By the Court,
Belknap, J.:
This is a contest brought by John H. Dennis, an elector of Washoe county, against the respondent, to determine whether John Hayes or W. H. Caughlin is legally entitled to the office of sheriff of Washoe county. According to the official returns, respondent received the highest number of votes, and was declared elected by the board of canvassers. At the trial it was stipulated that all returns and all ballots of each and every precinct in the county should be examined and considered, and legal ballots counted for whom cast, and under this stipulation the trial was had. Respondent recovered judgment.
One of the first questions to be determined is whether we can review all the rulings of the district court or only such as have been assigned as error by the appellant. It has frequently been decided that, a party who has not appealed _ from a judgment cannot, on appeal by the opposite party, obtain a review of the rulings of the court against him. In
Dougherty
v.
Henarie,
47 Cal. 9, the plaintiff offered to dismiss the action as to one of the defendants, who objected, and the court thereupon denied the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff excepting. Said the court: “But he cannot avail himself of his exception on this appeal. Having submitted to the judgment, and prosecuted no appeal from it, he cannot, on an appeal by the defendant, review the rulings of the court which he claims are to his prejudice.”
(Maher
v.
Swift,
14 Nev. 324;
Moresi
v.
Swift,
15 Nev. 215;
Nesbitt
v.
Chisholm,
16 Nev: 40.) Again, in
Whittam
v.
Zahorik,
59 N. W. 57, the supreme court of Iowa said in an election contest case: “The appellee complains that ballots similar in marking to some of those we hold should have been excluded were offered by the contestant, and counted for him; but, as the incumbent does not appeal, we .cannot determine the question he thus presents.” Our conclusion is that only such errors as the appellant complains of can be considered upon this appeal. ■
The errors assigned by the appellant embrace the rulings of the district court upon thirty-two ballots. These rulings involve a construction of the' statute of 1891 generally known as the “Australian ballot law.” The provisions of the statute relating to the preparation of the ballot by the elector, and its rejection in certain cases, are as follows:
“Sec. 20. On receiving his ballot the voter shall immediately retire alone to one of the places, booths or compartments. He shall prepare his ballot by marking a cross or X after the name of the person for whom he intends to vote for each office. In case of a constitutional amendment or other question submitted to the voters, the cross or X shall be placed after the answer which he desires to give. Such marking shall be done only with a black lead pencil. Before leaving the booth or compartment the voter shall fold his ballot in such manner that the water mark and the number
of the ballot shall appear on the outside, without exposing the marks upon the ballot, and shall keep it so folded until he has voted. Having folded his ballot, the voter shall deliver it to the inspector, who shall announce the name of the voter and the number of his ballot. The clerk having the registry list in his charge, if he finds the number to agree with the number of the ballot delivered to the voter shall repeat the name and number, and shall mark opposite the name the word ‘Voted.’ The inspector shall then separate the strip bearing the number from the ballot, and shall deposit the ballot in the ballot box. Said strip and number shall be immediately destroyed.”
“ Sec. 26. In counting the votes any ballot not bearing the water mark, as provided in this act, 'shall not be counted, but such ballot must be preserved and returned with the other ballots. When a voter marks more names than there are persons to be elected to an office, or if for any reason it is impossible to determine the voter’s choice for any office, his vote for such office shall not be counted. Any ballot upon which appears names, words or marks written or printed, except as in this act provided, shall not be counted.”
Statutes more or less similar in their nature have been adopted in many of our sister states, and a reference to some will aid in the construction to be placed upon our law.
In Re Vote Marks,
21 Atl. 962, the supreme court of Ehode Island said: “A cross is the only mark authorized by the statute to be used to designate the person voted for, and it is only by force of the statute that it gets its significance for that purpose. If another mark be used, there is nothing to certify its meaning. It might be conjectured that it was used inadvertently instead of a cross, but, in our opinion, such a conjecture would not justify the counting of it. The statute declares: ‘No voter shall place any mark upon his ballot by which it may be afterwards identified as the one voted by him.’ If marks other than crosses were counted, they might be used both to ansAver the purpose of crosses and to identify the ballots.”
In
Whittam
v.
Zahorik,
59 N. W. 57, in considering a law of this nature adopted in Iowa, the court said: “It is not practicable to adopt a rule in regard to identifying marks
which would be applicable in all' cases. It will not do to say that all ballots which bear marks not authorized by law should be rejected. All voters are not alike skillful in marking. Some are not accustomed to using a pen or pencil, and may place some slight mark on the ballot inadvertently, or a cross first made may be clumsily retraced. It is evident that in such cases, and in others where the unauthorized mark is not of a character to be used readily for the purpose of identification, the ballots should be counted; but where the unauthorized marks are made deliberately, and they may be used as means of identifying the ballot, it should be rejected.”
