RENDERED: NOVEMBER 7, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0825-MR
DENNY C. RUMFELT APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CR-00183
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Denny C. Rumfelt (“Rumfelt”), seeks reversal of
the Meade Circuit Court’s Order, entitled “Judgment/Sentence Following Guilty
Verdict,” entered June 6, 2024, sentencing him to 17 years of imprisonment, a
$1,000 fine, and $165 in Court costs. After thorough review and careful
consideration, we affirm the Trial Court’s Order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2021, Rumfelt admitted to a family member that he
had killed his girlfriend, Meaghan Dunn (“Dunn”), and transported her body to his
parents’ home. His brother, Ryan Rumfelt, contacted the Meade County Dispatch
and advised that his brother had killed Dunn. Police responded and then arrested
Rumfelt on charges of murder in the first degree (domestic violence), tampering
with physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse. On September 23, 2021, the Meade
District Court released Rumfelt on a $100,000 cash bond. On October 18, 2021, a
Meade County Grand Jury indicted Rumfelt on all three charges. Upon his
indictment, Rumfelt was rearrested and remained at the Meade County Detention
Center through sentencing. After a bond hearing on November 1, 2021, the Meade
Circuit Court instituted a cash bond of $1 million, which was not posted. At a
hearing on May 2, 2022, Rumfelt moved the Trial Court for a reduction in bail,
which the Trial Court denied.
At trial ending on March 27, 2024, a Meade Circuit Court jury
convicted Rumfelt of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the first
degree and the charge of abuse of a corpse. The jury found Rumfelt not guilty of
the charge of tampering with physical evidence. The jury recommended that
Rumfelt serve 15 years’ imprisonment for manslaughter and two years’
-2- imprisonment for abuse of a corpse, to be served consecutively for a total of 17
years in the penitentiary.
On June 6, 2024, the Trial Court sentenced Rumfelt according to the
recommendation of the jury and imposed Court costs in the amount of $1651 and a
felony fine in the amount of $1,000. Rumfelt’s private counsel, who represented
him from arraignment through sentencing, asked the Trial Court if it “would
consider giving [Rumfelt] credit for the [jail] time that he’s been in for the
payment of the fine plus costs,” to which the Trial Court responded: “No, I won’t
do that.” Record on Appeal (“ROA”), Video Recording (“VR”), 6/6/24 at 9:36:50-
9:37:30. The Trial Court, utilizing a form order, checked the box ordering Rumfelt
to pay Court costs and did not check the box stating: “Defendant is a poor person
as defined by KRS 453.190(2), and is therefore exempt from the imposition of
court costs and bond filing fees.”2 The Trial Court also checked the box on the
sentencing form indicating that it had considered Rumfelt’s ability to pay a fine
and ordered him to pay the fine in installments at the rate of $100 per month
1 The amount represents $100 in Court costs for a felony as prescribed by Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 23A.205 and, according to the form order, $65 in bond/filing fees. 2 ROA, p. 736.
-3- beginning the first day of the month immediately succeeding entry of the judgment
and sentencing order.3
On July 5, 2024, Rumfelt’s private counsel moved for him to proceed
in forma pauperis on appeal. The Trial Court granted the motion on July 11, 2024.
On August 8, 2024, Rumfelt appeared before the Trial Court without
counsel for failure to pay the $100 installment for the Court costs and fine. The
Trial Court recognized that Rumfelt had been appointed a public defender on
appeal. Based on Rumfelt’s statement of his financial circumstances and ongoing
incarceration, the Trial Court deferred Rumfelt’s payment until three days after his
release from the penitentiary.
On appeal, Rumfelt claims that the Trial Court erred by imposing
Court costs and a fine without assessing his financial ability to pay under Kentucky
Revised Statute (“KRS”) 23A.205 (Court costs), KRS 534.030 (felony fines), and
KRS 453.190(2) (definition of “poor person”). Rumfelt argues that he properly
preserved the alleged sentencing error when he moved for jail credit in lieu of
Court costs and a fine on June 6, 2024. Even if not preserved, Rumfelt argues this
3 ROA, p. 737. The form also has an “X” adjacent to a section stating: “The Court has considered Defendant’s ability to pay a fine, and has determined that no fine shall be imposed . . . .” However, the Trial Court did not check any of the conditions that would have justified waiving the fine. Therefore, this Court presumes that the checkmark is a scrivener’s error.
