedly unlawful. [Id.] 15 Finally, he states that he sought and was denied voluntary departure to a third country, and 16 that his credible fear interview was conducted with administrative procedure violations. 17 [Id. at 3.] 18 A. Termination of Parole 19 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(i) states that “[p]arole shall be automatically terminated 20 without written notice upon the departure from the United States of the alien[.]” Even if 21 unintended, Petitioner’s departure from the United States on January 30, 2025, 22 automatically terminated his parole status. See U.S. v. Ortiz-Diaz, 849 F. Supp. 734, 737 23 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (“The government may terminate parole automatically without written 24 notice to the alien if the alien departs from the U.S.”). As such, when he presented himself 25 to immigration officials to re-enter the United States, Petitioner was an applicant for 26 admission without valid documentation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and subject to 27 expedited removal. 28 1 B. Length of Detention 2 Petitioner’s final order of removal was entered on July 9, 2025. [Doc. No. 8 at 8.] 3 After a final order of removal, “the Government ordinarily secures the alien’s removal 4 during a subsequent 90-day statutory ‘removal period,’ during which time the alien 5 normally is held in custody.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). Further 6 detention is authorized “if the Government fails to remove the alien during those 90 7 days[,]” but it is limited “to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s 8 removal from the United States.” Id. at 682, 689. The Supreme Court has found six months 9 to be a presumptively reasonable period. Id. at 701. As of the date of this order, Petitioner 10 has been detained for three months post-final removal order. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 11 challenge to his detention based on its length is premature. 12 C. Detention with Criminals 13 Petitioner alleges he is in “custody with people who have committed different 14 crimes” and that it is “prohibited to hold non-criminals in conditions for criminals.” [Doc. 15 No. 1 at 2.] He cites Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003) for this principle, but the 16 case does not relate to his assertion.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DENYS SVENIN, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01865-CAB-KSC
12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden of Imperial [Doc. No. 1] Regional Detention Facility, and U.S. 15 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 16 SECURITY, 17 Respondents. 18 19 On July 21, 2025, Petitioner Denys Svenin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 20 against Respondents Jeremy Casey, Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility 21 (“IRDF”), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). On July 25, 2025, the 22 Court ordered Respondents to file a response to Petitioner’s habeas petition, which they 23 did on July 30, 2025. [Doc. No. 5.] The Court finds this case suitable for determination 24 on the papers submitted and without oral argument in accordance with Civil Local Rule 25 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons below, the Court DENIES the petition. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, is a Ukrainian national that lawfully entered the United 28 States pursuant to humanitarian parole along with his wife and daughter on April 28, 2024. 1 [Doc. No. 1 at 1; Doc. No. 8 at 2.] He says that on January 30, 2025, due to a GPS mistake, 2 he accidentally drove across the U.S.-Mexico border in Calexico, California. [Doc. No. 1 3 at 1.] When he turned back and attempted to re-enter the United States, he was detained 4 by immigration officials at the border processing facility. [Id.] Respondents allege that 5 Petitioner’s parole status automatically terminated upon his departure from the United 6 States and that when he sought to re-enter, immigration officials determined he was 7 inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(i)(I) as an immigrant not in possession of a valid 8 entry document. [Doc. No. 8 at 2.] Subsequently, Petitioner was issued a “Notice and 9 Order of Expedited Removal under section 235(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality 10 Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).” [Id. at 2–3.] 11 On February 3, 2025, Petitioner was received into Immigration and Customs 12 Enforcement (“ICE”) custody at IRDF. [Doc. No. 8-1 at 2.] On February 10, 2025, ICE 13 considered paroling Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), which “provides 14 discretionary authority to parole for significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian 15 reasons[,]” but declined to do so. [Doc. No. 8 at 3.] On May 23, 2025, and July 2, 2025, 16 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services asylum 17 officer interviewed Petitioner “to determine whether he had a credible fear of persecution 18 [or] torture if removed to Ukraine.” [Id.; see also Doc. No. 1 at 1.] In both instances, the 19 officer rejected Petitioner’s asylum claim. [See Doc. No. 8 at 3; see also Doc. No. 1 at 1.] 