MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:
Once again we are confronted with the issue on appeal of whether the FCC has properly applied its fairness doctrine to a particular set of facts. The petitioner, the Democratic National Committee (hereinafter DNC), contends that the Commission erred in determining that the three major television networks had acted reasonably in pursuing their obligation to provide adequate coverage of public issues in their refusal in August-October 1971 to make available free prime-time television air to DNC to respond to certain Presidential addresses concerning the Administration’s economic policy.
The Presidential broadcasts at issue consisted of the following appearances on all three networks:
(1) An address on August 15, 1971, announcing the Administration’s new economic program, broadcast by the networks live on television and radio between 9:00 p. m. and 9:20 p. m., EDT.
(2) A Labor Day address on September 6, 1971, clarifying the new program, broadcast by the networks
live on radio only between 12:00 noon and 12:15 p. m., EDT.
(3) An address delivered on September 9, 1971, at the request of the Democratic congressional leadership to a joint session of Congress explaining the President’s new economic policy and outlining legislation designed by the Administration to help achieve the policy’s goals. The networks broadcast this speech live on television and radio during non-prime time from 12:30 p. m. to 1:08 p. m., EDT.
(4) An address on October 7, 1971, announcing Phase II of the new economic program, broadcast live by the networks on television and radio between 7:30 p. m. and 7:46 p. m., EDT.
Petitioner also argues that three non-prime-time press conferences with then Treasury Secretary John Connally dealing with the President’s economic program should be weighed along with the President’s personal addresses.
DNC sought permission from the networks to respond to some of these broadcasts, and, upon being refused, filed a complaint with the Commission seeking an order to compel NBC, CBS and ABC to provide free time for the presentation of its viewpoint on the national economy. In its arguments to the Commission, DNC again pressed its contention
that Presidential addresses should give rise to an
automatic right of reply
by spokesmen of the opposing party — a position emphatically rejected by us in Democratic National Committee v. F. C. C., 148 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 460 F.2d 891, cert. denied 409 U.S. 843, 93 S.Ct. 42, 34 L.Ed.2d 82 (1972). In addition, DNC argued that under the Commission’s decision in Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970) (hereinafter
Fair
Committee) these facts must give rise to a right of reply. In
Fair Committee
the Commission held that five uninterrupted prime-time television (and radio) Presidential addresses dealing with the Indochina war in a seven month period where coverage had otherwise been roughly in balance, presented a unique situation requiring the networks to provide an opportunity for some spokesman for the other side to respond with one uninterrupted prime-time appearance. In opposing these contentions, each of the three networks responded to DNC’s complaint by pointing out the factual distinction between this case and
Fair Committee
and describing a comprehensive coverage of the viewpoints of critics of the President’s economic program that had already been implemented by them.
These facts relating to network programming of op
posing viewpoints were uncontested by DNC. The Commission requested the transcripts of four of these opposing broadcasts (two from CBS, one from NBC and one from ABC) and these were duly submitted for the Commission’s study over the objections of DNC.
On February 17, 1972, the Commission denied DNC's complaint. J.A. 200-11. The Commission held that there was no showing that the networks had failed to meet their fairness doctrine obligation to present contrasting views on the President’s economic program. Following its earlier rulings, the Commission reaffirmed that there is no automatic right of reply to Presidential broadcast appearances. J.A. 208-09. While recognizing that in
Fair Committee
it had required the networks to afford additional time to respond to the President on the special facts of that case, the Commission noted that the present case was readily distinguishable from its earlier ruling and that, in light of the policies of the fairness doctrine and the Communications Act, the factual differences between the cases justified different results. J.A. 206-11. Finally, the Commission ruled that even if DNC’s complaint were substantively meritorious, DNC would not be entitled to an order requiring the networks to afford DNC time to respond to the President, since the fairness doctrine left the selection of appropriate spokesmen to the licensee’s discretion. J.A. 205-06. The Commission found the inappropriateness of the relief requested to be an independent ground for its decision. J. A. 206.
