Demario Jones v. Federal Express Corporation

Opinion

Js Ginited States District Court ° Central District of California DEMARIO JONES, Case No. 2:19-cv-08429 ODW(JCx) Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1S v. REMAND AND DENYING AS | FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, | MOOT MOTION TO DISMISS [22] et al.; 25] Defendants. Plaintiff Demario Jones seeks to remand this action to Los Angeles Cour Superior Court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Mot. to Remand (“Mot.’ ECF No. 22.) Jones argues that Defendants Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx’ 21]; FedEx Corporate Services; Michael Caron (“Caron”) (erroneously named (“Micha Carona”)); and Sandra Garcia Mead (“Garcia Mead”) (collectively, (“Defendants’ failed to establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because Caron ai Garcia Mead destroy complete diversity. For the reasons discussed below, the Cot GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (“Motion”) (ECF No. 22) and therefor DENIES as moot Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25).! || | After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deems t matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

1 Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 Jones’s claims arise from the termination of his employment. (See First A 3} Compl. (“FAC”) 33-34, ECF No. 16.) Jones filed this action in Los Ange County Superior Court alleging against all Defendants: (1) racial discrimination 5 violation of California Government Code section 12940 et seq.; (2) retaliation 6 violation of California Government Code section 12940 et seq.; (3) ‘failure to prev: discrimination and retaliation in violation of California Government Code secti 12940 et seq.; and (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Notice Removal (“Notice”) 3, ECF No. 1.) Jones also alleges two causes of action agai: individual Defendants Caron and Garcia Mead for (5) intentional infliction emotional distress (“ITED”); and (6) defamation. (Notice 3.) Jones is a citizen California (FAC § 9); while, FedEx and FedEx Corporate Services are both citizens Delaware and Tennessee (Notice 5); and Caron and Garcia Mead are each citizens California. (Notice 6.) Jones alleges he was hired in August 2005 as a handler, and eventual promoted to customer service agent (“CSA”). (FAC {J 16-17.) Jones alleges that his over ten years at FedEx, he was a hard worker in one of the busiest locations a never reported for disciplinary action. (FAC 16-17.) Jones, an African American, alleges that he experienced continuous rac’ discrimination between August 2014 and August 2017. (FAC § 18.) He claims tt || Caron made racists remarks directed at him and treated him disparately from | || White colleagues. (FAC {J 18-28.) Jones specifically alleges Caron: (1) claimed | was the “master of this place”; (2) stated Jones would “scare” or “frighten” custome when wearing the company issued jacket with the hood up but never made su comments to other colleagues; (3) forced Jones to work the hardest and heavie assignments, without rotating between other CSAs—as was company policy— allowing him to have an assistant, as other White employees had; and (4) prevent Jones from taking breaks on site, wearing earrings, leaving tattoos exposed, ar

1 growing his hair out, although such behavior was tolerated for White and Hispat employees. (FAC §J 18-28.) Jones further alleges that he was terminated as a res of racial discrimination. (FAC 34.) On August 15, 2019, Jones commenced this action in Los Angeles Cour Superior Court. (Notice 2-3.) Defendants removed the action to this Court | September 30, 2019, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 13: (Notice 1.) On October 15, 2019, Jones filed the instant motion to remand the actic (Mot.) Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject-matt jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. U. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if t federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441( But courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction, at “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of remov in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). TI party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Durham Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Gaus, 980 F.2 at 566). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an action presents a feder question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 133. A defendant may remove a case from a state court to a federal court pursuant to tt federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, on the basis of federal question or diversi jurisdiction. To exercise diversity jurisdiction, a federal court must find comple diversity of citizenship among the adverse parties, and the amount in controversy mu exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

This case turns on the existence of complete diversity. Defendants argue tl Caron and Garcia Mead, California citizens, were fraudulently joined for the purpc of destroying diversity, and should therefore be disregarded. (Notice 6—7.) “[O]ne exception to the requirement of complete diversity is where a nc diverse defendant has been ‘fraudulently joined.’” Morris v. Princess Cruises, In 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). “Fraudulent joinder is a term of art and does r implicate a plaintiffs subjective intent.” Rangel v. Bridgestone Retail □□□□□□□□□ LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1030 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing McCabe v. General Fo Corp., 811 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1987)). When a plaintiff “fails to state a cause action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settl | rules of the state,” fraudulent joinder exists. Jd. Consequently, a defendant “must | more than show that the complaint at the time of removal fails to state a claim agait the non-diverse defendant.” Padilla v. AT & T Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 11. (C.D. Cal. 2009). Instead, the defendant must demonstrate “there is no possibility tt the plaintiff could prevail on any cause of action it brought against the non-diver defendant.” Jd. (emphasis added); see Macey v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 220 Supp. 2d 1116, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“If there is a non-fanciful possibility th plaintiff can state a claim under California law against the non-diverse defendants □□ court must remand.”). Furthermore, a defendant must prove fraudulent joinder through clear a1 convincing evidence. Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 120 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). This may be done by “piercing the pleading” to consid summary judgment-type evidence like affidavits and depositions. Morris, 236 F.3d 1068. Still, any ambiguity of law should be resolved in favor of the plainti: Hamilton Materials, Inc., 494 F.3d at 1206. Here, Defendants argue that claims for IIED occurring within the employme context are preempted by the California Workers’ Compensation Act. (Opp’n to Mc

