1 2
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 DAVID J. DEJEU, CASE NO. C20-5176 BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 9 v. DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 10 LEWIS COUNTY, et al., 11 Defendants. 12
13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Lewis County, Lewis County 14 District Court John Doe Employees, and Lewis County Risk Management John Doe 15 Employees’ (“Defendants”) second motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17. 16 On August 11, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ first motion to dismiss and 17 granted leave for Plaintiff David Dejeu (“Dejeu”) to amend his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 18 1985 claims against Defendants. Dkt. 15. On August 26, 2020, Dejeu filed an amended 19 complaint. Dkt. 16. On September 17, 2020, Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss. 20 Dkt. 17. On October 6, 2020, Dejeu responded. Dkt. 19. On October 22, Defendants 21 replied. Dkt. 22. 22 1 As a preliminary matter, Dejeu asserts in his response that Defendants’ motion to 2 dismiss is untimely and that therefore the Court should deny the motion. Dkt. 19 at 1–2.
3 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be made 4 before any response pleading is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Here, Defendants filed their 5 motion before filing their answer, Dkt. 20, on September 17, 2020. The Court does not 6 find Defendants’ motion to be untimely and will therefore consider its contents. 7 In its previous order, the Court found that Dejeu had failed to state a § 1983 8 Monell claim against Defendant Lewis County because he did not “allege actions
9 attributable to Lewis County, which of the actions violated his Fifth, Sixth, and 10 Fourteenth Amendments rights, and how those events are the result of Lewis County’s 11 policy, custom, or practice.” Dkt. 15 at 5. In his amended complaint, Dejeu alleges that 12 Lewis County has “a bad policy, custom, or practice” among judges, prosecutors, clerks, 13 and risk management employees. Dkt. 16 at 4–5. Dejeu further alleges that the “bad”
14 policies, customs, or practices deprived him of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 15 Amendment rights. 16 Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Dejeu has failed to allege facts to 17 support a reasonable inference that deliberate action attributable to Lewis Country 18 directly caused a deprivation of federal rights. See Horton by Horton v. Cty. of Santa
19 Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[a] plaintiff must therefore show ‘deliberate 20 action attributable to the municipality [that] directly caused a deprivation of federal 21 rights’”) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)) (emphasis in 22 original). Dejeu was charged with two traffic infractions and failed to respond to the 1 notice of infraction in Lewis County’s prescribed manner. He does not allege any 2 deliberate actions taken by Lewis County based on a policy that caused a deprivation of
3 rights. Rather, Dejeu alleges that “bad” policies exist, which resulted in a deprivation. 4 The Court therefore finds that Dejeu has failed to state a § 1983 Monell claim. 5 The Court also found previously that Dejeu failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 6 § 1985(2) and (3). See Dkt. 15 at 6. The Court found that the first prohibited act of § 1982 7 did not apply to Dejeu’s claim because it prohibits conspiracies to deter justice in federal 8 court but granted Dejeu leave to amend his claim under the second prohibited act. The
9 second of the prohibited acts of § 1985(2) proscribes a conspiracy to deny or hinder “the 10 due course of justice” in any State with “with intent to deny to any citizen the equal 11 protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). Because of the “equal protection” language 12 found in the second clause, a § 1985(2) state claim requires “an allegation of class-based 13 animus for the statement of a claim under that clause.” Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara,
14 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted); accord Griffin v. 15 Brekenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Here, Dejeu asserts that he is “part of a minority 16 or class of self represented people who try to legally defend themselves[.]” Dkt. 16 at 5. 17 But Dejeu’s asserted class is not a protected class and he “has not alleged that [Lewis] 18 County denied him access to state courts because he was a member of a protected class.”
19 Portman, 995 F.2d at 909. 20 Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive any person or class of persons 21 equal protection of the law. Similarly, to state a claim under § 1985(3) for a non-race- 22 based class, the Ninth Circuit requires “‘either that the courts have designated the class in 1 question a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring more exacting scrutiny or that 2 Congress has indicated through legislation that the class required special protection.’”
3 Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schultz v. 4 Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985)). “[T]he absence of a section 1983 5 deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the same 6 allegations.” Caldeira v. Cnty. of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 7 Cassettari v. Nev. Cnty., 824 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1987)). Again, Dejeu’s asserted 8 class does not have suspect or quasi-suspect classification by the courts. Therefore, the
9 Court finds that Dejeu’s § 1985 claim fails and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to 10 dismiss.1 11 Finally, Defendants assert that granting Dejeu leave to amend his complaint would 12 be futile. Where the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has 13 subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, “[t]he district court's
14 discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” In re Read–Rite, 335 F.3d 843, 15 845 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1097–98 (9th 16 Cir. 2002)). In this case, the Court has previously granted Dejeu leave to amend, and 17 Dejeu has not alleged any new, plausible facts upon which relief can be granted. The 18
20 1 Defendants raise the issue of whether Dejeu’s amended complaint is a de facto appeal of the state court’s judgment. See Dkt. 17 at 7–9.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 DAVID J. DEJEU, CASE NO. C20-5176 BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 9 v. DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 10 LEWIS COUNTY, et al., 11 Defendants. 12
13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Lewis County, Lewis County 14 District Court John Doe Employees, and Lewis County Risk Management John Doe 15 Employees’ (“Defendants”) second motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17. 16 On August 11, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ first motion to dismiss and 17 granted leave for Plaintiff David Dejeu (“Dejeu”) to amend his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 18 1985 claims against Defendants. Dkt. 15. On August 26, 2020, Dejeu filed an amended 19 complaint. Dkt. 16. On September 17, 2020, Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss. 20 Dkt. 17. On October 6, 2020, Dejeu responded. Dkt. 19. On October 22, Defendants 21 replied. Dkt. 22. 22 1 As a preliminary matter, Dejeu asserts in his response that Defendants’ motion to 2 dismiss is untimely and that therefore the Court should deny the motion. Dkt. 19 at 1–2.
