Denise Taylor v. Robert Neill, Jr.

Opinion

DENISE TAYLOR * NO. 2024-CA-0365

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL ROBERT NEILL, JR. * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2022-08173, DIVISION “L” Honorable Kern A. Reese, Judge ****** Judge Roland L. Belsome ****** (Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Dale N. Atkins)

ATKINS, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT.

Eric Oliver Person 1539 Jackson Avenue, Suite 100 New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Mark J. Boudreau James E. Uschold 700 Camp Street, Suite 317 New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

JUDGMENT VACATED, CASE REMANDED. December 17, 2024 RLB In this appeal, plaintiff/appellant, Denise Taylor (“Taylor”), seeks to nullify a DLD tax sale. The property is her residence. She has resided there at all times relevant

and continues to live there.

Taylor argues several bases for redemption in brief. However, the only

cognizable claim she makes in her petition is that she did not receive post tax sale

notice. Taylor’s other arguments, regardless of their merit, are not considered

here.

Prior proceedings.

Taylor filed suit against the tax sale certificate holder, Robert Neill (“Neill”).

Neill did not answer. Taylor took a preliminary default. On the same day that

Neill got notice of the default, he transferred title to NOLA Urban Redevelopment,

L.L.C., which resold it to IPF22, L.L.C. (“IPF”). IPF filed an exception of

peremption arguing that once the redemptive period expired, any right to redeem

expired with it. The trial court granted the exception and dismissed Taylor’s case.

Law and analysis.

The trial court was correct in determining that the redemption period is

peremptive. Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:2241 provides that, “All redemptive

periods provided in the Louisiana Constitution shall be peremptive.” The

1 constitution provides that, “The property sold shall be redeemable for three years

after the date of recordation of the tax sale.” La. Const. art. VII, § 25(B)(1).

The statutory scheme governing tax sales provides only three bases to nullify a

tax sale. Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:2286 provides in pertinent part that, “No

tax sale shall be set aside except for a payment nullity, redemption nullity, or a

nullity under R.S. 47:2162, all of which are relative nullities.” According to La.

R.S. 47:2122(10), “a ‘Redemption nullity’ means the right of a person to annul a

tax sale in accordance with R.S. 47:2286 because he was not duly notified at least

six months before the termination of the redemptive period.”

In paragraph V of her petition, Taylor alleged, “Petitioner, Denise Taylor avers

that she has not received post-tax sale notice of the ax (sic) sale referred to in

Paragraph III of this Petition.” Again, in paragraph VI, Taylor alleged that, “she is

entitled to redeem the tax sale referred to in Paragraph III in that Petitioner did not

receive post-tax sale notice.” Our court has previously held that the taxing

authority’s failure to provide adequate post-sale notice constitutes a redemption

nullity as that term is defined by La. R.S. 47:2122(10). Klein v. Henderson, 2021-

0317, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/21), 332 So. 3d 764, 778.

“In the absence of evidence, an exception of peremption must be decided upon

the facts alleged in the petition with all of the allegations accepted as true.” Lomont

v. Bennett, 2014-2483, p. 8 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d 620, 627. In this case, the

record reveals that IPF did not offer any evidence on the peremption issue.1

Therefore, we must accept as a fact that the City of New Orleans did not give

1 IPF offered some evidence on the exception of no cause of action that was argued on the same

date, but IPF relied on pleadings alone in the argument of the exception of peremption. 2 Taylor notice of the tax sale at least six months before the termination of the

redemptive period and the argument of peremption must fail.

Conclusion

Taking into account Taylor’s allegations and argument, we conclude that this

case must be remanded to the trial court to make factual determinations consistent

with this opinion. The judgment of peremption is vacated.

JUDGMENT VACATED, CASE REMANDED.