Dederick v. Cassell

9 F. 306, 1881 U.S. App. LEXIS 2484
CourtUnited States Circuit Court
DecidedOctober 6, 1881
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 9 F. 306 (Dederick v. Cassell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dederick v. Cassell, 9 F. 306, 1881 U.S. App. LEXIS 2484 (uscirct 1881).

Opinion

Butler, D. J.

The suit embraces seven patents, for “improvements in baling-presses,” numbered 8,130, 8,316, 7,983, 8,312, 8,292, 8,296, and 187,220. The last named, however, the plaintiff has withdrawn.

[307]*307The first and second are reissues derived from original 132,566, dated October 29, 1872; the third and fourth are reissues derived from original 132,639, of same date as 132,566 ; the fifth is a reissue of original 151,477, dated June 2, 1874, and the sixth a reissue of original 177,216, dated May 9, 1876. As the case now stands the respondent is charged with infringing 22 claims, being the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and eleventh of 8,130; the second and third of 8,316; the third, fifth, and eleventh of 7,983 ; the sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and eleventh of 8,312; the second, fifth, and sixth of 8,292; and the first of 8,296. Tho fourth and sixth of 7,983, and the fourth of 8,296, included in the bill, have been withdrawn; and the fifth of 8,292, which was not so included, has been introduced by agreement.

The answer denies the validity of the several patents and claims, and the charge of infringement.

The issues raised can only be disposed of intelligently, by considering each patent and claim separately. It is not necessary, however, to state at large our reasons for the disposition made of them. To do so would require a written analysis of the various machines and devices exhibited to prove anticipation, and a comparison of their several parts with the respective claims of the plaintiff, as well as a dissertation on the former state of the art, which would involve much useless labor and much more time than can be spared for the purpose. The questions of law are neither new nor difficult; and the questions of fact are such as commonly arise in patent cases. I shall, therefore, do little more than state conclusions. A few considerations, common to all the patents, and many of the claims, can be disposed of most profitably, at the outset.

As has been stated, the original letters were surrendered, and reissues obtained, (for separate minor, or subordinate, combinations as respects 132,566 and 132,639,) with the several claims of each original divided and enlarged. While this extensive division and enlargement of claims (induced, probably, by a nervous apprehension of future difficulties) tends to confusion and litigation, and is therefore reprehensible, it affords no legal ground of objection to the reissues, unless “new matter” has been introduced. The introduction of “new matter” is forbidden by the statute. Nothing, however, plainly embraced in the specifications, model, or drawings, is regarded by the courts as “new matter:” Bentz v. Elias, 6 O. G. 117; Thomas v. Manuf’g Co. 16 O. G. 541; Glue Co. v. Upton, 6 O. G. 830 ; Aultman v. Holley, 11 Blatchf. 317; Smith v. Goodyear, 11 O. G. 246; [308]*308s. c. 11 Otto, 486. While language may be found in Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall. 1, and a few other cases, which, standing alone, might justify a belief that where a general combination embraces minor, subordinate combinations, not claimed in the original patent, a subsequent introduction of claims for the latter, is invalid. Such a conclusion, however, cannot be reconciled-with what has been decided elsewhere, both before and since: Henry v. Nelson, 12 O. G. 753; Kerosene Lamp Co. v. Littell, 13 O. G. 1009; Stevens v. Pritchard, 10 O. G. 505; Brown v. Selby, 23 Wall. 181; Seymour v. Morgan, 11 Wall. 544; Pearl v. Ocean Mills, 11 O. G. 4; Christman v. Ramsey, 17 O. G. 95; Sussell v. Spaeth, 14 O. G. 274. The patent, whether a reissue or an original, is entitled to a presumption in its favor: Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, 14 Pet. 448; Stevens v. Pritchard, 10 O. G. 505; Rossner v. Anness, 13 O. G. 870; Smith v. Goodyear, 5 O. G. 585. To justify the rejection of a patent or its claims, therefore, on the allegation of “new matter” it must clearly appear that such matter has been introduced. A careful examination of the originals and reissues involved in this case has not satisfied us that “new matter” has been introduced.

These patents are, principally, for new combinations. A majority of patents granted in modern times, are for such inventions; and they are none the less entitled to protection, and none the less valuable, on this account. A new machine, or a new manufacture is thus produced, whereby new and useful results are obtained. Such a machine is infringed whenever another employs substantially the same combination, in plan and elements, operating in the same manner and producing substantially the same result. The doctrine of equivalents, with slight modification, applies with as much force to such an invention as to any other: Gould v. Reese, 15 Wall. 192; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 556; Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall. 14, 15. Where, however, there is a difference, not in form simply, but in substance,— a difference in plan or combination, — in short, a difference in invention, of course, the one machine will not infringe the other. The old elements from which one individual has drawn are open to all. It is the peculiar combination which one has effected that another shall not copy. It is the substance of the combination, however, and not the form, that is to be regarded. If the same plan, and substantially the same means of carrying it out, be employed, it is but copying.

That the plaintiff’s press (considered as an entire machine) is the result of a new plan and new combination; that invention was necessary to produce it,-and that great benefit has resulted from its pro[309]*309duction and use, we cannot doubt. An extended inquiry respecting the state of the art prior to its invention, in 1872, is unnecessary. The baling-presses employed for hay, up to that time, were of a primitive character. The upright press, principally used, consisted of a box or tube of about three by five feet in diameter, in which a platen or traverser moved, compressing the hay and forming the bale, by a single movement. While the hay was thus held in position, doors in the side of the box were opened and the bale was bound and removed. The platen was then drawn up, and the operation repeated. The balo rested on its side while within the box, and consequently was pressed and bound transversely. Longitudinal presses had been constructed, by laying the box or tube above described, upon its side, into which the hay was inserted through doors on top. After tramping, the doors were closed, and the platen moved forward until the hay was compressed, when they were opened, and the bale bound and removed. Beater-presses, referred to by the witnesses as in use to a limited extent, were similar to the two described, having a device, however, to supply the necessity for tramping while the box was being filled. For baling cotton, presses of similar construction, though somewhat more ingenious and complicated, were employed. None of the several machines referred to, however, were like the plaintiff’s, either in plan or combination of parts, or capable of performing its functions.

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Bluebook (online)
9 F. 306, 1881 U.S. App. LEXIS 2484, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dederick-v-cassell-uscirct-1881.