15‐423‐cv Dean Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2015
(Argued: November 30, 2015 Decided: August 25, 2016)
Docket No. 15‐423‐cv
DEAN NICOSIA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
AMAZON.COM, INC.,
Defendant‐Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Before: SACK, CHIN, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Townes, J.), dismissing plaintiffʹs complaint for
failure to state a claim on the grounds that plaintiffʹs claims are subject to
mandatory arbitration and denying plaintiffʹs motion for a preliminary
injunction for lack of standing. We affirm the district courtʹs denial of plaintiffʹs
motion for a preliminary injunction, but vacate the dismissal for failure to state a
claim and remand for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.
JOSEPH SETH TUSA, Tusa P.C., Southold, New York, Peter D. St. Phillip, Jr., Scott V. Papp, Lowey Dannenberg Cohen & Hart, P.C., White Plains, New York, Timothy G. Blood, Paula M. Roach, Blood Hurst & OʹReardon, LLP, San Diego, California, and Gregory S. Duncan, Esq., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Plaintiff‐Appellant.
GREGORY T. PARKS, Ezra D. Church, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Regina Schaffer‐Goldman, Mary Claire Dekar, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, New York, New York, for Defendant‐Appellee.
CHIN, Circuit Judge:
In 2013, plaintiff‐appellant Dean Nicosia purchased 1 Day Diet, a
weight loss product containing sibutramine, a controlled substance that had been
removed from the market in October 2010, on the website of defendant‐appellee
Amazon.com, Inc. (ʺAmazonʺ). Nicosia brought this action below, asserting
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claims u under the Consumerr Product S Safety Act (the ʺCPSAʺ), 15 U.S S.C. § 20511 et
seq., and d state law w.
The d district cou urt (Townees, J.) dism missed the ccomplaintt on the
ground d that the p parties are b bound by the mandaatory arbittration pro ovision in
Amazon nʹs Condittions of Usse. It found d that Nico osia was o on construcctive notice of
the term ms and tha at he assentted to man ndatory arb rbitration w when he pllaced his
order on n the webssite. In thee same meemorandum m and ord der, the district court
treated Nicosiaʹs m ary injuncttive relief aas a motio motion forr prelimina on for a
nary injun prelimin nction in aiid of arbitrration, and d denied th he motion on the gro ound
that he lacked standing to seek an inju unction blo ocking Am mazon from m selling
items co ontaining ssibutramin ne and req quiring Am mazon to seend remed dial noticess to
consum mers.
We a affirm the d district cou urtʹs deniaal of injuncctive relief,, vacate thee
dismisssal for failu ure to statee a claim, a and reman nd for furth her proceedings.
BACK KGROUND D
I. The Facts T
A. A As Alleged in tthe Compla aint
Amazon customer. O Nicosia is an A On both Jan nuary 30 aand April 119,
2013, hee used the Amazon w website to purchase 1 Day Diett (One Dayy Diet) Best
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Slimming Capsule 60 Pills (ʺ1 Day Dietʺ), a weight loss drug containing
sibutramine. Sibutramine is a Schedule IV stimulant that was withdrawn from
the market in October 2010 by the Food and Drug Administration (the ʺFDAʺ)
because its association with cardiovascular risks and strokes outweighed its
limited weight loss value. Prior to the FDAʹs removal of sibutramine from the
market, it was only available to consumers with a doctorʹs prescription. After its
removal, the FDA advised physicians to stop prescribing sibutramine and to
advise patients to cease its consumption due to its risks, including ʺmajor
adverse cardiovascular events.ʺ1
At the time of his purchase, Nicosia did not know that 1 Day Diet
contained sibutramine and he did not have a doctorʹs prescription. Sibutramine
was not listed as an ingredient on Amazonʹs website or on the 1 Day Diet
packaging, and Amazon sold the product without requiring a prescription. It
was only revealed in November 2013 by the FDA that 1 Day Diet contained
sibutramine.
Amazon has since stopped selling 1 Day Diet but never notified
Nicosia that 1 Day Diet contained the stimulant or offered to refund his
1U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA Drug Safety Communication: FDA Recommends Against the Continued Use of Meridia (sibutramine) (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm228746.htm.
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purchasses. As of the filing o of the com mplaint in JJuly 2014, A Amazon continued tto
sell otheer weight lloss produ ucts identiffied by thee FDA as ccontaining undisclosed
amountts of sibutrramine.
B. B Addiitional Facctual Asserrtions
In mo dismiss the complain oving to d n submitted a nt, Amazon
declarattion of a paralegal in n its legal d departmen nt, who rep presented that
Amazon nʹs recordss showed tthat Nicosia used an n Amazon account crreated on JJune
9, 2008 to make hiis purchasses and tha at the purcchases werre made in January aand
013. Attacched to thee declaratio April 20 on was a sccreenshot of Amazo onʹs accoun nt
registra ation webp page apparrently in usse in 2008,, bearing aa copyrightt notice daated
ʺ1996‐20 014ʺ (the ʺRegistratio d a screenshot on Pageʺ). The declaaration also attached
of Ama azonʹs ordeer page, beearing a copyright no otice dated d ʺ1996‐20114ʺ; a
customer purchassing an item m in 2013 apparently y would h have seen tthis screen
before ccompleting g a purcha ase. Amazon later su d version of ubmitted aa corrected
the ordeer page, allso bearing g a copyrig ght notice d dated ʺ19996‐2014ʺ (th he ʺOrder
Pageʺ).2
2 The eearlier versiion was sub bmitted in eerror, as it d depicted ann order screeen for ʺprodducts manu ufactured bby Amazon,, rather than n productss sold by thiird parties.ʺ J. App. 88. Copies off the Registrration Pagee and the O Order Page aare each rep produced aas Addend dum A and Addendum m B, respecttively.
