Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Air Capital Group, LLC

614 F. App'x 460
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJune 11, 2015
Docket14-11243
StatusUnpublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 614 F. App'x 460 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Air Capital Group, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Air Capital Group, LLC, 614 F. App'x 460 (11th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

GOLDBERG, Judge:

A vintage aircraft, a Miami executive, and a central African head of state. With a cast like that, one might confuse this case for a Bond film. But the matter before us is no work of fiction — it is the true story of an airplane maintenance check gone south and the weeks-long trial that followed. And the star of the show is not a tuxedoed spy, but the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), a law that protects consumers from predatory business schemes. See Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201-501.23.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) sued Air Capital Group, LLC (“ACG”), and its CEO, Mario Abad, for breach’ of contract, fraud, and FDUTPA violations. The DRC won a jury verdict, and the defendants now appeal aspects of the judgment, including jurisdiction, their liability under the FDUTPA, and monetary damages. We reject each of these challenges, however, because the trial court had proper jurisdiction and correctly interpreted Florida law. We thus affirm and close the book on a saga that began in a Kinshasa apartment.

BACKGROUND

A. The Workscope Agreement

Charles Deschryver had a problem. 1 As the Logistical Assistant to Joseph Kabila, president of the DRC, Deschryver was charged to care for the president’s aircraft, including a four-engine Boeing 707-100 (the “plane” or “707”). By early 2010, the plane was due for a “C-check,” or heavy maintenance. Deschryver searched from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia to find a shop that would do the job, but without success.

Then in June 2010, Deschryver found what he thought he was looking for. At a flat in Kinshasa (the DRC’s capital), Des-chryver met with Stavros Papaioannou, the CEO of Hewa Bora Airlines, and with two executives from ACG, Mario Abad and Jaime Sanchez. Papaioannou suggested that ACG could do the C-check for Kabi-la’s 707, and Abad agreed. Deschryver was delighted by the news, and soon after the meeting ended, Abad and Sanchez inspected the plane at the airport. Abad remarked the plane was in “good shape,” and the parties agreed that ACG would fix the 707 in Florida.

*463 Soon thereafter, Abad sent Deschryver a workscope agreement (the “Workscope” or “Agreement”). The Workscope said that ACG would perform the C-check, apply airworthiness directives (“ADs”) to the plane’s engines, and finish other tasks for a flat fee of $2,255,872.80. Deschryver signed the Agreement for the “Republic Democratic of Congo,” and he stamped the seal of the Presidency of the Republic on the signature block.

ACG prepared its first invoice for the DRC on July 30, 2010. The DRC requested the invoices because “they needed some sort of documentation to be able to go to their government and get payments” from the Ministry of Finance. The DRC paid the first $1 million installment on July 12, and the plane arrived in Florida on July 31.

B. Oral Agreements to Replace Engines Three and Four

Unwelcome difficulties arose soon after the plane reached Miami. While doing the C-check, ACG’s “technical people discovered that one of the engines did not have appropriate paperwork and needed to be replaced.” Abad and Sanchez returned to the DRC to discuss the matter with Des-chryver, and on September 10 or 11, the parties orally agreed to replace engine number three. Deschryver asked that the new engine come “with all the documents, QEC [quick engine change equipment], all the AD and all the airworthiness directives and all the service in order, a 707 engine.” The price for the engine would be $250,000.

Then, when Deschryver visited Miami in late September, he learned that engine four also needed replacing. In its stead, Deschryver wanted “a 707 engine with all the service built in, all the AD, full QEC, full overhaul with all the documents.” Like engine three, engine four would cost $250,000.

C. A String of Broken Promises

By October 28, 2010, the DRC had paid $4 million toward the cost of repairs. Just days before, ACG’s chief financial officer Antonio Neuman had asked for more money even though the company held over $2 million in reserve, allegedly to cover future charges. Deschryver was bewilderded by the mounting costs but paid the money anyway, and Abad reassured Deschryver that the replacement engines would soon arrive from Ireland. Abad added that he would do a test flight on December 12 and deliver the plane by December 16.

Yet nothing happened the way Abad said it would. When the engines arrived from Ireland, ACG learned that neither were properly documented. As a result, the engines were unusable, and ACG agreed with ABX Air, Inc. (“ABX”), to buy replacements. Antonio Neuman signed the contract with ABX, which set the price of each new engine at $49,500. The replacement engines, which carried serial numbers 645402 (“402”) and 669706 (“706”), were not serviceable upon delivery.

Meanwhile, the December 16 deadline for delivery slipped past. When it did, Abad repeated that the work would finish soon, this time by January — but Abad had no personal knowledge that the project was near completion. In reliance on Abad’s statements, Jean Tshiumba from the DRC Civil Aviation Authority and technical engineer Zacharie Nakwaya departed to inspect the 707 and collect it from ACG.

But when Tshiumba and Nakwaya arrived in Miami on January 10, 2011, their hopes were dashed. As he inspected the replacement engines, Nakwaya found that 402 was completely disassembled and that *464 706 was closed and unserviceable. Both were choked with dust and nests. Furthermore, the engines were configured for a DC8 airplane, not for a Boeing 707, which meant installation would take longer than anticipated. And Tshiumba, for his part, reported that the engines were not mounted and there was “no avionics equipment installed” on the aircraft. The plane was unfit to fly, despite Abad’s earlier assurances.

D.The Liens and the Audit

On April 21, Abad sent Deschryver more bad news. Bonus Tech, the company servicing the plane’s original engines, had filed a lien on the engines for $147,861.42. A few weeks later, Abad reported that Commercial Jet, Inc., which was performing the C-check, planned to file its own lien on the plane. The news irked Deschryver, because the DRC had already paid $5 million for the repairs, and Abad kept “on telling [Deschryver] that the aircraft [was] ready.” The DRC forked over another $1,381,531.64 to keep the work going.

The constant pleas for money prompted Deschryver to order an audit of the project. On May 27, he asked Nakwaya and Ben Kalala, a deputy logistical assistant, to review the project’s progress and finances. Nakwaya and Kalala asked for notarized invoices from each vendor to verify the amount paid for services provided. In response, Antonio Neuman furnished a contract between ACG and ABX for engines 402 and 706. Unlike the contract signed in November 2010, however, the contract provided in May was signed by Abad, not Neuman. And while the November contract said each engine cost $49,500, the May contract said each engine cost $57,000.

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614 F. App'x 460, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-v-air-capital-group-llc-ca11-2015.