-4- Court may correct this unpreserved “sentencing error” on appeal. Appellant Brief,
p. 6 (quoting Spicer v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.3d 26, 35 (Ky. 2014)).
The Commonwealth contends that the issue was not preserved. The
Commonwealth argues that under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”)
9.22, Rumfelt’s request for jail credit lacked the specificity necessary for the Trial
Court to make a ruling on his indigency and status as a “poor person.” KRS
534.030 and 453.190(2), respectively.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal alleges an error in sentencing. “[S]ince sentencing is
jurisdictional it cannot be waived by failure to object.” Wellman v.
Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1985). After Wellman, “a substantial
body of Kentucky law has developed following the principle that appellate review
of a sentencing issue is not waived by the failure to object at the trial court level.”
Jones v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Ky. 2011). “Thus, sentencing issues
may be raised for the first time on appeal[,] and Appellant is proceeding properly
before this Court.” Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Ky. 2007).
Further, “a ‘sentencing issue’ constitutes ‘a claim that a sentencing decision is
contrary to statute . . . or was made without fully considering what sentencing
options were allowed by statute[.]’” Jones, 382 S.W.3d at 27 (citing Grigsby v.
-5- Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Ky. 2010)); see also Spicer, 442 S.W.3d at
35.
As this Court very recently opined, sentencing errors “necessitate a
review de novo.” Dixon v. Commonwealth, 718 S.W.3d 408, 412 (Ky. App. 2025).
Fines are part of the punishment imposed by Courts, and they are thus part of the
sentence in a criminal case. Id. at 412.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 7, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0825-MR
DENNY C. RUMFELT APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CR-00183
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Denny C. Rumfelt (“Rumfelt”), seeks reversal of
the Meade Circuit Court’s Order, entitled “Judgment/Sentence Following Guilty
Verdict,” entered June 6, 2024, sentencing him to 17 years of imprisonment, a
$1,000 fine, and $165 in Court costs. After thorough review and careful
consideration, we affirm the Trial Court’s Order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2021, Rumfelt admitted to a family member that he
had killed his girlfriend, Meaghan Dunn (“Dunn”), and transported her body to his
parents’ home. His brother, Ryan Rumfelt, contacted the Meade County Dispatch
and advised that his brother had killed Dunn. Police responded and then arrested
Rumfelt on charges of murder in the first degree (domestic violence), tampering
with physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse. On September 23, 2021, the Meade
District Court released Rumfelt on a $100,000 cash bond. On October 18, 2021, a
Meade County Grand Jury indicted Rumfelt on all three charges. Upon his
indictment, Rumfelt was rearrested and remained at the Meade County Detention
Center through sentencing. After a bond hearing on November 1, 2021, the Meade
Circuit Court instituted a cash bond of $1 million, which was not posted. At a
hearing on May 2, 2022, Rumfelt moved the Trial Court for a reduction in bail,
which the Trial Court denied.
At trial ending on March 27, 2024, a Meade Circuit Court jury
convicted Rumfelt of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the first
degree and the charge of abuse of a corpse. The jury found Rumfelt not guilty of
the charge of tampering with physical evidence. The jury recommended that
Rumfelt serve 15 years’ imprisonment for manslaughter and two years’
-2- imprisonment for abuse of a corpse, to be served consecutively for a total of 17
years in the penitentiary.
