ENOCH, Chief Judge.
Defendants, Sandra Riley and Ronn Mayer, appeal a money judgment entered by the trial court on behalf of plaintiffs as a result of Riley’s sale of property to Mayer after executing a contract for sale with plaintiffs. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
In January 1977, defendant Riley was the owner of certain real property located in the City and County of Denver. She wished to sell this property as quickly as possible in order to use the proceeds from [997]*997the sale to close on another property which she wanted to purchase. On January 13, 1977, defendant Riley and plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell the property to plaintiffs for $136,000, the closing to take place on February 1, 1977. Later that same day, defendant Riley entered into another contract to sell the same property to defendant Mayer, for the same purchase price. The closing under this second contract was to be on January 19, 1977. At the time Mayer entered into the contract he was aware of the contract for sale of the same property to plaintiffs.
Upon learning of the execution of the contract for the sale to defendant Mayer, plaintiffs indicated to defendant Riley that they still intended to close on the property as previously agreed. Plaintiffs then recorded the contract, and, on January 17, 1977, filed this action.
Prior to the date of defendant Mayer’s closing, he was informed by defendant Riley of plaintiffs’ actions and that plaintiffs’ contract had appeared as an exception on the title insurance commitment. At defendant Mayer’s closing on January 19, 1977, defendant Riley’s husband executed an agreement with defendant Mayer which provided that defendant Mayer would be indemnified in the event plaintiffs’ contract was deemed valid and enforceable.
There was no closing on plaintiffs’ contract on February 1, 1977, although plaintiffs appeared at the specified place of closing, ready to perform under the terms of their contract with defendant Riley. Subsequently, defendant Mayer sold the property to a third person, who is not a party to this action, for $236,000.
Initially the complaint was dismissed on the grounds that plaintiffs’ contract lacked adequate consideration. That decision, however, was reversed by this court in Defeyter v. Riley, 43 Colo.App. 299, 606 P.2d 453 (1979). After the trial on remand, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Riley for breach of contract in the amount of $9,000, that being the difference between the contract price, $136,000, and the court-determined market value, $145,000, at the time the contract was entered into.
Because specific performance was impossible, the trial court determined that defendant Riley held title as constructive trustee for plaintiffs, and that defendant Mayer “took legal title as trustee of the plaintiffs and subject to the equitable interests of the plaintiffs.” The court then concluded that all profits defendant Mayer had received as a constructive trustee were to be awarded to plaintiffs. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Mayer for $119,-291.40.
The court further concluded that “defendant Mayer’s conduct in inducing the defendant Riley to convey the property to him, knowing of the existence of the contract with the Defeyters, amounted to a tortious interference with the latter contract.” The court went on to hold that, “[d]ue to the flagrancy of defendant Mayer’s wanton and reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights,” punitive damages should be assessed against defendant Mayer in the amount of $5,000.
I.
Defendants first contend that the receipt and option contract is unenforceable because of a failure of consideration. We disagree.
The question of whether the contract was supported by adequate consideration has already been answered affirmatively in Defeyter v. Riley, supra. That ruling is the law of the case, Dando v. Mangini, 107 Colo. 170, 109 P.2d 1055 (1941), and thus, such issue will not be reconsidered. United States National Bank v. Bartges, 122 Colo. 546, 224 P.2d 658 (1950). See Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301 (Colo.App.1982).
II.
Defendants next contend that the trial court erred in imposing a constructive trust upon defendants because there was no showing of fraud, duress, or a fiduciary [998]*998relationship between the parties. Again, we disagree.
In Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979), our Supreme Court, quoting Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 14 P.2d 187 (1932), stated that constructive trusts “ ‘are raised by equity in respect of property which has been acquired by fraud, or where, though originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by him who holds it.’ ” The Page court also quoted with approval the following language from 5 A. Scott, Trusts § 462.1 (3rd ed. 1967):
“The circumstances which give rise to a constructive trust may, but do not necessarily, involve a fiduciary relation.”
Since the circumstances here present a situation which under Page v. Clark, supra, justifies the use of a constructive trust, we find no error in the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust upon defendants.
III.
Defendants also contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust, its finding that defendant Mayer was liable for tortious interference with contract, and its finding as to the value of the property. We disagree.
The credibility of witnesses, the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all matters within the province of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on review unless manifestly erroneous. Broncucia v. McGee, 173 Colo. 22, 475 P.2d 336 (1970). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings in these matters.
IV.
We do agree with defendant Mayer’s contention that the trial court erred in finding him liable for $5,000 in punitive damages.
The money judgment awarded plaintiffs against defendant Mayer for $119,291.40 was a result of the constructive trust imposed on defendant Mayer. Although the court further determined that defendant Mayer tortiously interfered with the contract between plaintiffs and defendant Riley, it made no specific finding of any damages flowing from defendant Mayer’s malfeasance. The trial court stated that the tortious interference claim was “entirely independent of the conclusion that defendant Mayer was a constructive trustee for the property of plaintiffs.” The trial court then assessed the $5,000 in punitive damages against defendant Mayer for his tor-tious interference.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
ENOCH, Chief Judge.
Defendants, Sandra Riley and Ronn Mayer, appeal a money judgment entered by the trial court on behalf of plaintiffs as a result of Riley’s sale of property to Mayer after executing a contract for sale with plaintiffs. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
In January 1977, defendant Riley was the owner of certain real property located in the City and County of Denver. She wished to sell this property as quickly as possible in order to use the proceeds from [997]*997the sale to close on another property which she wanted to purchase. On January 13, 1977, defendant Riley and plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell the property to plaintiffs for $136,000, the closing to take place on February 1, 1977. Later that same day, defendant Riley entered into another contract to sell the same property to defendant Mayer, for the same purchase price. The closing under this second contract was to be on January 19, 1977. At the time Mayer entered into the contract he was aware of the contract for sale of the same property to plaintiffs.
