Deitrick v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co.

303 U.S. 471, 58 S. Ct. 696, 82 L. Ed. 962, 1938 U.S. LEXIS 351
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 28, 1938
Docket455
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 303 U.S. 471 (Deitrick v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deitrick v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co., 303 U.S. 471, 58 S. Ct. 696, 82 L. Ed. 962, 1938 U.S. LEXIS 351 (1938).

Opinions

Mr. Justice McReynolds

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Boston-Continental National Bank, established in December 1930 through consolidation of Boston National Bank and Continental National Bank, became insolvent. December 17, 1931, a receiver appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency took charge of its affairs. Petitioner is his successor. Among the bank’s effects were four “Note-Guaranty” Bonds—$40,000, $52,000, $20,000 and $20,000—alike in form, dated in August and December 1930 and June and July 1931, with certain “endorsements” showing extensions. Each purported to be executed by the maker of a described note as principal with Respondent as surety, and was conditioned to pay to the bank the amount of the note upon default, &c.

In June and September 1932 the Receiver brought separate actions at law upon three of these bonds. In each he alleged that the Company was indebted to him for the specified penalty with interest; and for this he asked judgment. The three declarations are alike in form and allegations. One, typical of all, is copied below.1 [473]*473There also is one of the Note-Guaranty Bonds, typical of all.2 Each declaration exhibited a bond, alleged that thereby the Company bound itself to pay the bank a [474]*474specified sum in the event of default, which had occurred, &c., that damages had been sustained whereby the surety had become indebted “in the penal sum of said bond, with interest.”

[475]*475Answering, the Company denied liability and alleged that, as the bank well knew, the bond was executed without authority, had been fraudulently obtained, was invalid.

Before the three law actions were filed the Surety Company instituted four separate equitable proceedings in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, Massachusetts, against the bank and makers of guaranteed notes. Each complaint alleged that the bank had fraudulently obtained the bond and asked that it be declared null and void. Later the Receiver became party in these causes and all were removed to the federal court. There, he filed separate answers, substantially alike, averring that the bond had been duly executed, that default had taken place and that damages amounting to the full amount of the specified penalty had been sustained. Each answer concluded—"Wherefore thesé defendants pray: 1. That the court determine the amount due from the plaintiff to Boston-Continental Bank and John B. Cunningham, its receiver, and order the plaintiff to pay the same with interest. 2. For such further relief as the court finds meet and just.”

Copies of one complaint3 and answer4 thereto, typical of all, are in the margin.

[476]*476A jury was waived in the law actions and the seven causes went to an Auditor and Master with instructions [477]*477to report findings of fact and conclusions of law, the former to be final. After taking much evidence he reported with [478]*478a finding of facts showing clearly that the bank obtained the bonds through the fraud of its president, Ragan, and Cliff, general agent of the Company. Among other things he said: “I rule that the bonds and 'endorsements’ in suit were not binding obligations in the hands of the bank as a going concern, for the reason that Ragan’s knowledge of their infirmities is imputed to the bank; and that the bonds and 'endorsements’ would not be binding obligations in the hands of the receiver, if his rights were derived solely from the bank as distinguished from its creditors.” He further ruled that as Cliff, general agent of the Surety Company, knew the bonds would be shown to the bank directors and to any others entitled to inquire concerning the notes described therein for the purpose of deception, therefore “the bonds and 'endorsements’ in suit are binding obligations in the hands of the receiver due to the fact that he represents the bank’s creditors.”

The District Court heard the causes on report and exceptions. It held the bonds void and further “adjudged and decreed that the counterclaim of the defendant receiver, set forth in his answer, be and the same is hereby dismissed.”

[479]*479By stipulation the causes were joined for appeal upon a single record. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court and said: “The master and auditor held that the receiver in bringing these actions did not derive his right of recovery through the Bank, but because one or more creditors of the Bank were deceived, and as he represents creditors he derived his right of action through them. The receiver, however, makes no such allegations in his declaration.” “It is clear from the pleadings that the receiver seeks to recover on these bonds as assets of the Bank. In such an action he stands no better than the Bank itself. All defenses open against the Bank in such a case are open against the receiver, and he is chargeable with knowledge of all facts known to the bank affecting the character of the claim.” “If therefore, the contract with the Surety Company was illegal as to the Bank, because, as the master and auditor found, the Bank was charged with the knowledge of its president, a recovery based on the contract of surety cannot be had by the receiver, since a recovery must be based on the pleadings, and the allegations of liability in the plaintiff’s declarations are based solely on the contract of surety.” In respect of the Receiver’s counterclaim set up in the equity suits it said: “The plaintiff’s counterclaim distinctly raises the question of the validity of the bonds. The issue of trust for the benefit of creditors is not raised or suggested.” “The obligations of the Surety Company based on the depositors of the bank being injured by the giving of the bonds, and the receiver’s claim against the Surety Company based on a trust relationship are not mentioned, and, we think, are not raised by the plaintiff’s counterclaim in the equity suits.”

We agree with the conclusion reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Its judgment must be affirmed.

Counsel for the Petitioner here submit—“The Receiver’s position rests primarily upon the proposition that the [480]*480circumstances surrounding the giving of the note-guaranty bonds by Cliff to the Bank accompanied by the supporting powers of attorney, . . . and the consequences which followed the credence given to said bonds and powers of attorney by the national bank examiners and the Comptroller, acting as the representatives of the depositors and other creditors, give rise, in a suit by the Receiver to enforce the bonds, to an estoppel which precludes the Surety Company from denying the validity of the bonds and from asserting as a defense that its agent acted fraudulently and without authority in executing the bonds and that a fraudulent official of the Bank knew of the agent’s misconduct.”

An examination of the pleadings makes it quite clear that the Receiver undertook to set up rights acquired by the insolvent bank through duly executed contracts between it and the Surety Company. He makes no suggestion of a purpose attributable to the company to mislead creditors or others; makes no allegations of damage except that sustained by the bank. He sets up no facts which would render unconscionable a denial of liability upon the bond because of the agent’s fraud obviously induced by the president of the bank.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
303 U.S. 471, 58 S. Ct. 696, 82 L. Ed. 962, 1938 U.S. LEXIS 351, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deitrick-v-standard-surety-casualty-co-scotus-1938.