On June 6, 2024, the Trial Court sentenced Rumfelt according to the
recommendation of the jury and imposed Court costs in the amount of $1651 and a
felony fine in the amount of $1,000. Rumfelt’s private counsel, who represented
him from arraignment through sentencing, asked the Trial Court if it “would
consider giving [Rumfelt] credit for the [jail] time that he’s been in for the
payment of the fine plus costs,” to which the Trial Court responded: “No, I won’t
do that.” Record on Appeal (“ROA”), Video Recording (“VR”), 6/6/24 at 9:36:50-
9:37:30. The Trial Court, utilizing a form order, checked the box ordering Rumfelt
to pay Court costs and did not check the box stating: “Defendant is a poor person
as defined by KRS 453.190(2), and is therefore exempt from the imposition of
court costs and bond filing fees.”2 The Trial Court also checked the box on the
sentencing form indicating that it had considered Rumfelt’s ability to pay a fine
and ordered him to pay the fine in installments at the rate of $100 per month
1 The amount represents $100 in Court costs for a felony as prescribed by Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 23A.205 and, according to the form order, $65 in bond/filing fees. 2 ROA, p. 736.
-3- beginning the first day of the month immediately succeeding entry of the judgment
and sentencing order.3
On July 5, 2024, Rumfelt’s private counsel moved for him to proceed
in forma pauperis on appeal. The Trial Court granted the motion on July 11, 2024.
On August 8, 2024, Rumfelt appeared before the Trial Court without
counsel for failure to pay the $100 installment for the Court costs and fine. The
Trial Court recognized that Rumfelt had been appointed a public defender on
appeal. Based on Rumfelt’s statement of his financial circumstances and ongoing
incarceration, the Trial Court deferred Rumfelt’s payment until three days after his
release from the penitentiary.
On appeal, Rumfelt claims that the Trial Court erred by imposing
Court costs and a fine without assessing his financial ability to pay under Kentucky
Revised Statute (“KRS”) 23A.205 (Court costs), KRS 534.030 (felony fines), and
KRS 453.190(2) (definition of “poor person”). Rumfelt argues that he properly
preserved the alleged sentencing error when he moved for jail credit in lieu of
Court costs and a fine on June 6, 2024. Even if not preserved, Rumfelt argues this
3 ROA, p. 737. The form also has an “X” adjacent to a section stating: “The Court has considered Defendant’s ability to pay a fine, and has determined that no fine shall be imposed . . . .” However, the Trial Court did not check any of the conditions that would have justified waiving the fine. Therefore, this Court presumes that the checkmark is a scrivener’s error.
-4- Court may correct this unpreserved “sentencing error” on appeal. Appellant Brief,
p. 6 (quoting Spicer v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.3d 26, 35 (Ky. 2014)).
The Commonwealth contends that the issue was not preserved. The
Commonwealth argues that under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”)
9.22, Rumfelt’s request for jail credit lacked the specificity necessary for the Trial
Court to make a ruling on his indigency and status as a “poor person.” KRS
534.030 and 453.190(2), respectively.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal alleges an error in sentencing. “[S]ince sentencing is
jurisdictional it cannot be waived by failure to object.” Wellman v.
Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1985). After Wellman, “a substantial
body of Kentucky law has developed following the principle that appellate review
of a sentencing issue is not waived by the failure to object at the trial court level.”
Jones v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Ky. 2011). “Thus, sentencing issues
may be raised for the first time on appeal[,] and Appellant is proceeding properly
before this Court.” Cummings v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Ky. 2007).
Further, “a ‘sentencing issue’ constitutes ‘a claim that a sentencing decision is
contrary to statute . . . or was made without fully considering what sentencing
options were allowed by statute[.]’” Jones, 382 S.W.3d at 27 (citing Grigsby v.
-5- Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Ky. 2010)); see also Spicer, 442 S.W.3d at
35.
As this Court very recently opined, sentencing errors “necessitate a
review de novo.” Dixon v. Commonwealth, 718 S.W.3d 408, 412 (Ky. App. 2025).
Fines are part of the punishment imposed by Courts, and they are thus part of the
sentence in a criminal case. Id. at 412. Similarly, Court costs also constitute the
imposition of a criminal sentence. See Peterson v. Commonwealth, 708 S.W.3d
435 (Ky. App. 2025). Therefore, we review Rumfelt’s claims of error under a de
novo standard of review.
