De San Juan v. United States

47 F.2d 446, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3471
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 18, 1931
DocketNo. 315
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 47 F.2d 446 (De San Juan v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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De San Juan v. United States, 47 F.2d 446, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3471 (10th Cir. 1931).

Opinion

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico confirming an award of the Pueblo Lands Board to the Pueblo of San Juan under the provisions of Section 6 of the Pueblo Lands Act (43 Stat. pp. 637, 638). The pertinent provisions of such Section 6 are set out in the margin.1

It will be noted that the board is required to find: (1) The area and character of the lands and water rights awarded to the pon-Indian claimants in its principal report; (2) whether such lands and water rights could bave been recovered by the United States by a suit brought within ten years from the time the non-Indian claimants’ adverse possession began or within ten years (the period prescribed by the limitation statute of New Mexi[447]*447co) after such possession began and after such lands came under the sovereignty of the United Slates; (3) as to the lands and water rights which could have been so recovered, the fair market value thereof, less the value of improvements made therein or placed thereon by the non-Indian claimants; and (4) as to the lands which could have been so recovered, the amount of loss, if any, suffered through the failure of the United States to seasonably prosecute an action therefor.

The board found that there wore 17,584.77 acres in the San Juan Pueblo- Grant; that the Indian title to 3,499.72 acres and the water rights appurtenant thereto had been extinguished; that 1,020.63 acres thereof could have been recovered for the Indians by a suit seasonably brought by the United States; that $60,758.94 was the value of such lands, exclusive of improvements placed thereon; and that the loss suffered by tbe Indians was $29,090.53. It awarded compensation to the pueblo in the latter amount.

Counsel for the pueblo contend (1) that an award should have been made for all the lands and water rights as to- which the board found the Indian title to have been extinguished, and (2) that the award for the loss of the lands and water rights considered was inadequate.

The theory of the first contention is that it was impossible for the pueblo at any time since the grant, under the laws of Spain, Mexico or the United States, to have lawfully alienated its lands and that, therefore, all of it could have been recovered by the seasonable prosecution of actions by the United States.

There may have been a prior lawful overlapping grant so that the title of the non-Indian claimants was superior to the title of the pueblo. Furthermore, during the time the lands were under the sovereignty of Spain, lawful conveyances could have been made by the pueblo with the approval of the sovereign; and, during the time such lands were under the sovereignty of Mexico, there is strong basis for the proposition that the pueblo had authority to Convey without the approval of the sovereign.

The act declares that upon review “the report of the board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts, the values, and the liability therein set forth, subject, however, to be rebutted by competent evidence.” 43 Stat. 638, § 6; United States v. Board of National Missions of Presbyterian Church (C. C. A. 10) 37 F.(2d) 272-274.

Sinee there was a possibility that a portion of the lands, to which the Indian title had been extinguished, could not have been recovered by the seasonable prosecution of a suit or suits by the United States, the burden was upon the pueblo to overcome the findings of the board by competent evidence, and this it wholly failed to do.

The second contention is bottomed upon the assertion that the method employed by the board in arriving at the value of the land, which it concluded could have been recovered by the seasonable prosecution of a suit by the United States, was erroneous. Counsel assert that the hoard made no specific finding of the value of the land after deducting “improvements made therein”; that it did not base its findings upon the present value of the land but upon the value thereon in 1889 (the average date when the non-Indian claimants went into possession thereof), plus $10.-00 per acre.

At the hearing before the district court, the pueblo offered no evidence in opposition to the findings of the board as to the value of the land exclusive of the improvements made therein or placed thereon by non-Indian claimants, and the loss suffered by the Indians. It offered no competent evidence from which the court could have made correct findings of such value and loss, even assuming that the findings of the hoard were incorrect. It leveled its attack at the methods employed by the hoard in arriving at its findings rather than at the correctness of the results obtained, and wholly failed to show that the findings as to value and loss were incorrect.

The act does not contemplate that the evidence before the board shall be brought before the district court and it was not in the instant case. Neither does it contemplate that the court shall examine into the methods employed by the hoard and if it finds tha-t the board followed incorrect methods to- then remand the matter to the hoard with instructions to follow correct methods and make new findings and a new award. On the contrary, it clearly provides that the court shall hear evidence as in a trial de novo in support of, or in opposition to the findings of the board and confirm, modify or reject such findings, and render its decision accordingly. Therefore, even if we assume that the- methods employed by the board were subject to criticism, in the absence of evidence in opposition to the findings from which the court could have made correct findings, we fail to see how- the court could have done otherwise than to con[448]*448firm and ratify the findings and award made by the board.

We conclude the decree of the district court was right and it is affirmed.

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47 F.2d 446, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3471, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/de-san-juan-v-united-states-ca10-1931.