The fairness doctrine has been discussed at great length by the courts in recent years and it is unnecessary to examine its fundamental principles in detail here. Suffice it to say that the doctrine places a duty on the licensee to “give adequate coverage to public issues and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects opposing views.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 395 U.S. 367, 377-378, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1800, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the discretion of the licensee in achieving this goal.
By its very nature the fairness doctrine is one which cannot be applied with scientific and mathematical certainty. There is no formula which if followed will assure that the requirements of the doctrine have been met. Procedurally, the doctrine can only succeed when the licensee exercises that discretion upon which he is instructed to call upon in dealing with coverage of controversial issues.
Democratic National Committee v. F. C. C.,
supra,
148 U.S.App.D.C. at 392, 460 F.2d at 900. Recently the Supreme Court has again reaffirmed its faith in licensee discretion. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973). Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, concluded from a review of legislative history that “Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations.”
Id.
at 110, 93 S.Ct. at 2090.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge:
Once again we are confronted with the issue on appeal of whether the FCC has properly applied its fairness doctrine to a particular set of facts. The petitioner, the Democratic National Committee (hereinafter DNC), contends that the Commission erred in determining that the three major television networks had acted reasonably in pursuing their obligation to provide adequate coverage of public issues in their refusal in August-October 1971 to make available free prime-time television air to DNC to respond to certain Presidential addresses concerning the Administration’s economic policy.
The Presidential broadcasts at issue consisted of the following appearances on all three networks:
(1) An address on August 15, 1971, announcing the Administration’s new economic program, broadcast by the networks live on television and radio between 9:00 p. m. and 9:20 p. m., EDT.
(2) A Labor Day address on September 6, 1971, clarifying the new program, broadcast by the networks
live on radio only between 12:00 noon and 12:15 p. m., EDT.
(3) An address delivered on September 9, 1971, at the request of the Democratic congressional leadership to a joint session of Congress explaining the President’s new economic policy and outlining legislation designed by the Administration to help achieve the policy’s goals. The networks broadcast this speech live on television and radio during non-prime time from 12:30 p. m. to 1:08 p. m., EDT.
(4) An address on October 7, 1971, announcing Phase II of the new economic program, broadcast live by the networks on television and radio between 7:30 p. m. and 7:46 p. m., EDT.
Petitioner also argues that three non-prime-time press conferences with then Treasury Secretary John Connally dealing with the President’s economic program should be weighed along with the President’s personal addresses.
DNC sought permission from the networks to respond to some of these broadcasts, and, upon being refused, filed a complaint with the Commission seeking an order to compel NBC, CBS and ABC to provide free time for the presentation of its viewpoint on the national economy. In its arguments to the Commission, DNC again pressed its contention
that Presidential addresses should give rise to an
automatic right of reply
by spokesmen of the opposing party — a position emphatically rejected by us in Democratic National Committee v. F. C. C., 148 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 460 F.2d 891, cert. denied 409 U.S. 843, 93 S.Ct. 42, 34 L.Ed.2d 82 (1972). In addition, DNC argued that under the Commission’s decision in Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970) (hereinafter
Fair
Committee) these facts must give rise to a right of reply. In
Fair Committee
the Commission held that five uninterrupted prime-time television (and radio) Presidential addresses dealing with the Indochina war in a seven month period where coverage had otherwise been roughly in balance, presented a unique situation requiring the networks to provide an opportunity for some spokesman for the other side to respond with one uninterrupted prime-time appearance. In opposing these contentions, each of the three networks responded to DNC’s complaint by pointing out the factual distinction between this case and
Fair Committee
and describing a comprehensive coverage of the viewpoints of critics of the President’s economic program that had already been implemented by them.
These facts relating to network programming of op
posing viewpoints were uncontested by DNC. The Commission requested the transcripts of four of these opposing broadcasts (two from CBS, one from NBC and one from ABC) and these were duly submitted for the Commission’s study over the objections of DNC.
