De La Rosa, Javier Jr.

Opinion

305-IS CCA No. PD- •15

COA No. 13-12-00368-CR ORIGINAL

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IN THE MAY 22 2015 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS Abe! Acosta, Clerk

FILED IN JAVIER DE LA ROSA, JR. COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS Appellant NAY 22 2015 VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS Abel Acosta, Cierk

In Appeal No. 13-12-00368-CR from the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Judical District of Texas at Corpus Christi - Edinburg, Texas

APPELLANT'S PRO SE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

Javier De La Rosa, Jr. TDCJ No. 1781303 Ferguson Unit 12120 Savage Dr. Midway, Texas 75852

APPELLANT PRO SE

IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL

Trial Court Judge:

Hon. Benjamin Euresti, Jr. District Judge 107th District Court 974 E. Harrison Brownsville, TX 78520

Appellant:

Javier De La Rosa, Jr. TDCJ No. 1781303 Ferguson Unit 12120 Savage Dr. Midway, Texas 75852

(PRO SE ON ANDERS APPEAL AND PDR) REPRESENTED ON APPEAL BY:

Rebecca E. RuBane Attorney-At-Law 847 E. Harrison Brownsville, TX 78520

(2nd Anders Counsel - Court appointed on appeal only) Reynaldo G. Garza, III Attorney-At-Law ADDRESS UNKNOWN

(1st Anders Counsel - Court appointed on appeal only) REPRESENTED AT TRIAL BY:

Rick Canales Attorney-At-Law 845 E. Harrison, Suite B Bownsville, TX 78520

Julio Ledezma Attorney-At-Law 845 E. Harrison, Suite B Brownsville, TX 78520

Ed Stapelton Attorney-At-Law 2401 Wildflower, Cuite C Brownsville, TX 78520

Sara Stapelton Reeves Attorney-At_Law 2401 Wildflower, Suite C Brownsville, TX 78520

State:

The State of Texas

REPRESENTED ON APPEAL BY:

Luis Saenz Cameron County County and District Attroney 964 E. Harrison Brownsville, TX 78520

Jennifer Avendano Assistant District Attorney

REPRSENTED AT TRIAL BY:

Armando Villalobos FORMER Cameron COunty County and District Attorney INCARCERATED in federal prison

NAME UNKNOWN Assistant District Attorney

NAME UNKOWN Assistant District Attroney

NAME UNKOWN Assistant District Attorney (Juvenile Division)

i i

- TABlfc- OF CONTENTS PAGE Identity of Judge, Parties, and Counsel i-ii Tab^C of Contents iii+iv Index of Authorties :-V-viv

Statement Regarding Oral Argument vii Statement of the Case viii

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW xi-xii

Statement of the Case (EXTENDED) xiii-xiv

Statement of Procudural History (EXTENDED) xv-xix

GROUND ONE: fRIVtOUSLY "HELD ARGUABLE ISSUES 1-2

GROUND TWO: APPELLATE COUNSEL IN CONTEMPT OF COURT 3-4

GROUND THREE: JUVENILE COURT RECORD IN ANDERS APPEAL 4-5

gROUND FOUR: COUNSEL ON REMAND (HEARING ON INCOMPLETE RECORD) 6-7 GROUND FIVE: ARGUABLE ISSUE, REVERSIBLE ERROR, & WHOLLY FRIVOLOUS 7-9 GROUND SIX: PRO SE ISSUES .. 9-12

1) INVOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA 10

2) TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION 11

3) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 11-12

4) GUILTY PLEA TO JUDGE = NO JURY 12 «^ •-•-- 13 frayer XJ

Verification/Certificate of Service 13

APPENDIX

"A" - COA Opinion (02/12/15) - NO REVERSIBLE ERROR "B" - COA ORDER ABATING APPEAL - ARGUABLE ISSUES (01/06/2014) "C" - COA ORDER OF CONTEMPT - 2ND ANDERS COUNSEL (10/21/2014) "D" - COA ORDER ABATING APPEAL - INCOMPLETE RECORD (07/30/2013)

"E" - COA DOCKET - CASE EVENTS (05/04/2012 - 03/23/2015)

TABLE OF CONTENTS-

turn PAGE

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INDEX OF AUTHORTIES

CASE PAGE

Ex Parte Allen, 618 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) 11 Ex parte Amezquita, 223 S.W.3d 363 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) 12 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) xvii,4 Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) 12 Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) xv,xvii,7 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) 10 Ex parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) 12 Carmell v. Quarterman, 292 Fed. Appx. 317 (5th Cir. 2006)...6 Chapman v. California, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967).. 8 Davis v. State, 150 S.W.3d 196 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 2004) 5 De La Cerda v. State, 325 S.W.3d 367 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) 11 High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978) 7 Holt v. State, 64 S.W.3d 434 (Tex.App. - Waco 2001) xix Jennings v. State, 890 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) 6 Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2001)., 8 Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) xviii,l,4 Kent v. U.S., 383.U.S. 541 (1966) 4 Livar v. State, 929 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1996) 11 Marin v. State, 851 S.W.3d 355 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) 12 Martinez v. State, 313 S.W.3d 355 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist] 2009) 8,9 Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) 11 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2155 (2012) 10,11 Moon v. State, PD-1215-13, (Tex .Crim. App-rDecemeber 10, 2014).4

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Oliver-v. State, 872 S.W.2d 713 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) 6-

Ortiz v. State, 849 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.App. - corpus Christi 1993) 5 Padilla v. Kentucky, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) 10

Perryman v. State, 159 S.W.3d 778 (Tex.App. - Waco 2005) 1

Matter of R.A.G., 866 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.1993) 11 Smith v. Rabbins, 120 S.Ct. 746 (2000) 7,8,9 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005) 11-12 Rushing v. State, 85 S.W.3d 283 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) xvi Satterwhite v. State, 858 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) 2 In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex.Crim. App. 2008) 1,2,4,6 In re Shelnutt, 695 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.App. - Austin 1985) 3 Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) 2 Stine v. State, 908 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) 12 Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) 11 In re Tharp, 393 S.W.3d 751 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012) 12 Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) 6 Wilson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 335 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st Dist] 2012) 5 Wilson v. State, 40 S.W.3d 192 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 2011) xix

Wilson v. State, 825 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1992) 10 Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 156 (Tex .Crim. App. 2000) 11

STATUTES / RULES

Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 1.051 ( ) 5 Art. 4.18 11 Art. 44.47 (b) 4

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 25.2 (d) xv Rule 44.2 (a) 8 Rule 44.2 (b) 8

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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The very nature of Anders appeals that both removes ones

rright to counsel on appeal and that^are often litigated by uneducated PRO SE prisonersj increases the need for a close look at the issues in this appeal during oral argument. And, specifically in this

a

appeal^ the court of appeals prtviously determined there were "arguable isses" and then sustained a second Anders brief that did not address the priorly found "arguable issues'1'because, according to the court of appeaii. there are no reversible errors. Oral arugment would allow the Court to focus on narrowly defining the difference between arguable issues, reversible error, and

wholly frivilous. The court of appeal described this appeal as being in a "unique posture and extereme circumstances" which is confirmed by the numerous procedural irregularties present in the appellate procedure followed by the court of appeals. Oral argument would allow this Court to simplify the facts and clarify the issues.

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• STATEMENT OF THE CASE ~

Javier De La Rosa, Jr., the Appelant, was charged as a juvenile with the murder of his girlfriend. The juvenile court waived

jurisdiction over conduct constituting 1st Degree Murder. However, once in the district court, Mr. De La Rosa was indicted for Capital

Murder based upon the State's additional investigation. At that time, the Capital Murder charge subjected Mr. De La Rosa to an

automatics capital LIFE sentence 'without parole. To avoid that sendee, that was declared unconstitutional while this appeal was pending, Mr. De La Rosa plead guilty to the lesser included offense of 1st degree murder. The guilty plea was before the trial court alone and then a jury determinec\only thisentnee of 90 years in prison. This appeal followed, where after the court of appeals determined that Mr. De La Rosa had a right to appeal, 1st Anders

counsel filed an Anders brief. The court of appeals originally

concluded that there were "arguable issues" and had new counsel appointed to file a merits brief. However, 2nd Anders counsel did not file a brief on the merits; but, rather 2nd Anders counsel

ffiled an Anders brief, under threat of contempt, that failed

to even address the priorly found arguable issues. 2nd Anders counsel was found in contempt for failure to comply with Kelly and, yet, she continued to represent Mr. De La Rosa. The court of appeals sustained the 2nd Anders brief and AFFIRMED the conviction bec«S*se there were no reversible errors in this case.

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STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In trial cause number, 11-CR-17-A, in the 107th District

Court of Cameron County, Texas, Javier De La Rosa , Jr., was

indicted for Capital Murder. On March 8, 2012, Mr. De La Rosa

plead guilty to trial court only. Then a jury was seated and

returned a verdict on punishment alone, for 90 years in prsion.

Mr. De La Rosa was sentenced on May 4, 2012. This appeal followed.

On November 16, 2012, the 13th District Court of Appeals

determined that Mr. De La Rosa had a right to appeal. However,

e« 1st Anders counsel filed an Anders brief on April 3, 2013.

Is""£esponse to a PRO SE pleading, on June 30, 2013, the court

of appeals REMANDED the case to the trial court for a hearing

and determination about the completeness of the record. Mr. De La Rosa

was not represented by counsel at the hearing, but it was determined

that the appelfate record was incomplete. The appellate record

was supplemented with some missing documents and pre-trial hearings.

On January 6, 2014 the court of appeals concluded that there

were "arguable issues" present in the appeal. The court allowed

1st Anders counsel to withdraw and had new counsel appointed.

The court of appeals also orderolthat a brief on the merits be filed on Mr. De La Rosa's behalf.

Nevertheless, after being threatened with contempt for her

delay in filing anAppellant's SVief, 2nd Anders counsel filed aa second Anders brief on August, 18, 2014. Yet, 2nd Anders

counsel failed to comply with the notification requirments of

Kelly. And, when 2nd Anders counsel continued to refuse to comply

with Kelly, the court of appeals held her in contempt of court

on October 21, 2014. 2nd Anderscousel continued to represnt Mr. De La Rosa in this appeal.

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2nd Anders counsel's Anders brief did not address the previously found "arguable issues" in any manner. That did not stop the 13th District Court of Appeals from AFFIRMING the conviction

in a summary Opinion because there were no revrsible errors.

The Opinion was issued on February 12, 2015. NO MOTION FOR REHEARING

WAS FILED. In fact, the appellate record demonstrated" that 2nd

Anders counsel never complied with Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules

of Appellate Procedure and did NOT notify Mr. De La Rosa of the

Opinion. However, Mr. De l& Rosa was able to leam of the Opinion

through other sources and requested an extension of time to file

this PRO SE PDR. This Court GRANTED the extension and set a

due date of May 15, 2015.

This PRO SE PDR was mailed to the Court of Criminal Appeals,

using the prison mail system, on .

