STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-05-246 j
KELLY DeCANIBRA, Individually and as Personal Representative of THE ESTATE OF LIONEL ST. HILAIRE,
Plaintiff
v. ORDER 0 ONAlD l. GARBRECHT lAW LIBRARY KIMBERLY CARSON, et al., SEP 07 2007 Defendants
This matter comes before the Court on Kimberly Carson's and Samantha
Carson's motion for summary judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). Following
hearing, the Motion is Granted.
BACKGROUND Plaintiff Kelly DeCambra (IDeCambra") of Biddeford, Maine is the personal
representative of the estate of her son, Lionel St. Hilaire ("St. Hilaire"). Defendants
Kimberly Carson and Samantha Carson ("the Carsons") reside in Hollis, Maine with
Defendant Chris Carter ("Carter"), Kimberly Carson's boyfriend. Joel Fenderson, in his
capacity as personal representative of the estate of his son, Zachary, is also a defendant.
Zachary Fenderson ("Fenderson") lived at the Carson home for approximately
six years because he was having family problems and was romantically involved with
Samantha Carson, Kimberly Carson's then 23-year-old daughter. Fenderson, who was
22 in 2004, had dated Carson since she was approximately 14 years old. The two
acquired a modular home together, but continued to live at Kimberly Carson's
residence because the new home did not yet have working utility services. Fenderson had struggled with depression over the years. Eventually, he went to
a physician, who recommended counseling and prescribed him medication. Fenderson
apparently took the medication, but did not seek counseling. By spring 2004, Fenderson
and Carson were experiencing relationship problems. In March or April of that year,
Fenderson attempted suicide. After that, the Carsons gave his gun collection to his
parents so that he would not have access to firearms. In the late spring of 2004, Carson
and Fenderson ended their relationship. Fenderson believed that Carson had been
seeing other men; she characterizes the problems as growing apart. Although
Fenderson moved out of the Carson residence and began staying in the modular home
with Carson's uncle, he retained access to Kimberly Carson's home.
By early July 2004, Samantha Carson had begun dating Lionel St. Hilaire. St.
Hilaire was with her at her residence on July 15, when Fenderson arrived. Carson
believed that Fenderson had consumed illegal drugs, including crack cocaine, but had
not been drinking. Upon meeting, the two men shook hands and had a casual
conversation. Following that conversation, shortly after 11:00 p.m., Samantha Carson
and St. Hilaire left together to visit her cousin. Fenderson left to see Mike Carson at the
modular home. The three apparently made tentative plans to meet back at the Carson
residence later that night to smoke marijuana. St. Hilaire and Carson returned to her
home at approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 16, as Kimberly Carson was sleeping.
Fenderson was in the basement at that time. He walked upstairs to the kitchen, where
Carson and St. Hilaire were sitting together. Fenderson shot St. Hilaire three times,
mortally wounding him, and then killed himself.
In August 2005, DeCambra, individually and as personal representative of St.
Hilaire's estate, filed this lawsuit against the Carsons, Chris Carter, and the Estate of
Zachary Fenderson, alleging negligence, (statutory) wrongful death, assault, battery,
2 and loss of comfort, society, and companionship. The Carsons' answer raised several
affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
comparative fault, and failure to mitigate damages. The Carsons now move for
summary judgment, contending that they owed no duty of care to St. Hilaire.
DISCUSSION
1. Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of material fact
such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c);
see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, CJI 4, 770 A.2d 653, 655. A genuine issue is
raised "when sufficient evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing
versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, CJI 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A
material fact is a fact that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v.
Sobus, 2000 ME 84, CJI 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute
must be resolved through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 :NIE 158, CJI 7, 784 A.2d 18,
22. At this stage, the facts are reviewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2003 ME 24, CJI 6,816 A.2d 63, 65.
2. Did the Carsons Owe Plaintiff's Decedent a Duty of Care?
A party has a duty of care when he or she "is under an obligation for the benefit
of a particular plaintiff." Quadrino v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 588 A.2d 303, 304
(Me. 1991). Whether a duty of care exists is a legal question. Pelletier v. Fort Kent Golf
Club, 662 A.2d 220, 222 (Me. 1995). When there is no such duty to the plaintiff, "[a]
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a negligence claim." Budzko v.
One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. Partn., 2001 :ME 37, CJI 10, 767 A.2d 310, 313. a. Foreseeability.
Here, the Carsons argue that neither of them owed St. Hilaire a duty of care
3 because they could not have foreseen that Fenderson would take St. Hilaire's life.
Nevertheless, DeCambra contends that because Fenderson still had access to their
home, and because St. Hilaire was an invitee, both Carsons owed St. Hilaire a duty of
care to warn him of Fenderson's dangerous propensities. DeCambra alleges that the
defendants were aware of Fenderson's drug use and instability but did nothing to
protect St. Hilaire.
