Delafield v. Village of Westfield

28 N.Y.S. 440, 77 Hun 124, 84 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 124, 59 N.Y. St. Rep. 73
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedApril 12, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 28 N.Y.S. 440 (Delafield v. Village of Westfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Delafield v. Village of Westfield, 28 N.Y.S. 440, 77 Hun 124, 84 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 124, 59 N.Y. St. Rep. 73 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1894).

Opinion

LEWIS, J.

In the year 1889 the village of Westfield caused to be prepared plans and specifications for waterworks for the village. Bids were invited from contractors. The plaintiff, who was a contractor and engineer, submitted a bid or proposal sheet for the work, which was accepted by the defendant, and a written contract, based upon the plans and specifications and proposal sheet, was entered into between the parties on the 19th day of July, 1889. The scheme contemplated taking the water from a stream several miles from the village, at a point called the “Intake.” From this point the water was to be first conducted through a vitrified pipe line to a point upon the lands of one Hawley, where were to be constructed a filter and small reservoir) known in the case as the “Hawley Filter and Reservoir.” From there a pipe line was to conduct the water to the village, where it was to be distributed through iron mains along the various streets specified in the contract. These mains connected with a large reservoir upon the lands of one Kent, known in the case as the “Kent Reservoir.” A full and particular description of the various parts of the system was contained in the specifications, and particular rules were stated, to guide bidders. For the reservoirs, excavations, and filling, bids were required to be made by the solid yard, once measured, only, in the dikes; for the ditches, by the solid yard of excavation only; for the iron and vitrified pipe lines, by the running foot. 'At the end of the specifications was the following: “Note. The vitrified pipe line is mostly,' and the tunnels are entirely, to be in soft, shale rock.” The plaintiff’s proposal sheet was submitted to the defendant in line with the specifications, with a few modifications. He bid a lump sum of $1,500 for the Hawley filter and cistern; $100 for the valve house at the main reservoir; for the work upon the Kent reservoir, 21 cents per cubic yard, measured in the dike (modifying, as will be observed, the defendant’s specifications, which provided that the filling should be measured once, only, in the dikes); for the vitrified and iron pipe, by the running foot, at different prices, stated in the bid,—and, under the head of “Remarks,” stated:

“This bid to be considered only as a whole, and in no case as a part.” “I hereby agree to enter into a formal contract with you, to furnish such labor and materials, according to the advertisements and specifications, within five days after notice is given to me that you are willing to accept the proposal, in all, as called for in the advertisements.”

[442]*442Plaintiff’s bid was accepted by the defendant, and a written ■contract was entered into by the parties on the 1st day of July, 1889, which provided, among other things, that the plaintiff, in consideration of the payments to be made to him by the village, agreed to furnish all the labor and materials, and do the work, required to complete the work as named in the proposal sheet annexed, “as the same is more fully described in the printed and written specifications hereto annexed;” that he would do the work according to the plans and specifications, according to the true intent and meaning of his proposal sheet and such plans and specifications. The contract required the village to appoint a competent person to supervise the work as it progressed. It further provided as follows:

“The party of the first part [the village] agrees that their executive committee will cause an estimate to be made, before the 10th day of each month, of the value of the labor and materials on all work completed up to the first day of the same month, and will on said tenth day of each month pay to the party of the second part [the defendant], as a partial payment, ninety per ■cent, of the contract price of such completed work, and will within twenty days after the completion of the work cause a final and complete estimate of the labor and materials furnished by the party of the second part under the contract, in accordance with said proposal sheet and specifications, and accepted by the board under this agreement, and will gay to the party of the ■second part, at the ratio named in this proposal sheet, the balance found him due, withbut undue delay.”

It further provided that if the plaintiff failed to prosecute the work diligently, and complete the same by the 1st day of December, 1889, to the satisfaction of the village, it was at liberty to suspend the execution of the agreement, and annul the same. The plaintiff made a deposit of $2,000 as security for the performance of the ■contract. This the contract provided should be repaid to him upon the completion of the work. The plaintiff entered upon the work, and prosecuted the same till the fore part of December, when the defendant, being dissatisfied with the progress and the manner •of performing the work, terminated the contract; and this action was brought by the plaintiff to recover $10,000 damages for breach ■of the contract. The case was referred to a referee, to hear and determine; and he reported in favor of the plaintiff for the amount ■of the deposit, $2,000, and interest, and an item or two of extra work, amounting in all to the sum of $2,515.70. From the judgment entered, this appeal was taken.

Whether the conclusions of the referee are to be sustained depends upon the construction which should be given- to the contract. He held that the plaintiff had failed to perform the contract within the time agreed, and to perform the work as agreed, and that the defendant was therefore justified in declaring the contract terminated. Within a few days after making the contract, plaintiff commenced work upon the Kent reservoir. In a few days thereafter he received notice in writing from Kent, the owner of the land on which the reservoir was being constructed, directing him to discontinue work for the reason stated in the notice,—that no arrangement had been made for the purchase of the land by the defendant, [443]*443-and threatened to prosecute the plaintiff if he did not desist. The plaintiff, upon advice of his counsel, ceased work upon the reservoir for something over a month. The village had caused a survey and map to be made of the lands of Kent intended to be taken, and had filed the same, pursuant to chapter 211 of the Laws of 1885, and therefore had the right to enter upon the lands; but this was not known to the plaintiff, during the suspension of his work thereon. The lawyer with whom he advised does not seem to have been aware of this act. He had in mind, undoubtedly, as was quite natural he should, the general condemnation law. Plaintiff testified that he relied upon the advice of his counsel, and suspended work because of the notice; and his evidence in that particular is not contradicted. It is also contended by the plaintiff, and the evidence tends to show, that, in digging the trenches and tunnels for the vitrified pipe line, he encountered a very large amount of hard rock; that the excavations for the tunnels, instead of being entirely in soft, shale rock, were largely made up of hard rock, which required blasting; and that he was, in consequence, very greatly delayed in the progress of the work.

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Bluebook (online)
28 N.Y.S. 440, 77 Hun 124, 84 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 124, 59 N.Y. St. Rep. 73, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/delafield-v-village-of-westfield-nysupct-1894.