On February 17, 1972, the Commission denied DNC's complaint. J.A. 200-11. The Commission held that there was no showing that the networks had failed to meet their fairness doctrine obligation to present contrasting views on the President’s economic program. Following its earlier rulings, the Commission reaffirmed that there is no automatic right of reply to Presidential broadcast appearances. J.A. 208-09. While recognizing that in
Fair Committee
it had required the networks to afford additional time to respond to the President on the special facts of that case, the Commission noted that the present case was readily distinguishable from its earlier ruling and that, in light of the policies of the fairness doctrine and the Communications Act, the factual differences between the cases justified different results. J.A. 206-11. Finally, the Commission ruled that even if DNC’s complaint were substantively meritorious, DNC would not be entitled to an order requiring the networks to afford DNC time to respond to the President, since the fairness doctrine left the selection of appropriate spokesmen to the licensee’s discretion. J.A. 205-06. The Commission found the inappropriateness of the relief requested to be an independent ground for its decision. J. A. 206.
The fairness doctrine has been discussed at great length by the courts in recent years and it is unnecessary to examine its fundamental principles in detail here. Suffice it to say that the doctrine places a duty on the licensee to “give adequate coverage to public issues and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects opposing views.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 395 U.S. 367, 377-378, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1800, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the discretion of the licensee in achieving this goal.
By its very nature the fairness doctrine is one which cannot be applied with scientific and mathematical certainty. There is no formula which if followed will assure that the requirements of the doctrine have been met. Procedurally, the doctrine can only succeed when the licensee exercises that discretion upon which he is instructed to call upon in dealing with coverage of controversial issues.
Democratic National Committee v. F. C. C.,
supra,
148 U.S.App.D.C. at 392, 460 F.2d at 900. Recently the Supreme Court has again reaffirmed its faith in licensee discretion. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973). Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, concluded from a review of legislative history that “Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations.”
Id.
at 110, 93 S.Ct. at 2090. In addition, we have “made it clear that unlike those corollaries to the doctrine that create equal-opportunities situations the doctrine itself does not create a right for any person or group to be granted time.” Democratic National Committee v. F. C. C.,
supra,
148 U.S.App.D.C. at 395, 460 F.2d at 903. “The licensees may exercise their judgment as to what material is presented and by whom .... The fairness doctrine is issue-oriented, and it would be sufficient if each licensee could show that the point of view advocated by petitioner . . . had been or was being presented on its station by others.” Green v. F. C. C., 144 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 358, 447 F.2d 323, 328 (1971). “Thus in opinion after opinion, the Commission and the courts have stressed the wide degree of discretion available under the fairness doctrine and we have clearly stated time after time,
ad infinitum ad nauseam,
that the key to the doctrine is no mystical formula but rather the exercise of reasonable standards by the licensee.” Democratic National Committee v. F. C. C.,
supra,
148 U.S.App.D.C. at 395, 460 F.2d at 903. And in our recent
Democratic National Committee
case we held unequivocally that a Presidential address does not automatically give rise to a special right to respond.
Id.,
148 U.S.App.D.C. at 396-397, 460 F.2d at 904-905.
In light of these established principles it is clear that DNC was not entitled automatically to any right to reply. That there is no equal-opportunities rule in the context of the fairness doctrine is now beyond dispute. The Commission must look to all the relevant facts and circumstances to determine whether the public had been left uninformed of opposing viewpoints during the period in question and the burden is on the petitioner to show that the networks had not exercised reasonable judgment in this regard. We feel that the Commission was completely justified in finding in this case that no such showing had been made. It correctly concluded that in light of “the extensive coverage which the networks appear to have given to the current issue, including presentation of contrasting viewpoints on their news and interview programs, as well as some special programs they have cited . . . we cannot find that the broadcast licensees have acted unreasonably or left the American
people uninformed on the issue of the economic program.” (J.A. 209-10, 211).