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The Registration Page and the Order Page both included a link to
Amazonʹs ʺConditions of Use.ʺ The Amazon declaration provided a copy of the
conditions of use apparently in effect in 2013, when Nicosia made his purchases,
as they were last updated December 5, 2012 (ʺ2012 Conditions of Useʺ). They
included the following mandatory arbitration provision:
Any dispute or claim relating in any way to your use of any Amazon Service, or to any products or services sold or distributed by Amazon or through Amazon.com will be resolved by binding arbitration, rather than in court . . . . We each agree that any dispute resolution proceedings will be conducted only on an individual basis and not in a class, consolidated or representative action.
J. App. 20‐21 (emphases omitted).
In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Nicosia challenged
Amazonʹs assertions that he had registered for an Amazon account. He also
introduced a copy of Amazonʹs prior conditions of use, which his counsel
contended were in place in 2008 (ʺ2008 Conditions of Useʺ). These did not
include an arbitration provision, but merely included a choice of forum clause
designating ʺany state or federal court in King County, Washington,ʺ as the
forum with exclusive jurisdiction and venue over consumer claims exceeding
$7,500. J. App. 50.
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II. Procedural History
Nicosia brought this putative class action below against Amazon,
alleging that Amazon had sold and was continuing to sell weight loss products
containing sibutramine to its customers in violation of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2051‐89, and state consumer protection laws. He alleged additional claims for
breach of implied warranty and unjust enrichment. The complaint sought both
damages and an injunction to prohibit Amazon from further sale of products
containing sibutramine.
After suit was filed, Amazon informed the district court that it
intended to move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Nicosia was
subject to Amazonʹs mandatory arbitration provision. The district court stayed
discovery pending resolution of Amazonʹs anticipated motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 2014, Nicosia sought reconsideration of the district
courtʹs stay of discovery with respect to ʺsubjects put at issue by Defendantʹs
requested motions to dismiss Plaintiffʹs individual claims and to compel
arbitration.ʺ Pl.ʹs Ltr. 1, ECF No. 23. Nicosia requested discovery concerning his
ʺindividual purchases of 1 Day Diet . . . from Amazon, and discovery supporting
Amazonʹs claims that Plaintiff provided his individual consent to arbitrate his
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claims made in this action.ʺ Id. at 2. The district court denied Nicosiaʹs motion
for reconsideration of the discovery stay, clarifying that ʺall discovery in this
action is temporarily stayed pending resolution of the motion to dismiss,ʺ but
ruling that ʺ[t]o the extent limited discovery becomes necessary in connection
with a factual dispute in the anticipated motion to dismiss, Plaintiff may then
submit proposed narrowly‐tailored and specific requests to the Court for
approval prior to propounding any such request.ʺ Special App. 4.
Nicosia moved for preliminary injunctive relief on December 19,
2014, requesting an order enjoining Amazon from selling weight loss products
containing sibutramine and requiring Amazon to provide remedial notices to
past consumers of those products.
On December 24, 2014, Amazon moved to dismiss the complaint.
Amazon did not move to compel arbitration, but instead argued that the
complaint should be dismissed ʺin favor of individual arbitrationʺ for failure to
state a claim because Nicosia had agreed to arbitration. Mot. to Dismiss 5, ECF
No. 52‐1. Amazon submitted the declaration and the exhibits described above.
The district court granted Amazonʹs motion to dismiss, concluding
that Nicosia failed to state a claim because he was on constructive notice of
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Amazonʹs conditions of use. In doing so, the district court relied on the Order
Page and the 2012 Conditions of Use as well as Amazonʹs assertion that Nicosia
created an Amazon account in 2008 by signing on through the Registration Page,
and used that account to make his purchases of 1 Day Diet. The district court
then concluded that Nicosia was given reasonable notice of the conditions of use
given: (1) the conspicuousness of the hyperlink to the 2012 Conditions of Use on
the Order Page; and (2) the fact that Nicosia signed up for an Amazon account
via the Registration Page in 2008, which required assent to the 2008 Conditions of
Use that named King County as the forum for suit but provided that the
conditions were subject to change.
The district court also concluded that questions as to the validity of
the agreement as a whole had to be submitted to arbitration. After
acknowledging that courts generally consider the merits of requested injunctive
relief even where the underlying claims will be sent to arbitration, the district
court then held that Nicosia lacked standing to pursue a preliminary injunction,
and that, in any event, he could not obtain this relief because he did not
demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his CPSA claim.
This appeal followed.
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DIS SCUSSION N
We cconsider firrst the disttrict courtʹss grant of Amazonʹss motion to o
dismisss and secon nd its deniial of Nicossiaʹs motio on for a preeliminary injunction n.
I. The Motion T n to Dismiiss
A. A Appllicable Law w
The p principal isssue preseented is wh hether Niccosia is bou und by thee
mandattory arbitra ation prov vision in Amazonʹs C Procedural and Conditionss of Use. P
substan ntive questtions of law w are impllicated.
1. Procedurral Framew work
The F Federal Arrbitration A Act (the ʺF vides that ʺ[a] writteen FAAʺ) prov
provisio on in . . . a contract . . . to settlee by arbitraation a con ntroversy tthereafter
arising out of [thee] contract . . . shall b be valid, irrrevocable,, and enforrceable.ʺ 99
U.S.C. § § 2. The Su upreme Co ourt has reepeatedly iinstructed that the FAA
ʺembod d[ies] [a] na ational pollicy favorin ng arbitrattion.ʺ AT& &T Mobilitty LLC v.
Concepccion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 6 (2011) (seecond alteeration in o original) (q quoting
Buckeyee Check Cashing, Inc. v v. Cardegnaa, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (22006)). ʺ[T T]his policy y is
founded d on a desire to preserve the partiesʹ abillity to agreee to arbitrrate, ratherr
than litiigate, disp putes.ʺ Sch hnabel v. Trrilegiant Coorp., 697 F.33d 110, 1188 (2d Cir.
