DEFER LP v. Raymond James Financial, Inc.

654 F. Supp. 2d 204, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84685, 2009 WL 2971072
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 17, 2009
Docket08 Civ. 3449(LAK)
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 654 F. Supp. 2d 204 (DEFER LP v. Raymond James Financial, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DEFER LP v. Raymond James Financial, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 204, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84685, 2009 WL 2971072 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, an investor in auction rate securities (“ARS”), brings this purported class action against a financial service firm and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries that underwrote, marketed and sold the securities and managed the auctions at which the interest rates they paid were set. Plaintiff claims that defendants knowingly misrepresented ARS to potential investors as highly liquid investments and earned millions of dollars in sales commissions and fees to their detriment. The matter is before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it fails to state a legally sufficient claim. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

Background

Auction rate securities are bonds or preferred stocks that pay interest or dividends at rates set at periodic auctions. 1 First introduced in 1984, 2 ARS experienced dramatic growth, and by February 2008 approximately $330 billion of ARS were outstanding. 3 The securities were attractive to issuers because they allowed them to obtain long-term capital at short- *207 term rates. 4 ARS originally were marketed only to highly sophisticated institutional investors. Prior to the beginning of the class period, however, issuers and underwriters lowered the minimum required investment to $25,000, thus expanding the market for ARS to individuals, charities and small businesses. 5

Auction Rate Securities

ARS pay interest or dividends at rates set at auctions that usually were held every 7, 28, 35, or 49 days, with interest paid at the end of an auction period. 6 In a typical auction, potential buyers submitted bids for a specific quantity of securities with a particular interest or dividend rate. 7 The rate bid at which the last securities were sold was the “clearing rate.” 8 This rate then applied to all securities sold in the auction. 9

Auctions could end in one of three ways: a successful auction, an “all-hold” auction, or a failed auction. In the first case, the demand for shares was equal to or greater than the supply. All shares on the market were purchased, and the clearing rate applied to all securities sold until the next auction. 10 In an all-hold auction, investors decided to hold rather than sell their securities. A formula specified in the offering documents set the interest or dividend rate to be paid in this scenario, which was usually lower than the market rate. 11 An auction failed if the quantity of shares or bonds offered for sale exceeded that bid for purchase, i.e., when supply exceeded demand. In that situation, shareholders could sell their securities, and the “penalty rate” or “maximum rate” applied until the next auction. 12 The maximum rate on an ARS was intended to ensure the liquidity of the security in the event of a failed auction by attracting new buyers. This rate was specified also in the offering documents. 13

Alleged Market Manipulation

According to the complaint, between April 8, 2003 and February 13, 2008 (the “Class Period”), financial firms, including but not limited to defendants, underwrote billions of dollars of ARS that carried insufficient maximum rates to ensure the liquidity of those securities if auctions failed. 14 Broker-dealers then allegedly engaged in a variety of tactics to mask the risk of investing in ARS. 15

These tactics included the routine intervention by broker-dealers in auctions by placing “support bids.” Broker-dealers simulated demand by placing bids for their own accounts when auctions otherwise would have failed due to lack of investors. 16 Through extensive and sustained interventions of this type, numerous financial firms created the illusion that ARS were highly liquid, low-risk investments. 17 Without *208 such interventions, there would have been widespread auction failures. 18

As a result of insufficient investor participation in the market, broker-dealers who placed support bids were able to assert almost complete control over the interest and dividend rates paid on the ARS for which they managed auctions. 19 Broker-dealers sometimes depressed the clearing rate to benefit issuer clients on whom they depended for business and underwriting and management fees. 20 While they sometimes increased rates to entice investors, they decreased rates again once they had reduced their own inventories. 21

As broker-dealers intervened to support auctions, they accumulated increasing numbers of securities in their own accounts. They allegedly pressured their sales personnel to sell the ARS and thereby remove them from their own books. 22 In addition, broker-dealers from certain firms other than defendants allowed some auctions to fail between August 2007 and early February 2008 rather than purchasing ARS. These auction failures represented only a small fraction of the ARS market and were not widely known to investors. 23 On February 13, 2008, however, all major ARS broker-dealers ended their support of auctions. As a result, 87 percent of all ARS auctions failed. The ARS market collapsed, and over $300 billion of the securities were rendered illiquid. 24

Raymond James Entities

Defendant Raymond James Financial, Inc. (“RJF”) is a financial firm that conducts brokerage and investment banking services through subsidiaries including defendants Raymond James & Associates, Inc. (“RJA”) and Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. (“RJFS”) (collectively “Raymond James” or “defendants”). RJFS sold auction rate securities to investors. RJA, a registered broker-dealer, underwrote auction rate securities and managed auctions for ARS that defendants sold to the investing public. 25 Raymond James earned substantial fees for these services. 26

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Bluebook (online)
654 F. Supp. 2d 204, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84685, 2009 WL 2971072, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/defer-lp-v-raymond-james-financial-inc-nysd-2009.