In Indiana it was provided that the voter should indicate his choice by stamping a certain.square opposite the candidate’s name, and, if he desired to vote for all candidates of one party, should place the stamp on the square preceding the party designation. The court held that the provision concerning the use of the stamp was mandatory, the stamping of the square being the only method prescribed by which the voter can indicate his choice. The statute was amended at the next session of the legislature so that a stamp placed upon a ballot which does not touch a square thereon was declared to be a distinguishing mark, and was not to be counted. The court said: “This amendment was intended, we think, to make certain that which, prior to its passage, was left in some measure, to construction; but it only makes certain that which was intended by the legislature when it passed the original section.”
(Parvin
v. Wimberg, 130 Ind. 561.)
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By the Court,
Belknap, J.:
This is a contest brought by John H. Dennis, an elector of Washoe county, against the respondent, to determine whether John Hayes or W. H. Caughlin is legally entitled to the office of sheriff of Washoe county. According to the official returns, respondent received the highest number of votes, and was declared elected by the board of canvassers. At the trial it was stipulated that all returns and all ballots of each and every precinct in the county should be examined and considered, and legal ballots counted for whom cast, and under this stipulation the trial was had. Respondent recovered judgment.
One of the first questions to be determined is whether we can review all the rulings of the district court or only such as have been assigned as error by the appellant. It has frequently been decided that, a party who has not appealed _ from a judgment cannot, on appeal by the opposite party, obtain a review of the rulings of the court against him. In
Dougherty
v.
Henarie,
47 Cal. 9, the plaintiff offered to dismiss the action as to one of the defendants, who objected, and the court thereupon denied the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff excepting. Said the court: “But he cannot avail himself of his exception on this appeal. Having submitted to the judgment, and prosecuted no appeal from it, he cannot, on an appeal by the defendant, review the rulings of the court which he claims are to his prejudice.”
(Maher
v.
Swift,
14 Nev. 324;
Moresi
v.
Swift,
15 Nev. 215;
Nesbitt
v.
Chisholm,
16 Nev: 40.) Again, in
Whittam
v.
Zahorik,
59 N. W. 57, the supreme court of Iowa said in an election contest case: “The appellee complains that ballots similar in marking to some of those we hold should have been excluded were offered by the contestant, and counted for him; but, as the incumbent does not appeal, we .cannot determine the question he thus presents.” Our conclusion is that only such errors as the appellant complains of can be considered upon this appeal. ■
The errors assigned by the appellant embrace the rulings of the district court upon thirty-two ballots. These rulings involve a construction of the' statute of 1891 generally known as the “Australian ballot law.” The provisions of the statute relating to the preparation of the ballot by the elector, and its rejection in certain cases, are as follows:
“Sec. 20. On receiving his ballot the voter shall immediately retire alone to one of the places, booths or compartments. He shall prepare his ballot by marking a cross or X after the name of the person for whom he intends to vote for each office. In case of a constitutional amendment or other question submitted to the voters, the cross or X shall be placed after the answer which he desires to give. Such marking shall be done only with a black lead pencil. Before leaving the booth or compartment the voter shall fold his ballot in such manner that the water mark and the number
of the ballot shall appear on the outside, without exposing the marks upon the ballot, and shall keep it so folded until he has voted. Having folded his ballot, the voter shall deliver it to the inspector, who shall announce the name of the voter and the number of his ballot. The clerk having the registry list in his charge, if he finds the number to agree with the number of the ballot delivered to the voter shall repeat the name and number, and shall mark opposite the name the word ‘Voted.’ The inspector shall then separate the strip bearing the number from the ballot, and shall deposit the ballot in the ballot box. Said strip and number shall be immediately destroyed.”
“ Sec. 26. In counting the votes any ballot not bearing the water mark, as provided in this act, 'shall not be counted, but such ballot must be preserved and returned with the other ballots. When a voter marks more names than there are persons to be elected to an office, or if for any reason it is impossible to determine the voter’s choice for any office, his vote for such office shall not be counted. Any ballot upon which appears names, words or marks written or printed, except as in this act provided, shall not be counted.”
Statutes more or less similar in their nature have been adopted in many of our sister states, and a reference to some will aid in the construction to be placed upon our law.
In Re Vote Marks,
21 Atl. 962, the supreme court of Ehode Island said: “A cross is the only mark authorized by the statute to be used to designate the person voted for, and it is only by force of the statute that it gets its significance for that purpose. If another mark be used, there is nothing to certify its meaning. It might be conjectured that it was used inadvertently instead of a cross, but, in our opinion, such a conjecture would not justify the counting of it. The statute declares: ‘No voter shall place any mark upon his ballot by which it may be afterwards identified as the one voted by him.’ If marks other than crosses were counted, they might be used both to ansAver the purpose of crosses and to identify the ballots.”
In
Whittam
v.
