Delta Brands, Inc. v. Rautaruukki Steel

118 S.W.3d 506, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9306, 2003 WL 22462553
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 31, 2003
Docket05-02-01743-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 118 S.W.3d 506 (Delta Brands, Inc. v. Rautaruukki Steel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delta Brands, Inc. v. Rautaruukki Steel, 118 S.W.3d 506, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9306, 2003 WL 22462553 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

Opinion by

Justice O’NEILL.

Delta Brands, Inc. (DBI) appeals the trial court’s order sustaining Rautaruukki Steel’s special appearance. We hold that Rautaruukki had sufficient minimum contacts to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over it in Texas. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

*509 Facts

The jurisdictional facts are undisputed. DBI designs and manufactures steel processing equipment. It is a Texas corporation with its headquarters in Irving, Texas. Rautaruukki Steel (Rautaruukki) develops, manufactures, and markets steel products and related services. It is a division of a Finnish corporation, Rautaruukki Group (the Group), headquartered in Finland. Neither the Group nor Rautaruukki has offices, facilities or employees in the United States, except the Group has an affiliate in Northbrook, Illinois, that markets steel products.

In the fall of 2001, Rautaruukki made inquiries to suppliers, seeking a solution on how to remove residual stresses from coiled steel. In November 2001, DBI traveled to Finland to visit Rautaruukki. DBI suggested an in-line temper mill and proposed they test a quantity of Rautaruukki-manufactured steel in a plant where a client of DBI uses a DBI temper mill. The trip occurred in February 2001, with a predetermined agenda beginning with observation of DBI equipment in the Steel Warehouse facility in Memphis, Tennessee, followed by travel to DBI headquarters in Irving, Texas, and ending with observation of DBI equipment in use in Indiana and Illinois.

When the Rautaruukki representatives arrived in Memphis, before they were allowed to observe any equipment, they were asked to sign a confidentiality agreement. Under the agreement, Rautaruukki undertook not to disclose any information concerning the engineering design of DBI technology, including any data, drawing, or equipment discussed with, or viewed by, Rautaruukki.

After observing the equipment in Memphis, the Rautaruukki representatives traveled to DBI headquarters in Irving, Texas. The two parties conferred all day Friday and Saturday at DBI’s offices. During that time, Rautaruukki had access to DBI engineers and received detailed technical specifications and technical drawings, which they took with them when they left. Through the following six months, Rautaruukki sent DBI numerous e-mails requesting technical information, with DBI sending its responses from Texas to Finland. Thereafter, Rautaruukki informed DBI it would not be purchasing an in-line temper mill from DBI.

DBI asserts it is the only company to produce an in-line temper mill that would fit Rautaruukkfis physical plant (because other technologies use hump rolls, which take more space). DBI contends that, to its knowledge, its competitors do not have comparable equipment on the European market. When DBI learned that Rautar-uukki was negotiating for an in-line temper mill from a European competitor, DBI became concerned that Rautaruukki intended to disclose DBI’s proprietary information to the competitor to enable it to copy DBI’s technology. DBI obtained a temporary restraining order against Rau-taruukki. In response, Rautaruukki filed a special appearance, which the trial court sustained. DBI appeals that order. The trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Personal Jurisdiction: Minimum Contacts Analysis

Standard of Review

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the long-arm statute. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex.2002). A defendant challenging a Texas court’s personal jurisdiction over it must negate all jurisdictional bases. Id. Whether a court *510 has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law. Id. at 794. When a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its special appearance ruling, all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied. Id. at 795.

Legal Principles Governing Special Appearance

Two conditions must be met for a Texas court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: the Texas long-arm statute must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction, and the exercise of jurisdiction must be consistent with the guarantees of due process. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex.1990). The long-arm statute provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over any nonresident “doing business” in Texas. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code ÁNN. § 17.042(2) (Vernon 1997). Because the language of the long-arm statute is broad, its requirements are considered satisfied if the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with federal due process limitations. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.1996). Thus, in practice, the two conditions are conflated into one requirement of due process. City of Riverview, Michigan v. Am. Factors, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 855, 857 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).

Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is constitutional when (1) the defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 796 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). The defendant’s conduct and connection with the state must be such that it could reasonably anticipate being sued in the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). A nonresident defendant that has “purposefully availed” itself of the privilege of conducting business in the state — thus invoking the benefits and protections of its law— has sufficient contacts with the forum to confer personal jurisdiction. Id. A nonresident defendant must “purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction” in the state. Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358. Random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or the unilateral activity of another party or a third person are insufficient. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.1991). It is not the number, but rather the quality and nature of the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state that are important. Id. at 230 n. 11.

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118 S.W.3d 506, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9306, 2003 WL 22462553, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delta-brands-inc-v-rautaruukki-steel-texapp-2003.