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GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

GROUND ONE: In an Anders appeal, once the appellate court holds that there are 'arguable issues' in the appeal, which is a determination that the appeal is NOT wholly frivolous, may the appellate court subsequently dispose of the appeal by sustaining a second Anders brief that does not discuss the previosly found agSwable issues?

GROUND TWO: Once an appellate court holds a court-appointed appellate attorney in contempt of court for her (non)actions in a pending appeal, must that attorney be removed from that appeal and substitute counsel appointed to represent the indigent appellant?

GROUND THREE: In an Anders appeal from a conviction where the appellant was originally charged as a juvenile, and when Article 44.47 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires juvenile court waiver proceedings to bg a part of the appeal after a conviction, must the appellate record examined by the appellate court to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous include the record from the juvenile court proceedings?

GROUND FOUR: In an Anders appeal, when an appellate court REMANDS the case back to the trial court for a hearing and determination about the completeness of the appellate record, must the appellant be affordcdthe assistance of counsel at that hearing about the completeness of the record? [SUPP RR (08/16/2013) PASSIM]

GROUND FIVE: In an Anders appeal, where according*the U.S. Supreme Court a finding of "wholly frivolous" requires less merit to an appeal than "unTiTceily* to prevail on appeal", "no grave and prejudical errors", and "that the appeal would be unsuccessful", does the standard used by the 13th District Court of Appeals of no "reversible error" correctly measure whether the appeal is "wholly frivolous" -- especially when the court of appeals previously held that there were "arguable issues" present in the appeal?

GROUND SIX: In this Anders appeal, do any of the "arguable issues"

presented by the Appellant, PRO SE, have a basis in law and fact, so that the appeal is not wholly frivolous, to include:

1) The guilty plea was involuntary when it was induced by the law's threat of an automatic LIFE sentence without parole which was subsequently held to be an unconstitutional and illegal sentence for juveniles, like Appellant [2 RR (08/29/2012) PASSIM];

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2) The trial court had no jurisdiction over the Capital Murder indictment when the only conduct the juvenile court considered and waived jurisdiction o8/2o/2oi:nrS#"hesree murder [supp CR (°8/16/2013 & 3) Trail counsels were ineffective when they failed to offer any scientific, medical, or psychological evidence to support their sole strategy at sentencing, which was that because a juvenile's brain is not fully developed Appelant desrved a lifghter punishment [4 RR (08/29/2012) 78]; and, 4) The trial was improperly split into a twostage trial and the Jury was an unauthorized trier of fact to determine punishment, after the trial court alone accepted the guilty plea and found Appellant guilty, so that the sentence is VOID [2 RR (08/29/2012) ##]„

NOTES ABOUT CITATIONS USED IN THIS PDR:

A date is included with each record citation becuase of the numerous supplemental records that were filed. The date used is the date the record was FILED in the court of appeals, as reflected on that court's docket listing available on the internet.

Thus, SUPP CR (08/20/2013) ##, refers to the Suppelemtnal Clern s,,Record FILED on 08/20/2013 in the Court of APpeals and the "##" reflects that Appellant is unaware of the page number for that specific cite. The same is followed for "RR" as the Repolrter's Record.

Additonal cites are given refering to the actions of the 13th District Court of Appeals. Again, dates are used to reference what happendiri the court of appeals. These dates are as listed on that court's docket (or case events) available on the internet and, as included herein, as APPENDIX "E".

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE (EXTENDED)

Javier De La Rosa, Jr., the Appellant, was originally a

juvenile when he was charged with this murder (that made headlines in south Texas). 1 When the juvenile court waived jurisdiction that court onltj had before it evidence of conduct that amounted to first degree murder. In fact, the juvenile court Order specifically only waived jurisdiction over 1st degree murder, which means

that the juvenile court only con*«dered that the possible punishment could be 5-99 years or life. SUPP CR (08/16/2013 & 08/20/2013) ##.

nevertheless, after further investigation, the State felt they

had additional evidence of retaliation (?? for child support even though the deceased was never pregnat ??), of robbery, (??

becuase the deceased's cell phone was missing and perhaps disappeared as an after-thought to the murder ??), and of kidnapping (?? when the deceased's mother was fully aware the deceased was leaving with Mr. De La Rosa ??). Therefore, before the adult district

court, the State indicted Mr. De La Rosa for Capital Murder.

1 CR (06/27/2012) 19.

At that time, the Capital Murder indictment subjected

Mr. De La Rosa, a juvenile, to an automatic^ capital LIFE sentence

without parole, if he was convicted. Again, that autotnatice

sentence was something the juvenile court never considered possible

when it made its decision to waive jurisdiction. Then, the State

used the laws's threat of an automatic LIFE sentence without

parole to coerce Mr. De La Rosa into pleading guilty to the lesser

included offense of first degree murder. 2 RR (08/29/2012) 3-7; 2nd Anders Brief ("AB") - Sufficiency of the Indictment. That

T~. It might be noted that the murder in this case was of Mr. De La Rosa's girlfriend and that it had nothing to do with any gang violence or any other criminal activity. Similarly, Mr. De La Rosa had absoultely no other criminal history (juvenile or otherwise).

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coerced guilty plea was made before the trial court only " and the trial court itself found Mr. De La Rosa guilty. 2 RR (08/29/2012) PASSIM. However, a few months later, and while this appeal was pending, the U.S. Supereme Court held that an automatic LIFE sentence without parole was an unconsitutional and illegal sentence for juveniles, like Mr. De La Rosa. Subsequently, this Court of Criminal Appeals also held that that Supreme Court ruling would be retroactively effective (to past conduct).

Even though the trial court itself found Mr. De La Rosa guilty, a Jury was seated to decide punishment alone. Mr. De La Rosa did not plead guilty to the Jury, nor did the Juryjs verdict include any finding of guilt. CR (06/27/2012) ##; 3 RR (08/29/2012) PASSIM. At sentencing, Mr. De La Rosa's trial counsel's sole strategy was to convince the Jury that a less harsh punishment was appropriate because, as a juvenile, Mr. De La Rosa's brain was not fully developed. 4 RR (08/29/2012) 78. Yet, trial counsel offered no evidence whatsoever of a scientific, medical, of psychological nature that would have supported his lone theory. None. Perhaps, not suprisingly th*n, the Jury returned a verdict of 90 years in prison. This appeal follows.

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STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY (EXTENDED)

In describing this appeal, the 13th District Court of Appeals

held that this appeal has a "unique posture and extreme circumstances APPENDIX "C" - COA Order of Contempt (10/21/2014) p 4. Yet,

one would hardly get that understanding by reading the Court's Opinion. APPENDIX "A". This is because the 13th District Court

of Appeals issued a pro forma, standard opinion used for Anders

2

appeals. The court reserved the facts that put this appeal

in a "unique posture and extreme circumstances" to footnotes.

And, ther"facts" provided in those footnotes, as well as other

"facts" in' the Opinion, are misleading and incomplete. Thus, pursuant to Rule 68.4(h) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure; it is necessary to address the procedural background of this

appeal in detail.

Appellnat was originally e'epresented on this appeal by

Reynaldo G. Garza, III, court-appointed on appeal only. Inspite

of the lack of a Certification of Defendant's Right to Appeal,

the 13th District Court of Appeals summarly determined that

Mr. De La Rosa did have a right to appeal. COA Notice (11/16/2012) Yet, Mr. Garza filed a motion to withdraw anf faccompaining Anders

brief. COA Docket (04/03/2013). Mr. De La Rosa, acting PRO SE,

requested access to the record. COA Docket (04/19/2013). And, there were difficulties with the appellate record being provided

to Mr. De La Rosa. COA Letter (06/04/2013) and APPENDIX "B" -

COA Order Abating Appeal (01/06/2014) p 3. When Mr. De La Rosa was finally provided with access to the appellate record, the

T. See, Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). 3. Had the court of appeals at anytime determined that there was no right to appeal, including because the Certification of Defendant's Right t0 Appeal was never filed, the proper disposition would have been DISMISSAL (not affirmed). See, Tex. R. App. Proc, 25.2 (d).

•XV

record was missing parts of the trial record, including the record

of the juvenile court proceedings (where the juvenile court waived jursidiction). COA Docket (11/18/2013).

Mr. De La Rosa filed a PRO SE motion to supplement the record

with this missing parts and the court of appeals REMANDED the

case back to the trial court for a hearing and determination

of "what constitutes a complete record." APPENDIX "D" - COA Order

(07/30/2013) p 2. However, Mr. De La Rosa was NOT represented by counsel at the remand hearing concerning the incomplete record;

and, the State was able to get Mr. De La Rosa, a juvenile, to

sign a stipulation about the some of the missing documents.

SUPP CR (08/16/2013 & 08/20/2013) PASSIM, SUPP RR (08/16/2013)

PASSIM. A supplemental record was filed on appeal that included

some priorly excluded pre-trial hearings, but not the juvenile

court proceedings.4 SUPP RR (09/09/2013), SUPP CR (08/20/2013).

Mr. De La Rosa filed a motion requesting for the juvenile

court proceedings to be included in the appellate reocrd and

complaining of the denial of counsel at the remanded hearing

concerning the incomplete record. COA Docket (11/18/2013).

A

Mr. De La Rosa also askeVfor additonal time to file a PRO SE

Response or, in the alternative, for the court of appeal to consider

that motion and all prior pleadings as his PRO SE Response.

The appeallate "e.»rmined and fully considered this motion and

all matters raised therein, [and was] of the opinion that it

should be and is GRANTED IN PART insofar as the Court considers

% The motion to supplement was actually carried with the case. COA Docket (07/30/2013). And then, it was denied in footnote 5 of the court's Opinion. Had the court of appeals meant that it was refusing- to accept the supplemental record that contained the juvenile court's Order waiving jurisdiction, then the appellate record would continue to support that the trial court had no jurisdiction. See, ^Rushing, v. State, 85 S.W.3d 283 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). Therefore, when the court denied thaT motion in a footnote, it must have meant that it was denying the only relief not priorly grassed — the supplementing of the juvenile court proceedings. COA Docket (08/16/2013).

this motion, together with the other pro se pleadings on file, as appellant's pro se brief in this matter. All other relief requested in this motion is DENIED." APPENDIX "B" - p 2. Then t-eft 13th District COurt of Appeals,:

"... conclude[d] that there [were] 'arguable'

appellate issues in this case. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826-27^ For instance, appellant has briefed issues pertaining tojurisdiction, the right to appeal, and the completeness of the appellate record. We note this matter has been plagued by repeated difficulties in assembling the appellate record. We further note that appellate counsel did not have the entire re£trd when he filed his ANders brief. We stress that this is not an exhaustive list of arguable issues that could be raised on appeal and, further, that we have not determined that any of these arguments have merit."

APPENDIX "B" - p 3. The court of appeals also specfically mentioned the "various issues pertaining to juvenile cases" raised by Mr. De La Rosa. APPENDIX "B" - p 2. Thus, the appellate court allowed first Anders counsel to withdraw and REMANDED the case

to the trial court to appoint new appellate counsel. Finally, the court of appeals ORDERED that, "Appellant's brief on the merits will be due thirtly days after the supplemental record is filed." APPENDIX "B" - p 4 (emphasis added).

