Denis Jossue Rivas Amaya v. Warden, Golden State Annex Detention Facility

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 8, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-00884
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DENIS JOSSUE RIVAS AMAYA No. 1:26-cv-00884-DJC-SCR (A#708-577-505), 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER AND v. 14 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS WARDEN, GOLDEN STATE ANNEX 15 DETENTION FACILITY, 16 Respondent. 17 18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee who filed this habeas corpus action pursuant 19 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Because petitioner’s § 1226(c) detention is still 21 within the brief, constitutionally permissible period contemplated by the Supreme Court in 22 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the undersigned recommends denying the petition. 23 I. Factual and Procedural History 24 Petitioner is a native of El Salvador and currently detained at the Golden State Annex, 25 within this judicial district. ECF No. 1 at 2, 5. Petitioner entered the United States on an 26 unknown date in 2017 and was later granted asylum. ECF No. 1 at 5. On May 19, 2023, 27 petitioner was convicted of two counts of First Degree Residential Burglary with a Person Present 28 in violation of California Penal Code § 459. See ECF No. 10-2 at 4-5. He was sentenced to serve 1 six years in prison. ECF No. 10-2 at 4. After his release from state prison, petitioner was 2 detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on January 26, 2026. Id. In his § 3 2241 petition, he alleges that his prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing 4 violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. Id. at 6-17. 5 Respondent asserts that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 6 1226(c) based on his convictions for two counts of burglary in violation of California Penal Code 7 § 459. ECF No. 10. While respondent concedes that petitioner was granted asylum, he was 8 served with a Notice of Intent to Terminate Asylum Status on January 26, 2026 based on his 2023 9 convictions for First Degree Residential Burglary resulting in a six year prison sentence. ECF 10 No. 10-1. Respondent asserts that these convictions render petitioner subject to mandatory 11 detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(A), 1226(c)(1)(B), and 1226(c)(1)(E) based on the 12 nature and seriousness of the crimes. ECF No. 10 at 3-4. According to respondent, petitioner’s 13 reliance on Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), does not justify relief in this case because 14 petitioner has not been detained in excess of six months. ECF No. 10 at 5. Respondent explains 15 that petitioner’s detention has a “definite” termination point when his removal proceedings 16 conclude. Id. at 4-5. 17 On February 11, 2026, the District Judge in this case denied petitioner’s motion for a 18 temporary restraining order after concluding that petitioner did not demonstrate a likelihood of 19 success on the merits of his § 2241 petition. ECF No. 11. 20 II. Applicable Detention Statute 21 The statutory framework governing immigration detention is complex. “Where a 22 [noncitizen] falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or 23 discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the 24 necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 25 Respondent argues that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under various subsections of 26 § 1226(c) based on his two 2023 burglary convictions for which he was sentenced to six years in 27 prison. Respondent is correct that petitioner’s detention is mandatory under § 1226(c)(1)(A) 28 because he has been convicted of an “offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title; 1 specifically, he has been convicted of “2 or more offenses . . . for which the aggregate sentences 2 to confinement were 5 years or more.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(A) and 1182(a)(2)(B).1 See ECF 3 No. 10-2 at 4-7. 4 III. Legal Standard 5 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life, 6 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has 7 concluded that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, 8 including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 9 permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Courts examine procedural due 10 process claims in two steps: the first step is determining whether there exists a protected liberty 11 interest under the Due Process Clause. The second step examines the procedures necessary to 12 ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See 13 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 14 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains 15 what process is due.”). 16 There is no binding Circuit precedent on the appropriate test or standard to apply to an as- 17 applied challenge to prolonged detention claims. While observing “district courts throughout this 18 circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens held for 19 prolonged periods under § 1226(c),” the Ninth Circuit has expressly declined to address 20 “[w]hether due process requires a bond hearing” in such situations. Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 21 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). But it has 22 previously expressed “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention 23 without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to 24 protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.”