20 On July 9, 2025, an immigration judge affirmed the asylum officer’s rejection and 21 “returned the matter to [DHS] for execution of the expedited order of removal to Ukraine.” 22 [Doc. No. 8 at 3.] 23 Petitioner seeks the following forms of relief from the Court: (1) restoring his 24 humanitarian parole, (2) granting him temporary protected status, (3) releasing him on 25 bond, (4) prohibiting his transfer to another place of detention, (5) confirming his right to 26 voluntarily depart to a third country, and (6) immediate release from custody. 27 28 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 28 U.S.C. § 2241 states that a federal district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 3 if the petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 4 United States[.]” Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating his detention is unlawful. 5 See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In . . . federal habeas 6 proceedings, it is the petitioner who bears the burden of proving his case.”); see also 7 Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the burden of proof under 8 § 2241 is on the petitioner). The petition “must . . . specify all the grounds for relief 9 available to the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting each ground.” Davydov v. Casey, 10 No. 25-CV-845-RSH-AHG, 2025 WL 2042355, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2025) (quoting 11 Rule 2(c) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts). 12 Petitioner asserts that his now-seven-month detention is unlawful because there is 13 no “realistic prospect of [his removal.]” [Doc. No. 1 at 2.] He also argues that as a civil 14 immigration detainee he is being held with criminals, which is purportedly unlawful. [Id.] 15 Finally, he states that he sought and was denied voluntary departure to a third country, and 16 that his credible fear interview was conducted with administrative procedure violations. 17 [Id. at 3.] 18 A. Termination of Parole 19 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1)(i) states that “[p]arole shall be automatically terminated 20 without written notice upon the departure from the United States of the alien[.]” Even if 21 unintended, Petitioner’s departure from the United States on January 30, 2025, 22 automatically terminated his parole status. See U.S. v. Ortiz-Diaz, 849 F. Supp. 734, 737 23 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (“The government may terminate parole automatically without written 24 notice to the alien if the alien departs from the U.S.”). As such, when he presented himself 25 to immigration officials to re-enter the United States, Petitioner was an applicant for 26 admission without valid documentation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and subject to 27 expedited removal. 28 1 B. Length of Detention 2 Petitioner’s final order of removal was entered on July 9, 2025. [Doc. No. 8 at 8.] 3 After a final order of removal, “the Government ordinarily secures the alien’s removal 4 during a subsequent 90-day statutory ‘removal period,’ during which time the alien 5 normally is held in custody.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). Further 6 detention is authorized “if the Government fails to remove the alien during those 90 7 days[,]” but it is limited “to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s 8 removal from the United States.” Id. at 682, 689. The Supreme Court has found six months 9 to be a presumptively reasonable period. Id. at 701. As of the date of this order, Petitioner 10 has been detained for three months post-final removal order. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 11 challenge to his detention based on its length is premature. 12 C. Detention with Criminals 13 Petitioner alleges he is in “custody with people who have committed different 14 crimes” and that it is “prohibited to hold non-criminals in conditions for criminals.” [Doc. 15 No. 1 at 2.] He cites Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003) for this principle, but the 16 case does not relate to his assertion. In Ly, the Sixth Circuit held that removable criminal 17 aliens may be detained without bond “for a reasonable period of time required to initiate 18 and conclude removal proceedings promptly” and that “[w]hen actual removal is not 19 reasonably foreseeable, deportable aliens may not be indefinitely detained without a . . . 20 ‘strong special justification[.]’” Id. at 273. Petitioner provides no support for his argument. 