Aultman v. Holley

2 F. Cas. 217, 11 Blatchf. 317, 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 534, 1873 U.S. App. LEXIS 1412
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York
DecidedOctober 27, 1873
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2 F. Cas. 217 (Aultman v. Holley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aultman v. Holley, 2 F. Cas. 217, 11 Blatchf. 317, 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 534, 1873 U.S. App. LEXIS 1412 (circtsdny 1873).

Opinion

WOODRUFF, Circuit Judge.

On the 20th of September, 1853, Philo Sylla and Augustus Adams received letters patent from the United States, for an “improvement in harvesters.” On the 17th of May, 1859, on a surrender of the said patent, new letters were issued to C. Aultman & Co., assignees, intended severally to cover different parts of the same invention, or different devices included in the original machine. These reissues were numbered respectively 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, and 72G. Thereafter, reissue No. 722 was assigned to the original alleged inventors, was by them surrendered, and, on the 14th of September, 1SG7, new letters patent were issued to them, professedly for the same invention, which last named reissue is numbered 2,60S. The several reissued patents numbered 2,608, 723, 724, and 726, were, on the 19th of September, 1867, extended for seven years from the expiration of the original terms, namely, to the 20th of September, 1874, and by assignment from the original patentees, the title thereto is vested in the complainant in this suit, who charges the defendants with an infringement of these extended reissued patents. The defendants have raised the preliminary objection, that the suit is defective for want of necessary parties; and, on the merits, they insist upon varous objections to the relief sought,' the chief of which are. that the reissued patents are void, because they “are not for the same invention as the original patent from which they have sprung, but claim substantial and material matters not indicated, suggested, or described in that original patent;”' that, if the reissued patents embrace no devices but such as are shown or suggested-in the record of the original, or if they can-be sustained so far as to embrace what is shown in such original and nothing more, then the defendants’ machine is no infringement; and, finally, that the invention shown or indicated by the original patent, its specification and model, in any particular in which the defendants can be deemed to use any device or devices shown therein was not new when such original patent was granted.

2 [1. The objection that the suit is defective for want of necessary parties (then considered by the court and overruled) is founded upon a certain agreement entered into on the 27th of December, 1860, by and between Cyrenus Wheeler, Jr., and several others of the first part, and this complainant and others, (composing the firm of G. Aultman & Co.,) and Sears, Adriance & Platt of the second part, which recited the ownership of sundry patents for improvements in grain and grass harvesting machines by Wheeler, and the interest of others of the parties of the first part therein, and the ownership of the original patent hereinabove mentioned and the reissues thereof, and of sundry other patents by O. Aultman & Co., and that they have assigned exclusive rights in certain territory within the United States to Sears, Adriance & Platt. The agreement then proceeds to declare that each party licenses the other party for the term of ten years from January 1, 1861, to make, vend, and use the respective patented improvements, and to license others to make, vend, and use their respective separate machines, but only such machines as correspond with an agreed sample of the machines of each, each party reserving to themselves and to their licensees the right to make their own machines, illustrated by such sample, and not to make or license others to make, vend, or use machines, corresponding substantially to the sample of the other party. Among, other things there-inafterward following, they fix the minimum license fee which each party shall charge-licensees for each machine licensed corresponding with such party’s sample machine; they provide for the payment of one dollar to a common agent for each machine sold by either party or by the licensees of either party as a common fund. Certain outstanding contracts with other parties are then recognized and affirmed. It is then declared that any persons selling machines other than the specified sample machines, and using any of the patents of either party, are to be deemed infringers. The agreement, then, ninthly, declares that any patents which shall [219]*219be deemed necessary by the parties hereto for the protection of either machine, upon joint consent, may be purchased, the expense being’ borne equally by the parties of the first and second part. * * * The special agent is to be paid the one dollar for each machine above mentioned, and all sums received for infringements are to.be paid to him; he is to be the general agent of both parties to settle claims for infringements, and to do such other acts as the parties see fit to authorize him to do, the parties to report to him the number of machines built by them, the names, &e., of their licensees, and the number of machines made by the latter, respectively. The common fund to be paid into the hands of the agent is to be used for expenses in transacting any business provided for in the agreement, and in defending and maintaining the patents of either party, and if there be any surplus it shall be divided. “Thirteenth. The title to the patents now owned by either party shall remain as now vested, and such as shall hereafter be acquired shall become the joint property of the parties hereto, subject only to such transfers as may be hereafter made by mutual consent.

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“This contract shall be in force and continue to the full end of ten years from the first day of January, 1861, unless otherwise dissolved by mutual consent.” The claim that the parties to the agreement are necessary parties is mainly founded upon the provision therein that such patents as should thereafter be acquired should' become the joint property of the parties. The extension of the patents originally granted to Sylla & Adams was made to the original patentees, and was assigned to Cornelius Aultman after the making of this agreement. But I am satisfied, upon a consideration of the design and object of the agreement and an examination of all its'details that such extension of one of the patents, owned by one or some of the parties when the agreement was made, and the acquisition thereof by assignment from the patentees, was not intended by the clause in question. It was not the purpose to change the title of the respective parties, but to bring the machines manufactured by either party or by their licensees, corresponding with the respective samples, under the operation of the agreement, and so to prevent competition among themselves, and provide a common fund, which might be availed of by either, to maintain their respective patents. The party of the second part was, perhaps, bound to treat all machines, made substantially like the sample machine during the ten years, as within the scope of the agreement, and could not avail themselves of the extension as a ground for withdrawing such machines therefrom. That was, in respect to the extension and the assignment to the complainant, the extent, at most; to which the other parties to the agreement could assert any interest in the extension. Besides, the patents which were to become-joint property were only those the purchase-of which was warranted by the agreement itself. Those were described in the previous ninth clause of the agreement—viz., patents deemed necessary for the protection of either machine, purchased upon joint consent, the-expense thereof being borne equally by the parties of the first and second part. It was to those patents that the thirteenth clause referred.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 F. Cas. 217, 11 Blatchf. 317, 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 534, 1873 U.S. App. LEXIS 1412, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aultman-v-holley-circtsdny-1873.