Del Monte Corp. v. Everett Steamship Corp.

402 F. Supp. 237, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11080, 1974 A.M.C. 1880
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedNovember 14, 1973
DocketC-73-1485 RFP
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 402 F. Supp. 237 (Del Monte Corp. v. Everett Steamship Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Del Monte Corp. v. Everett Steamship Corp., 402 F. Supp. 237, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11080, 1974 A.M.C. 1880 (N.D. Cal. 1973).

Opinion

ORDER

PECKHAM, District Judge.

Plaintiff sues defendants on contract for alleged damage to cargoes of bananas carried by defendants from ports in the Philippines to ports in Japan. Plaintiff, who brings this action as the assignee of the consignee of the cargoes, invokes the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court.

Defendant now moves for dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that this court does -not have personal jurisdiction over defendants; that this court should invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens; and that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The three possible grounds for dismissal will be considered seriatim.

FACTS

Plaintiff Del Monte Corporation is incorporated in New York and has its principal place of business in California. Defendant Everett Steamship Corporation is incorporated in Panama and has its principal place of business in Yokohama, Japan. Defendant Everett Orient Line, Inc. is incorporated in Liberia and operates vessels of Liberian registry in the Far East.

In December, 1971, plaintiff Del Monte Corporation sold to Fugi Fruits Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation, a quantity of bananas priced at $41,231.52. In January, 1972, the two corporations transacted for the sale and purchase of additional bananas priced at $38,433.98. Plaintiff delivered the cargoes of bananas to defendant shipowners at ports in the Philippines for shipment to the purchasing corporation in Japan. Defendants shipped the cargoes on the steamships “Peteeverett” and “Rosseverett.”

In January, 1972, the “Peteeverett” and the “Rosseverett” arrived, respectively, at Osaka, Japan and Yokohama, Japan. Japanese Quarantine Officials at both ports refused to allow the cargoes to be unloaded — allegedly due to the unacceptably high percentage of overripened fruit.

Plaintiff Del Monte Corporation is the assignee of the claims, causes of action, and rights which Fugi Fruits Co., Ltd., the consignee of the cargoes, may have against the defendants.

DISCUSSION

1. Personal Jurisdiction

Defendants, noting that they are foreign corporations with few contacts with California, argue that this court lacks personal jurisdiction and, therefore, must dismiss the action.

California Code of Civil Procedure § 410.10-provides for personal jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” This section indicates “an intent to exercise the broadest possible jurisdiction” consistent with the due process clause of the federal Constitution. Michigan National Bank v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.App.3d 1, 6, 99 Cal.Rptr. 823, 826 (1972). This court must determine its extra-territorial personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by applying the California long-arm statute within its constitutional limits. “The constitutional perimeters of this jurisdiction are found in the decisions of the United State Supreme Court.” Michigan National Bank v. Superior Court, supra at 6, 99 Cal.Rptr. at 826.

International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed 95 (1945), provides the basic definition for determining the appropriateness of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation:

. . . due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not *241 present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’
[citations omitted]

McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), reinforced the International Shoe doctrine, extending its application to a case'in which the defendant merely solicited the business of a California resident.

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), represents the Supreme Court’s limitation of the liberal approach of both International Shoe and McGee to the definition of personal jurisdiction. The court, in denying a Florida court’s assertion of jurisdiction over a Delaware trust account, stated that:

. it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240.

Courts, applying this standard, assert personal jurisdiction if a plaintiff establishes at least one of two alternative sets of jurisdictional facts. As one alternative, the plaintiff may prove that the particular cause of action arises out of or is connected with the defendant’s activity within the forum. “It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit [is] based on a contact which had substantial connection with that State.” McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, supra 355 U.S. at 223, 78 S.Ct. at 201. As the other alternative, the plaintiff may prove that the defendant engages in such extensive activity within the state as to justify a state court’s jurisdiction over a cause of action not related to that activity. Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 222, 225, 1 Cal.Rptr. 1, 347 P.2d 1 (1959). “Once it is established that the defendant has engaged in activity of the requisite quality and nature in the forum state . the propriety of an assumption of jurisdiction depends upon a balancing of the inconvenience to the defendant in having to defend itself in the forum state against both the interest of the plaintiff in suing locally and the interrelated interest of the state in assuming jurisdiction.” Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal.2d 893, 899, 80 Cal.Rptr. 113, 118, 458 P.2d 57, 62 (1969).

In the present case, plaintiff argues that the presence of George P. Bradford, an officer of the defendant corporations, within this judicial district satisfies the “minimum contacts” requirement articulated in the Supreme Court decisions listed supra. The affidavit of Bradford, which is attached to defendants’ motions, states:

That he is President of G. P. Bradford, Inc., a California corporation, with its only office at San Mateo, California. G. P. Bradford, Inc., with its total staff of less than ten employees, provides the personal office used ...

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402 F. Supp. 237, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11080, 1974 A.M.C. 1880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/del-monte-corp-v-everett-steamship-corp-cand-1973.