DeMario v. Lamadrid-Maldonado

CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJanuary 18, 2023
Docket3:16-cv-02897
StatusUnknown

This text of DeMario v. Lamadrid-Maldonado (DeMario v. Lamadrid-Maldonado) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeMario v. Lamadrid-Maldonado, (prd 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

DINO DEMARIO, et al.

Plaintiffs

v. CIVIL NO. 16-2897(RAM) ANTHONY LAMADRID-MALDONADO, et al.

Defendants

OPINION AND ORDER RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, District Judge This matter comes before the Court on co-defendant Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority’s (“PREPA”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 252 and 259-1). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court GRANTS PREPA’s Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket No. 252. (Docket Nos. 264, 265, 275, and 276). I. BACKGROUND Dino DeMario and Cheryl Steele (collectively "Plaintiffs") are the parents of the late Nicholas DeMario. (Docket No. 99 ¶¶ 3- 4). On November 1, 2015, Nicholas DeMario was assisting his friends with pushing their vehicle, a Mazda Protege with license plate number 1KG-492, which had suffered a mechanical breakdown on a road in the Municipality of Hormigueros. (“Hormigueros” or the "Municipality"). Id. ¶ 16. Anthony Lamadrid-Maldonado (“Lamadrid”) was driving a Mitsubishi Eclipse with license plate number GLG- 871 in the same direction. Id. ¶ 17. Lamadrid’s Mitsubishi impacted the rear end of the Mazda and Nicholas DeMario was pronounced dead at the scene. Id. On October 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Lamadrid, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”), the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”), the Municipality, and unnamed insurance companies, seeking emotional damages as well as medical and funeral expenses caused by the loss of their son. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs subsequently filed three (3) amended complaints incorporating as co-defendants various insurance companies. (Docket Nos. 2 ¶ 10; 61 ¶¶ 11-12; 99 ¶ 13).1

Essentially, Plaintiffs assert that the street light poles in the area where accident occurred were not energized. (Docket No. 99 ¶ 26). Plaintiffs further allege that those street light poles were under the jurisdiction, ownership, care, custody and control of PREPA, the PRHTA, and the Municipality. Id. Accordingly, they maintain that said co-defendants negligently failed to maintain the street light poles functional and are thereby liable. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. On January 28, 2019, PREPA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 252). PREPA avers that the highway where the accident occurred corresponded to a construction project titled

1 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at Docket No. 99 is the operative complaint. Project AC-200213 (“Project AC-200213” or “Project”). Id. at 3. PREPA maintains it was neither the owner nor the contractor of the Project, and its only duties regarding the same consisted of approving the design of the lighting system and certifying that it was built accordingly. Id. However, PREPA avers Project AC-200213 was never finished nor delivered to PREPA for energization, therefore barring it from liability. Id. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to PREPA's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 265). Their main argument is that on June 6, 2006, pursuant to a document titled Notification of the Constitution of Access Easement and Cession of Transfer and

Warranty (“Notification of Cession and Transfer”), the PRHTA ceded and transferred the distribution or transmission of Project AC- 200213 to PREPA for the conservation and installation of all the posts, structures, and necessary equipment that make up the electrical system of the project. Id. at 5. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges PREPA can be held liable in the case at bar. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs take issue with PREPA's claim that the Project was never energized because the area where the accident occurred had been temporarily illuminated by the PRHTA for the Central American and Caribbean Games of 2010. Id. at 8-9. Lastly, PREPA replied to Plaintiffs' opposition. (Docket No.

276). Therein, PREPA highlights that the June 6, 2006 Notification of Cession and Transfer provides that it will become effective on the date that PREPA “incorporates and connects the project's distribution and transmission system” to PREPA’s electrical grid. Id. at 2. PREPA maintains that the Project was not completed and thus, it was never energized and the cession and transfer from the PRHTA to PREPA never occurred. Id. at 2-3. PREPA re-asserts it is not liable because it neither designed the lighting system nor did it energize it. Id. at 4-5. II. LEGAL STANDARD A motion for summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that (1)

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and (2) they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.” Thompson v. Coca–Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008). A fact is considered material if it “may potentially ‘affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’” Albite v. Polytechnic Univ. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 191, 195 (D.P.R. 2014) (quoting Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660–661 (1st Cir. 2000)). The moving party has “the initial burden of demonstrat[ing]

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with definite and competent evidence.” Mercado-Reyes v. City of Angels, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 344, at 347 (D.P.R. 2018) (quotation omitted). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, to present “competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Bautista Cayman Asset Co. v. Terra II MC & P, Inc., 2020 WL 118592, at 6* (quoting Méndez-Laboy v. Abbott Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2005)). A nonmoving party must show “that a trialworthy issue persists.” Paul v. Murphy, 2020 WL 401129, at *3 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). While a court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, it will disregard conclusory allegations, unsupported speculation and improbable inferences. See Johnson v.

Duxbury, Massachusetts, 931 F.3d 102, 105 (1st Cir. 2019). Moreover, the existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 (2007) (quotation omitted). Hence, a court should review the record in its entirety and refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). In this District, summary judgment is also governed by Local Rule 56. See L. CV. R. 56(c). Per this Rule, an opposing party must “admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for

summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material facts.” Id. Furthermore, unless the fact is admitted, the opposing party must support each denial or qualification with a record citation. Id. Additionally, Local Rule 56(c) allows an opposing party to submit additional facts “in a separate section.” L. CV. R. 56(c).

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