Dennis Moore v. Susan Grundmann

Ninth Circuit

Dennis Moore v. Susan Grundmann

671 F. App'x 686

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedDecember 21, 2016

Docket15-55023

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 671 F. App'x 686 (Dennis Moore v. Susan Grundmann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dennis Moore v. Susan Grundmann, 671 F. App'x 686 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

*687 MEMORANDUM **

Dennis Moore appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action, arising from the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (“MSPB”) denial of his request to reopen his appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Crum v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (subject matter jurisdiction). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the MSPB’s denial of Moore’s request to reopen his appeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (“Any employee ... aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board may obtain judicial review of the order or decision”); Haines v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 44 F.3d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that MSPB denials of repetitive informal requests to reopen did not constitute final decisions that the court could review).

The district court properly dismissed Moore’s due process claims because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth elements of a procedural due process claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion for an extension of time to file a response to the Third Amended Complaint. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review); FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court has broad discretion to control its docket and set deadlines).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, including Moore’s contentions regarding the Notification and Federal Employees Antidiscrimination Act, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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*687 MEMORANDUM **

Dennis Moore appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action, arising from the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (“MSPB”) denial of his request to reopen his appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Crum v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (subject matter jurisdiction). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the MSPB’s denial of Moore’s request to reopen his appeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (“Any employee ... aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board may obtain judicial review of the order or decision”); Haines v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 44 F.3d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that MSPB denials of repetitive informal requests to reopen did not constitute final decisions that the court could review).

The district court properly dismissed Moore’s due process claims because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth elements of a procedural due process claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion for an extension of time to file a response to the Third Amended Complaint. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review); FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court has broad discretion to control its docket and set deadlines).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, including Moore’s contentions regarding the Notification and Federal Employees Antidiscrimination Act, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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