FILED Dec 10 2024, 9:10 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Denise Paul Hatch, Constable of the Center Township of Marion County Small Claims Court, Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
The Honorable Brenda A. Roper, Judge of the Center Township of Marion County Small Claims Court, Appellee-Defendant
December 10, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-PL-1375 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D06-2312-PL-47082
Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Pyle and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 1 of 6 Weissmann, Judge.
[1] While serving as Constable of Marion County’s Center Township Small Claims
Court, Denise Hatch sued the court’s presiding judge, the Honorable Brenda
Roper, over Judge Roper’s appointment of Special Constables to carry out
Constable Hatch’s duties. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in
favor of Judge Roper, and Constable Hatch appealed. But Hatch has since been
removed from her public office by operation of law. Finding her appellate
claims are therefore moot, we dismiss.
Facts [2] Hatch was elected Center Township Constable in November 2022 and began
serving her four-year term of office in January 2023. Her official duties included
acting as bailiff and process server for the Center Township Small Claims
Court. By statute, Constable Hatch was compensated solely through the fees
collected for each service of process she effected.
[3] Ten months into Constable Hatch’s term, Judge Roper found Constable Hatch
had “failed to maintain any meaningful contact with the [Center Township
Small Claims] Court so that personal service of process and orders of the Court
[could] be completed.” App. Vol. II., pp. 10, 16. Therefore, pursuant to Indiana
Code § 33-34-6-4(d), Judge Roper appointed several Special Constables to carry
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 2 of 6 out Constable Hatch’s duties.1 Constable Hatch, in turn, sued Judge Roper in
Marion Superior Court.
[4] In her complaint, Constable Hatch disputed her purported inability to perform
the duties of her office, and she protested that her means of compensation had
been improperly granted to the Special Constables. Constable Hatch did not
request damages though. Instead, she sought: (1) a declaration that Judge Roper
was violating Indiana law by not withdrawing the Special Constable
appointments; and (2) an injunction requiring Judge Roper to withdraw them.
[5] Judge Roper denied the material allegations of Constable Hatch’s complaint.
She then moved for judgment on the pleadings, characterizing the lawsuit as an
original action for writ of mandate over which the Indiana Supreme Court had
exclusive jurisdiction.2 The trial court agreed with this characterization and
entered judgment on the pleadings in Judge Roper’s favor. Constable Hatch
then initiated this appeal of the trial court’s judgment.
1 Indiana Code § 33-34-6-4(d)(2) provides: “If there is an inability of a constable to carry out the constable’s duties, the judge may appoint a special constable to carry out the duties of the constable during the inability.” (cleaned up). 2 Indiana Original Action Rule 1(A) provides: “The Supreme Court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of jurisdiction by other courts of the State of Indiana by virtue of Indiana Constitution, Article 7, Section 4, and [Indiana] Appellate Rule 4(B)(3).” And Indiana Appellate Rule 4(B)(3) provides: “The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the . . . [s]upervision of the exercise of jurisdiction by other courts of the State of Indiana, including the issuance of writs of mandate and prohibition.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 3 of 6 [6] Meanwhile, in a separate case,3 the State charged Constable Hatch with official
misconduct, a Level 6 felony, for unlawfully carrying a handgun in the
performance of her duties as Center Township Constable. Constable Hatch
eventually pleaded guilty to the felony charge pursuant to a plea agreement
with the State, and on October 8, 2024, the trial court entered judgment of her
conviction. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 5-8-1-38(b), Constable Hatch was
thereby removed from her public office by operation of law.4 A new Center
Township Constable has since been elected, but Hatch’s appeal in the case
against Judge Roper remains pending.
Discussion and Decision [7] Hatch challenges the trial court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of
Judge Roper, arguing that her lawsuit was not an original action for writ of
mandate over which the Indiana Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction.