1 “Opp’n”) 12-13, ECF No. 29.) Generally, “claims for emotional distress caused the employer’s conduct causing distress such as ‘discharge, demotion, discipline criticism’ are preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act, even when 1 employer’s acts causing the distress are intentional or outrageous.” Onelum v. Bi } Buy Stores L.P., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Cal. Lab. Code 3601(a) (“[T]he right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of tl division is . . . the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against a || other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his or | employment... .”) However, “a claim is not barred by Workers’ Compensation Act when: (i) t employer’s conduct contravenes public policy, or (ii) the employer’s conduct excee the boundaries of the inherent risks of the employer-employee relationship.” Walk v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., LLC, No. LA:CV-15-0124-1JA-KASx, 2015 WL 1375294 } at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2015). Consequently, courts have routinely found discrimination to exceed t boundaries of inherent risks associated with the employer-employee relationship. Walker, plaintiff was severely injured on the job and claimed IIED against h managers for refusing to provide work accommodating her disability. Walker, 20. 19} WL 13752943 at *1-2. Defendants’ argued that the ITED claims were preempted | the Workers’ Compensation Act; however, the court disagreed, emphasizing that ‘ finding that discrimination is a risk inherent in the employer-employee relationsh would be problematic given the efforts made over the past several decades eliminate such conduct from the workplace.” Jd. at *5; see also Barsell v. Urbc Outfitters, Inc., No. CV-09-02604-MMM-RZx, 2009 WL 1916495, at *4 (C.D. Cz July 1, 2009) (“Because this claim is based on allegations of disability discriminatio there is a non-fanciful possibility that the workers’ compensation exclusivi provisions do not bar [Plaintiff’s] claim.’’)

1 Clearly, Jones’s allegations against Caron concerning his earrings, hairsty 2 and tattoos are managerial decisions that would fall under the Workers’ Compensati 3 Act exclusive remedy provision. Onelum, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. However, Jone 4} allegations that Caron made racially charged statements, prevented Jones from havi an assistant when White employees were permitted one, and consistently assign Jones the toughest jobs without rotating between other CSAs demonstrate potentia discriminatory conduct. See Macias v. Levy Premium Foodservices Ltd. P’ship, } 2:14-CV-09220-SVW-PLA, 2015 WL 12747900, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 20] (IED claim arising from discriminatory statements based on plaintiffs race and s not preempted by Workers’ Compensation Act.) Thus, because discrimination is no risk inherent in the employer-employee relationship, there is a non-fanciful possibil Jones may have a claim for IED based on the allegedly discriminatory misconduct Caron in the workplace. Walker, 2015 WL 13752943 at *5. Defendants additionally ague that Jones’s allegations are insufficient to supp an ITED claim against Caron and Garcia Mead. (Opp’n 13.) Specifically, th contend that Jones failed to allege conduct that is extreme or outrageous. (Opp’n 14 California allows recovery for IIED claims based on conduct “so extreme a outrageous as to go beyond all possible bound of decency and to be regarded || atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Onelum, 948 F. Supp. | 20}, at 1053. In Onelum, plaintiffs allegations that defendant-employer mocked | Nigerian accent and regularly threatened to terminate him was sufficient to ple extreme and outrageous behavior for his IED claim. Jd. Here, Jones similarly alleg instances in which Caron made racially insensitive comments targeting his Afric: American ethnicity, which may be sufficient to plead the extreme and outrageo element of an IIED claim. (FAC 9{ 18-23.) Furthermore, defendants carry the burden of establishing that a plaintiff cou not cure the deficiencies in his Complaint by amending it. Rangel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1033. Thus, even if Jones’s Complaint failed to sufficiently state a claim for IIE]

1 | Defendants have not met their burden of establishing that Jones is unable to amend | complaint to include additional facts that properly state a claim. Thus, the Court fir that Jones may bring an ITED claim against Caron, destroying diversity. According the Court GRANTS the motion to remand on this basis.” Vv. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Jones’s Motion Remand and DENIES as moot Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 22, 2. This action shall be remanded to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, 111 No: Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012. The Clerk of the Court shall close this case. February 4, 2020 XN , ’

OTIS D. WRIGHT, I UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE ? Since the Court finds that the IED claim destroys diversity, it declines to assess whether Jone: Defamation claim is adequately raised.