After 7 extensions of time and another remand about the

delay, second Anders counsel, Rebecca E. RuBane, filed another Anders brief (under threat of contempt of court for the delay). In the time period before she filed the 2nd Anders brief, Mrs. RuBane never once communicated with Mr. De La Rosa. COA Docket (05/30/2014 & 06/10/2014). Mr. De La Rosa was seeking to have 2nd Anders counsel have the appelate record supplemented with the juvenile court proceedings. COA Docket (03/26/2014). The appellate court 5. It should be noted that 2nd Anders counsel's brief looks extremely similar to the 1st Anders brief (except for the missing cites and less explanation). It is not reaching, nor an overstatement, to say that 2nd Anders counsel prepared her Anders brief very quickly and under extreme duress.

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refused to require 2nd Anders counsel to communicate with Mr. De La Rosa COA Notice (06/13/2014). And, the appelate record was never ft supplemented with the juvenile court proceedings. Additionally, when 2nd Anders counsel filed her Anders brief she never complied with the new requirments of Kelly concerning providing Appellant (PRO SE) access to the appellate record. Because 2nd Anders counsel continued to comply with Kelly, the court of appeals held 2nd Anders counsel in contempt of court. APPENDIX "C".

Nevertheless, over Mr. De LA Rosa's objections, the court of appeals permitted 2nd Anders counsel to continue to represent Apellant. Mr. De La Rosa also complained that 2nd Anders counsel should not have been allowed to file an Anders brief when the court of appeals had previously held there were "Arguable issues." COA Docket (09/12/2014 & 10/06/2014). At least in part, that concern was carried with the case. COA Notice (motion to hold counsel in contempt) (i0/20/2014). In^UI" of that motion remaining pendinga&^the recognition that a PRO SE Response does not have to be a "brief", in its Opinion the court of appeals considered that no PRO SE Response was filed. APPENDIX "A" - p 3. And, Fi 2nd Anders counsel acknowledged the need to review the juvenile court proceedings in her second motion for extension of time. APPENDIX C p Z. Nevertheless, the 2nd Anders brief did not provide any mention, reference, nor discussion about the juvenile court proceedings whatsoever._ It appears 2nd Anders counsel's illness that caused the delay in filing a brief also resulted in her failure to remember to review the juvenile court record. la 7 In its Order of Contempt, the court of appeals caiimed that the court would fulfill the requirments of Kelly. APPENDIX "C". However, the appellate record (and docket listing) fails to support that the appellate court ever did anything to comply with Kelly_. Solely as an example, the Order of Contempt itsffif was not even mailed to Mr. De La Rosa. COA Notice/Letter (10/21/2014).

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the court of appeals summarly denied the complaintabout a 2nd Anders brief after the prior finding of "arguable issues" being present in the appeal. APPENDIX "A" - p 5, fn 5.

Thus, the court of appeals AFFIRMED the conviction claiming

there were no "reversible errors." APPENDNIX "A" - p 4. Amazingly,

ini footnote, the court of appeals transformed itje? previous "note"

about 1st Anders counsel not having the complete record into

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the sole reason behind the appointment fornew counsel. Perhaps

that mix-up of whS^y the court of appeals appointed new counsel

e

was the result of the numerous different panels of justices that

9

considered this appeal at different stages. This detailed procedural

history confirms th£ "unique poster and extreme circumstance" of this ap^peal. With this understanding, that is lacking from

the 13th District Court of Appeals Opinion, it is a slap in the

*

face to transparent justice for the court to summarily AFFIRM

without explaining the court's view on the numerous procedural irregularties encountered in this appeal.

8~! If the sole reason the court of appeals previously appointed new counsel was because 1st Anders counsel did not review the entire record, then the proper relief would have been to STRIKE the 1st Anders brief and allow 1st Anders counsel the opportunity to rebrief (with the entire record). See i.e., Holt v. State, 64 S.W.3d 434 (Tex.App. - Waco 2001); See also, Wilson v. State, 40 S.W.3d 192 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 2001)(explaining the difference between substantive and matter of form problems in Andersrbriefs and that matters:of form result only in rebriefing (not new counsel)). 9. For instance, while Justice Benavides, the author of the Opinion, is the only Justice on the Opinion's panel that was on the panel to find "arguable issues"; becuase the prior Order of Abatement (01/06/2014) was per curiam there is no indication that Justice Benavides was the lead voter on that panel for this case. And, whiLiJustice Benavides was on the panel to hold 2nd Anders counsel in contempt, she was not on the panel that REMANDED for hearing about the incomplete record. Moreover, it is unclear what panel, or single justice, ruled on the numerous motions.

. . ARGUMENT-

GIOBNDTONE: IN AN ANDERS APPEAL, ONCE THE APPELLATE COURT HOLDS THAT THERE ARE "ARGUABLE ISSUES" IN THE APPEAL, WHICH IS A DETERMINATION THAT THE APPEAL IS not WHOLLY FRIVOLOUS, MAY THE APPELLATE COURT SUBSEQUENTLY DISPOSE OF THE APPEAL BY SUSTAINING A SECOND ANDERS BREIF THAT DOES NOT DISCUSS THE PREVIOUSLY FOUND ARGUABLE ISSUES?

This Court has recently "acknowledged 'that there is a need for uniform procedures for those cases in which an Anders brief

is filed, especially as the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure

do not provide any explicit guidance.'" See, Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, (Tex.Crim. App. 2014) (quoting In re Schutlman), 252 S.W.3d 403, 410 (Tex.Crim.App.2008)). One Anders procedure

this Court has never addressed is whether, after an appellate

court, in response to an Anders brief, holds there are "arguable issues" in an appeal, may the appellate court subsequently approve of a second Anders brief filed by newly appointed counsel when

the new Anders brief fails to address the previously found "arguable issues." Yet, it does appear that at least one court has disapporved of such a procedure. See, Perryman v. State, 159 S.W.3d 778, 778- 779 (Tex.App. - Waco 2005). In this appeal, the 13th District Court of Appeals allowed 2nd Anders counsel to withdraw and AFFIRMED the conviction pursuant to a 2nd Anders brief that did not discuss the previously found "arguable issues" because, according to the court of appeal, there were no "reversible errors." COA Op. p 4.

Javier De La Rosa, the Appellant, specifically complained

to the appellate court that 2nd Anders counsel should:have: been required to file an Appellant's Brief on the Merits. See, COA Docket (09/12/2014 & 10/06/2014). Primarly, in its January 6, 2014

Order of Abatement, the court of appeals concluded there were "arguable issues." APPENDIX "B". Thus, under the law of the case doctrine, the-appellate court could not (lightly) change its - - prior holding. See, Satterwhite v. State, 858 S.W.2d 412, 430

(Tex.Crim.App.1993)(following law of the case doctrine after reversal and REMAND from the U.S. Supreme Court). Moreover,

in the Order of Abatement, the court of appeals specifically

ORDERED that newly appointed appellate counsel was to file an

"Appellant's brief on the merits..." APPENDIX "B". That Order was in complaince with this COurt's prior pronouncements thatfl the purpose of appointing new appellate counsel, after a prior Anders brief has been rejected, is so that new counsel can file

a merits brief containing the "arguable issues" pointed out by the appellate court and any other issues new counsel might find. See, Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409, Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 n.32 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Indeed, an Anders brief is NOT a brief on the merits, rather it is only a document supporting a motion to withdraw. See, Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 410-411.

Thus, the appellate court in this appeal should not have allowed 2nd Anders counsel to file her Anders brief. And, the appellate

court should not have AFFIRMED the conviction without the assistance

of counsel for the indigent Appellant (through the filing of a brief on the merits).

Along with the denial of several motions about this complaint, the 13th District Court of Appeals denied the motion to hold

a

2nd Anders in cdxempt for not filing a merits brief in footnote five of its Opinion. FN This Court should grant review to address this concern.

W. Mr. De La Rosa did not actually "pray" for the relief of 2nd Anders.

counsel to be held incontempt. Rather, Mr. De La Rosa pointed out -tkie-^o the court of appeals^hat its prior Orders had ORDERED that a merits brief be filed, in addition to the other arguments set out herein.

GROUND-TWO:- ONCE AN APPELATE COURT HOLDS A COURT-APPOINTED APPELLATE ATTORNEY IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR HER (NON)ACTIONS IN A PENDING APPEAL, MUST THAT ATTORNEY BE REMOVED FROM THAT APPEAL AND SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL APPOINTED TO REPRESENT THE INDIGENT APPELLANT?

The 13th District Court of Appeals held 2nd Anders counsel

in contempt of court for her actions, or inaction, during the

pendancy of this appeal. Specifically, 2nd Anders counsel was

held in contempt for her failure to comply with the requirments

of Kelly. APPENDIX "C". In that Order of Contempt, the appellate

court discussed 2nd Anders counsel's extensive delay in filing

Appellant's appellate brief. However, the appellate court failed

to discuss 2nd ANders counsel's refusal to communicate with

Mr. De La Rosa. See, COA Docket (03/26/2014, 05/30/2014, & 06/10/2014); COA Notice (06/13/2014). And, even after being found in contempt

of court, when the court of appeals 0RDERD 2nd Anders counsel

to notify Mr. De La Rosa about the court's Opinion, the appellate record (docket listing) reveals that 2nd Anders counsel also refused to comply with Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Yet, the court of appeals accepted the trial court's finding that Mr. De La Rosa had "not been denied the effective assistance of counsel." COA Order 08/11/2014.

Once again, Mr. De La Rosa complained that when 2nd Anders counsel was held in contempt of court that new counsel should be appointed. COA Docket 12/23/2014. Indeed, one appellate court has held that once appelate counsel is held in contempt of court in a specfic case then new appellate counsel must be appointed. See, In re Shelnutt, 695 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. App. - Austin 1985). 10. Mr. De La Rosa was able to learn of the Opinion from other sources in time to request an extension of time from the Court to file his PDR. Yet, this is a perfect example of why, once counsel has been held in contempt, it is probable that something is wrong and they will not, or are unable (becuase of illness), to comply with court Orders (and Rules).

-V

This should- also apply to Anders appeals because, even after

an Anders brief has been filed, counsel contrues to have a duty

to represent (and assist) an appellant. See, Schulman, 252 S.W.2d

11

at 411. When the 13th District Court of Appeals held 2nd Anders

S

counsel in contempt of court, the court Should have required

that new counsel be appointed. Review should be GRANTED to address this

GROUND THREE: IN AN ANDERS APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION WHERE THE APPELLANT WAS ORIGINALLY CHARGED AS A JUVENILE, AND WHEN ARTICLE 44.47 (b) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REQUIRES JUVENILE COURT WAIVER PROCEEDINGS TO BE A PART OF THE APPEAL AFTER THE CONVICTION, MUST THE APPELLATE RECORD EXAMINED BY THE APPELLATE COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE APPEAL IS WHOOLY FRIVOLOUS INCLUDE THE RECORD FROM THE JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS?