In addition, DeCambra alleges that Fenderson had made threats about hanning
any male companion that Samantha Carson might have, making it foreseeable that he
would harm St. Hilaire. She relies on a decision in which the Law Court stated that
foreseeability of harm generates a duty to act with reasonable care. Brewer v. Roosevelt
Motor Lodge, 295 A.2d 647,651 (Me. 1972). In Brewer, a motel guest who was raped sued
the motel for not having adequate security measures and for failing to warn her that it
was not properly secured. ld. at 650. Focusing on foreseeability, the Court found that
the motel could not have foreseen that such a crime would occur and, therefore, did not
owe the guest a duty of care to prevent it. ld. at 652.
The Court reached a different result in a case involving a student who was
assaulted by a stranger in her donn room. Schultz v. Gould Academy, 332 A.2d 368, 370
(Me. 1975). In that case, there was evidence that could have led the school's night
watchman to suspect that an intruder had entered a donnitory, but the watchman did
not warn students. ld. at 370. The Court found that because the victim was a student,
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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-05-246 j
KELLY DeCANIBRA, Individually and as Personal Representative of THE ESTATE OF LIONEL ST. HILAIRE,
Plaintiff
v. ORDER 0 ONAlD l. GARBRECHT lAW LIBRARY KIMBERLY CARSON, et al., SEP 07 2007 Defendants
This matter comes before the Court on Kimberly Carson's and Samantha
Carson's motion for summary judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). Following
hearing, the Motion is Granted.
BACKGROUND Plaintiff Kelly DeCambra (IDeCambra") of Biddeford, Maine is the personal
representative of the estate of her son, Lionel St. Hilaire ("St. Hilaire"). Defendants
Kimberly Carson and Samantha Carson ("the Carsons") reside in Hollis, Maine with
Defendant Chris Carter ("Carter"), Kimberly Carson's boyfriend. Joel Fenderson, in his
capacity as personal representative of the estate of his son, Zachary, is also a defendant.
Zachary Fenderson ("Fenderson") lived at the Carson home for approximately
six years because he was having family problems and was romantically involved with
Samantha Carson, Kimberly Carson's then 23-year-old daughter. Fenderson, who was
22 in 2004, had dated Carson since she was approximately 14 years old. The two
acquired a modular home together, but continued to live at Kimberly Carson's
residence because the new home did not yet have working utility services. Fenderson had struggled with depression over the years. Eventually, he went to
a physician, who recommended counseling and prescribed him medication. Fenderson
apparently took the medication, but did not seek counseling. By spring 2004, Fenderson
and Carson were experiencing relationship problems. In March or April of that year,
Fenderson attempted suicide. After that, the Carsons gave his gun collection to his
parents so that he would not have access to firearms. In the late spring of 2004, Carson
and Fenderson ended their relationship. Fenderson believed that Carson had been
seeing other men; she characterizes the problems as growing apart. Although
Fenderson moved out of the Carson residence and began staying in the modular home
with Carson's uncle, he retained access to Kimberly Carson's home.
By early July 2004, Samantha Carson had begun dating Lionel St. Hilaire. St.
Hilaire was with her at her residence on July 15, when Fenderson arrived. Carson
believed that Fenderson had consumed illegal drugs, including crack cocaine, but had
not been drinking. Upon meeting, the two men shook hands and had a casual
conversation. Following that conversation, shortly after 11:00 p.m., Samantha Carson
and St. Hilaire left together to visit her cousin. Fenderson left to see Mike Carson at the
modular home. The three apparently made tentative plans to meet back at the Carson
residence later that night to smoke marijuana. St. Hilaire and Carson returned to her
home at approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 16, as Kimberly Carson was sleeping.
Fenderson was in the basement at that time. He walked upstairs to the kitchen, where
Carson and St. Hilaire were sitting together. Fenderson shot St. Hilaire three times,
mortally wounding him, and then killed himself.
In August 2005, DeCambra, individually and as personal representative of St.
Hilaire's estate, filed this lawsuit against the Carsons, Chris Carter, and the Estate of
Zachary Fenderson, alleging negligence, (statutory) wrongful death, assault, battery,
2 and loss of comfort, society, and companionship. The Carsons' answer raised several
affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
comparative fault, and failure to mitigate damages. The Carsons now move for
summary judgment, contending that they owed no duty of care to St. Hilaire.
DISCUSSION
1. Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of material fact
such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c);
see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, CJI 4, 770 A.2d 653, 655. A genuine issue is
raised "when sufficient evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing
versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, CJI 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A
material fact is a fact that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v.
Sobus, 2000 ME 84, CJI 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute
must be resolved through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 :NIE 158, CJI 7, 784 A.2d 18,
22. At this stage, the facts are reviewed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2003 ME 24, CJI 6,816 A.2d 63, 65.
2. Did the Carsons Owe Plaintiff's Decedent a Duty of Care?
A party has a duty of care when he or she "is under an obligation for the benefit
of a particular plaintiff." Quadrino v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 588 A.2d 303, 304
(Me. 1991). Whether a duty of care exists is a legal question. Pelletier v. Fort Kent Golf
Club, 662 A.2d 220, 222 (Me. 1995). When there is no such duty to the plaintiff, "[a]
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a negligence claim." Budzko v.