2012). B But the FA AA ʺdoes n not require parties to arbitrate w when they y have not
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agreed to do so.ʺ Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
The question of whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate, i.e., the
ʺquestion of arbitrability,ʺ is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); see also Bensadoun v. Jobe‐Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir.
2003). ʺThis principle ʹflow[s] inexorably from the fact that arbitration is simply a
matter of contract between the parties.ʹʺ Wachovia Bank, Natʹl Assʹn v. VCG
Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)). The threshold
question of whether the parties indeed agreed to arbitrate is determined by state
contract law principles. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 27 (2d Cir.
2002).
The question of arbitrability usually arises in the context of a motion
to compel arbitration. Under the FAA, parties can petition the district court for
an order directing that ʺarbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement.ʺ 9 U.S.C. § 4. The district court must stay proceedings once it is
ʺsatisfied that the parties have agreed in writing to arbitrate an issue or issues
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underlying the district court proceeding.ʺ WorldCrisa Corp. v. Armstrong, 129 F.3d
71, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting McMahan Sec. Co. v. Forum Capital Mkts. L.P., 35
F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1994)). In deciding motions to compel, courts apply a
ʺstandard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment.ʺ
Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175. The summary judgment standard requires a court to
ʺconsider all relevant, admissible evidence submitted by the parties and
contained in pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with . . . affidavits.ʺ Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147,
155 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the court must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non‐moving party. See Wachovia
Bank, 661 F.3d at 171‐72.
ʺIf there is an issue of fact as to the making of the agreement for
arbitration, then a trial is necessary.ʺ Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175 (citing 9 U.S.C.
§ 4 (ʺIf the making of the arbitration agreement . . . be in issue, the court shall
proceed summarily to the trial thereof.ʺ)); accord Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v.
Clarendon Natʹl Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 2001). ʺ[B]ut where the
undisputed facts in the record require the matter of arbitrability to be decided
against one side or the other as a matter of law, we may rule on the basis of that
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legal issue and ʹavoid the need for further court proceedings.ʹʺ Wachovia Bank,
661 F.3d at 172 (quoting Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175).
In this case, Amazon did not move to compel arbitration and instead
moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, relying on the arbitration provision in
the 2012 Conditions of Use. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Some district courts in
this Circuit have treated motions to dismiss based on mandatory arbitration
clauses as motions to compel arbitration. See, e.g., Begonja v. Vornado Realty Tr.,
No. 15 Civ. 4665 (PAE), 2016 WL 356090, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2016); Cupples
v. Valic Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 13‐CV‐4501(JS)(AKT), 2014 WL 4662272, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014); Jillian Mech. Corp. v. United Serv. Workers Union Local
355, 882 F. Supp. 2d 358, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). The district court here, however,
specifically declined to do so because, it reasoned, Amazon had not explicitly or
implicitly asked the court to order arbitration. We agree with the district court
that because Amazonʹs motion to dismiss neither sought an order compelling
arbitration nor indicated that Amazon would seek to force Nicosia to arbitrate in
the future, it was proper not to construe the motion to dismiss as a motion to
compel arbitration, to which the summary judgment standard would apply.
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Nicosia argues that the district court erred in not construing
Amazonʹs motion as a motion to compel arbitration, citing Bensadoun v. Jobe‐Riat,
316 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003). There, we held that it was ʺappropriateʺ to use the
ʺsummary judgment standard . . . in cases where the District Court is required to
determine arbitrability, regardless of whether the relief sought is an order to
compel arbitration or to prevent arbitration.ʺ Id. at 175. We did not, however,
hold that the summary judgment standard was ʺmandatoryʺ in such cases.
When the moving party does not manifest an intention to arbitrate the dispute,
Bensadoun does not require the district court to convert the motion to dismiss to
one to compel. Here, given the absence of a clear indication of Amazonʹs intent
to compel Nicosia to arbitrate, the district court properly proceeded with the
motion as one to dismiss, without converting it to a motion to compel
arbitration.3 Accordingly, we review the district courtʹs ruling as the grant of a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations as
3 We do not decide whether, in the absence of an indication of an intent on the part of the movant to compel arbitration, the district court has discretion to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion to compel. We hold only that the district court did not err in not converting under the circumstances here.
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true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffʹs favor. Chen v. Major
League Baseball Props., Inc., 798 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2015). ʺTo survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
ʹstate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.ʹʺ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A complaint ʺis deemed to include any written instrument attached
to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by
reference.ʺ Chambers, 282 F.3d at 152 (quoting Intʹl Audiotext Network, Inc. v.
AT&T Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)); see also Brass v. Am. Film
Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993). ʺWhere a document is not
incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the
complaint ʹrelies heavily upon its terms and effect,ʹ thereby rendering the
document ʹintegralʹ to the complaint.ʺ DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d
104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d
Cir. 2006)); see also Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153. A ʺnecessary prerequisiteʺ for
taking into account materials extraneous to the complaint ʺis that the ʹplaintiff
rely on the terms and effect of the document in drafting the complaint; mere
notice or possession is not enough.ʹʺ Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New
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York, 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted) (quoting Chambers, 282
F.3d at 153). This generally occurs when the material considered is a ʺcontract or
other legal document containing obligations upon which the plaintiffʹs complaint
stands or falls, but which for some reason ‐‐ usually because the document, read
in its entirety, would undermine the legitimacy of the plaintiffʹs claim ‐‐ was not
attached to the complaint.ʺ Id. at 157.