The Texas Legislature has provided that when a defendant

is originally charged as a juvenile and the juvenile court waives

jurisdiction, the appeal after the conviction includes any concerns

from the juvenile court proceedings. See, Moon v. State, PD-1215-13,

j^Tex. Crim. App. - December 10, 2014)(citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc, art. 44.47 (b)). And U.S. Supreme Court has mandated that there

must be meaningful appellate review opportunities for a juvenile

court's decision to waive its exclusive jurisdiction. Id. (following Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966)). More specifically,

this Court has held that it will continue to follow Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) that requires appellate courts

to conduct "a full examination of all proceedings, to decide

whether the case is wholly frivolous." See, Schulman, 252 S.W.3d

at 408-409. Thus, the question of if an appellate court can sustain

an Anders brief in such a case as this appeal, where Mr. De La Rosa

was originally charged as a juvenile and when the appellate court does not have and has never examined the record from the juvenile court proceedings.

11. Kelly tends to amplify the need for counsel to continue to provide assistance.

In this Anders appeal,_ no less than six (6) times the-appellate -

court heard from Mr. De La Rosa, acting PRO SE, about the need

to supplement the appellate record with the juvenile court proceedings.

COA Docket (07/05/2013, 08/21/2013, 11/18/2013. 03/26/2014, 06/10/2014, 09/12/2012, and 10/06/2014). And, Mr. De La Rosa explained that the juvenile court record was needed to demonstrate what "conduct" was before the juvenile court and that the adult district court did not have jurisdiction over the Capital Murder indicment.

COA Docket (11/18/2013). Amazingly, in its January 6, 2014 Abatement

Order, the court of appeals recognized that because the juvenile court record was not in the appellate record that "the completeness of the appellate record" was an "arguable issue." APPENDIX "B". Yet, in footnote 5 of its Opinion the court of appeals continued to refuse to supplement the appellate record with the record of the juvenile court proceedings.

Multiple appellate courts have held that in an Anders appeal counsel has a duty to review the record from all the proceedings below. See, Wilson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 335, 339-340 (Tex.App. -

12

Houston [1st Dist.] 2012)(lisintg cases). It would seem to follow that the entire record must be made available for the

appellate court to review, if the court is to meet its duty to examine "all proceedings" prior to determining that and Anders appeal is wholly frivolous. This court should GRANT review to determine if "All proceedings" includes juvenile court proceedings when the Appellant was originally charged as a juvenile. IT. See also, Davis v. State, 150 S.W.3d 196 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 2004), Ortiz v. State, 849 S.W.2d 921, 924 n. 6 (Tex.App. -Corpus Christi 1993), after remand, 885 S.W.2d 271.

s-

4

GROUND FOUR: IN AN ANDERS APPEAL, WHEN AN APPELLATE COURT REMANDS THE CASE BACK TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A HEARING AND DETERMINATION ABOUT THE COMPLETENESS OF THE APPELLATE RECORD, MUST THE APPELLANT BE AFFORDED THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THAT HEARING ABOUT THE COMPLETENESS OF THE RECORD? [SUPP RR (08/16/2013)]

This Court has held that even after an ANders brief is filed,

court-apointed appellate counsel has a continuing duty to represent

and assist an appellant. See, Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411.

Additionally, the right to counsel is such a right that it must

be implemented (when not waived) even without a request from the

criminally accused. See, Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353,

359 n. 40 (Tex.Crim.App.2008), Oliver v. State, 872 S.W.2d 713, 714-715 (Tex.Crim.App.2996). Mr. De La Rosa has never waived his right to counsel and has a right to counsel in this appeal.

See i.e, Tex. Code Crim. Proc, art. 1.051( ). Yet, upon REMAND, at the hearing concerning the incomplete record, no counsel was

provided to Mr. De La Rosa. SUPP RR (08/16/2013) PASSIM.

Mr. De La Rosa complained to the court of appeals that counsel

was not provided upon REMAND at the hearing concerning the incomplete

record. COA Docket (11/18/2013). Appellant explained that effective

counsel at the hearing would have made sure that the appellate

record was "completed" with the entire record from the juvenile

court proceedings. The court of appeals disregarded this complaint -•

perhaps hoping that newly appointed counsel would insure the

appeallate record was completed with the juvenile court proceedings.

APPENDIX "B". Yet, it was not to be.

It is well-established that when an appeal is REMANDED for

further consideration, an appellant has a right to the assistance

of counsel to file a supplemental brief. See, Jennings v. State, 890 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); See also, Carmell v. Quarterman 292 Fed. Appx. 317 (5th Cir. 2006)(on remand from Supreme Court).

This principle should extend to when an appeal is REMANDED to the

trial court for any hearing -- even in an Anders appeal. This

Court should GRANT review to consider this concern.

GROUND FIVE: IN AN ANDERS APPEAL, WHERE ACCORDING TO THE U.S.

SUPREME COURT A FINDING OF "WHOLLY FRIVOLOUS" REQUIRES LESS MERIT TO AN APPEAL THAN "UNLIKELY TO PREVAIL ON APPEAL", "NO GRAVE AND PREJUDICAL ERRORS", AND "THAT THE APPEAL WOULD BE UNSUCCESSFUL", DOES THE STANDARD USED BY THE 13TH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS OF NO "REVERSIBLE ERROR" CORRECTLY MEASURE WHETHER THE APPEAL IS "WHOLLY FRIVOLOUS" -- ESPECIALLY WHEN THE COURT OF APPEM.S PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT THERE WERE "ARGUABLE ISSUES" PRESENT IN THE APPEAL?

For an indignet appellant to have no right on appeal to

have dt»<Utnsel to file a merits brief, the appeal must be "wholly frivolous." See, Smith v. Robbins, 120 S.Ct. 746, 756 (2000). What ever else the stan^dard for determining if an appeal is "wholly frivolous", the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the

n

appeal must have less merit tha\,:

"unlikely to prevail on appeal", "no grave and prejudical error", and "that the appeal would be unsuccessful."

See, Robbins, 120 S.Ct. at 761. Yet, in the past this Court

has sanctioned standards in place of "wholly frivolous" such as, no harmful error and no reversible error. See, Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 838, High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811-812 (Tex. Crim.App.[Panel Op.] 1978). This court should GRANT review to clarify the correct standard for determining whether an appeal is "who/Jly frivolous", which should not include any measurement of harmful or reversible error.

In this appeal, in its Opinion the 13th District Court of Appeals held there was no "reversible error." COA Op. p 4.

•1-

5

Yet, ironically, in a prior Order the court of appeals had held"

there were "arguable issues" in the appeal. APPENDIX "B". The term arguable issue is the most common term used to measure whether

an apeal is wholly frivolous. See, Robbins, 120 S.Ct. at 764.

?

Indeed, in its prior Order, the court of appeals cited to decisions

holding appeals were not wholly frivolous by concluding there

were arguable issues. APPENDIX "B". Does that mean that even

though there are arguable issues in this appeal (and the appeal

is not wholly frivolous", that becuse there are no reversible

errors, that Mr. De La Rosa is not entitled to have appelate

counsel file a brief on the merits?

Additionally, the decision in this appeal is in direct conflict

with Martinez v. State, 313 S.W.3d 355 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st

Dist] 2009). In Martinez the appellate court held that the error of when the trial court failed to instruct the jury that extraneous

offenses had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt was an "arug&ble issue" irrespective of any consideration of hartfc. In this appeal, at both ANders counsel prese«kfied in their ANders briefs the error

from Mr. De La Rosa's trial where the trial court failed to instruct

the Jury that extraneous offenses had to be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. 2nd Anders Brief - Charge Error in Jury Instructions.

Yet, Mr. De La Rosa's ANders counsels also argued against him

on the issue of harm. But, harm, under both Rule 44.2(a) and

44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, are independent

reviews undertaken by the appellate court and an appellant never

has the burden to prove any type of harm. See, Chapman v. Calalifornia,

87 S.Ct. 824, 829 (1967), Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4-5

(Tex.Crim.App.2001). Thus considerations of harm should never impact whether an appeal is "wholly frivolous." Yet, in-conflictwith Martinez, inthis appeal, because there was no "reverisble error", the court of apeals sustained the ANders brief that

covered the very same "arguable issue" that Matinez held made the appeal not wholly frivolous.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recongnized the inherent ambiguity

in the use of the term "arguable issue" to describe whether an appeal is wholly frivolous. See, Robbins, 120 S.Ct. at 762, 764. Specificaly, when , as here, the appellate court used the term HA "arguable issue" in its REAMND Order -- did the court mean an

"arguable issue" that counsel had a duty to address in an Anders brief, or an "arguable issue" in the normal sense of meaning that the appeal was not "wholly frivolous?" The Supreme Court left if to the States to establsih more defjfnative standards,

or terms, to determine, or describe, whether an appeal is wholly

frivolus. Id. at 762. This appeal is the perfect case to address

this i*sue, as the court of appeals used incompatable terms and

this Court should GRANT review to address this issue.

GROUND SIX: IN THIS ANDERS APPEAL, DO ANY OF THE "ARGUABLE ISSUES"

PRESENTED BY THE APPELANT, PRO SE, HAVE A BASIS IN LAW OR FACT, SO THAT THE APPEAL IS NOT WHOLLY FRIVOLOUS, TO INCLUDE:

1) THE GUILTY PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY WHEN IT WAS INDUCED BY THE LAW'S THREAT OF AN AUTOMATICE LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT PAROLE WHICH. WAS SUBSEQUENTLY HELD TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND AN^ILLEGAL SENTENCE FOR JUVENILES, LIKE APPELLANT [2 && (08/29/2012) PASSIM];

2) THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CAPITAL MURDER INDICTMENT WHEN THE ONLY CONDUCT THE JUVENILE COURT CONSIDERED AND WAIVED JURISDICTION OVER WAS FIRST DEGREE MURDER [SUPP CR (08/16/2013 & 08/20/2013) ##];

3) TRIAL COUNSELS WERE INEFFECTIVE WHEN THEY FAILED TO OFFER ANY SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL, OR PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR SOLE STRATEGY AT SENTENCING,

-cl-

10

WHICH WAS THAT BECAUSE A JUVENILE'S BRAIN IS NOT- FULLY DEVELOPED APPELLANT DESERVED A LIGHTER PUNISHMENT [4 RR (08/29/2012) 78];

4) THE TRIAL WAS IMPROPERLY SPLIT INTO A TWO- STAGE TRIAL AND THE JURY WAS AN UNAUTHORIZED TRIER OF FACT TO DETERMINE PUNISHMENT, AFTER THE TRIAL COURT ALONE ACCEPTED THE GUILTY PLEA AND FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY, SO THAT THE SENTNCE IS VOID [2 RR (08/29/2012) ##] .

In his numerous PRO SE pleadings, filed throughout this

appeal, Mr. De La Rosa presented all kinds of arguable issues.

For illistrative purposes, four are set fourth herein to demonstrate

that this appeal is NOT wholly fr^iolous.

1) INVOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA

Ignorance of the law being no excuse, one must consider

that Mr. De La Rosa was well aware of the laws' threat of an

automatic LIFE sentence without parole, at the time he plead

guilty, if he was convicted of Capital Murder. See, Wilson v.

State, 825 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1992)(applying doctrine to procedural laws). Yet, not four months after the guilty plea >rt.n this case (and while this appeal was pending_ the U.S. Supr*fte»££burt held that an auotmatic LIFE sentence without parole was unconsitutional and an illegal Sentence for a juvenile like Mr. De La Rosa. See, Miller v. Albama, 132 S.Ct. 2155 (2012).15 & 16 It is well-established that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

and Fourteeth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution requires guilty

pleas to be made intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily. See,

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Mr De La Rosa's guilty IT! Ironically, upon the Capital Mur^r indictment, the trial court incorrectly admonished Mr. De La Rosa that the ra§36of punishment was 5-99 years or life (which was the range for the lesser included plea bargain).

14. Is there any doubt that trial counsels would have been ineffeetive had they failed to advise Mr. De La Rosa of the proper range of punishment for Capital Murder that he was indicted for? See, Padilla v. Kntucky, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 296-297 (2010)("critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of 'the advantage and disadvantages of a plea agreement. )

15. Mr. De la Rosa plead guilty on March 8, 2012 and the Superme Court decided Miller on June 25, 2012.

•2) TRIAL COURT HAD NO-JURISDICTION

Of course, Mr. De 1A Rosa should never have been indicted

for Capital mUrder in any event. The Texas Supreme Court has

related that a juvenile court may not make a finding about a

lessserious charge onlHy* to allow an adult district court to

proceed on a more serious charge. See, Matter of R.A.G., 866 S.W.2d 7€V.

199, 200 (.1993). Yet, in this case, the juvenile court only made a finding o£ probable cause for first degree murder. SUPP

CR (08/16/2013 & 08/20/2013) ##.18 Nevertheless, when Mr. De La Rosa got to the adult district court, he was indicted for Capital 19 Rr 70 Murder. The trial court had no jurisdiction over the

21

Capital Murder indictment and the proceedings thereunder are VOID. v

3) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

There is lots of scientific, medical, and psychological

evidence that exisit to demonstrate that the brain of a juvenile

is not fully developed. See, Miller, 132 S.Ct. at , Roper v.

16. This Court of Criminal Appeals has held that Miller applies retroactively.

See, Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66 (Tex.Crim.App.2014). Thus, it applies to the past conduct of the guilty plea. .

17. In her Anders brief, 2nd ANders counsel recognized that the purpose of the plea bargain was for Mr. De La Rosa to avoid the automatic LIFE sentSSce without parole.

18. The juvenile court record would also demonstrate that the evidence (or allegations)

of the capital factors (retalfetion, robbery, and kidnapping) were not before the juvenile court; thus the idea that the adult district court may indict for any "conduct" before the juvenile court would not apply here. See, Livar v. State, 929 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 1996)(following Ex parte Alien, 618 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1981)).

19. Meaning that the juvenile court also never considered the possibabilty of a sentence of LIFE without parole when it decided to waive jurisdiction.

20. Because the juvenile court did waive jurisdiction over 1st degree murder, just not Capital Murder, Article 4.18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not apply to this ground. See, De La Cerda v. State, 325 S.W.3d 367, 379-380 (Tex.Crim.App.2011), Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). And, even if an objection was necessary to this jurisdictional error, there was no straegic reason for trial counsel to fail to object to prevent a Capital Murder chagre and counsel was ineffective not to object. See also, Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 666-667 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)(right to appeal after open plea of guilty). i, 21. The Judgment for this conviction specifcally records that it is for a lesser included offense, so that it rests upon the Capital Murder indicment.

- /I-

Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 118-3, 1195 (2005). And, that was Mr.- De-La- Rosa-' s trial counsel's sole strategy at sentencing: to convince the Jury that a less harsh punishment was desrved because a juvenile's

brain was not fully developed. 4 RR (08/29/2012) 78. Yet, trial

counsel failed to present to the Jury any scientific, medical,

or psychological evidence to sufcpprt counsel's sole strategy and counsel was ineffective. See, Ex parte Amezquita, 223 SW.3d

363 (Tex.Crim.App.2006), Ex parte Brigs, 187 S.W.3d 458 (Tex.Crim. App.2005).22 4) GUILTY PLEA TO JUDGE = NO JURY

Peri-hps, the trial court, rather than a Jury, could have considered the Supreme Court's opinions that establish that juveniles' brains are not fully developed. Indeed, Mr. De La Rosa plead

guilty before the trial court alone -- making it a ministrial

duty for the trial court to also assess punishment. See, In re Tharp,

23

393 S.W.3d 751 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) Because this was a mandatory

unitary proceeding, a second finder-of-fact, the Jury, was not authorized to return a verdict on punishment. Making the 90 year

24

sentence VOID.

With these arguable issues this appeal is not wholly frivolous.

22"! See, Andrews y. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex.Crim. App. 2005)

(IAC on appeal when no plausible stratgic excuse).

23. This "ministrial duty" is a systemic requirment that is non-waivable and under Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) this issue may be raised for the first time on appeal. See, Stine v. State, 908 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

24. It is wellknown that a void sentnce may also be raised at anytime.

IV

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, ALL CONSIDERED, JAVIER DE LA ROSA, JR, the Appellant, acting. PRO SE, PRAYS this Honorable Court GRANT review in this case, for, one, some, or all of the reasons stated herein, or for any reason the Court might wish to review on it own motion; AND, ANY AND ALL OTHER RELIEF THIS COURT CONSIDERES PROPER IN THE

INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

>ectfu¥ly/ Siibmi/t/ted,

/^<A, JuL er De'-'La Rosa, Jr TDCJ No. 1781303 guson Unit 20 Savage Dr. Midway, TX 75852

APPELLANT PRO SE

VERIFICATION / CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Javier De La Rosa, Jr., TDCJ Id No. 1781303, being currently incarcerated in the Ferguson Unit of TDCJ-CID, in Madil-sn County, Texas; do declare under the penalty of perjury that the facts in this PDR are true and correct and that on the date executed below that I have casued a copy of this PDR to be mailed 1st Class USPS to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Cameron County District Attorney, and the State Prosecuting Attorney by using the prison mail system.

EXECUTED on this the a day of

ravier De La Rosa,Jr. Appellant PRO SE

\3

CCA NO. PD- -15 COA NO. 13-12-00368-CR

APPENDIX "A'

Opinion

13th District Court of Appeals

COA No. 13-12-00368-CR

flLt, LUfV

CHIEF JUSTICE NUECES COUNTY COURTHOUSE ROGELIO VALDEZ 901 LEOPARD, 10TH FLOOR CORPUS CHRISTI.TEXAS 78401 -

JUSTICES 361-888-0416 (TEL)

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ 361-888-0794 (FAX)

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA HIDALGO COUNTY GINA M. BENAVIDES ADMINISTRATION BLDG.

GREGORY T. PERKES NORA L. LONGORIA Court of Sppeate 100 E. CANO, 5TH FLOOR EDINBURG, TEXAS 78539 CLERK 956-318-2405 (TEL)

DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Qfytvtztnti) Mstxitt at Gfexa* 956-318-2403 (FAX)

www. txcourts.gov/13thcoa

February 12,2015

Hon. Rebecca RuBane Hon. Luis V. Saenz Attorney at Law District Attorney 847 E. Harrison Street 964 E. Harrison Brownsville, TX 78520 Brownsville, TX 78520-7123 * DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * * DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Re: Cause No. 13-12-00368-CR Tr.Ct.No. 11-CR-17-A Style: JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR. v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

Enclosed please find the opinion and judgment issued by the Court on this date.

Very truly yours,

Dorian E. Ramirez, Clerk

DER:mrq Enc. cc: 107th District Court/Cameron County (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

Hon. Eric Garza, District Clerk (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) State Prosecuting Attorney (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

NUMBER 13-12-00368-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR., Appellant,

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Benavides Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

On March 8, 2012, appellant Javier De La Rosa pleaded guilty to murder, a

first-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02 (West, Westlaw 2013 through

3d C.S.). De La Rosa elected for the jury to determine his punishment, and a trial was held solely on the issue of punishment. The jury assessed punishment at ninety years'

imprisonment with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Institutional Division.

This appeal followed. De La Rosa's court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief.1

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. Anders Brief

Pursuant to Anders v. California, De La Rosa's court-appointed appellate counsel

has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the

record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id.

Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional

evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal.

See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("In Texas, an

Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.") (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), De La

Rosa's counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

1 On April 3, 2013, De La Rosa's initial appellate attorney filed an Anders brief and corresponding motion to withdraw. On January 6,2014, we issued an order noting that appellate counsel did not have the entire record before he filed his Anders brief. Accordingly, we: (1) granted De La Rosa's appellate attorney's motion to withdraw; (2) abated the appeal; and (3) remanded the case to the trialcourt to appoint a new appellate attorney to review the complete record on appeal. On August 18, 2014, De La Rosa's second appellate attorney filed an Anders brief and corresponding motion to withdraw.

reversible error in the trial court's judgment. This Court has also ensured that De La

Rosa has been (1) notified that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to

withdraw; (2) provided with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed of his rights to file a

pro se response,2 review the record preparatory to filing that response, and seek

discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided with a

form motion for pro se access to the appellate record, lacking only De La Rosa's

signature and the date and including the mailing address for the court of appeals, with

instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436

S.W.3d at 319-20, Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252

S.W.3d at 409 n.23.

In this case, De La Rosa filed neither a timely motion seeking pro se access to the

appellate record nor a motion for extension of time to do so. No pro se response was

filed.3

II. Independent Review

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief, and we

have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178

2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that "the pro se response need not complywith the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues." In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

3 This Court granted three motions for extension of time to give De La Rosa an opportunityto file a pro se brief, if any. A reasonable amount of time has passed, and no pro se response has been filed.

S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by

indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed

the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement

of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1."); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no

reversible error in the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

III. Motion to Withdraw

In accordance with Anders, De La Rosa's attorney has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) ("[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he

must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.") (citations omitted)). We grant counsel's

motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court's opinion, counsel is

ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court's judgment to De La Rosa and to

advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.4 See Tex. R. App. P.

48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d

4 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals, see Tex. R. App. P. 68.3, and should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.4.

670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).5

/s/ Gina M. Benavides GINA M. BENAVIDES, Justice

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed the 12th day of February, 2015.

5 De La Rosa filed the following motions, which remain pending: (1) motion to supplement the appellate record; (2) motion to forward original exhibits to this Court; and (3) motion to hold appellate counsel in contempt. After due consideration, we deny all of these motions.