One City Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. Partn., 2001 :ME 37, CJI 10, 767 A.2d 310, 313. a. Foreseeability.
Here, the Carsons argue that neither of them owed St. Hilaire a duty of care
3 because they could not have foreseen that Fenderson would take St. Hilaire's life.
Nevertheless, DeCambra contends that because Fenderson still had access to their
home, and because St. Hilaire was an invitee, both Carsons owed St. Hilaire a duty of
care to warn him of Fenderson's dangerous propensities. DeCambra alleges that the
defendants were aware of Fenderson's drug use and instability but did nothing to
protect St. Hilaire.
In addition, DeCambra alleges that Fenderson had made threats about hanning
any male companion that Samantha Carson might have, making it foreseeable that he
would harm St. Hilaire. She relies on a decision in which the Law Court stated that
foreseeability of harm generates a duty to act with reasonable care. Brewer v. Roosevelt
Motor Lodge, 295 A.2d 647,651 (Me. 1972). In Brewer, a motel guest who was raped sued
the motel for not having adequate security measures and for failing to warn her that it
was not properly secured. ld. at 650. Focusing on foreseeability, the Court found that
the motel could not have foreseen that such a crime would occur and, therefore, did not
owe the guest a duty of care to prevent it. ld. at 652.
The Court reached a different result in a case involving a student who was
assaulted by a stranger in her donn room. Schultz v. Gould Academy, 332 A.2d 368, 370
(Me. 1975). In that case, there was evidence that could have led the school's night
watchman to suspect that an intruder had entered a donnitory, but the watchman did
not warn students. ld. at 370. The Court found that because the victim was a student,
she was a "business invitee" 1 and the watchman had a legal duty to take "such
measures as were reasonably necessary for her safety in light of all then existing
circumstances." ld.
1 Maine law no longer distinguishes between business and social invitees. 14 M.R.S.A. § 159 (2006).
4 DeCambra makes a similar argument for a duty of care to St. Hilaire, an invitee. In
this case, however, no duty arose by virtue of St. Hilaire's invitation into the Carson
home. The Carsons knew that Fenderson had struggled with depression, had at one
time been suicidal, and had exhibited frustration regarding the breakup, but such
knowledge does not generate a duty to protect or warn St. Hilaire. This is especially so
where St. Hilaire and Fenderson had met earlier in the evening and carried on a civil
conversation, despite the fact that Fenderson may have been upset. Although he later
declined an offer to smoke marijuana because he "wouldn't need it/I this comment does
not make it foreseeable that he was planning to end his life and St. Hilaire's.
Additionally, the Carsons apparently were not even aware that Fenderson had regained
access to his firearms.
Also, DeCambra makes a "latent defect" argument; in essence, she contends that,
like a latent defect on a person's property for which he or she would be responsible,
Fenderson's instability amounted to a latent defect of which the Carsons should have
been aware, creating a duty to warn. Fenderson may have been unstable, but that
would not necessarily have indicated to the Carsons that he was capable of killing
another person. Based on his prior behavior, it would have been more likely that
Fenderson would have committed suicide, and suicide attempts do not necessarily
translate into foreseeable, violent propensities toward others.2 As tragic as this incident
was, signs of troubled behavior did not make it foreseeable, and they do not legally
operate to impose a duty of care upon either of the Carsons.
b. Special relationship.
In addition, DeCambra also asserts that a "special relationship exists" which
2 In her deposition, Samantha Carson testified that she viewed the suicide attempt as a "cry for help," not as a sign of violence toward others.
5 created a duty to protect or warn. However, mere knowledge "that a third party is or
could be dangerous to others does not make that individual responsible for controlling
the third party or protecting others from the danger." Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Society of New York, 1999 ME 144, 1 12, 738 A.2d 839, 844. More recently, in the
context of a clergy sexual abuse case, the Court explained that "the general rule is that
an actor has no duty to protect others from harm caused by third parties," unless a
"special relationship exists." Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, 1
25, 871 A.2d 1208, 1217 (citations omitted). Examples of a special relationship include a
contractual or a student-teacher relationship. ld. 125 n.5, 871 A.2d at 1217 n.5.
When considering whether a special relationship existed in this case, the Court
does not consider whether the relationship between the Carsons and Fenderson was a
special relationship. The Court asks whether the relationship between Samantha
Carson and St. Hilaire was a special relationship that required Carson to warn him
about Fenderson. The short-lived relationship between St. Hilaire and Samantha
Carson is not the type of special relationship contemplated in Fortin or even in Schultz.
Whether or not it would have been wise for Carson to try to protect or warn St. Hilaire
on the facts presented, she was not legally required to warn or protect him.
CONCLUSION
The Carsons' Motion far Summary Judgment is Granted.
Dated: May Z:!1, 2007
Nicholas J. K. Mahoney, Esq. - PL Kenneth Pierce, Esq. - DEFS. KIMBERLY CARSON & SAMANTHA CARSON Chris Carter - DEF. (PRO SE)