ANALYSIS
KRS 23A.205 mandates Court costs in criminal cases before a Circuit
Court. Put differently, the legislature passed a law that requires Courts to impose
costs, and Trial Courts do not have the discretion to waive them at will for persons
who have the ability – if not the desire – to pay them. Kentucky jurisprudence is
clear that “[t]he assessment of court costs in a judgment fixing sentencing is illegal
only if it orders a person adjudged to be ‘poor’ to pay costs.” Spicer, 442 S.W.3d
at 35 (emphasis supplied); see also Peterson, 708 S.W.3d at 445-46. Likewise,
KRS 534.030 provides a minimum fine of $1,000 upon the conviction of any
felony, and as this Court most recently opined, to qualify for the exemption from
an otherwise mandatory fine under KRS 534.030(4), a Trial Court must find a
-6- defendant “indigent.” Dixon, 718 S.W.3d at 417. To qualify as a “poor” or
“indigent” person, the “onus is ‘on the part of a defendant to raise and show
poverty status.’” Chadwell v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Ky. 2021)
(citing Hall v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 7, 23 (Ky. 2018)).
Just as in Dixon and Peterson, defendants before him, Rumfelt did not
raise the issue of indigency before the Trial Court. Likewise, Rumfelt did not
request a public defender until he sought to appeal before a different tribunal.
Also, like Dixon, Rumfelt was represented by private attorneys at his arraignment,
trial, and sentencing, and he made no showing that he was entitled to avoid the
required payments. Rumfelt also did not request the Trial Court to determine that
he was a “poor person” under KRS 453.190(2) and, therefore, exempt from Court
costs.
We acknowledge that at sentencing Rumfelt did ask the Trial Court to
consider his ability to pay a fine due to his inability to work due to his continued
incarceration since October of 2021.4 The Trial Court considered that information
and ordered Rumfelt to pay the fine and costs at a rate of $100 per month
beginning 30 days after sentencing. Further, as reflected in the record and
conceded by Rumfelt, he appeared before the Trial Court at a show cause hearing
4 Rumfelt was released on a $100,000 bond between his arraignment before the Meade District Court and his indictment and rearrest on October 18, 2021. Thus, it is clear that he had access to considerable finances.
-7- after he failed to pay the monthly installment and after he was appointed a public
defender. At the show cause hearing, the Trial Court recognized that he had been
appointed a public defender as well as the circumstances of his incarceration and
allowed Rumfelt additional time for payment of the $1,165 in fines and costs until
after his release from the penitentiary.
Despite this history, there is no record that Rumfelt ever requested the
Trial Court to waive the imposition of costs by finding him a “poor person” under
KRS 453.190(2) or exempt him from paying fines as an “indigent” person under
KRS 534.030(4). Just as in Dixon and Peterson, the Trial Court did not make its
own inquiry on whether Rumfelt qualified as an “indigent” or a “poor person.”
Dixon, 718 S.W.3d at 417; Peterson, 708 S.W.3d at 446. We also note that while
the Trial Court did recognize that Rumfelt was appointed a public defender on
appeal, he “is not deemed a poor person exempt from paying court costs merely
because he was adjudged a needy person eligible for appointment of a public
defender.” Peterson, 708 S.W.3d at 446.
As Rumfelt did not raise the issue of his status as a “poor person,” the
Court of Appeals cannot conclude that a sentencing error has occurred as to costs.
Regarding fines, at sentencing and then again at his show cause hearing, the Trial
Court did take into consideration Rumfelt’s ability to pay and established an
incremental payment plan, subsequently, deferring all payment until after his
-8- incarceration. But Rumfelt’s status as “indigent” for the purpose of waiving the
fine was neither pled by Rumfelt nor considered by the Trial Court. Rumfelt had
several opportunities to raise and litigate these issues at the Trial Court level. He
chose not to do so, and he should not then be heard by a different tribunal on
appeal. Therefore, as in Dixon, this Court cannot conclude that a sentencing error
has occurred. 718 S.W.3d at 416-18.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, we decline to disturb the Trial Court’s Order.
The Meade Circuit Court’s Judgment/Sentence Following Guilty Verdict is hereby
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sarah D. Dailey Russell Coleman Assistant Public Advocate Attorney General of Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky Courtney J. Hightower Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-9-