Even where a document is considered ʺʹintegralʹ to the complaint, it
must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or
accuracy of the document.ʺ DiFolco, 622 F.3d at 111 (quoting Faulkner v. Beer, 463
F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006)). ʺIt must also be clear that there exist no material
disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.ʺ Faulkner, 463
F.3d at 134. This principle is driven by a concern that a plaintiff may lack notice
that the material will be considered to resolve factual matters. See Cortec Indus.,
Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991). Thus, if material is not
integral to or otherwise incorporated in the complaint, it may not be considered
unless the motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment
and all parties are ʺgiven a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that
is pertinent to the motion.ʺ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
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um, when iit is appareent ‐‐ on th In su he face of tthe complaaint and
documeents propeerly incorp porated theerein ‐‐ thaat claims arre subject tto arbitratiion,
a districct court ma ay dismisss in favor o of arbitratiion withou ut the delay y of
discoveery. See Gu uidotti v. Leegal Helpers Debt Resoolution, L.L L.C., 716 F..3d 764, 7774‐76
(3d Cir.. 2013). If, however, there is a dispute ass to the releevance, au uthenticity,, or
accuraccy of the do ocuments relied upo on, the disttrict court may not d dismiss thee
complaint with th hose materrials in min nd. Cf. Chaambers, 2822 F.3d at 154. If the
district court is go oing to rely y on the ex xtrinsic maaterials, th he proper ccourse is to o
convertt the motio on to a mottion for summary jud dgment diismissing tthe case in n
favor off arbitratio on, after prroviding notice to thee parties aand an opp portunity tto be
heard.
2. Substanttive Law
State law princciples of co ontract form mation gov vern the arrbitrability y
question n. See Speccht, 306 F.3 3d at 27. T The districtt court app plied Wash hington law w
on the q question off contract fformation,, and the p parties do n not challen nge that
decision n on appea al. The detterminatio on of wheth her partiess have con ntractually
bound tthemselves to arbitra ate under sstate law is subject to o de novo rreview. Seee id.
at 26.
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Washington courts have not specifically addressed the question of
the reasonableness of notice of additional terms in online contracts, see Kwan v.
Clearwire Corp., No. C09‐1392JLR, 2012 WL 32380, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012)
(noting absence of reported cases), but it is clear that general contract principles
under Washington law apply to agreements made online, see Spam Arrest, LLC v.
Replacements, Ltd., No. C12‐481RAJ, 2013 WL 4675919, at *8 n.10 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 29, 2013) (finding no authority to ʺsuggest[] that Washington law applies
differently to online contractsʺ). Indeed, as we have explained on multiple
occasions, ʺnew commerce on the Internet . . . has not fundamentally changed the
principles of contract.ʺ Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir.
2004); accord Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 124; see also Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763
F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014).
Under Washington law, contract formation requires an objective
manifestation of mutual assent. Keystone Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp., 152
Wash. 2d 171, 177 (2004) (en banc) (ʺWashington follows the objective
manifestation test for contracts.ʺ); In re Marriage of Obaidi & Qayoum, 154 Wash.
App. 609, 616 (2010) (ʺA valid contract requires a meeting of the minds on the
essential terms.ʺ); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.2‐204. ʺWhether parties
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manifested mutual assent is a question of fact.ʺ Spam Arrest, 2013 WL 4675919, at
*8 (citing Sea‐Van Invs. Assocs. v. Hamilton, 125 Wash. 2d 120 (1994)). ʺThe
existence of mutual assent may be deduced from the circumstances . . . .ʺ Jacobʹs
Meadow Owners Assʹn v. Plateau 44 II, LLC, 139 Wash. App. 743, 765 (2007).
Where a party has signed a contract without reading it, she can argue that
mutual assent was lacking if she was ʺdeprived of the opportunity to read the
contractʺ or if the contract was not ʺʹplain and unambiguous.ʹʺ Yakima Cty. (W.
Valley) Fire Prot. Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima, 122 Wash. 2d 371, 389 (1993)
(quoting Skagit State Bank v. Rasmussen, 109 Wash. 2d 377, 381‐84 (1987)). ʺSo
long as a[n] [offeree] could have seen a reasonably conspicuous reference to the
. . . Agreement . . . a jury could conclude that [she] manifested assent.ʺ Spam
Arrest, 2013 WL 4675919, at *8 (citing M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software
Corp., 140 Wash. 2d 568 (2000) (en banc)).
Washington has also upheld the validity of shrinkwrap agreements,
endorsing the view that ʺ[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right
to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a
means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.ʺ M.A. Mortenson,
140 Wash. 2d at 582‐83 (quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th
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Cir. 1996)). The validity of shrinkwrap agreements assumes that buyers have
notice of the existence of standard adhesion terms, even if they are not read or
understood. See id. at 584 (enforcing terms of adhesion where text of terms were
ʺset forth explicitly or referenced in numerous locationsʺ); Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (relying on fact that plaintiffs ʺconcede[d]
noticing the statement of terms [on the box], but den[ied] reading itʺ); see also
Specht, 306 F.3d at 33‐34 (distinguishing shrinkwrap cases as instances where
notice of existence of additional terms was provided).
Manifestation of assent to an online contract is not meaningfully
different, and can be accomplished by ʺwords or silence, action or inaction,ʺ so
long as the user ʺintends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to
know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.ʹʺ Schnabel,
697 F.3d at 120 (footnote omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
19(2) (1981)). As with paper contracts or shrinkwrap agreements, to be bound,
an internet user need not actually read the terms and conditions or click on a
hyperlink that makes them available as long as she has notice of their existence.
See id. at 121 (ʺAs a general principle, an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer
unless the offeree knows of its existence.ʺ (internal quotation marks omitted));
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Specht, 306 F.3d at 29‐30 (ʺ[C]licking on a . . . button does not communicate assent
to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking
on the . . . button would signify assent to those terms.ʺ).
Under Washington law, a person has notice of a fact if she ʺ[h]as
actual knowledge of it.ʺ Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.1‐202(a)(1); see also Register.com,
356 F.3d at 402‐03 (concluding that website user who manifested assent with
actual knowledge of terms was bound by them). Where there is no actual notice
of contract terms, ʺan offeree is still bound by the provision if he or she is on
inquiry notice of the term and assents to it through the conduct that a reasonable
person would understand to constitute assent.ʺ Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120; see also
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 62A.1‐202(a)(3), (d) (charging person with inquiry
notice if she ʺhas reason to know that it existsʺ ʺ[f]rom all the facts and
circumstances known to the person at the time in questionʺ or has received
notification of it from someone who took ʺsuch steps as may be reasonably
required to inform the other person in ordinary courseʺ).