Zahorik,
59 N. W. 57, in considering a law of this nature adopted in Iowa, the court said: “It is not practicable to adopt a rule in regard to identifying marks
which would be applicable in all' cases. It will not do to say that all ballots which bear marks not authorized by law should be rejected. All voters are not alike skillful in marking. Some are not accustomed to using a pen or pencil, and may place some slight mark on the ballot inadvertently, or a cross first made may be clumsily retraced. It is evident that in such cases, and in others where the unauthorized mark is not of a character to be used readily for the purpose of identification, the ballots should be counted; but where the unauthorized marks are made deliberately, and they may be used as means of identifying the ballot, it should be rejected.”
In Indiana it was provided that the voter should indicate his choice by stamping a certain.square opposite the candidate’s name, and, if he desired to vote for all candidates of one party, should place the stamp on the square preceding the party designation. The court held that the provision concerning the use of the stamp was mandatory, the stamping of the square being the only method prescribed by which the voter can indicate his choice. The statute was amended at the next session of the legislature so that a stamp placed upon a ballot which does not touch a square thereon was declared to be a distinguishing mark, and was not to be counted. The court said: “This amendment was intended, we think, to make certain that which, prior to its passage, was left in some measure, to construction; but it only makes certain that which was intended by the legislature when it passed the original section.”
(Parvin
v. Wimberg, 130 Ind. 561.)
In Maine the statute provides that “the voter shall prepare his ballot by marking on the appropriate margin or place a (X) as follows: He may place such mark opposite the name of a party or political designation; or he may place such mark opposite the name of the individual candidates of his choice for each office to be filled.” (Stats. Me. 1891, c. 102, sec. 24.) The court said of this provision: “Its distinguishing feature was its careful provision for a secret ballot. The leading purpose of it was to give the elector an opportunity-to cast his vote in such a manner that no other person would know for what candidate he voted, and thus to protect him against all improper influences, and enable.
him to enjoy absolute freedom from restraint and entire independence in the expression of his choice.” “If it be conceded that the intention of the voter may be correctly inferred from the mark actually made by him in each of these instances, it is still a fatal objection to the ballot that such an irregular and unauthorized mode of marking it might readily be, and probably would bo, agreed upon with the voter as a distinguishing mark to identify the ballot cast by him, whenever identification was desired. Such a palpable disregard of the plain requirements of the act strikes at the root of the secret-ballot system.”
(Curran
v.
Clayton,
86 Me. 42.)
These decisions show that the only way the voter can indicate hiij choice is by a cross or X, used in the manner required by the statute. The statute of this state is less liberal in its terms than those of the other states, and if its provisions relating to “marks,” in the twenty-sixth section of the act, are to be literally enforced, many voters would be disfranchised. This section provides that any names, words or marks, except as in the act provided, shall invalidate the ballot. Under the terms of the statute, any mark, although innocently or accidentally made, would come within its provisions. The. evils against which the statute was directed were bribery and intimidation, and to repress these the secret ballot was adopted. Its aim was that the ballot should not disclose by whom it was cast, and.for this reason all of the. means by which it may be indentilled were interdicted.
Courts should construe statutes with such liberality, if practicable, as to advance the object and correct the evils which the legislature had in view. A mark satisfactorily appearing to have been inadvertently or accidentally made, and not for an evil purpose, is not within the meaning of the statute, and should not be construed as an identifying or distinguishing mark; and we think the statute should be read as if this qualification were attached to it. Adopting this view, a ballot written by a hand unaccustomed to the use of a pencil, or awkwardness in its use, or carelessness, or an apparent attempt to retrace a clumsily made cross X, or an effort to make it more certain, and in doing so employing
more lines than are necessary to properly make a cross, or a slightly blurred spot to correct a mistake, not indicating an intention to identify the ballot, or a slight erasure for the same purpose, or cross made when the ballot paper was defective, and to avoid the defect, and make the vote more certain, a second cross was made, or a slight pencil mark, clearly made by accident, and not design, or a stain of tobacco, will not avoid the ballot.
There are fifteen ballots numbered as follows: 45, 49, 50, 78, 68, 73, 74, 53, 27, 72, 59, 75, 40, 36, 66, to which these objections were made, and we think that all of them should be counted for the appellant. But blurred spots, plainly made by a lead pencil, which may have been made for the purpose of canceling a cross, but which might have been made also for identification, or a cross not opposite the name of any candidate, or two or more crosses instead of one, or a number of crosses in a bunch, or a mark not a cross, or the use of a blue lead pencil instead of a black one, or a straight lino, thus, —, over the word “No,” or writing a word instead of employing a cross, are grounds for rejecting the ballot.
There are seventeen ballots to which these objections apply, and wo think the court properly rejected them. These ballots were numbered as follows: 30, 39, 44, 69, 33, 38, 604, 71, 41, 48, 66f, 37, 52, 35, 54/57, 77.
The district court found that Hayes was entitled to 558 votes, and Caughlin 561. Adding to Hayes’ vote the fifteen votes that we have found for him, changes the result of the election.
Similar motions were-made in this case as those in
Buckner
v.
Lynip,
22 Nev. 426, and upon the authority of that case the motions are dismissed.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
Bonnifield, J.: I concur.