DeLong v. Brown

113 Iowa 370
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedApril 10, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 113 Iowa 370 (DeLong v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeLong v. Brown, 113 Iowa 370 (iowa 1901).

Opinion

Ladd, J.

[372]*3721 2 [371]*371The statute requires the auditor to carefully preserve the ballots received1 from the judges of election for six months. Section 1142, Code. The particular manner or place is not pointed out. If carefully done, this precludes any reasonably well founded suspicion that they may [372]*372have been changed or tampered with, and in such event they form the best evidence of who has been elected. With their integrity thus fully established, they are silent witnesses which can neither err nor lie. And it is generally held, where the manner or mode of preservation has been enjoined! by statute, a substantial compliance therewith must be shown, preliminary to the introduction of ballots in evidence. Davenport v. Olerich, 104 Iowa, 194, and cited cases; Mentzer v. Davis, 109 Iowa, 528 ; Hudson v. Solomon, 19 Kan. 177; Sone v. Williams, 130 Mo. Sup. 530 (32 S.W. Rep. 1016). See decisions collected in 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 732, 830; also in briefs to Tebbe v. Smith, 108 Cal. 101 (41 Pac. Rep. 454, 29 L. R. A. 673). The rule seems to prevail in Texas that if the ballots come from their lawful custodian in obedience to an appropriate writ, and are produced in court apparently intact, they are prima facie admissible. Hunnicutt v. State, 75 Tex. 233 (12 S. W. Rep. 106); Gray v. State, 19 Tex. Ciy. App. 521 (94 S. W. Rep. 699). While these circumstances, and also the presumption obtaining that an officer has performed his -duty, should be given weight, we do not think they alone afford sufficient assurance of the identity and genuineness of the ballots. The official count as finally declared with respect to county officers is the ultimate conclusion of many officers presumed to have faithfully performed their respective duties, and concerning the correctness of which a very strong presumption obtains — so strong that it ought not to be overcome by evidence, peculiarly susceptible of change,'unless proven, not merely presumed, to have been properly preserved. This preliminary proof, unless waived, is essential to the competency of the ballots as evidence for any purpose as against the official count, and certainly no averment in the pleading is required as a basis for an objection to such incompetency. In Furguson v. Henry, 95 Iowa, 439, it was merely held that, although the ballots had been received in evidence, the incumbent might show them not to [373]*373be tbe same as voted, or counted by tbe judges of election. What was said of the ballots coming through regular channels was by way of argument. The character of preliminary proof required was neither involved nor decided.

3 II. But the question of the competency of the ballots as evidence is one of fact, to be determined by the trial court; and, as the action is by ordinary proceedings, its finding cannot be disturbed unless without sufficient support in the evidence. Tebbe v. Smithy 108 Cal. 101 (41 Pac. Rep. 455, 29 L. R. A. 673) ; People v. Livingston, 79 N. Y. 290; Hughes v. Holman 23 Or. 48 (32 Pac. Rep. 298); People v. Cicott, 16 Mich. 283 (97 Am. Dec. 141). But the weight to be given to evidence and its admissibility are different matters. Por this reason it is often difficult to determine whether the ballots, although the irregularities in their presentation may not justify their rejection as evidence, should be accepted, when their actual condition is disclosed, as better proof of who has been elected than the official count. In other words, there are always the two issues in such a case: (1) Were the ballots so preserved as that they should be received in evidence? and, (2) if so received, are they, in view of the manner in which they have been kept, and their condition when examined, entitled to greater credit than the count as made by the officers of election ?

4 III. The evidence disclosed that connected with the auditor’s office is a vault, and below that another, in the basement, reached from the first by an iron stairway. The first was entered from the office through iron doors having a combination lock, and! there appears to have been no door to the second or lower vault, though it had an outside window, -hung by cords and weights. The desk of the auditor and his deputy was so located that they could notice persons enter the vault, but could not see them after-having gone in. The ballots before being received had been placed in paper envelops or sacks about 6x14 inches, and 16 [374]*374inches deep. These had been fastened by seals when received by the auditor, except one which was broken in order to extract the poll book, inadvertently included. The sacks when received were put in the upper vault, on the floor, under the table,’ but with no other covering, and remained there until after the canvass by the board of supervisors. They were then taken to the lower vault and placed on a box about a foot above the floor, and there remained until the trial before the contest board, said by appellant to have been 49 days after the election. At that time the sealing wax on some of the sacks had been cracked or broken by handling, but not so as to release the cords fastening them. The wax. had been stamped with the seals of the respective townships, but not always making a good impression. In one instance the wax did not cover the -cords, and by untying these the sack could be opened halfway without tearing. The seal of another was broken, but not so as to open, and the ends of the wires on which the bollots were strung were twisted, but not sealed. Still another did not have the cord through one side, and a space six to eight inches was not closed-. In four of the sacks or envelopes the ballots were ’not folded, and in three they were not strung on wires. In another they were not wired, and there were four ballots more than the number of electors entered on the poll book. Th.e auditor during this time made no count of the packages, and only glanced at them casually when he happened to be in the vault, to see that the pile of envelopes had not been disturbed. The auditor does not pretend to name all who were in the vault unattended while the ballots-were there. He admits that three abstractors, four attorneys, the co-unty treasurer, and the court-house janitor had free access to the vaults; but all these testify that, though having the opportunity, they did not tamper with the ballots. ■Some of these testify to seeing persons examining the records in the vault when they entered. Besides these- are mentioned three persons who frequently examined the returns of pharmacists of sales of liquors in the vaults, who may [375]*375have been allowed in the upper vault unattended; and the members of the board of supervisors were allowed free access. None of these were called as witnesses and it is to be said that the auditor has no recollection of any of them being in there during this time, though they may have been. With respect to his care and observation a better understanding nan be had from his own testimony: “I most always noticed to see who went in there, and if I should'hear any one in there, and not know who it was, I always went to see who it was. * * * When people wished to go into the vault during that time I accompanied a good many of them who were not in the habit of going in there daily, outside of abstractors. * * * Anybody that is not familiar with the office would not go in there unless I knew what their business is. 'Q.

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Bluebook (online)
113 Iowa 370, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delong-v-brown-iowa-1901.