One common way of alerting internet users to terms and conditions
is via a ʺclickwrapʺ agreement, which typically requires users to click an ʺI agreeʺ
box after being presented with a list of terms or conditions of use. See
‐ 21 ‐
Register.com, 356 F.3d at 402‐03, 429. Clickwraps force users to ʺexpressly and
unambiguously manifest either assent or rejection prior to being given access to
the product.ʺ Id. at 429. In contrast, ʺbrowsewrapʺ agreements involve terms
and conditions posted via hyperlink, commonly at the bottom of the screen, and
do not request an express manifestation of assent. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 31‐32
(describing what would later be termed ʺbrowsewrapʺ). In determining the
validity of browsewrap agreements, courts often consider whether a website user
has actual or constructive notice of the conditions. See id. at 32; Schnabel, 697 F.3d
at 129 n.18 (noting that browsewrap provisions are generally enforced only if
ʺthe website user . . . had actual or constructive knowledge of the siteʹs terms and
conditions, and . . . manifested assent to themʺ (quoting Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite,
Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 937‐38 (E.D. Va. 2010))); see also In re Zappos.com, Inc.,
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063‐64 (D. Nev. 2012)
(ʺ[T]he determination of the validity of a browsewrap contract depends on
whether the user has actual or constructive knowledge of a websiteʹs terms and
conditions.ʺ).
Whether there was notice of the existence of additional contract
terms presented on a webpage depends heavily on whether the design and
‐ 22 ‐
content of that webpage rendered the existence of terms reasonably conspicuous.
See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177‐78; Spam Arrest, 2013 WL 4675919, at *8. ʺClarity
and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are important in securing informed
assent.ʺ Specht, 306 F.3d at 30. Thus, when terms are linked in obscure sections
of a webpage that users are unlikely to see, courts will refuse to find constructive
notice. See id. at 30‐32 (finding insufficient notice where only reference to
conditions of use was at the bottom of screen via hyperlink and webpage did not
indicate that ʺdownload nowʺ button constituted agreement to terms and
conditions); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(finding no notice where ʺwebsite did not prompt [the user] to review the Terms
and Conditions and . . . the link to the Terms and Conditions was not
prominently displayed so as to provide reasonable notice of the Terms and
Conditionsʺ); Zappos.com, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (concluding user did not
manifest assent to conditions of use that were ʺinconspicuous, buried in the
middle to bottom of every . . . webpage among many other links, and the website
never directs a user to the Terms of Useʺ).
‐ 23 ‐
B. B Appllication
We cconclude th granting Amazonʹs hat the district court erred in g
motion to dismisss. First, the district ccourt erred d in consid dering certaain factuall
als extrinsic to the complaint. S materia Second, Niicosia has plausibly stated a
claim, a as we are n nd by the arbitration not convincced at this stage thatt he is boun n
clause.
1. Considerration of M Extraneous to the Co Materials E omplaint
As an n initial matter, we cconclude th hat the disstrict courtt correctly
determiined that tthe Order P Page and 2 2012 Cond ditions of U Use were aan
embodiiment of th he contractt made bettween Nico osia and A Amazon, an nd thus
integrall to the com mplaint. S See Global N Network, 4558 F.3d at 1157. Nicossia did nott
attach a a copy of th he Order P Page to hiss complain nt, but the ccomplaint alleges
injuriess on the bassis of the p purchases made on A Amazon, m made possiible only v via
clicking g ʺPlace yo our orderʺ on the Ord der Page. See Add. B B. Thus, th he Order P Page
and thee linked 2012 Conditiions of Usee were parrt of the co orporated into ontract inco
the com mplaint by reference. See Chambers, 282 F F.3d at 153 n.4 (consid dering
contract relied up pon as integral to com mplaint, w which was ʺʺreplete with referen nces
‐ 24 ‐
to the contracts and request[ed] judicial interpretation of their termsʺ). Therefore
the district court properly considered them.4
The district court also relied on additional extrinsic materials in
dismissing the complaint. Specifically, the district court relied on Amazonʹs
assertion that Nicosiaʹs purchases were made using an account created in 2008
and that to have registered for an account in 2008 one must have checked a box
on the Registration Page, acknowledging acceptance of the 2008 Conditions of
Use. Based on those assertions, the district court concluded that Nicosia himself
created the account in 2008 and personally assented to the 2008 Conditions of
Use. This was error, as those facts were neither alleged in nor integral to the
complaint. Most importantly, their authenticity and relevance were disputed
below.
4 The district court relied on the corrected version of the Order Page ʺfor items sold by third‐party sellersʺ on Amazon, rather than the screenshot initially submitted by Amazon in error depicting the order screen for ʺcertain products manufactured by Amazon.ʺ On appeal, Nicosia disputes this finding, contending that the court should have relied on the earlier submission because his complaint alleges that he purchased 1 Day Diet from Amazon, not a third‐party seller. However, there is no allegation that Amazon manufactured 1 Day Diet. Further, while the later submission is described by Amazon as depicting the Order Page ʺfor items sold by third‐party sellers,ʺ Amazon does not contest its role as an additional seller of the product. Nevertheless, because the pages are substantially the same, our analysis and conclusion would be essentially the same if we used the earlier submission instead. A copy of the earlier submission is attached as Addendum C.
‐ 25 ‐
First, contrary to the district courtʹs assertion, Nicosia did not admit
to or allege that he created an account with Amazon in 2008. Nowhere in the
complaint does Nicosia so allege. Nor is the Registration Page integral to the
complaint, as Nicosia did not ʺrel[y] heavily upon its terms and effectʺ in
drafting his complaint, in contrast to the Order Page and 2012 Conditions of Use.
Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153 (quoting Intʹl Audiotext, 62 F.3d at 72). Account
registration with Amazon in 2008 was ʺneither mentioned nor relied uponʺ by
Nicosia, and its nexus to the contract relied upon is ʺtoo attenuated to render [it]
integral to the complaint.ʺ Global Network, 458 F.3d at 156; see Chambers, 282 F.3d
at 154 (holding that certain codes of fair practice were improperly considered
despite the fact that they may be incorporated into the contract).
Second, because Nicosia disputes the accuracy and authenticity of
the 2008 registration, the Registration Page and disputed fact of Nicosiaʹs
registration should not have been considered at the motion to dismiss stage. See
Faulkner, 463 F.3d at 134 (ʺ[E]ven if a document is ʹintegralʹ to the complaint, it
must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or
accuracy of the document.ʺ). The Amazon declarations assert that: (1) to make a
purchase on Amazon.com, a registered account had to be used; and (2) Nicosiaʹs
‐ 26 ‐
purchases were made using an account created in 2008. Even assuming these
statements to be true, they do not exclude the possibility that Nicosia used an
account that he did not create. Nicosia could have used a shared account created
by a member of his family to make his purchases. Further, the generic
Registration Page screenshot submitted by Amazon was apparently captured in
2014, as indicated by the 2014 copyright notice at the bottom of the page. See
Add. A. While Amazon asserts that the webpage depicts a version that Nicosia
allegedly saw in 2008, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the
Registration Page did not change ‐‐ as some of the conditions of use and
arbitration clause did ‐‐ in the intervening six years.
Finally, the relevance of the 2008 registration is disputed, as the
parties disagree about whether and how the account registration relates to the
contractual relationship. See Faulkner, 463 F.3d at 134 (ʺIt must also be clear that
there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the
document.ʺ); Chambers, 282 F.3d at 154 (ʺ[T]he parties disagree as to whether and
how the Codes relate to or affect the contractual relationships at issue.ʺ). The
2008 Conditions of Use that Nicosia would have been bound to at the time of
alleged registration listed King County as the exclusive forum in which to bring
‐ 27 ‐
suit. It did not include an arbitration provision. While the 2008 Conditions of
Use did reserve Amazonʹs right to change those terms at any time, this did not
necessarily bind Nicosia to any change of terms without notice. Under
Washington contract law, such unilateral modifications are only binding if there
is notice and assent to the changed terms. See Gaglidari v. Dennyʹs Rests., Inc., 117
Wash. 2d 426, 435 (1991) (holding employee was not bound by unilateral changes
to company policy because she did not receive reasonable notice of changes).
Therefore, while the district court correctly incorporated the Order
Page and 2012 Conditions of Use as integral to the complaint, it erred in
considering the Registration Page and 2008 Conditions of Use on a motion to
dismiss.
2. Whether Nicosia Plausibly Stated That There Was No Constructive Notice of the 2012 Conditions of Use
Considering only the allegations in the complaint, the Order Page,
and the 2012 Conditions of Use linked thereto, we conclude that Nicosia
plausibly stated a claim for relief.
Nicosia argues that the 2012 Conditions of Use were a browsewrap
agreement. Amazon, like the district court, maintains that the agreement here
was neither a clickwrap agreement nor a browsewrap agreement; rather, it was
‐ 28 ‐
something in between. An Amazon purchaser was not required to click an ʺI
agreeʺ box after being presented with a list of terms and conditions. Nor was the
purchaser simply left to browse the page, as she was asked to click on a ʺPlace
your orderʺ button after being told elsewhere on the page that ʺBy placing your
order, you agree to Amazon.comʹs privacy notice and conditions of use,ʺ with the
latter phrase hyperlinked to the 2012 Conditions of Use. Add. B. For purposes
of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the agreement was a hybrid
between a clickwrap and a browsewrap agreement. In making this assumption,
we do not mean to suggest that a ʺhybridʺ agreement is a type of agreement that
Washington law would recognize as such. The question is whether a reasonably
prudent offeree would know that the 2012 Conditions of Use governed, such that
her purchase manifested implied assent to the additional terms. See Specht, 306
F.3d at 29; see also Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120 (ʺ[I]n cases such as this, where the
purported assent is largely passive, the contract‐formation question will often
turn on whether a reasonably prudent offeree would be on inquiry notice of the
term at issue.ʺ); cf. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177 (ʺ[T]he validity of the browsewrap
agreement turns on whether the website puts a reasonably prudent user on
inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.ʺ).
‐ 29 ‐
Turning to the Order Page, we are not convinced that notice was
sufficient as a matter of Washington law. Near the top of the page, below the
ʺReview your orderʺ heading, the critical sentence appears in smaller font: ʺBy
placing your order, you agree to Amazon.comʹs privacy notice and conditions of
use.ʺ Add. B. The phrases ʺprivacy noticeʺ and ʺconditions of useʺ appear in
blue font, indicating that they are clickable links to separate webpages. The body
of the page summarizes the userʹs purchase and delivery information. Among
other things, users are shown their shipping address, billing address, and
payment method, and given the option to edit that information or ʺtry Amazon
Locker.ʺ Users are also given the opportunity to change the delivery date, enter
gift cards and promotional codes, and sign up for ʺFREE Two‐Day Shipping with
a free trial of Amazon Prime.ʺ The Amazon Prime promotion features the words
ʺFREE Two‐Day Shippingʺ four times in the center of the page, appearing in
orange, green, and black fonts, and in white font against an orange banner. On
the right side of the page appears a ʺPlace your orderʺ button above a box with
the heading ʺOrder Summary.ʺ The Order Summary box lists the cost of the
items to be purchased, shipping and handling costs, total price before tax,
estimated tax to be collected, purchase total, gift card amount, and order total.