Upon learning of the execution of the contract for the sale to defendant Mayer, plaintiffs indicated to defendant Riley that they still intended to close on the property as previously agreed. Plaintiffs then recorded the contract, and, on January 17, 1977, filed this action.
Prior to the date of defendant Mayer’s closing, he was informed by defendant Riley of plaintiffs’ actions and that plaintiffs’ contract had appeared as an exception on the title insurance commitment. At defendant Mayer’s closing on January 19, 1977, defendant Riley’s husband executed an agreement with defendant Mayer which provided that defendant Mayer would be indemnified in the event plaintiffs’ contract was deemed valid and enforceable.
There was no closing on plaintiffs’ contract on February 1, 1977, although plaintiffs appeared at the specified place of closing, ready to perform under the terms of their contract with defendant Riley. Subsequently, defendant Mayer sold the property to a third person, who is not a party to this action, for $236,000.
Initially the complaint was dismissed on the grounds that plaintiffs’ contract lacked adequate consideration. That decision, however, was reversed by this court in Defeyter v. Riley, 43 Colo.App. 299, 606 P.2d 453 (1979). After the trial on remand, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Riley for breach of contract in the amount of $9,000, that being the difference between the contract price, $136,000, and the court-determined market value, $145,000, at the time the contract was entered into.
Because specific performance was impossible, the trial court determined that defendant Riley held title as constructive trustee for plaintiffs, and that defendant Mayer “took legal title as trustee of the plaintiffs and subject to the equitable interests of the plaintiffs.” The court then concluded that all profits defendant Mayer had received as a constructive trustee were to be awarded to plaintiffs. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Mayer for $119,-291.40.
The court further concluded that “defendant Mayer’s conduct in inducing the defendant Riley to convey the property to him, knowing of the existence of the contract with the Defeyters, amounted to a tortious interference with the latter contract.” The court went on to hold that, “[d]ue to the flagrancy of defendant Mayer’s wanton and reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights,” punitive damages should be assessed against defendant Mayer in the amount of $5,000.
I.
Defendants first contend that the receipt and option contract is unenforceable because of a failure of consideration. We disagree.
The question of whether the contract was supported by adequate consideration has already been answered affirmatively in Defeyter v. Riley, supra. That ruling is the law of the case, Dando v. Mangini, 107 Colo. 170, 109 P.2d 1055 (1941), and thus, such issue will not be reconsidered. United States National Bank v. Bartges, 122 Colo. 546, 224 P.2d 658 (1950). See Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301 (Colo.App.1982).
II.
Defendants next contend that the trial court erred in imposing a constructive trust upon defendants because there was no showing of fraud, duress, or a fiduciary [998]*998relationship between the parties. Again, we disagree.
In Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979), our Supreme Court, quoting Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 14 P.2d 187 (1932), stated that constructive trusts “ ‘are raised by equity in respect of property which has been acquired by fraud, or where, though originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by him who holds it.’ ” The Page court also quoted with approval the following language from 5 A. Scott, Trusts § 462.1 (3rd ed. 1967):
“The circumstances which give rise to a constructive trust may, but do not necessarily, involve a fiduciary relation.”
Since the circumstances here present a situation which under Page v. Clark, supra, justifies the use of a constructive trust, we find no error in the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust upon defendants.
III.
Defendants also contend that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust, its finding that defendant Mayer was liable for tortious interference with contract, and its finding as to the value of the property. We disagree.
The credibility of witnesses, the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all matters within the province of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on review unless manifestly erroneous. Broncucia v. McGee, 173 Colo. 22, 475 P.2d 336 (1970). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings in these matters.
IV.
We do agree with defendant Mayer’s contention that the trial court erred in finding him liable for $5,000 in punitive damages.
The money judgment awarded plaintiffs against defendant Mayer for $119,291.40 was a result of the constructive trust imposed on defendant Mayer. Although the court further determined that defendant Mayer tortiously interfered with the contract between plaintiffs and defendant Riley, it made no specific finding of any damages flowing from defendant Mayer’s malfeasance. The trial court stated that the tortious interference claim was “entirely independent of the conclusion that defendant Mayer was a constructive trustee for the property of plaintiffs.” The trial court then assessed the $5,000 in punitive damages against defendant Mayer for his tor-tious interference.
It is a fundamental principle of law that punitive damages may not be awarded absent an award of actual damages. Section 13-21-102, C.R.S.1973; Ress v. Rediess 130 Colo. 572, 278 P.2d 183 (1954); Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851 (1977); Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc., 35 Colo.App. 102, 529 P.2d 656 (1974). There being no award of actual damages on the claim of tortious interference against Mayer, an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained. Nor can the punitive damages be predicated upon the court’s award on the basis of the constructive trust, as argued by plaintiffs, because, as a general rule, which we hold applicable here, punitive damages are not recoverable in equity. Miller v. Kaiser, 164 Colo. 206, 433 P.2d 772 (1967); Littlejohn v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 92 Colo. 275, 20 P.2d 311 (1933).
V.
The issue raised in plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, relating to the trial court’s adjustment of the amount of judgment against defendants, has already been resolved by defendant Riley’s posting of a bond which would satisfy plaintiffs’ judgment against her.
Defendant Mayer’s other contentions of error concerning the amount of damages are without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in all respects except as to the award of punitive damages against defendant Mayer, which award is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions [999]*999that it modify the judgment to delete the $5,000 punitive damages award.
PIERCE, J., concurs.
TURSI, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.