Rather, Hatch contends her complaint merely sought a declaration concerning
the validity of Judge Roper’s Special Constable appointments, which the trial
court had jurisdiction to issue under Indiana’s Declaratory Judgment Act.5 We
3 Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(a), we take judicial notice of the Marion Superior Court’s records in Case No. 49D18-2405-F6-014188. See McMillen v. State, 169 N.E.3d 437, 443 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“The records need not be from the court hearing the present action; records of any Indiana court are appropriate for judicial notice.”). 4 Indiana Code § 5-8-1-38(b)(1)(C) provides: “Any public officer convicted of a felony during the public officer’s term of office shall be removed from office by operation of law when, in a guilty plea hearing, the person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a felony.” (cleaned up). 5 Indiana Code § 34-14-1-1 provides: “Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions have the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 4 of 6 observe that Hatch also sought an injunction requiring Judge Roper to
withdraw the Special Constable appointments. However, we need not decide
whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue either form of relief because
Hatch’s claims are moot.
[8] “Mootness arises when the primary issue within the case ‘has been ended or
settled, or in some manner disposed of, so as to render it unnecessary to decide
the question involved.’” In re Custody of M.B., 51 N.E.3d 230, 233 (Ind. 2016)
(quoting Matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)). “[W]hen no
effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court,” a case will be
deemed moot and “usually dismissed.” Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37.
[9] In this case, the primary issue was whether Constable Hatch was unable to
carry out the duties of Center Township Constable, such that Judge Roper was
authorized to appoint Special Constables to perform those duties under Indiana
Code § 33-34-6-4(d)(2). Hatch’s removal from the public office resolved this
issue because she is no longer entitled to perform the duties of Center Township
Constable. See Larkin v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1281, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(finding on interlocutory appeal that denial of defendant’s motion to disqualify
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FILED Dec 10 2024, 9:10 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Denise Paul Hatch, Constable of the Center Township of Marion County Small Claims Court, Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
The Honorable Brenda A. Roper, Judge of the Center Township of Marion County Small Claims Court, Appellee-Defendant
December 10, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-PL-1375 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D06-2312-PL-47082
Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Pyle and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 1 of 6 Weissmann, Judge.
[1] While serving as Constable of Marion County’s Center Township Small Claims
Court, Denise Hatch sued the court’s presiding judge, the Honorable Brenda
Roper, over Judge Roper’s appointment of Special Constables to carry out
Constable Hatch’s duties. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in
favor of Judge Roper, and Constable Hatch appealed. But Hatch has since been
removed from her public office by operation of law. Finding her appellate
claims are therefore moot, we dismiss.
Facts [2] Hatch was elected Center Township Constable in November 2022 and began
serving her four-year term of office in January 2023. Her official duties included
acting as bailiff and process server for the Center Township Small Claims
Court. By statute, Constable Hatch was compensated solely through the fees
collected for each service of process she effected.
[3] Ten months into Constable Hatch’s term, Judge Roper found Constable Hatch
had “failed to maintain any meaningful contact with the [Center Township
Small Claims] Court so that personal service of process and orders of the Court
[could] be completed.” App. Vol. II., pp. 10, 16. Therefore, pursuant to Indiana
Code § 33-34-6-4(d), Judge Roper appointed several Special Constables to carry
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 2 of 6 out Constable Hatch’s duties.1 Constable Hatch, in turn, sued Judge Roper in
Marion Superior Court.
[4] In her complaint, Constable Hatch disputed her purported inability to perform
the duties of her office, and she protested that her means of compensation had
been improperly granted to the Special Constables. Constable Hatch did not
request damages though. Instead, she sought: (1) a declaration that Judge Roper
was violating Indiana law by not withdrawing the Special Constable
appointments; and (2) an injunction requiring Judge Roper to withdraw them.
[5] Judge Roper denied the material allegations of Constable Hatch’s complaint.
She then moved for judgment on the pleadings, characterizing the lawsuit as an
original action for writ of mandate over which the Indiana Supreme Court had
exclusive jurisdiction.2 The trial court agreed with this characterization and
entered judgment on the pleadings in Judge Roper’s favor. Constable Hatch
then initiated this appeal of the trial court’s judgment.
