Deaton v. Commonwealth

163 S.W. 204, 157 Ky. 308, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 287
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedFebruary 6, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 163 S.W. 204 (Deaton v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Deaton v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W. 204, 157 Ky. 308, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 287 (Ky. Ct. App. 1914).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Miller

Affirming.

While in his store on Long’s Creek, a tributary of the Middle Fork of the Kentucky River, and about 20 miles from the town of Jackson, in Breathitt County, Ed Callahan was, on May 4,1912, shot and killed by persons concealed on a wooded hillside in front of his store building, and 156 yards therefrom.

The appellant, D. F. Deaton, commonly called “Fletch” Deaton, and Dan Deaton, James Deaton, Dock Smith, Elisha Smith, Asberry McIntosh, Andrew John[310]*310son, Abe Johnson, Billy Johnson, (Abe’s son) Willie Johnson (John’s son), Grovan Smith, Robert Deaton, (Tom’s son), Bill Deaton, John Clear and Tom Deaton (Bill’s son), were jointly indicted for the murder. The indictment charged the defendants as principals and as conspirators.

On motion of the Commonwealth the venue was changed from Breathitt County to Clark County, where separate trials, were had.

In January, 1913, the appellant, “Fletch” Deaton was tried in the Clark Circuit Court, the trial resulting, however, in a hung jury. At the same term of the court, Andrew Johnson and Dock Smith were tried, and the jury in each case failed to agree. Upon a second trial in August, 1913, the appellant ‘ ‘ Fletch ’ ’ Deaton was found guilty and given a life sentence in the penitentiary. Pie appeals.

1. Appellant’s first ground for a reversal is, that the jury was improperly selected. After the mistrials of Andrew Johnson, Dock Smith, and the appellant in January, 1913, the circuit judge, being satisfied from the experience of those trials that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to obtain a jury in Clark County that would be free from bias, ordered the deputy sheriff of Clark County to summon a special venire of ninety legally qualified jurors from the adjoining county of Madison, for the second trial of appellant. This, the circuit court had the right to do. Hargis v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky., 578; Daniel v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky., 605.

It appears, however, that while the presiding judge was holding the May Term 1913 of the Madisen Circuit Court he learned from the deputy clerk of that court that the jury list drawn from the jury wheel for grand and petit jury service in Madison County in February, 1913, containing sixty names, and the list of the same number drawn from the wheel for jury service in May, 1913, in that court, had been preserved; and, upon their being • produced by the deputy clerk, the whole of the May list and thirty names from the February list, making a total of ninety names, were copied and left with the deputy clerk, who was instructed to deliver said list to the sheriff of Clark County when he should come to [311]*311Madison Connty to summon jurors for the second trial of appellant. When the deputy sheriff went to Madison County pursuant to the order above referred to to summon the extra venireman, he was verbally instructed by the circuit judge to call upon the deputy circuit court clerk of Madison County and get the list of ninety names above referred to, and to summon the persons therein named for service in the trial of appellant. The deputy sheriff followed the judge’s instruction, and summoned the ninety men named in the list; and from this number the jury was selected for the trial of appellant. It is insisted that this method of selecting a jury is wholly unknown to the law, was improper, and highly prejudicial to appellant’s rights.

There is no statute directing, the summoning officer how he shall discharge his duty in selecting jurors from another county. The common law rule is laid down in 24 Cyc., 208, as follows:

“At Common law there was no prior selection of a jury list by persons other than the summoning officer, but the sheriff or other officer selected as he summoned. The practice led to many abuses, and has now to a considerable extent been modified by statute in England, and practically done away with in this country.”

The common law method of leaving it to the sheriff to secure the jury has been changed in this State by statute, providing the method of selecting jurors through jury commissioners, leaving it to the sheriff merely to summon those selected by the jury commissioners. As there is no statute, however, covering the case where the sheriff is directed to summon extra talesmen from an adjoining county, the common law method of selecting the jury necessarily becomes operative.

Appellant’s motion to quash the panel, and also to discharge the jury before it had been sworn, were overruled, and the trial proceeded before a jury selected from the talesmen summoned from Madison County in the manner above indicated.

It is insisted, however, by the Commonwealth that this action of the circuit judge on motions to discharge the jury or to discharge the panel, are not reviewable by this court.

[312]*312Section 281 of the Criminal Code of Practice, reads as follows:

“The decisions of the court upon challenges to the panel, and for cause* or upon motions to set aside an indictment, shall not be subject to exception.”

Under this section as it now stands, and as it formerly read before it was amended in 1910, this court has held in a long line of decisions, beginning- with Adwell v. Commonwealth, 17 B. M., 316, decided in 1856, and ending with Daniel v. Comomnwealth, 154 Ky., 605, decided in 1913, that the decisions of the circuit court upon challenges to the panel and for cause, or upon motion to set aside an indictment, are not subject to exception and are not reviewable by this court.

In Daniel v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky., 606, one of the grounds relied on for a reversal was the act of the circuit judge in summoning a jury from an adjoining county; and in holding that this court had no power to review that action of the trial judge, under section 281 of the Criminal Code as it now stands, this court said:

“But, it is insisted that by the act of the Legislature, approved March 23, 1910 (Acts 1910, Chap. 92), section 281 of the Criminal Code, was so amended as to authorize this court to consider and pass upon the correctness of the court’s ruling in impaneling a jury. Section 281, as amended by the act of 1910, provides: ‘The decisions of the court upon challenges to the panel and for cause, or upon motion to set aside an indictment, shall not be subject to exception.’ Prior to the adoption of this amendment, this court was without authority to pass upon the correctness of the court’s ruling upon a motion for a new trial. By this amendment, the words ‘and upon motions for a new trial’ were stricken from section 281, thereby giving to this court power to review the action of the trial court in passing upon a motion for a new trial. There remained, however, the inhibition against the right of’ this court to review the action of the trial court in the formation of the jury.”

This authority is conclusive of the question before us: and while the action of the trial judge in selecting the jurymen himself instead of leaving it to the sheriff, was not proper, it is not reviewable.

[313]

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Bluebook (online)
163 S.W. 204, 157 Ky. 308, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 287, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/deaton-v-commonwealth-kyctapp-1914.