‐ 30 ‐
The words ʺOrder totalʺ appear in bold, red font. A large area in the center of the
page has been redacted, but presumably features a picture of the product being
purchased, its name, price, quantity, stock and seller information, and gifting
options. Near the bottom of the page, there are a number of sentences in faint,
black font directing users to links to other Amazon webpages for additional
information, such as tax and seller information, customer assistance pages, and
product return policies. At the very bottom of the page, links to the Conditions
of Use and Privacy Policy appear again in blue, next to Amazonʹs copyright
notice.
Notably, unlike typical ʺclickwrapʺ agreements, clicking ʺPlace your
orderʺ does not specifically manifest assent to the additional terms, for the
purchaser is not specifically asked whether she agrees or to say ʺI agree.ʺ Cf.
Register.com, 356 F.3d at 402‐03, 429 & n.41. Nothing about the ʺPlace your orderʺ
button alone suggests that additional terms apply, and the presentation of terms
is not directly adjacent to the ʺPlace your orderʺ button so as to indicate that a
user should construe clicking as acceptance. Cf. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F.
Supp. 2d 829, 835, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding Facebook user was ʺinformed of
the consequences of his assenting clickʺ because he was shown, immediately
‐ 31 ‐
below the ʺSign Upʺ button, a notice stating, ʺBy clicking Sign Up, you are
indicating that you have read and agree to the Terms and Serviceʺ).
The message itself ‐‐ ʺBy placing your order, you agree to
Amazon.comʹs . . . conditions of useʺ ‐‐ is not bold, capitalized, or conspicuous in
light of the whole webpage. Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,
587, 589 (1991) (enforcing forum selection clause printed on a cruise ticket where
notice of conditions was printed in bold font and capital letters on the front of the
ticket); Starkey v. G Adventures, Inc., 796 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 2015) (multiple
bolded, capitalized headings alerting customers of terms and conditions was
sufficiently reasonable notice). Proximity to the top of a webpage does not
necessarily make something more likely to be read in the context of an elaborate
webpage design. See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1179 (ʺ[E]ven close proximity of the
hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on ‐‐ without more ‐‐ is insufficient
to give rise to constructive notice.ʺ). There are numerous other links on the
webpage, in several different colors, fonts, and locations, which generally
obscure the message. See Zappos.com, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (ʺThe Terms of Use
is inconspicuous, buried in the middle to bottom of every Zappos.com webpage
among many other links, and the website never directs a user to the Terms of
‐ 32 ‐
Use.ʺ). Although it is impossible to say with certainty based on the record, there
appear to be between fifteen and twenty‐five links on the Order Page, and
various text is displayed in at least four font sizes and six colors (blue, yellow,
green, red, orange, and black), alongside multiple buttons and promotional
advertisements. Further, the presence of customersʹ personal address, credit card
information, shipping options, and purchase summary are sufficiently
distracting so as to temper whatever effect the notification has. See Nguyen, 763
F.3d at 1179 (ʺGiven the breadth of the range of technological savvy of online
purchasers, consumers cannot be expected to ferret out hyperlinks to terms and
conditions to which they have no reason to suspect they will be bound.ʺ).
To draw on Judge Levalʹs analogy in Register.com,5 it is as if an apple
stand visitor walks up to the shop and sees, above the basket of apples, a wall
filled with signs. Some of those signs contain information necessary for her
purchase, such as price, method of payment, and delivery details, and are
displayed prominently in the center of the wall. Others she may quickly
5 In Register.com, Judge Leval provided an apple stand analogy to describe the basis for imputing constructive knowledge on a repeat consumer who is alerted to terms of use after each purchase. 356 F.3d at 401; see Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 124‐25. This analogy was extended in Ftejaʹs description of imputing knowledge of terms contained in an unclicked hyperlink, so long as the consequences of assenting are conveyed and the user is directed where to click to view the additional terms. 841 F. Supp. 2d at 839‐ 40.
‐ 33 ‐
disregard, including advertisements for other fruit stands. Among them is a sign
binding her to additional terms as a condition of her purchase. Has the apple
stand owner provided reasonably conspicuous notice?
We think reasonable minds could disagree.
In a seeming effort to streamline customer purchases, Amazon chose
not to employ a clickwrap mechanism. While clickwrap agreements that display
terms in a scrollbox and require users to click an icon are not necessarily
required, see Register.com, 356 F.3d at 403 (an offeree need not specifically assent
to certain terms by clicking an ʺI agreeʺ icon so long as the offeree ʺmakes a
decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offerʺ), they are
certainly the easiest method of ensuring that terms are agreed to, see Starkey, 796
F.3d at 197 n.3 (noting that it would have been ʺsimpler to resolveʺ this question
had a clickwrap mechanism been used).
To be clear, we do not hold that there was no objective manifestation
of mutual assent here as a matter of law. Rather, we conclude simply that
reasonable minds could disagree on the reasonableness of notice. See Cascade
Auto Glass, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 135 Wash. App. 760, 767 (2006)
(ʺWhether particular notice was reasonable is ordinarily a question of fact for the
‐ 34 ‐
jury.ʺ).6 We therefore hold that Amazon has failed to show that Nicosia was on
notice and agreed to mandatory arbitration as a matter of law. The district court
thus erred in concluding that Nicosia had failed to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).7
II. The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
Nicosia moved for a preliminary injunction requesting that: (1)
remedial notices be sent to past purchasers of products containing sibutramine;
and (2) measures be put in place to prevent Amazon from unwittingly selling
other products containing sibutramine. The district court concluded that Nicosia
lacked standing for an injunction because he ʺfailed to plead facts that would
permit the plausible inference that [he is] in danger of being wronged again.ʺ
Special App. 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Although ʺthe making of the arbitration agreement . . . [is] in issue,ʺ no ʺtrialʺ is required at this time because neither side has ʺpetition[ed] . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed.ʺ 9 U.S.C. § 4; see Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175 (ʺThe present case does not fall squarely under section 4 of the FAA or the cases interpreting it because the [defendants] never cross‐moved to compel arbitration, and the FAA does not provide for petitions (such as [plaintiff]ʹs) brought by the party seeking to stay arbitration.ʺ). 7 Nicosia appeals the district courtʹs determination that challenges on the basis of contract illegality ab initio are subject to arbitration. As we have decided that factual questions remain as to the formation of the agreement to arbitrate, we need not reach that question.