CCA NO". PD- ' -15 COA No. 13-12-00368-CR

APPENDIX "B1

Order Abating Appeal - 01/06/2014

(Concluding there are "arguable issues" in this appeal)

13th District Court of Appeals

COA No. 13-12-00368-CR

CHIEF JUSTICE NUECES COUNTY COURTHOUSE ROGELIO VALDEZ 901 LEOPARD, 10TH FLOOR CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 78401 JUSTICES 361-888-0416 (TEL)

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ 361-888-0794 (FAX) DORI CONTRERAS GARZA GINAM. BENAVIDES HIDALGO COUNTY GREGORY T. PERKES ADMINISTRATION BLDG. NORA L. LONGORIA Court of gppeate 100E. CANO, 5TH FLOOR EDINBURG, TEXAS 78539 CLERK 956-318-2405 (TEL)

DORIAN E. RAMIREZ TEInrteentf) ©tatrtct of tEexatf 956-318-2403 (FAX)

January 6, 2014

Hon. Benjamin Euresti Jr. Judge, 107th District Court 974 E. Harrison Brownsville, TX 78520

Re: Cause No. 13-12-00368-CR Tr.Ct.No. 11-CR-17-A Style: JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR. v. THE STATE OF TEXAS Dear Judge Euresti:

Enclosed please find copy of an order issued by this Court on this date.

Very truly yours,

Dorian E. Ramirez, Clerk

DER Enc. cc: Hon. Reynaldo G. Garza III Mr. Javier De La Rosa Jr., TDCJ #1781303 Hon. Luis V. Saenz Hon. Aurora De La Garza, District Clerk

NUMBER 13-12-00368-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR., Appellant,

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

ORDER ABATING APPEAL

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria Order Per Curiam

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), appellant's counsel

has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the

record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Counsel's brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation ofthe record demonstrating why counsel concluded there are no arguable grounds for relief.

Currently pending before the Court is "Appellant's Pro Se Motion Concerning Reinstatement of Appeal, Denial of Counsel at Abatement Hearing, lack of Access to Complete Record, (Third) Additional Time to File Pro Se Response to Counsel's Anders Brief Due to Appellant's [Transient] Status, and Related Relief; or, in the Alternative, For Court to Consider All Prior and Current Pro Se Filings as Informal Pro Se Response io Counsel's /Anders Brief." The motion requests assorted relief pertaining to the certification of appellant's right to appeal, the completeness of the record, appellant's access to the record and supplemental records, appellant's right to the assistance of counsel on appeal and during abatement hearings, counsel's duty to review the entire appellate record in performing an Anders review, and various issues pertaining to juvenile cases. The motion requests, in the alternative, that this Court consider this pleading and others as appellant's pro se brief. The Court, having examined and fully considered this motion and all matters raised therein, is of the opinion that it should be and is GRANTED

IN PART insofar as the Court considers this motion, together with the other pro se pleadings on file, as appellant's pro se brief in this matter. All other relief requested in this motion is DENIED.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case iswholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). In this evaluation, we consider the record, the arguments raised in the

Anders brief, and issues appellant points out in his pro se brief. See United States v. Wagner, 158 F.3d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A court of appeals has two options when an /Anders brief and a subsequent pro se response are filed. After reviewing the entire record, it may: (1) determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it finds no reversible error; or (2) determine that there are arguable grounds for appeal and remand the case to the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If the court finds arguable grounds for appeal, it may not review those grounds until after new counsel has briefed those issues on appeal. Id.

After our independent review, we conclude that there are "arguable" appellate issues in this case. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826-27. For instance, appellant has briefed issues pertaining to jurisdiction, the right to appeal, and the completeness of the appellate record. We note that this matter has been plagued by repeated difficulties in assembling the appellate record. We further note that appellate counsel did not have the entire record when he filed his Anders brief. Westress thatthis is not an exhaustive list of arguable issues that could be raised on appeal and, further, that we have not determined that any of these arguments have merit.

We conclude that appellate counsel has met his professional obligations under Anders and GRANT his motion to withdraw. We ABATE the appeal and REMAND the case to thetrial court to appoint a new appellate attorney. See Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409. The trial court shall make the appointment and ensure that a supplemental record of the proceedings is filed in this Court no later than 20 days from the date of this order.

The appeal will be reinstated upon receipt of the supplemental record. Appellant's brief

on the merits will be due thirty days after the supplemental record is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 6th day of January, 2014.

CCA No. PD- -15 COA No. 13-12-00368-CR

APPENDIX "C

Order of Contempt '(io/^'i'^'v (In the Matter of Rebecca Rubane)

13th Court of Appeals

COA No. 13-12-00368-CR

Br

NUMBER 13-12-00368-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI—EDINBURG

IN THE MATTER OF REBECCA RUBANE1

On appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

ORDER OF CONTEMPT

Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Order Per Curiam

This is a contempt proceeding ancillary to appeal number 13-12-00368-CR, styled

Javier De La Rosa Jr. v. State of Texas, currently pending in this Court. Appellant is

represented on appeal by appointed counsel, Ms. Rebecca Rubane. Ms. Rubane is

appellant's second court-appointed appellate counsel. The trial court appointed Ms.

1 Ancillaryto Javier De La Rosa Jr. v. The State of Texas, 13-12-00368-CR.

Rubane as appellant's counsel on January 13, 2014, and we ordered that appellant's brief was due to this Court on January 15, 2014.

On February 13, 2014, Ms. Rubane filed her first motion for extension of time to

file appellant's appellate brief citing her busy schedule. This Court granted the motion and ordered that appellant's briefwas due on March 28, 2014. On March 31, 2014, Ms.

Rubane filed a second motion for extension of time to her appellant's brief citing a need to request and review appellant's juvenile record. We granted this motion and ordered

that appellant's briefwas due on May 12, 2014. On May 15, 2014, Ms. Rubane filed her

third motion for extension of time to file appellant's brief. In this motion, Ms. Rubane

informed the Court that she suffered from a serious illness that "greatly reduced" her ability to work. This Court granted Ms. Rubane's motion and ordered appellant's brief due on June 26, 2014. On June 26, 2014, Ms. Rubane failed to file appellant's brief.

This Court made unsuccessful attempts to contact Ms. Rubane by telephone. On July I, 2014, this Court issued an order directing Ms. Rubane to file appellant's brief by July II, 2014. On July 11, 2014, Ms. Rubane filed her "final" motion for extension of time to

file appellant's brief. Ms. Rubane cited continuing health concerns and medical

treatment as the reasons for her inability to file her brief. This Court granted Ms.

Rubane's motion and ordered her to file appellant's brief by July 18, 2014. On July 18,

2014, Ms. Rubane failed to file her brief or any other motion.

On July 22, 2014, this Court issued an order of abatement and remanded the case

to the trial court to hold a hearing to determine (1) whether appellant desires to prosecute

this appeal; (2) why appellant's counsel has failed to file a brief and whether counsel has effectively abandoned the appeal; (3) whether appellant has been denied effective

assistance of counsel; (4) whether appellant's counsel should be removed; and (5)

whether appellant is indigent and entitled to new court-appointed counsel. On August

4, 2014, the trial court held a hearing and found that (1) appellant would like to proceed

with his appeal; (2) Ms. Rubane had been ill; and (3) appellant has not been denied

effective assistance of counsel. The trial court further recommended that counsel be

allowed to stay as appellant's current attorney and suggested a new deadline of August

18, 2014 for counsel to file her brief. On August 11, 2014, this Court ordered Ms.

Rubane to file appellant's appellate brief by August 18, 2014, or appear for a hearing to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. On August 18, 2014, Ms.

Rubane filed an Anders brief related to this cause. Although the brief was marked as

"filed," the Court notified Ms. Rubane that her Anders brief was not in compliance with

Kelly v. State. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 315-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). On August 19,

2014, the Court sent a letter to Ms. Rubane notifying her of the deficiencies of the brief

and requested that she submit documentary evidence in compliance with Kelly by August

29, 2014. On August 29, 2014, the clerk of the court sent a reminder e-mail

correspondence to Ms. Rubane about the Kelly compliance deadline. Ms. Rubane

acknowledged the e-mail correspondence and replied that she would "file it soon." Later

that evening, Ms. Rubane emailed the clerk of this court apologizing and stating that her

computer had "crashed," would not be able to file her Kelly compliance certification by the

deadline, but would file it the following morning. No filing was made.

On September 15, 2014, this Court issued an order to Ms. Rubane ordering her to

comply with the requirements set forth in Kelly and to notify this Court of her compliance

with the case law and provide documentary proof that she had complied with its

requirements. The order further stated that if Ms. Rubane failed to file this notice by

September 19, 2014, she was ordered to appear in the Edinburg courtroom of this Court

at 9:00 a.m. on September 25, 2014 to show cause why she should not be held in

contempt of court. On September 19, 2014, Ms. Rubane failed to file her requisite Kelly

notice with this Court. Over the course of September 22 and 23, 2014, the clerk of this

Court attempted to contact Ms. Rubane by telephone to assist her with filing the requisite

Kelly notice. On September 23, 2014, Ms. Rubane telephoned the clerk of this Court to

notify her that she was ready to file her notice, but was experiencing technical difficulties

because her computer had again "crashed." Later that day, Ms. Rubane filed a

document with this Court that was not in compliance with Kelly. The clerk again

telephoned Ms. Rubane to notify her of the deficiency. On September 24, 2014, Ms.

Rubane filed another document that did not comply with Kelly.

At 9:00 a.m. on September 25, 2014, pursuant to its September 15, 2014 order,

this Court held a hearing in its Edinburg courtroom on this matter.2 Ms. Rubane was not

present. Accordingly, this Court took judicial notice of the procedural and factual

histories of this case and found Ms. Rubane in contempt of this Court. Furthermore, in

light of the unique posture and extreme circumstances of the case, the Court stated that

it would fulfill the requisite duties under Kelly to ensure compliance. It is therefore

2 A record was made of this hearing. An electronic transcript of this hearing is on file with the clerk of this Court.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the Thirteenth Court of Appeals that:

(1) Rebecca Rubane is in contempt of this Court for willfully and intentionally failing to comply with (1) this Court's order dated September 15, 2014 by failing to comply with the requisites of Kelly v. State as outlined in the Court's order and correspondence with Ms. Rubane and failing to appear before this Court on September 24,2014 to show cause why she should not be held in contempt.

(2) Rebecca Rubane pay a fine of $500.00 to the Clerk of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 31, 2014. In the event the fine is not timely paid, it shall be collectible in the manner provided by law.

(3) For any future appearance before this Court, Rebecca Rubane shall fully comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure; and

(4) Rebecca Rubane ensure that this Court has current contact information for her, including telephone number(s), email address, and business address.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs of this proceeding shall be and are assessed

against Rebecca Rubane, for which execution may issue.

It is so ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 21st day of October, 2014.

I'lLfc LUl'V

NUECES COUNTY COURTHOUSE CHIEF JUSTICE 901 LEOPARD, 10TH FLOOR ROGELIO VALDEZ CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 78401 361-888-0416 (TEL)

JUSTICES 361-888-0794 (FAX)

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ DORI CONTRERAS GARZA HIDALGO COUNTY GINA M. BENAVIDES ADMINISTRATION BLDG.

