DeLoach Mill Manufacturing Co. v. Tutweiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co.

58 S.E. 790, 2 Ga. App. 493, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 438
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedOctober 3, 1907
Docket16
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 58 S.E. 790 (DeLoach Mill Manufacturing Co. v. Tutweiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeLoach Mill Manufacturing Co. v. Tutweiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co., 58 S.E. 790, 2 Ga. App. 493, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 438 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907).

Opinion

Russell, J.

The hill of exceptions calls for a review of the judgment of the lower court in striking the fourth' and fifth paragraphs of the defendant’s answer and in refusing a new trial. The paragraphs which were stricken (exceptions being taken pendente lite) were as follows:

“4. For further plea in this behalf, this defendant says, that on February 6th, 1904, this defendant purchased from the plaintiff, through its agents and brokers, Rogers, Brown & Co., one hundred and twenty-five tons of Standard Alabama Number 2. Foundry Pig Iron at the price of $10.00 per ton of 2240 lbs., f. o. b. cars furnace, Birmingham, Alabama; and on the same day, this defendant purchased from plaintiff, through its said agents and brokers, one hundred and twenty-five tons of Standard Alabama Number 1 Soft Pig Iron at the price of $10.50 per ton, 2240 lbs., f. o. b. furnace, Birmingham, Alabama. The amount mentioned in plaintiff’s petition was made and contracted by defendant solely for and on account of said iron, so sold and to be delivered to it by plaintiff, and without any other consideration therefor. Said goods were purchased by defendant, as plaintiff then well knew, for the purpose of being manufactured by this defendant at the foundry into various castings used by this defendant in machines made and manufactured by it in its factory in the city of Atlanta; and plaintiff, as a part of the contract of sale and consideration of said account) impliedly warranted and represented that said goods were fit, proper, and reasonably suited for such purposes. Defendant accepted and purchased said goods for the purpose of manufacturing the same into castings for machines so made and manufactured by it at its said factory, trusting in said representations and warranty of plaintiff, as plaintiff well knew. Said iron was not fit for said purpose, and was not reasonably suited therefor, the same being dirty iron and containing too little silicon and too much graphitic carbon, and the said iron has always been and is altogether useless and worthless to this defendant.
“5. For further plea in this behalf, this defendant sa3rs that it began using said iron in its said foundry in making said castings, on or about May 15, 1904. The output of its foundry was thirteen tons per diem. The necessary cost and expense to this defendant [495]*495of making each, day’s output was $100.00. By reason of said iron, so sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant, and so used by it in its foundry in making eastings as aforesaid, being dirty nor fit and reasonably suited for the purpose,of being, moulded, into said castings, the defendant buying said iron, from the plaintiff for the said purpose, and the plaintiff well knowing, that the- defendant purchased it for said purpose, one third of -said output was absolutely worthless and a total waste in the foundry, -whereby this defendant sustained a daily loss of $33.33 1-3 for the period -of thirty days, making a total loss to thi^ defendant of $1,000:00. This defendant was put to this necessary.expense and loss in attempting to use said.iron for the purpose,aforesaid, and,for the purpose for which the same was bought, and before this defendant knew that the defects in said castings were .due to the inferior quality of said iron. -Said loss- and damage to this defendant arise, naturally and according to the usual course of things, from the ■failure of the plaintiff to deliver to this defendant the iron which it purchased from the plaintiff, and such as the parties contemplated when such contract was made, as the-probable result of its breach. • Said loss and 'expense in attempting to use said iron and in converting the same into castings was due solely and directly to -said breach of plaintiff’s- contract to furnish to this defendant Standard Alabama Number 2 Foundry Pig Iron and Standard Alabama Number 1 Soft Pig Iron reasonably suited for the purpose aforesaid, for which this defendant purchased the same. This defendant recoups said loss and damage against the account of the plaintiff sued on in this case.”

The effect of the judge’s ruling in striking paragraph four was & holding that the contract was one of express warranty and therefore excluded any implied warranty. The fifth paragraph was stricken because, in the judgment of the court, the defend.ant’s damages, if any, were not to be measured by the rule which ■defendant was endeavoring to apply, if indeed they were not too :remote for recovery at all. '

We have no difficulty in sustaining the judgment of the lower ■court in striking paragraph four of the answer. Alabama Iron No. 1 Soft, and Alabama No. 2 Foundry, are as- apt terms of •description for two grades of iron, — as distinctive and as well -.understood by those engaged in the iron business, as the different [496]*496grades of cotton are known by those engaged in the cotton business.. A term that is well known as conveying the idea of identity ancL individuality of characteristics, quality, and use, and is understood by buyer and seller as such (while this understanding is not always necessary) may import a warranty. Words of description do-not always import an express warranty, but they do when (as in. the contract in this case) they have reference-to an article of property whose features and qualities are so well known to those engaged, in the business of producing or selling such article that it can not be mistaken for any other thing. As wé have heretofore remarked in Crankshaw v. Schweizer Mfg. Co., 1 Ga. App. 363, 58 S. E. 222, it is often difficult to determine the line of demarcation between implied' conditions and such -description as will constitute ah express warranty and thereby exclude the warranty implied by law.. The determination of the question depends often on the fullness- and particularity of the description. If one contracts for quinine,, we have an article whose appearance, taste, and effects identify it and distinguish it from other articles; but an implied warranty would exist that the quinine was reasonably suited for the purposes-intended. But if I contract for Powers & Weightman’s quinine,, the express warranty on the part of the seller that the quinine-shall be of a particular manufacture or brand excludes any other warranty. In our opinion, the rule excluding all implied warranties where there is any express warranty is illogical, and sometimes works injustice; but it is the settled rule in this State and nearly all of the States of the Union. In Johnson v. State, 71 Ga. 470 (2), the court ruled that “it is only in the absence of an express warranty that resort can be had to an implied warranty * and where there was an express warrant}', the court could refuse to-charge on the subject of implied warranty.”

If the defendant had purchased 175 tons of iron, the law would have implied that it was merchantable and reasonably suited for all the purposes for which it was intended. Civil Code, §3555-But when the buyer'specified that he wanted Standard Alabama. No. 1 Soft Pig Iron and Standard No. 2 Foundry Pig Iron, the seller expressly warranted that the iron to be delivered would be those two grades of iron and no other, and the presence of the express warranty excluded any implied warranty whatsoever. The-very particularity of description created an express warranty. The-[497]

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Bluebook (online)
58 S.E. 790, 2 Ga. App. 493, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 438, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deloach-mill-manufacturing-co-v-tutweiler-coal-coke-iron-co-gactapp-1907.