Moreover, even if a right of reply were warranted, we again reiterate that the networks have discretion in the selection of the appropriate spokesmen. Especially relevant in this regard is our statement in
Democratic National Committee, swpra,
involving the same petitioner as well as a Presidential address on the issue of the economy:
Furthermore, they [DNC] assert that as the leading party out of the White House and as the majority party in Congress they would always be an appropriate party to respond. DNC feels it is obligated to inform the nation of the viable options open to it. Should this be DNC’s manifest destiny we can find no reason to compel the networks to assist it. Can it be said that others are not equally capable of the task? At times the President speaks to crucial problems to which other groups are far more qualified to speak. DNC and its representatives have no greater claim to expertise in the area of the economy than the National Chamber of Commerce or the president of the New York Stock Exchange, and that is the point; crucial issues must be reasonably aired after consideration of the viewpoints of. all significant factions. This is a matter for licensee discretion and not automatic rule because the speaker is the President of the United States.
148 U.S.App.D.C. at 402, 460 F.2d at 910.
Petitioners also vigorously claim that the facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in
Fair Committee.
We are convinced the Commission was correct in ruling to the contrary. The scope of the holding in
Fair Committee
was very carefully circumscribed by the Commission in its fear that it would be considered a step towards a modified equal-opportunities rule. In other words, it correctly envisioned the inevitability of a case such as this. In recognizing that
Fair Committee
was an exception to the mainstream of fairness doctrine cases, the Commission stated:
We wish to stress that we are not holding that such an obligation arises from a single speech — that where an uninterrupted address is afforded one side, the fairness doctrine demands that the other side be presented in the same format. . . .
Rather, our holding here is based upon the unusual facts of this case
— five addresses by the outstanding spokesman on one side of an issue.
(emphasis added). 25 F.C.C.2d at 297. Indeed, the F.C.C. emphasized that “the question of reasonableness calls for a judgment on the facts of each case.”
Id.
at 295. The Commission repeatedly underscored the unique facts of that case, mentioning over and over that the President had appeared
five times
on
prime-time
television and radio to deliver
uninterrupted
messages justifying his Indochina policy. In this case there were only two Presidential prime-time broadcasts accompanied by two other ■wow-prime-time appearances. Comparison of the total prime-time coverage reveals only 36 minutes in this case as compared with 132 minutes in
Fair Committee.
The Commission declined to “add in” Secretary Connally’s press conferences, stating that he “was subject in the three press conferences to the same kind of critical questioning that he would have faced on news interview programs, and his appearances were neither uninterrupted nor in prime time.” J.A. 208. In light of the special emphasis placed on the
Presidential
and the
uninterrupted
nature of the addresses involved in
Fair Committee,
we cannot say the Commission was incorrect in this regard.
That such distinctions as these perhaps seem overly refined is a direct consequence of DNC’s attempts to convert the “reasonable under the circumstances” rule to a more rigid, mathematical “modified equal-opportunities” doctrine — the very result the Commission was most cautious to avoid in deciding
Fair Committee.
The Commission declined in this ease to extend
Fair Committee
for precisely that reason. The Commission declared its belief that extension of its earlier decision would result in a “whittling away” of basic fairness doctrine principles and lead to the substitution of an equal-opportunities approach which Congress had expressly rejected. J.A. 209. The Commission further expressed its fear that a broad interpretation of its earlier decision would “lead us down a slippery slope with a consequent undesirable diminution of licensee responsibility . [since] a continuing series of
ad hoc
rulings by the Commission which necessarily constitute special departure from the general fairness weighing process would inevitably push the Commission further and further into the programming process.”
We find the Commission was correct in refusing to venture upon such dangerous waters. In light of the factual distinctions between this case and
Fair Committee,
and in view of the fact that the networks had adequately fulfilled their obligation to inform the public on the issue of the economy, as determined by the Commission, we cannot say that the Commission erred in holding that this particular pattern of Presidential addresses was not so intense as to give rise to a right of response. The decision of the Commission is therefore
Affirmed.