Debellis v. Andrew Nash and James Flynn

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided October 28, 2019·No. 1:19-cv-08730·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ANTHONY F. DEBELLIS, aka GIANFRANCO, Plaintiff, -against- 19-CV-8730 (CM) P.O. SOLOMAN Shield 15004; SGT. GILBERT Shield 3452; JUAN ORDER TO AMEND O’SULLIVAN; BERNARD MONAHAN; ALIPIO ALDARONDO; DANIELLE KOVES; ERICK HICKS; NYPD; NY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Rikers Island, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated October 8, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The complaint contains the following allegations.2 Plaintiff was arrested in Bronx County on July 23, 2017. After a jury trial, he was acquitted on April 4, 2019. At the time of his arrest, Plaintiff had been an employee of the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) for fifteen years. Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely accused of stealing city

property, and although he was acquitted, he was fired from his job. Plaintiff asserts claims of wrongful arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, wrongful termination, and defamation. Named as Defendants are Police Officer Soloman; Police Sergeant Gilbert; employees of the New York City Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (DOITT) Juan O’Sullivan and Bernard Monahan; DCAS custodian Alipio Aldarondo, DCAS Disciplinary Counsel Erick Hicks; the New York County Assistant District Attorney’s Office; Assistant District Attorney Danielle Koves; and the New York Police Department. Plaintiff seeks a written apology and money damages. DISCUSSION A. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

2 Plaintiff filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York; that court transferred the matter here. See Debellis v. Solomon, ECF 1:19-CV-4408 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019). Plaintiff recently filed another case in this Court. Debellis v. Massing, 1:19-CV-7834, 1 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 21, 2019). A claim for false arrest under § 1983 incorporates the elements of a false arrest claim under state law. See Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2003). To establish a false arrest claim under New York law, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Liranzo v.

United States, 690 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2012). An arrest is privileged if it is based on probable cause. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.”) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The tort of malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389- 90 (2007). To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) that the defendant initiated or continued a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant lacked probable cause to commence the proceeding or believe the proceeding could

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