21 To be sure, “noncitizens subject to civil immigration detention . . . cannot be 22 subjected to conditions that amount to punishment.” Doe v. Becerra, 732 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 23 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 24 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004)). But Petitioner does not allege that the conditions at IRDF are 25 such that he is being punished like a criminal detainee—only that he is detained with 26 27 28 1 individuals who have committed crimes. The Court finds that this is not a basis for which 2 to grant Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus. 3 D. Voluntary Departure 4 Petitioner states that he “requested voluntary departure to a third country . . . but [] 5 was denied.” [Doc. No. 1 at 3.] Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(4), “arriving noncitizens are 6 not eligible for voluntary departure[.]” Immigrant Defs. L. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 7 Sec., No. 21-CV-00395 FMO-RAO, 2025 WL 1191572, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2025) 8 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(4)); see also Wen Zhong Li v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 127, 130 (1st 9 Cir. 2016) (finding petitioner “ineligible for voluntary departure because he was an arriving 10 alien”). As an arriving noncitizen, or alien, Petitioner is not entitled to voluntary departure. 11 E. Credible Fear Interview 12 Petitioner alleges that the English–Russian interpreter in his credible fear interview 13 “did not confirm his level of English language proficiency, which is contrary to the 14 qualification requirements set out in 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)” and “created a risk of 15 misinterpretation.” [Doc. No. 1 at 3.] He also alleges that he was rushed by the interviewer 16 and could not “fully stat[e] the basis for [his] fear.” [Doc. No. 1 at 3.] Though he does not 17 specify what relief he seeks based on these allegations, the Court presumes that Petitioner 18 seeks re-adjudication of his asylum application. 19 Regarding interpretation, 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(5) states that the asylum officer “shall 20 arrange for the assistance of an interpreter in conducting the interview” if need be, and that 21 the “interpreter must be at least 18 years of age” and may not be, inter alia, the alien’s 22 attorney, representative, or witness. There is no mention of the interpreter being required 23 to specifically confirm his English proficiency to the petitioner. Moreover, Petitioner does 24 not even allege that the interpreter failed to interpret properly during the interview. Finally, 25 26 27 1 Petitioner does complain of the conditions at San Luis Regional Detention and Support Center in Arizona where he was previously held. [Doc. No. 1 at 1.] However, he is now in custody at IRDF, lists 28 | |}issues with the time provided to Petitioner during his interview to state the basis for his 2 would not entitle Petitioner to release, and a habeas petition is not the appropriate 3 ||means by which to seek another opportunity to apply for asylum. See Dep’t of Homeland 4 v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 118 (2020) (finding petitioner’s requested relief of “a 5 || fair procedure to apply for asylum” to be “outside the scope of the common-law habeas 6 || writ’). 7 F. Transfer of Petitioner 8 Petitioner seeks to prohibit his transfer to another place of detention because it would 9 || allegedly interfere with access to counsel, constitute forum shopping, and could worsen his 10 current condition. [Doc. No. | at 4.] Petitioner cites Devitri v. Cronen, 289 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D. Mass. 2018) but misstates its holding, and the Court finds it is not relevant to his 12 ||argument. Courts typically enjoin the Government from transferring detainees out of the 13 district during the pendency of the habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Oliveros v. Kaiser, No. 14 || 25-CV-07117-BLF, 2025 WL 2430495, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2025) (“Respondents 15 || are [enjoined] from transferring Petitioner out of this district or deporting her pending these 16 habeas proceedings.”). This order, however, concludes Petitioner’s habeas proceeding. 17 || Moreover, Petitioner has been in custody at IRDF since June 26, 2025 and does not allege 18 |/any actions by Respondents indicating that they intend to transfer him. Accordingly, the 19 || Court declines to enjoin a potential transfer of Petitioner at this time. 20 Hl. CONCLUSION 21 As Petitioner fails to demonstrate that Respondents are holding him in custody 22 unlawfully, the Court DENIES his petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice. 23 || Should Petitioner’s post-final removal order detention continue beyond six months without 24 ||a reasonable likelihood of removal, he may choose to re-file his petition. 25 It is SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: October 14, 2025 ©; g 27 38 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge