Dean v. Rampton

556 P.2d 205, 1976 Utah LEXIS 934

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Decided: October 21, 1976
• Docket: 14518
• Status: Published

Opinions

CROCKETT, Justice:

Plaintiffs, members of the Forty-first Legislature (1975) brought this action to test the validity of subsection (3) of Sec. 63-2-15, U.C.A.1953, quoted below, as applicable to their claims for expenses incurred in attending the national convention of State Legislatures in Philadelphia in October, 1975. They submitted their claims to the State Auditor, who in turn referred them to the defendant Board of Examiners (herein Board). The Board refused to authorize payment of the claims because they had not been submitted for prior approval as prescribed by that statute. Plaintiffs filed this suit in the District Court to compel payment of the claims. Upon an agreed statement of facts the parties each moved for a summary judgment. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendants appeal.

The issue confronted here concerns the interpretation, application, and priority to be given the statute referred to as compared to our constitutional provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, which states:

Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General shall constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners [etc.] . . . They shall, also, constitute a Board of Examiners, with power to examine all claims against the State except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim against the State, except for salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the Legislature without having been considered and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners.

Subsection (3) of Sec. 63-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, relied upon by the plaintiffs states:

Reimbursement for other travel expenses incurred. No obligation shall be incurred for travel outside of the state without the advance approval of the board of examiners through the director of finance. Such approval shall consist of a certification as to the availability of funds as well as a review of the necessity and desirability of such travel. This section shall not apply to the legislature, its committees, or any member or employee of same.

In reference to that statute, it should be acknowledged that under our system the legislature, representing the people, indeed has all of the fundamental power of the sovereign to make whatever laws it deems proper for the general welfare.¹ But even that power is not without limit. The purpose of a constitution is to provide an orderly foundation for government and to keep even the sovereign (as applicable here, the people through their legislature) within its bounds. Therefore, the legislative power itself must be exercised within the framework of the constitution. Accordingly, it has been so long established and universally recognized, as to be hardly necessary to state, that if a statutory enactment contravenes any provision of the constitution, the latter governs.²

There is no question but that the general purpose of the above statute is salutary and in harmony with the constitution, but the serious question arises as to its last sentence, which purports to exempt members of the legislature and its employees from its requirement. To be weighed against that provision we must consider the effect to be given Sec. 13 of Article VII of our Constitution quoted above. It has been the subject of controversy before this Court in a number of cases.³ In that series of cases it has been reasoned that, in looking at the structure of our state government as provided in our state constitution, the examination of claims as an auditing function was intended to be performed by the state auditor; and that the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII, which gives the three major constitutional officers, the governor, the secretary of state, and the attorney general “power to examine all claims against the State except salaries' or compensation of officers fixed by law . . . intended something beyond the mere auditing of claims: that is, for reasons explained therein, which need no repetition here, some supervisory control over claims against the State other than those .expressly excepted.⁴

In the case of Uintah State Bank v. Ajax,5 which dealt with the payment of bounties for killing predatory animals (coyotes) from a fund which had been appropriated to that purpose, the court said, “the claims here are not fixed by law in the sense that the Legislature has made an appropriation of an amount certain to a definite named person.” And further, that under the constitutional provision “all claims are subject to action by the board of examiners, except only claims for ‘salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law.’ ” Similarly here, while there has been a general appropriation for travel expenses, there has been no appropriation for an amount certain to a definite named person which could be classified as either salary or compensation fixed by law. (All emphases in this opinion are ours.)

The general principle underlying the constitutional provision referred to and the application thereof as explained in the adjudicated cases thereon is that the Board of Examiners performs the function of safeguarding against possible excesses or abuses in the disbursement of public funds. We say with emphasis that it is not suggested here that there is any excess or abuse in these particular claims. But the principle embodied in this constitutional provision, that there be such a safeguard, applies to anyone who asserts a claim against the State, even by a member of the legislature itself, except only the specific exception therein for salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law.

The law as so grounded upon that constitutional provision and as developed in the cited decisions thereon has been the established law of this State for many decades. It contains no exemption of members of the legislature or anyone else. It should be regarded, as it has been, as a valid and effective part of the constitutional structure of our state government which no statute can repudiate or supersede.

It is appropriate to advert to this thought: If the legislature can exempt itself and its employees from the requirement of this constitutional provision, then where would be the restraint from exempting themselves, or others, from any other constitutional provision.

In accordance with what we have said herein it is our opinion that insofar as subsection (3) of Section 63-2-15, U.C.A. 1953, purports to exempt members of the legislature from submitting the claims in question to the Board of Examiners it is in conflict with Section 13, Article VII, of our Constitution, and in that particular it is invalid; and that as a predicate to they payment of any such claims it is necessary that the plaintiffs submit them to the Board of Examiners for approval.⁶ No costs awarded.

HENRIOD, C. J., MAUGHAN, J., and GEORGE E. BALLIF, District Judge, concur.

1 . See Statement in Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 516.

2 . Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60; State v. Betensen, 14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669.

3 . E. g. State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 P. 720 (1908); Thoreson v. State Bd. of Examiners, 21 Utah 187, 60 P. 982 (1900); Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913); Dall v. State, 42 Utah 498, 184 P. 632 (1913); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm., 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 (1937); Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958); Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964).

4 . See Toronto v. Clyde, footnote 3 above, 15 Utah 2d at 405, 393 P.2d 795.

5 . 77 Utah 455, 297 P. 434.

6 . It should be noted that we do not here confront the question as to the prerogative of the full legislature to act upon these claims subsequent to action upon them by the Board of Examiners. That matter is dealt with in the case of Wood v. Budge, footnote 1 above.