3 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be made 4 before any response pleading is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Here, Defendants filed their 5 motion before filing their answer, Dkt. 20, on September 17, 2020. The Court does not 6 find Defendants’ motion to be untimely and will therefore consider its contents. 7 In its previous order, the Court found that Dejeu had failed to state a § 1983 8 Monell claim against Defendant Lewis County because he did not “allege actions
9 attributable to Lewis County, which of the actions violated his Fifth, Sixth, and 10 Fourteenth Amendments rights, and how those events are the result of Lewis County’s 11 policy, custom, or practice.” Dkt. 15 at 5. In his amended complaint, Dejeu alleges that 12 Lewis County has “a bad policy, custom, or practice” among judges, prosecutors, clerks, 13 and risk management employees. Dkt. 16 at 4–5. Dejeu further alleges that the “bad”
14 policies, customs, or practices deprived him of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 15 Amendment rights. 16 Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Dejeu has failed to allege facts to 17 support a reasonable inference that deliberate action attributable to Lewis Country 18 directly caused a deprivation of federal rights. See Horton by Horton v. Cty. of Santa
19 Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[a] plaintiff must therefore show ‘deliberate 20 action attributable to the municipality [that] directly caused a deprivation of federal 21 rights’”) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)) (emphasis in 22 original). Dejeu was charged with two traffic infractions and failed to respond to the 1 notice of infraction in Lewis County’s prescribed manner. He does not allege any 2 deliberate actions taken by Lewis County based on a policy that caused a deprivation of
3 rights. Rather, Dejeu alleges that “bad” policies exist, which resulted in a deprivation. 4 The Court therefore finds that Dejeu has failed to state a § 1983 Monell claim. 5 The Court also found previously that Dejeu failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 6 § 1985(2) and (3). See Dkt. 15 at 6. The Court found that the first prohibited act of § 1982 7 did not apply to Dejeu’s claim because it prohibits conspiracies to deter justice in federal 8 court but granted Dejeu leave to amend his claim under the second prohibited act. The
9 second of the prohibited acts of § 1985(2) proscribes a conspiracy to deny or hinder “the 10 due course of justice” in any State with “with intent to deny to any citizen the equal 11 protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). Because of the “equal protection” language 12 found in the second clause, a § 1985(2) state claim requires “an allegation of class-based 13 animus for the statement of a claim under that clause.” Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara,
14 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted); accord Griffin v. 15 Brekenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). Here, Dejeu asserts that he is “part of a minority 16 or class of self represented people who try to legally defend themselves[.]” Dkt. 16 at 5. 17 But Dejeu’s asserted class is not a protected class and he “has not alleged that [Lewis] 18 County denied him access to state courts because he was a member of a protected class.”
19 Portman, 995 F.2d at 909. 20 Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive any person or class of persons 21 equal protection of the law. Similarly, to state a claim under § 1985(3) for a non-race- 22 based class, the Ninth Circuit requires “‘either that the courts have designated the class in 1 question a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring more exacting scrutiny or that 2 Congress has indicated through legislation that the class required special protection.’”
3 Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schultz v. 4 Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985)). “[T]he absence of a section 1983 5 deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the same 6 allegations.” Caldeira v. Cnty. of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 7 Cassettari v. Nev. Cnty., 824 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1987)). Again, Dejeu’s asserted 8 class does not have suspect or quasi-suspect classification by the courts. Therefore, the
9 Court finds that Dejeu’s § 1985 claim fails and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to 10 dismiss.1 11 Finally, Defendants assert that granting Dejeu leave to amend his complaint would 12 be futile. Where the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has 13 subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, “[t]he district court's
14 discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” In re Read–Rite, 335 F.3d 843, 15 845 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Vantive Corp. Sec. Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1097–98 (9th 16 Cir. 2002)). In this case, the Court has previously granted Dejeu leave to amend, and 17 Dejeu has not alleged any new, plausible facts upon which relief can be granted. The 18
20 1 Defendants raise the issue of whether Dejeu’s amended complaint is a de facto appeal of the state court’s judgment. See Dkt. 17 at 7–9. Though the Court need not decide on this issue 21 because it has found that Dejeu has failed to state a claim, the Court notes that, to the extent Dejeu is attempting to appeal the imposition of fines, such appeals are barred by the Rooker- 22 Feldman doctrine. 1 Court agrees with Defendants that amendment would be futile and denies Dejeu leave to 2 amend.
3 Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Dejeu’s complaint without leave to amend, and 4 the Clerk shall close this case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated this 9th day of November, 2020. A 7 8 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 9 United States District Judge
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22