25 1 Having determined that petitioner’s burglary convictions constitute an aggravated felony under 26 immigration law, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine whether petitioner is also subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) and (E), as respondent contends. 27 However, the Court notes that United States v. Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d 932, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2013), which respondent relies on as to § 1226(c)(1)(B), is no longer good law in light of 28 Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148 (2018). 1 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). 2 The undersigned finds Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), provides the 3 appropriate test for evaluating prolonged detention issues. Under Mathews, the court considers 4 three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that 5 interest; and (3) the government’s interest involved including any fiscal or administrative burden 6 that additional procedures would include. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 7 IV. Analysis 8 A. As-Applied Framework 9 The undersigned construes the petition as raising an as-applied, procedural due process 10 challenge to the constitutionality of petitioner’s detention under § 1226(c)(1)(B). Although the 11 Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of mandatory detention under § 1226(c) in 12 Demore, it did so with the understanding that such detention is relatively “brief” and “limited,” 13 and “lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases” and “about five months in the 14 minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 529 n.12, 530. 15 Later, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the Supreme Court expressly recognized the right 16 to bring as-applied challenges to the mandatory detention under § 1226(c): “Our decision today 17 on the meaning of that statutory provision [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied 18 challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications of the statute as we have now read 19 it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. Since Demore and Preap, “[c]ourts in the Ninth Circuit routinely 20 review as-applied constitutional challenges to § 1226(c) detention.” Jose G. M. L., 2026 WL 21 472987, at *3 (collecting cases). 22 B. Procedural Due Process 23 Petitioner undoubtedly has a liberty interest in “‘freedom from prolonged detention’ [that] 24 is ‘unquestionably substantial.’” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022) 25 (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011)). However, petitioner has been 26 detained for three months in total. In Demore, the Supreme Court held the petitioner’s six-month 27 detention under § 1226(c) was “constitutionally permissible” despite being “somewhat longer 28 than average.” 538 U.S. at 530-531. Further, although the Ninth Circuit has not pinpointed when 1 mandatory detention under § 1226(c) becomes prolonged, it has referred to detentions longer than 2 six months as prolonged “in the context of detentions for which no individualized bond hearings 3 had taken place at all because the statutes on their faces did not allow for them.” Rodriguez Diaz, 4 53 F.4th at 1207 (citations omitted); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (recognizing a “6–month 5 period” of presumptively reasonable postremoval-period detention). Therefore, given that the 6 duration of petitioner’s detention is still within the range contemplated in Demore, the 7 undersigned finds that it does not yet trigger a protected liberty interest from prolonged detention. 8 However, petitioner still retains a general liberty interest in freedom from detention which 9 “lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.’” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 10 But applying the Mathews factors to that private interest, the relatively short duration of 11 petitioner’s § 1226(c) detention significantly diminishes its strength. “[T]he longer mandatory 12 detention continues under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) beyond the ‘brief’ period authorized in Demore, the 13 harder it becomes to justify without conducting an individualized bond hearing.” Sarr v. Scott, 14 765 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1098 (W.D. Wash. 2025); cf. Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 151 (2d Cir. 15 2024) (finding first Mathews factor “weighs heavily in favor” of petitioners where they were 16 detained for “far longer” than the petitioner in Demore). 17 Further, the risk of erroneous deprivation is currently low where the duration of 18 petitioner’s detention does not exceed that of the petitioner in Demore, and petitioner presumably 19 has an opportunity to challenge his inclusion in a mandatory detention category pursuant to 20 Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). However, the risk of erroneous deprivation 21 will increase over time as his detention becomes prolonged due to the “almost nonexistent 22 procedural protections in place for section 1226(c) detainees.” Black, 103 F.4th at 152. 23 Finally, precedent dictates that “[t]he government has an obvious interest in ‘protecting 24 the public from dangerous criminal aliens.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 25 538 U.S. at 515). Indeed, in Demore, the Supreme Court expressly upheld the brief detention of 26 criminal noncitizens without an individualized determination of dangerousness. See 510 U.S. at 27 528. While this factor currently favors the government, it too will tilt toward petitioner as his 28 detention without an individualized determination of danger or flight risk becomes prolonged. 1 See Black, 103 F.4th at 153–54 (“The additional procedural safeguards we would allow here 2 under Mathews do nothing to undercut those interests. At any ordered bond hearing, the IJ would 3 assess on an individualized basis whether the noncitizen presents a flight risk or a danger to the 4 community, as IJs routinely do for other noncitizen detainees.”); Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv- 5 7996 NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“Providing a bond hearing would 6 not undercut the government’s asserted interest in effecting removal. After all, the purpose of a 7 bond hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents a flight risk or danger to the community.”) 8 (citing In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006)). 9 On balance, the Mathews factors weigh against ordering a bond hearing at the current, 10 three month juncture of petitioner’s immigration detention. Accordingly, the undersigned 11 recommends that the habeas petition be denied.2 12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel 13 (ECF No. 3) is denied as unnecessary in light of the recommendation contained herein. 14 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas 15 corpus be DENIED without prejudice. 16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 17 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days after 18 being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 19 the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period 20 is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties 21 have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v. 22 Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets 23 the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties 24 //// 25 //// 26

27 2 These findings and recommendations do not preclude petitioner from seeking a bond hearing in a subsequent § 2241 petition at a later point in time should his detention become prolonged. 28 1 | are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 2 || the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 3 || DATED: June 8, 2026 4

SEAN C. RIORDAN 7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28