DeBartolo v. Healthsouth Corp.

569 F.3d 736, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 13921, 2009 WL 1811757
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJune 26, 2009
Docket07-1272
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 569 F.3d 736 (DeBartolo v. Healthsouth Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeBartolo v. Healthsouth Corp., 569 F.3d 736, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 13921, 2009 WL 1811757 (7th Cir. 2009).

Opinion

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Hansel DeBartolo, a surgeon, is a limited partner in an ambulatory surgical center managed by the general partner, Surgicare of Joliet, Inc. When DeBartolo failed to certify that his practice at the facility met the threshold mandated by the partnership agreement, Surgicare notified him that it was exercising a clause in the agreement allowing it to buy out his interest. DeBartolo balked and brought this federal action against Surgicare, its parent company, and the partnership, claiming that the term of the partnership agreement requiring him to conduct one-third of his surgical practice at the center violates federal criminal law and cannot be enforced. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, but because this litigation is simply a state-law contract dispute between non-diverse parties, we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I.

The Medicare and Medicaid Patient Program Protection Act of 1987, see Pub.L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680, recodified and strengthened existing criminal prohibitions against paying physicians to refer patients for medical services that might be covered by Medicare or Medicaid. When Congress debated this legislation, however, some healthcare providers expressed concern that it swept too broadly and would crimi *738 nalize even innocuous fee arrangements. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed.Reg. 63,518, 63,518 (Nov. 19, 1999); S. REP. No. 100-109, at 27 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 682, 707-08. Consequently, the updated statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b), commonly known as the Anti-Kickback Act, see McNutt ex rel. United States v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.2005), includes a “safe harbor” exception for any payment practice authorized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, see Pub.L. No. 100-93, § 14(a), (b)(3), 101 Stat. 680 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(E)).

In 1999 the Secretary of HHS used that safe-harbor authority to permit some payments from ambulatory surgical centers to qualified physician-investors. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs, 64 Fed.Reg. at 63,534 (now codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(r)). Ambulatory surgical centers are non-hospital facilities equipped with operating and recovery rooms where physicians perform outpatient surgeries and other procedures. See Ambulatory Surgery Center Association, Frequently Asked Questions About Ambulatory Surgery Centers, http:// ascassociation.org/faqs/faqaboutascs/ (last visited May 28, 2009). HHS was concerned that physician ownership of ambulatory surgical centers could lead to violations of the Anti-Kickback Act because the promise of higher dividends (which would presumably be roughly proportional to the number of patients using the center) could provide a financial incentive for physician-owners to refer patients to the center. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs, 64 Fed.Reg. at 63,536-37. Indeed, a facility might even offer shares to physicians precisely so that it could buy referrals through the guise of dividends. Id. at 63,536. At the same time, however, HHS also acknowledged that ambulatory surgical centers could legitimately serve as an extension of the office practice of physicians who would invest for practical reasons, including physical proximity and a desire to maintain quality control, and for those investor-physicians, the risk that dividends would induce improper referrals was low. Id. at 63,534-37. The Secretary of HHS therefore crafted safe-harbor conditions designed to authorize ambulatory surgical centers to make payments to physician-investors who use the center as an extension of their office practice. Id.

Four categories of ambulatory surgical centers received safe-harbor status, each with slightly different requirements. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(r)(1)-(4). The parties agree that the facility in Joliet, Illinois, owned by the partnership and managed by Surgicare is a multi-specialty center and, hence, that 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(r)(3) provides the relevant safe harbor. That section reserves safe-harbor status for payments to physician-owners who earn at least one-third of their medical income from performing Medicare-approved procedures and who perform at least one-third of those procedures at the center. Id. § 1001.952(r)(3)(ii), (iii), (r)(5). These two thresholds, collectively known as the “one-third/one-third” test, are designed to ensure that the physician-investor uses the center as an extension of his or her office practice, and not as an engine for illegal referral-based compensation. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs, 64 Fed.Reg. at 63,534-35.

In 2004 the owners of the Joliet facility sought shelter in this safe harbor and amended their partnership agreement to require that physician-investors certify annually that they are meeting the “one-third/one-third” test. Another amendment *739 compelled noncompliant physician-investors to sell out to Surgieare or other partners. DeBartolo had bought into the partnership (through a trust he controls) in 1981 for $250,000, and had practiced at the center for many years. Then in 2001 he lost his surgical privileges at the center and never again performed a procedure there. He still received dividends, although, including $91,000 in 2004, but after the partnership agreement was amended, he was unable to certify that his practice met the “one-third/one-third” test. And when DeBartolo did not vouch for his safe-harbor eligibility, Surgieare exercised its right to buy out his interest and sent him a check representing the cost of his shares and his portion of undistributed dividends.

DeBartolo refused the money and initiated this action in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief. He argued that the 2004 amendment requiring physician-investors to conduct one-third of their surgical practice at the center, although written to track the safe-harbor regulation, see 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(r)(3)(iii), cannot be reconciled with a different safe-harbor limitation, which mandates that the “terms on which an investment interest is offered to an investor must not be related to the previous or expected volume of referrals, services furnished, or the amount of business otherwise generated from that investor to the entity,” id. § 1001.952(r)(3)(i).

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569 F.3d 736, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 13921, 2009 WL 1811757, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/debartolo-v-healthsouth-corp-ca7-2009.