GREGORY T. PERKES NORA L. LONGORIA Court of Sppeate 100E. CANO, 5TH FLOOR EDINBURG, TEXAS 78539 956-318-2405 (TEL)

CLERK DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Gfljfrteentf) ©tetrict of Gfaca* 956-318-2403 (FAX)

www. txcourts. gov/13thcoa. aspx

October 21, 2014

Hon. Rebecca RuBane Attorney at Law 847 E. Harrison Street Brownsville, TX 78520 'DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL & CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED* 7011 1570 0002 2572 2790

Re: Cause No. 13-12-00368-CR Tr.Ct.No. 11-CR-17-A Style: JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR. v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

Dear Ms. RuBane:

Enclosed please find a copy of an order issued by this Court on this date.

Very truly yours,

Dorian E. Ramirez, Clerk

DER:mrq Enc. cc: Hon. Luis V. Saenz (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

Hon. Aurora De La Garza, District Clerk (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL) Hon. Benjamin Euresti Jr./107th District Court (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

NUMBER 13-12-00368-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI—EDINBURG

IN THE MATTER OF REBECCA RUBANE1

On appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

ORDER OF CONTEMPT

Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Order Per Curiam

This is a contempt proceeding ancillary to appeal number 13-12-00368-CR, styled

Javier De La Rosa Jr. v. State of Texas, currently pending in this Court. Appellant is

represented on appeal by appointed counsel, Ms. Rebecca Rubane. Ms. Rubane is

appellant's second court-appointed appellate counsel. The trial court appointed Ms.

Ancillary to JavierDe La Rosa Jr. v. The State of Texas, 13-12-00368-CR.

Rubane as appellant's counsel on January 13, 2014, and we ordered that appellant's brief

was due to this Court on January 15, 2014.

On February 13, 2014, Ms. Rubane filed her first motion for extension of time to

file appellant's appellate brief citing her busy schedule. This Court granted the motion

and ordered that appellant's brief was due on March 28, 2014. On March 31, 2014, Ms.

Rubane filed a second motion for extension of time to her appellant's brief citing a need

to request and review appellant's juvenile record. We granted this motion and ordered

that appellant's brief was due on May 12, 2014. On May 15, 2014, Ms. Rubane filed her

third motion for extension of time to file appellant's brief. In this motion, Ms. Rubane

informed the Court that she suffered from a serious illness that "greatly reduced" her

ability to work. This Court granted Ms. Rubane's motion and ordered appellant's brief

due on June 26, 2014. On June 26, 2014, Ms. Rubane failed to file appellant's brief.

This Court made unsuccessful attempts to contact Ms. Rubane by telephone. On July

I, 2014, this Court issued an order directing Ms. Rubane to file appellant's brief by July

II, 2014. On July 11, 2014, Ms. Rubane filed her "final" motion for extension of time to

file appellant's brief. Ms. Rubane cited continuing health concerns and medical

treatment as the reasons for her inability to file her brief. This Court granted Ms.

Rubane's motion and ordered her to file appellant's brief by July 18, 2014. On July 18,

2014, Ms. Rubane failed to file her brief or any other motion.

On July 22, 2014, this Court issued an order of abatement and remanded the case

to the trial court to hold a hearing to determine (1) whether appellant desires to prosecute

this appeal; (2) why appellant's counsel has failed to file a brief and whether counsel has effectively abandoned the appeal; (3) whether appellant has been denied effective

assistance of counsel; (4) whether appellant's counsel should be removed; and (5)

whether appellant is indigent and entitled to new court-appointed counsel. On August

4, 2014, the trial court held a hearing and found that (1) appellant would like to proceed

with his appeal; (2) Ms. Rubane had been ill; and (3) appellant has not been denied

effective assistance of counsel. The trial court further recommended that counsel be

allowed to stay as appellant's current attorney and suggested a new deadline of August

18, 2014 for counsel to file her brief. On August 11, 2014, this Court ordered Ms.

Rubane to file appellant's appellate brief by August 18, 2014, or appear for a hearing to

show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. On August 18, 2014, Ms.

Rubane filed an Anders brief related to this cause. Although the brief was marked as

"filed," the Court notified Ms. Rubane that her Anders brief was not in compliance with

Kelly v. State. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 315-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). On August 19,

2014, the Court sent a letter to Ms. Rubane notifying her of the deficiencies of the brief

and requested that she submit documentary evidence in compliance with Kelly by August

29, 2014. On August 29, 2014, the clerk of the court sent a reminder e-mail

correspondence to Ms. Rubane about the Kelly compliance deadline. Ms. Rubane

acknowledged the e-mail correspondence and replied that she would "file it soon." Later

that evening, Ms. Rubane emailed the clerk of this court apologizing and stating that her

computer had "crashed," would not be able to file her Kelly compliance certification by the

deadline, but would file it the following morning. No filing was made.

On September 15, 2014, this Court issued an order to Ms. Rubane ordering her to

comply with the requirements set forth in Kelly and to notify this Court of her compliance

with the case law and provide documentary proof that she had complied with its

requirements. The order further stated that if Ms. Rubane failed to file this notice by

September 19, 2014, she was ordered to appear in the Edinburg courtroom of this Court

at 9:00 a.m. on September 25, 2014 to show cause why she should not be held in

contempt of court. On September 19, 2014, Ms. Rubane failed to file her requisite Kelly

notice with this Court. Over the course of September 22 and 23, 2014, the clerk of this

Court attempted to contact Ms. Rubane by telephone to assist her with filing the requisite

Kelly notice. On September 23, 2014, Ms. Rubane telephoned the clerk of this Court to

notify her that she was ready to file her notice, but was experiencing technical difficulties

because her computer had again "crashed." Later that day, Ms. Rubane filed a

document with this Court that was not in compliance with Kelly. The clerk again

telephoned Ms. Rubane to notify her of the deficiency. On September 24, 2014, Ms.

Rubane filed another document that did not comply with Kelly.

At 9:00 a.m. on September 25, 2014, pursuant to its September 15, 2014 order,

this Court held a hearing in its Edinburg courtroom on this matter.2 Ms. Rubane was not

present. Accordingly, this Court took judicial notice of the procedural and factual

histories of this case and found Ms. Rubane in contempt of this Court. Furthermore, in

light of the unique posture and extreme circumstances of the case, the Court stated that

it would fulfill the requisite duties under Kelly to ensure compliance. It is therefore

2 A record was made of this hearing. An electronic transcript of this hearing is on file with the clerk of this Court.

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED by the Thirteenth Court of Appeals that:

(1) Rebecca Rubane is in contempt of this Court for willfully and intentionally failing to comply with (1) this Court's order dated September 15, 2014 by failing to comply with the requisites of Kelly v. State as outlined in the Court's order and correspondence with Ms. Rubane and failing to appear before this Court on September 24, 2014 to show cause why she should not be held in contempt.

(2) Rebecca Rubane pay a fine of $500.00 to the Clerk of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 31, 2014. In the event the fine is not timely paid, it shall be collectible in the manner provided by law.

(3) For any future appearance before this Court, Rebecca Rubane shall fully comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure; and

(4) Rebecca Rubane ensure that this Court has current contact information for her, including telephone number(s), email address, and business address.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs of this proceeding shall be and are assessed

against Rebecca Rubane, for which execution may issue.

It is so ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 21st day of October, 2014.

CCA-No: -PD- -1-5 COA No. 13-12-00368-CR

APPENDIX "D'

Order Abating Appeal ~ 07/'V/ ^°l ^ (REMANDING for hearing and determination about completeness of record)

13th District Court of Appeals

COA No. 13-12-00368-CR

NUMBER 13-12-00368-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR., Appellant,

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

ORDER ABATING APPEAL

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Perkes Order Per Curiam

Currently pending before the Court is appellant's pro se motion to supplement the

record. Appellant's counsel has filed an Anders brief herein. Appellant has been

provided with a copy of the record, but he believes the record is incomplete. Specifically, the reporter's record is missing page two of the handwritten statement of Rodrigo Loyde

(State's Exhibit 2). Appellant states that there is no reporter's record from the pre-trial

hearing held on May 31, 2011, and the clerk's record does not include a copy of any order

that the juvenile court waived jurisdiction.

This situation requires us to effectuate our responsibility to avoid further delay and

to preserve the parties' rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(a)(1). Accordingly, this appeal

is ABATED and the cause REMANDED to the trial court for a determination of what

constitutes a complete record.

In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(f)(4), the trial court is

directed to conduct a hearing to determine: (1) if the appellant has timely requested a

reporter's record; (2) if, without the appellant's fault, a significant exhibit or a significant

portion of the court reporter's notes and records has been lost or destroyed or - if the

proceedings were electronically recorded - a significant portion of the recording has been

lost or destroyed or is inaudible; (3) if the lost, destroyed, or inaudible portion of the

reporter's record, or the lost and destroyed exhibit, is necessary to the appeal's

resolution; and (4) if the lost, destroyed, or inaudible portion of the reporter's record

cannot be replaced by agreement of the parties, or the lost or destroyed exhibit cannot be

replaced either by agreement of the parties or with a copy determined by the trial court to

accurately duplicate with reasonable certainty the original exhibit, and (5) if anything

relevant has been omitted from the reporter's record. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(d), (f).

The trial court shall also determine if the clerk's record, or any part thereof, has

been lost or destroyed, and shall make appropriate findings under Tex. R. App. P.

34.5(e), if necessary. Otherwise, the court shall determine what steps are necessary to

ensure the prompt preparation of a complete clerk's record, and shall enter any orders

required to avoid further delay and to preserve the parties' rights. If a filing designated

for inclusion in the clerk's record has been lost or destroyed and the parties cannot agree,

by written stipulation, for a copy of that item to be included in a supplemental record, the

trial court shall determine what constitutes an accurate copy of the missing item and order

it to be included in the clerk's supplemental record.

If the clerk's or reporter's record is supplemented, the trial court shall notify this

Court as to the date upon which the supplemental record was made available to

appellant.

The trial court is directed to forward the record of the proceedings, including any

orders and findings, to this Courtwithin thirty (30) days of the date ofthis order, or to notify

this Court within such period indicating a date by which the trial court can comply.

Appellant's motion for extension of time to file his brief is hereby GRANTED

pending resolution of the matters referenced herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 30th day ofJuly, 2013.

CCA NO. PD- -15.

COA NO. 13-12-00368-6R

APPENDIX

COA Docket - Case Events

13th District COurt of Apeals

COA No. 13-12-00368-Cfi *~ase u e i a n rage l ot /

CASE: 13-12-00368-CR DATE FILED: 06/06/2012

CASE TYPE: MURDER

STYLE: JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR.