‐ 35 ‐
Geneerally, ʺcou urts should d consider the meritss of a requ uested
prelimin nary injun nction even n where th derlying claims will b he validity of the und be
determiined in arb bitration.ʺ Am. Expreess. Fin. Addvisors Inc. v. Thorleyy, 147 F.3d 229,
231 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation o omitted); see also Ben ihana, Inc. v. Benihan na of Tokyo,,
7, 894‐95 (2 LLC, 784 F.3d 887 2d Cir. 2015 5) (ʺWheree the partiees have ag greed to
arbitratte a disputee, a districct court hass jurisdictiion to issuee a prelimiinary
pending arrbitration.ʺ). ʺ[T]he expectatio injunctiion to presserve the sttatus quo p on of
speedy arbitration n does nott absolve th he district court of itts responsiibility to
decide rrequests fo or prelimin nary injunctions on tthe merits.. Nor is th his duty
affected d by the prro‐arbitratiion policy manifested in the FA AA.ʺ Thorrley, 147 F.33d
at 231. We genera ally review w the denia al of a prelliminary in njunction ffor abuse o of
discretion. Lusk v v. Vill. of Coold Spring, 475 F.3d 4480, 484 (2d Cir. 20077). A distrrict
buses its d court ab discretion w when its deecision ressts on an errror of law w or clearly y
erroneo ous finding g of fact. S Shain v. Elliison, 356 F F.3d 211, 2114 (2d Cir. 2004). ʺTh he
existencce of stand ding is a qu uestion of llaw that w we review dde novo.ʺ IId.
Articcle III limitts federal ju udicial pow wer to thee resolution n of ʺCasessʺ
and ʺCo ontroversiees.ʺ U.S. C Const. art. III, § 2. To o satisfy th his jurisdicctional
‐ 36 ‐
requirement, ʺ(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury‐in‐fact; (2) there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct at issue; and (3) the
injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.ʺ Jewish People for the
Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 778 F.3d 390, 394 (2d
Cir. 2015) (quoting Cooper v. USPS, 577 F.3d 479, 489 (2d Cir. 2009)). For each
form of relief sought, a plaintiff ʺmust demonstrate standing separately.ʺ Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). A
plaintiff seeking to represent a class must personally have standing. Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996).
Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief where they are
unable to establish a ʺreal or immediate threatʺ of injury. City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111‐12 (1983); Shain, 356 F.3d at 215‐16. Although past injuries
may provide a basis for standing to seek money damages, they do not confer
standing to seek injunctive relief unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that she is
likely to be harmed again in the future in a similar way. See DeShawn E. ex rel.
Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344‐45 (2d Cir. 1998). While ʺenhanced riskʺ of
future injury may constitute injury‐in‐fact in certain circumstances, such injuries
are only cognizable where the plaintiff alleges actual future exposure to that
‐ 37 ‐
increaseed risk. Seee Baur v. V Veneman, 352 F.3d 6225, 633‐35, 640‐42 (2d d Cir. 2003))
(holding that plaiintiff has sttanding to o seek injun nction to sstop defend dants from m
butcherring non‐am mbulatory nhanced rissk of mad cow y cows because of plaaintiffʹs en
disease as a consu umer of beeef); LaFleu ur v. Whitm man, 300 F.33d 256, 2700 (2d Cir.
2002) (cconcluding g that likeliihood of ex xposure to o additionaal sulfur d dioxide
emissio ons qualifiees as injury y‐in‐fact).
agree with the districct court thaat Nicosia did not esstablish a We a
likeliho ood of futu ure or contiinuing harrm. Even aassuming h his past pu urchases o of 1
Day Dieet resulted in injury a and that hee may con ntinue to su uffer conseequences aas a
result, h he has not shown tha at he is likeely to be su ubjected to o further ssales by
Amazon n of produ ucts contain ning sibuttramine. A Amazon haas ceased sselling 1 D Day
Diet on its websitee, and Niccosia has fa ailed to alleege that hee intends tto use
n in the fu Amazon uture to buy any prod ducts, let aalone food or drug prroducts
generallly or weig ght loss pro oducts in p particular. See Comp pl. ¶ 15, EC CF No. 1; cf cf.
Baur, 35 52 F.3d at 6 640 (conclu uding plain ntiff established a ʺppresent, imm mediate risk k of
exposurreʺ by virtu ue of alleg ging to be a a regular cconsumer o of beef pro oducts).
‐ 38 ‐
Nicosiaʹs remaining arguments are meritless. The district court was
correct in concluding that the private cause of action provided by the CPSA, 15
U.S.C. § 2073, is unable to confer standing to enforce provisions in the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act (the ʺPPPAʺ) relating to child‐proof packaging
requirements for controlled drugs. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(5)(H) (excluding
ʺdrugs, devices, or cosmeticsʺ from the definition of ʺconsumer productʺ in the
CPSA), with 16 C.F.R. § 1700.14(a)(4), (10) (requiring child‐proof packaging for
ʺControlled drugsʺ and ʺPrescription drugsʺ under the PPPA).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the order of the district court is
AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part, and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings.
‐ 39 ‐ ADDENDU UM A (J. Ap pp. 25)
ADDENDU UM B (J. Ap pp. 91)
ADDENDU UM C (J. Ap pp. 27)
‐ 42 ‐