Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp.

274 F.2d 626
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJanuary 22, 1960
DocketNos. 195, 196, Dockets 25200, 25201
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 274 F.2d 626 (Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 274 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1960).

Opinion

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Defendants Temp-Resisto Corporation and Samuel Kaplan & Sons, Inc. (appellants) appeal from a judgment in favor of Deering, Milliken & Co. Inc. (appellee) sustaining the validity of Patents Nos. 2,630,620 and 2,630.573, issued March 10, 1953. The product involved is a fabric coated with metallic material and known as “Milium,” produced by plaintiff under an agreement with the patentee, H. J. Rand. Defendants’ product, “Temp-Resisto,” was found to have infringed. The district court enjoined its further manufacture during the term of the patents and awarded damages, the determination of which was referred to a Special Master. The court dismissed counterclaims, interposed against plaintiff and the additional defendants, which alleged violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13, and unfair competition.

The action was tried before a Special Master, whose findings, recommendations and additional findings on recommittal were approved and adopted by the district court. Defendants challenge all the material findings, complain about the exclusion of certain evidence offered on recommittal and assert affirmatively the defense of patent misuse. Although appellants argue non-infringement at length, this issue is secondary to their contention that the Rand patent1 is invalid because: (1) it is neither new nor an invention; (2) it covers only the products of prior art; (3) the Rand “invention” consists merely in describing the prior art in greater detail; and (4) the “invention” is void for lack of utility. If there be any merit to the invalidity arguments, infringement becomes academic. Thus initially an analysis must be made of the patent and its claims as to inventiveness and their relationship to the prior art.

The patent provides that its fundamental object is “to provide a textile fabric bearing a thin superficial application of heat reflective metallic material” which would retain its “porosity, hand 2 and cleaning properties * * * unimpaired * * *

Claim 1 3 contains the basic elements of Rand’s “invention.” Virtually any cloth, any metal or any binder could be used. The patent contained drawings as [628]*628.to how the threads would appear under microscopic examination after being coated and a sketch of a proposed spraying apparatus for the application of the flake and binder. The method of application involved “the balance of a number of variables including composition of the metallic application, distance of spray heads from the fabric * * * ” which was stated to be “readily attained by those skilled in the art.” 4

Breaking this claim down into its essential elements the fabric was to be “pliable, porous and heat reflective” and comprised of “a preformed textile weave of fibrous warp and weft threads.” This result was to be obtained by applying a discontinuous film of heat reflective metallic flakes to one side of the fabric. A binder between the flakes and the fabric threads was to cause them to adhere to the threads without substantial penetration into the threads. The exposed side of the fabric was to be substantially completely covered but the unexposed areas, namely, at the points of intersection, would be substantially free of the flakes. This, in substance, Rand claimed would make the fabric “porous, pliable and reflective to radiated heat.”

Rand had come to appellee’s attention in 1949 and had worked with appellee. A commercial operation to produce the fabric was commenced in early 1950 and in March appellee with a fanfare of publicity announced this allegedly new fabric subsequently named “Milium.” On August 28, 1950 Rand filed his original application (Serial No. 181,756). The application on which the Rand patent issued was a continuation of the original application and was filed September 29, 1952 (Serial No. 311,961).

The original claims disclosed a “pliable porous fabric having a metallic application adhered superficially to one side thereof, said metallic application being composed of discrete particles of metal” which was “radiation reflective.” These claims were rejected by the Patent Office “as being unpatentable over Juel, Wiggin, Cavanaugh, Allan et al. or Humes, each of which discloses a fabric coated with a binder and metal particles.” “The claimed proportions of binder and metal flakes [were] not considered to be critical.” Further amendments were submitted. The Patent Office continued to reject stating that “Claims 1, 2, 3 and 8-18 are rejected as being unpatentable over Cavanaugh who discloses a fabric lightly sprayed with bronze powder, and a binder in order to preserve the original pliability of the fabric. Cavanaugh specifically takes precaution to prevent more than a superficial penetration of the coating into the fabric. If it is true that applicant’s coated fabric is air and moisture permeable and has air pockets therein, the same must also be true of the lightly coated fabric in Cavanaugh. * * * The claimed coated fabric is not considered to be patentably distinguishing over the coated fabric of Cavanaugh since whatever differences may be present are considered at the most unpatentable variations, and well within the skill of the art.” Finally a few adverbs were included in the claims and on March 10, 1953 the Rand patent issued although as the Special Master found the subject matter was sufficiently disclosed in the original application and that the amendments “made no material addition to or variance from the original disclosure.” Thus twice the Patent Office had rejected the Rand coated fabric as unpatentable and as “well within the skill of the art.” Inquiry, therefore, must be made to ascertain what Rand claims to have invented and whether the “invention” is entitled to receive the monopolistic protection of the patent laws.

First the elements should be eliminated as to which no claim is made. Rand did not invent the base fabric — virtually any fabric could be treated. He did not invent the metallic flakes or the binder. [629]*629Several different types of binder are suggested. Rand could not have invented the qualities with which the various elements were endowed by natural law, such as, heat reflectivity of metallic flakes, porosity of textile fibers, the interstices of woven cloth or permeability of textiles to moisture and air. Nor does he claim to have invented any machine by which to apply the coating although he does furnish a diagram of a spraying5 operation. The means to accomplish the spraying of a light coating and the degree of viscosity required for the best results were to be solved by those skilled in the art. Again natural laws, not inventiveness, teach that a spray applied to one side of a fabric will coat the side of the threads exposed to the spray and the under side protected by the exposed portion will not be coated. If this obvious result permits the fabric to remain pliable and porous it is due to the qualities of the fabric; not to Rand. Thus there is left, in effect, only the idea that a fabric to which a light and superficial coating has been applied would have certain heat reflecting or heat retaining characteristics. However, if Rand originated the idea of coating a fabric with metallic flakes to achieve the properties asserted for “Milium” he may well have made a substantial contribution worthy of patent protection.6 But it must have been his idea and not suggested by others whether by prior publication or prior art.7

Kirkpatrick

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274 F.2d 626, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deering-milliken-co-v-temp-resisto-corp-ca2-1960.