Delta Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. City of Beverly Hills

1 Cal. App. 3d 781, 82 Cal. Rptr. 318, 1969 Cal. App. LEXIS 1327
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 18, 1969
DocketCiv. 33105
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 1 Cal. App. 3d 781 (Delta Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. City of Beverly Hills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delta Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. City of Beverly Hills, 1 Cal. App. 3d 781, 82 Cal. Rptr. 318, 1969 Cal. App. LEXIS 1327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).

Opinion

Opinion

CHANTRY, J. pro tem. *

Delta Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., a California corporation, and Ruth Nagel Jones (Jones) appeal from a judgment of the Los Angeles Superior Court denying them a writ of mandate to compel the City of Beverly Hills (City) to grant them a driveway access through the frontage of the lot occupied by Delta to South Santa Monica Boulevard. The lot occupied by Delta is one of four lots in the block between Wilshire *784 Boulevard on the west to Linden Drive on the east in the City of Beverly Hills. The most westerly of these four lots constitutes the northeast corner of Wilshire and South Santa Monica Boulevard. This corner is owned by Jones and leased to Delta. Jones also owns the most easterly lot in this block, which may be described as the northwest corner of Linden Drive and South Santa Monica Boulevard. These two corner lots are separated by two lots owned by third parties and occupied by business buildings. We shall refer to the lot leased to Delta as lot 1 and the Linden corner as lot 2. Lot 2 is leased to West Coast Auto Park. There is no present driveway through any of the frontage of the four lots except a driveway into lot 2. There are approximately 60 feet between the rear of the four lots comprising the previously described block and the south curb of North Santa Monica Boulevard. All of this area belongs to the Pacific Electric Railway. Jones leases a 40-foot portion of the railway property contiguous to the rear of the four lots in this particular block. This 40-foot strip connects lots 1 and 2 and also provides access through lot 2 to the area leased by Delta. Driveway access to Delta’s lot is limited to an entrance on the other side of a restaurant through lot 2 (West Coast Auto Park) approximately 350 feet from Delta’s office building on lot 1. The existing driveway also serves as an entrance to the West Coast parking lot. The use of the West Coast driveway by customers of Delta and West Coast results in a certain amount of traffic congestion which causes inconvenience of the 40 percent of Delta’s customers who arrive by automobile and use that driveway.

Appellants are unhappy with this arrangement and seek by this action to obtain a driveway directly from lot 1 to South Santa Monica Boulevard. A map depicting the block and properties in question is attached (Exhibit A) as a visual aid to the written description. [See infra, p. 789.]

Administrative. Action

Delta contemplated opening a new driveway access only 100 feet from its small office building on lot 1. Delta applied to the Director of Public Works (Director) of the City. The Director tentatively determined upon approval of Delta’s driveway request and referred the matter to the Beverly Hills City Council (Council). Notwithstanding the Director’s indication for approval, the Council decided that the application should be rejected. The Director took no further action. This action was treated by Delta as a refusal by the Director to grant the driveway permit. “ ‘Any conduct on the part of the officer or tribunal under a duty to perform signifying unequivocal intention not to do so amounts to a refusal.’ (55 C.J.S. 66.)” (Palmer v. Fox, 118 Cal.App.2d 453, 456 [258 P.2d 30].) Delta thereafter filed directly with the Council an application for a driveway permit. This for all practical purposes constituted an appeal from the Director’s denial *785 of the permit. The Council referred the matter to the City Traffic Commission. The Traffic Commission recommended approval with certain restrictions. Thereafter the Council denied the driveway access on the grounds that “the granting of the permit would create a serious traffic hazard to the detriment of the public safety and the general welfare,” thus affirming the Director’s rejection.

Superior Court Action

After the Council’s action, Delta and Jones filed a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the City, its Council and the Director of Public Works to grant them a driveway through the frontage of their lot to South Santa Monica Boulevard. The petition alleged that both Delta and Jones are beneficially interested in the petition; that lack of a driveway is highly prejudicial to Delta’s business; that all administrative remedies have been exhausted; that the Director of Public Works and the Council have violated their statutory duties; that petitioners have a right to access to the highway on which their property abuts; that they have no adequate remedy at law, and that therefore a writ should issue to the City to grant the driveway access. A demurrer to the petition by the City was overruled. The City answered the complaint generally and alleged affirmatively that administrative mandamus was not the proper remedy and that the writ would compel a hazardous and illegal act. The superior court denied the writ, concluding that the Council proceeded within its jurisdiction and gave a fair and lawful hearing; that the Council’s decision is supported by the evidence, and that the Council did not abuse its discretion nor act unreasonably or capriciously in denying the driveway access.

Issues

As to the quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies, judicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the agency to determine whether its action has been arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether it has failed to follow the procedure and give notices required by law. (Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824 [27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d 83].) The issues in this case are set forth in these questions;

1. Does the City have the authority to deny a driveway access?

2. Was the procedure followed by the Council and Director of Public Works a denial of due process of law?

3. Was the denial of a driveway access an abuse of discretion?

4. Was the denial of a driveway access arbitrary or capricious?

*786 Authority to Deny Driveway

Appellants and respondents argue extensively whether driveway access is a property right which must be compensated for if taken, or if the City may deny it without compensation pursuant to its police power. This issue is important to appellants, for they argue that the City has taken their property without compensation; that since “money damage would be inadequate or no remedy," they are thereby deprived of their remedy at law, and therefore the only alternative remedy for them is a writ of mandate to compel the City to grant them a driveway access.

Section 1086 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “The writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.” But appellants’ mere statement that “money damage would be inadequate or no remedy” does not, without more, entitle them to a writ of mandate. Even if denial of a driveway access were found to be a compensable taking, appellants have not adequately shown that they do not have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to them.

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Bluebook (online)
1 Cal. App. 3d 781, 82 Cal. Rptr. 318, 1969 Cal. App. LEXIS 1327, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delta-rent-a-car-systems-inc-v-city-of-beverly-hills-calctapp-1969.