1 Indiana Code § 33-34-6-4(d)(2) provides: “If there is an inability of a constable to carry out the constable’s duties, the judge may appoint a special constable to carry out the duties of the constable during the inability.” (cleaned up). 2 Indiana Original Action Rule 1(A) provides: “The Supreme Court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to supervise the exercise of jurisdiction by other courts of the State of Indiana by virtue of Indiana Constitution, Article 7, Section 4, and [Indiana] Appellate Rule 4(B)(3).” And Indiana Appellate Rule 4(B)(3) provides: “The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the . . . [s]upervision of the exercise of jurisdiction by other courts of the State of Indiana, including the issuance of writs of mandate and prohibition.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 3 of 6 [6] Meanwhile, in a separate case,3 the State charged Constable Hatch with official
misconduct, a Level 6 felony, for unlawfully carrying a handgun in the
performance of her duties as Center Township Constable. Constable Hatch
eventually pleaded guilty to the felony charge pursuant to a plea agreement
with the State, and on October 8, 2024, the trial court entered judgment of her
conviction. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 5-8-1-38(b), Constable Hatch was
thereby removed from her public office by operation of law.4 A new Center
Township Constable has since been elected, but Hatch’s appeal in the case
against Judge Roper remains pending.
Discussion and Decision [7] Hatch challenges the trial court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of
Judge Roper, arguing that her lawsuit was not an original action for writ of
mandate over which the Indiana Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction.
Rather, Hatch contends her complaint merely sought a declaration concerning
the validity of Judge Roper’s Special Constable appointments, which the trial
court had jurisdiction to issue under Indiana’s Declaratory Judgment Act.5 We
3 Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(a), we take judicial notice of the Marion Superior Court’s records in Case No. 49D18-2405-F6-014188. See McMillen v. State, 169 N.E.3d 437, 443 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“The records need not be from the court hearing the present action; records of any Indiana court are appropriate for judicial notice.”). 4 Indiana Code § 5-8-1-38(b)(1)(C) provides: “Any public officer convicted of a felony during the public officer’s term of office shall be removed from office by operation of law when, in a guilty plea hearing, the person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a felony.” (cleaned up). 5 Indiana Code § 34-14-1-1 provides: “Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions have the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 4 of 6 observe that Hatch also sought an injunction requiring Judge Roper to
withdraw the Special Constable appointments. However, we need not decide
whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue either form of relief because
Hatch’s claims are moot.
[8] “Mootness arises when the primary issue within the case ‘has been ended or
settled, or in some manner disposed of, so as to render it unnecessary to decide
the question involved.’” In re Custody of M.B., 51 N.E.3d 230, 233 (Ind. 2016)
(quoting Matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)). “[W]hen no
effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court,” a case will be
deemed moot and “usually dismissed.” Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37.
[9] In this case, the primary issue was whether Constable Hatch was unable to
carry out the duties of Center Township Constable, such that Judge Roper was
authorized to appoint Special Constables to perform those duties under Indiana
Code § 33-34-6-4(d)(2). Hatch’s removal from the public office resolved this
issue because she is no longer entitled to perform the duties of Center Township
Constable. See Larkin v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1281, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(finding on interlocutory appeal that denial of defendant’s motion to disqualify
elected prosecutor was mooted by prosecutor’s failure to win reelection).
Moreover, Hatch did not seek any retrospective relief, only a declaratory
judgment and injunction. See Bookwalter v. Ind. Election Comm’n, 209 N.E.3d
438, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“A case is moot when . . . the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (internal quotation omitted)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 5 of 6 [10] As we are unable to provide Hatch with effective relief, her appeal is moot. And
though there exists a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, we find
it inapplicable here because circumstances of Hatch’s case are unusual enough
that they are not likely to recur. See generally T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health
Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019) (“The public interest
exception may be invoked when an issue involves a question of great public
importance which is likely to recur.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, we dismiss.
Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Andrea L. Ciobanu Ciobanu Law, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Evan Matthew Comer Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-1375 | December 10, 2024 Page 6 of 6