V.: THE STATE OF TEXAS

ORIG PROC: NO

TRANSFER FROM:

TRANSFER IN:

TRANSFER CASE:

TRANSFER TO:

TRANSFER OUT:

PUB SERVICE:

APPELLATE BRIEFS

Date Event Type Description Document

08/18/2014 Anders brief filed Appellant 04/03/2013 Anders brief filed Appellant

CASE EVENTS

Date Event Type Description Disposition Document

03/23/2015 Motion disposed ProSe Grant motion

JUDGMENT

[ PDF/37 KB ]

Memorandum opinion MEMORANDUM OPINION 02/12/2015 Affirmed issued [ PDF/102 KB ]

NOTICE

[ PDF/99 KB]

Motion to withdraw 02/12/2015 Appellant Grant motion attorney disposed

02/12/2015 Motion disposed ProSe Motion or Writ Denied

02/12/2015 Motion disposed ProSe Motion or Writ Denied

Motion to supplement 02/12/2015 ProSe Motion or Writ Denied record disposed Motion for extension of NOTICE 12/23/2014 time to file brief ProSe Grant motion [ PDF/99 KB]

disposed Motion for extension of 12/11/2014 ProSe time to file brief filed

http://wvvw.search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=:13-12-00368-CR&coa:=coal3 5/9/2015 c a s e uetaii rage I ot I

Date Event Type - Description- Disposition- Document

11/03/2014 Fee paid Appellant 10/23/2014 Document returned

ORDER

[ PDF/166 KB ]

10/21/2014 Order entered NOTICE

[ PDF/108 KB ]

Motion for extension of NOTICE 10/21/2014 time to file brief ProSe Grant motion (PDF/104 KB J disposed

Motion to abate appeal NOTICE 10/21/2014 ProSe Motion or Writ Denied disposed [ PDF/99 KB ]

Motion to strike NOTICE 10/21/2014 ProSe Motion or Writ Denied disposed [ PDF/99 KB 1

Motion for extension of NOTICE 10/20/2014 time to file brief ProSe Grant motion [ PDF/100 KB ]

disposed

Motion to appoint NOTICE 10/20/2014 ProSe Motion or Writ Denied attorney disposed [ PDF/99 KB ]

NOTICE 10/20/2014 Motion disposed ProSe Carried with the case [ PDF/100 KB)

Motion to strike NOTICE 10/20/2014 ProSe Motion or Writ Denied disposed [ PDF/99 KB ]

Motion for extension of 10/06/2014 ProSe time to file brief filed

Motion to abate appeal 10/06/2014 ProSe filed

10/06/2014 Motion to strike filed ProSe

10/01/2014 Document filed

09/26/2014 Hearing record filed Letter issued by the 09/25/2014 Appellant court

09/25/2014 Internal memo

09/24/2014 Notice filed Appellant I 1 09/23/2014 Notice filed Appellant I 09/18/2014 Document filed Appellant i

i ORDER I [ PDF/158 KB ]

09/15/2014 Order entered NOTICE

[ PDF/100 KB ]

Motion for extension of 09/12/2014 ProSe time to file brief filed

Motion to appoint 09/12/2014 ProSe attorney filed 09/12/2014 Motion filed ProSe

09/12/2014 Motion to strike filed ProSe

08/29/2014 Internal memo Appellant

08/19/2014 Case ready to be set

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Date Event Type- Description Disposition- Document

Letter issued by the NOTICE 08/19/2014 Appellant court [ PDF/100 KB ]

Motion to withdraw 08/18/2014 Appellant attorney filed 08/18/2014 Anders brief filed Appellant

08/14/2014 Document filed Appellant ORDER

I PDF/154 KB]

08/11/2014 Order entered NOTICE

[ PDF/103 KB ]

08/11/2014 Case reinstated

08/06/2014 Supplemental reporters ^ R NOTICE

record filed [ PDF/93 KB ]

NOTICE Supplemental clerks 08/06/2014 District Clerk record filed [ PDF/93 KB ]

07/30/2014 Letter filed Trial court judge ORDER

[ PDF/174 KB ]

07/22/2014 Order issued Abated NOTICE

[ PDF/92 KB ]

07/16/2014 Submitted

Motion for extension of 07/14/2014 time to file brief Appellant Grant motion disposed ORDER

[ PDF/147 KB ]

07/14/2014 Order entered NOTICE

[ PDF/96 KB ]

Motion for extension of 07/11/2014 Appellant time to file brief filed

07/07/2014 Document filed Appellant ORDER

[ PDF/144 KB ]

07/01/2014 Order entered NOTICE

[ PDF/95 KB ]

NOTICE Set for submission on 06/25/2014 briefs [ PDF/93 KB 1

NOTICE Motion to abate appeal 06/13/2014 ProSe Motion or Writ Denied disposed [ PDF/53 KB ]

NOTICE Motion for leave 06/13/2014 ProSe Motion or Writ Denied disposed [ PDF/53 KB ]

Motion to abate appeal 06/10/2014 ProSe filed

05/30/2014 Motion for leave filed ProSe

Motion for extension of NOTICE 05/23/2014 time to file brief Appellant Grant motion [ PDF/52 KB)

disposed

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Date Event Type Description - Disposition Document

Motion for extension of 05/15/2014 Appellant time to file brief filed

Motion for extension of NOTICE 04/17/2014 time to file brief Appellant Grant motion t PDF/52 KB J disposed Motion for extension of 03/31/2014 Appellant time to file brief filed

03/26/2014 Letter filed ProSe

Motion for extension of NOTICE 02/19/2014 time to file brief Appellant Grant motion [ PDF/52 KB ]

disposed Motion for extension of 02/13/2014 Appellant time to file brief filed

01/27/2014 Letter filed Court Reporter

01/15/2014 Case ready to be set NOTICE 01/15/2014 Case reinstated [ PDF/92 KB ]

Supplemental clerks NOTICE 01/15/2014 District Clerk record filed [ PDF/54 KB ]

Motion to withdraw 01/06/2014 Appellant Grant motion attorney disposed NOTICE 01/06/2014 Order issued Abated [ PDF/93 KB)

Motion to strike GRANTED IN PART AND 01/06/2014 ProSe disposed OVERRULED IN PART

GRANTED IN PART AND 01/06/2014 Motion disposed ProSe OVERRULED IN PART

Motion for extension of GRANTED IN PART AND 01/06/2014 time to file brief ProSe OVERRULED IN PART disposed Motion to abate appeal GRANTED IN PART AND 01/06/2014 ProSe disposed OVERRULED IN PART

GRANTED IN PART AND 01/06/2014 Motion disposed ProSe OVERRULED IN PART

Motion to supplement GRANTED IN PART AND 01/06/2014 ProSe record disposed OVERRULED IN PART

12/04/2013 Document filed ProSe

11/18/2013 Motion to strike filed ProSe

11/18/2013 Motion filed ProSe

Motion for extension of 11/18/2013 ProSe time to file brief filed

Motion to abate appeal 11/18/2013 ProSe filed

11/18/2013 Motion filed ProSe

Motion to supplement 11/18/2013 ProSe record filed

11/13/2013 Record checked in

10/31/2013 Record checked out

09/10/2013 Letter filed Court Reporter

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Date Event Type Description Disposition- Document^

Electronic Supplemental 09/09/2013 Reporter/Recorders Record Filed

Telephone inquiry to or 09/05/2013 Court Reporter from the court

08/21/2013 Letter filed Court Reporter

Electronic Supplemental 08/20/2013 Clerks Record Filed

08/16/2013 Case ready to be set 08/16/2013 Case reinstated

08/16/2013 Hearing record filed District Clerk

08/16/2013 Hearing record filed Court Reporter

08/16/2013 Document filed ProSe

07/30/2013 Order issued Abated

Motion for extension of 07/30/2013 time to file brief ProSe Motion or Writ Granted disposed 07/30/2013 Motion disposed ProSe Carried with the case

07/30/2013 Motion disposed ProSe Motion or Writ Granted

Motion to supplement 07/30/2013 ProSe Carried with the case record disposed Letter issued by the 07/19/2013 ProSe court

07/18/2013 Telephone call received Court Reporter

Telephone inquiry to or 07/18/2013 District Clerk from the court

Motion for extension of 07/05/2013 ProSe time to file brief filed

07/05/2013 Motion filed ProSe

07/05/2013 Motion filed ProSe

Motion to supplement 07/05/2013 ProSe record filed

06/18/2013 Document filed Trial court judge

06/10/2013 Letter filed ProSe

06/10/2013 Telephone call received Court Reporter

Letter issued by the 06/04/2013 Trial court judge court

05/17/2013 Letter filed ProSe

05/09/2013 Order entered

Motion for extension of 05/09/2013 time to file brief ProSe Motion or Writ Granted disposed

05/09/2013 Motion disposed ProSe Motion or Writ Granted

04/19/2013 Motion filed ProSe

Motion for extension of 04/19/2013 ProSe time to file brief filed

Motion to withdraw 04/19/2013 Appellant Carried with the case attorney disposed

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Case Detail Page 6 ot 7

Date Event Type Description Disposition Document

Motion to withdraw 04/03/2013 Appellant attorney filed 04/03/2013 Case ready to be set 04/03/2013 Anders brief filed Appellant

02/15/2013 Order entered

Motion for extension of 02/15/2013 time to file brief Appellant Motion or Writ Granted disposed Additional copies of 02/04/2013 documents received Appellant after initial filing Motion for extension of 01/31/2013 Appellant time to file brief filed

Motion for extension of 01/28/2013 time to file brief Appellant Motion or Writ Granted disposed Certificate of 12/28/2012 Appellant conference filed

Motion for extension of 12/17/2012 Appellant time to file brief filed

11/16/2012 Motion disposed Appellant Motion or Writ Granted

Additional copies of 10/31/2012 documents received State after initial filing 10/30/2012 Fax received State

Response requested by 10/17/2012 State the court

08/29/2012 Exhibits filed

08/29/2012 Reporters record filed 08/29/2012 Exhibits received

Reporters record 08/29/2012 received not filed

Supplemental clerks 08/16/2012 record filed

Supplemental clerks 08/16/2012 record received

07/19/2012 Response filed Appellant

07/19/2012 Motion filed Appellant

06/28/2012 Order entered Appellant

06/27/2012 Clerks record filed

06/27/2012 Clerks record received

Docketing statement 06/13/2012 Appellant filed

Notice to trial court that 06/07/2012 District Clerk certification is missing Notice of appeal 06/05/2012 District Clerk w/form from trial clerk

Notice of appeal filed in 06/05/2012 Appellant court of appeals

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Case Detail Page 7 ot 7

Date Event Type Description Disposition Document

Notice of appeal filed in 05/24/2012 District Clerk trial court

Sentence imposed in 05/04/2012 the trial court

CALENDARS

Set Date Calendar Type Reason Set

04/28/2015 Status Mandate to Issue

Petition for discretionary review due in 05/15/2015 Status Court of Criminal Appeals

PARTIES

Party PartyType Representative

THE STATE OF TEXAS Criminal - State of Texas Hon. Luis V. Saenz

Javier De La Rosa Jr.

De La Rosa, Jr., Javier Criminal - Appellant Hon. Rebecca RuBane

TRIAL COURT INFORMATION

COURT: 107TH DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY: CAMERON

COURT JUDGE: HONORABLE BENJAMIN EURESTI

COURT CASE: 11-CR-17-A

COURT REPORTER:

PUNISHMENT: 90 YEARS TDCJ

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